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Abstract 
This thesis considers Kant’s concept/intuition model of objective determination [Bestimmung] as 
presented in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/87) and Hegel’s critical transformation of that model 
in “The Doctrine of Being,” the first book of the Science of Logic (1812-16/32). Although subject to 
competing interpretation, the Critique’s “Transcendental Logic” advances the “togetherness 
principle,” namely, that both intuitional representations (logically characterised by singularity and 
immediacy) and concepts (mediate and general representations) are required for determinate 
cognition of empirically real objects. It is often claimed that Hegel’s Logic vitiates this principle via a 
conceptualist reduction of intuition to conceptual form. I argue that this view misses a central 
motivation of the Doctrine of Being (or “Being Logic”). My thesis is that the Being Logic begins by 
ontologically generalising the logical structure of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction, deriving from 
the being of thought the inseparability of mediation and immediacy in any determinacy whatsoever. 
From this understanding of determinacy, the Being Logic then derives the minimal logical form of the 
qualitative determination of singular immediacies (or “somethings”). For Hegel, something in its 
immediacy is “indifferent” [gleichgültig] to other such somethings in the sense that they cannot be 
qualitatively distinguished. Hegel follows Kant’s Transcendental Logic in arguing that qualitative 
determination requires the conceptual mediation of singular somethings; unlike Kant, Hegel accounts 
for such mediation without constitutive reference to conceptuality understood as an independently 
articulable propositional form. Thus, rather than advance a one-sided conceptualism, Hegel’s Doctrine 
of Being provides a logical corrective to Kant’s tendency to present the respective cognitive 
contributions of concepts and intuitions as independently determinate, as well as to “two-stage” 
interpretations of Kant that argue for some form of concept/intuition separability. Instead, Hegel’s 
Being Logic constitutes a systematic derivation and ontological generalisation of Kant’s togetherness 
principle.  
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Introduction 
This thesis intends to understand and analyse the way in which the “Doctrine of Being” in Hegel’s 
Science of Logic (1812-6/32) takes up and transforms Kant’s concept/intuition distinction, advanced in 
its mature form in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/87). Kant’s distinction between conceptual and 
intuitional representation, while interpretively contentious, is the cornerstone of Kantian philosophy. 
As Paul Redding has recently put it, “Clearly Kant regarded his having distinguished structurally 
different species of representation, concepts and intuitions, as his great breakthrough.”1 As it is very 
often said that Hegel is concerned to “overcome” Kantian dualism, one could expect that Hegel would 
direct particular critical attention to the central Kantian dualism of concept and intuition. As such, 
Simon Lumsden has suggested that “Overcoming the rigidity of the concept/intuition distinction is 
perhaps the single most important concern of Hegel’s Logic.”2 Lumsden’s claim in fact prompted this 
research project, and I broadly agree that Kant’s account of concepts and intuition is a central concern 
of Hegel’s Logic. In its brevity, however, there are three problems with Lumsden’s formulation. 
Firstly, it is not clear whether it is accurate to characterise the concept/intuition distinction in 
Kant by “rigidity,” or indeed as a “dualism” at all. The term “rigidity” suggests a binary opposition 
whose terms are mutually exclusive and independently intelligible. Kant is ambiguous on this point. 
Kant independently advances his account of the intuitional form of representation in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic section of the first Critique, before considering its interaction with 
conceptuality in the Transcendental Logic. As is well known, Kant defines intuitions as “immediate” 
and “singular,” while concepts are “mediate” representations “common to several things” (or 
“general”). (B377). Having distinguished concepts and intuitions in this way, Kant then advances the 
“togetherness principle” or “mutual dependency thesis,” famously put in the formula: “Thoughts 
without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (A51/B75). Conceptualist readers of 
Kant hold that “blind” here means that we cannot cognise intuitional representation at all without 
conceptuality; non-conceptualists hold that intuitions do provide cognition with discriminable 
particulars. 3  However, James Conant has recently and I think rightly argued that Kant has been 
consistently misread as committed to a “two-stage” or “layer-cake” conception of cognition, and it is 
only in the context of such a misreading that questions concerning the cognisability of intuitions in 
abstraction from conceptuality have any interest or pertinence.4 On Conant’s reading, Kant does not 
define two self-standingly intelligible representational forms and then demonstrate their interaction. 
Instead, Kant begins by “glossing” the opposition between two species of representation, and then 
shows “over a great many pages” that this opposition must be understood “dialectically,” in the sense 
that the conditions of possibility of our enjoying one representation is its dependence on its other, and 
vice-versa.5  
In my view, Hegel’s Logic is demonstrably at pains to present something like the “dialectical” 
account of concepts and intuitions that Conant attributes to Kant. In this suggestion, I follow Robert 
Pippin, whose 1989 Hegel’s Idealism is usually considered the seminal text for “non-metaphysical” 
readings of Hegel’s philosophy (more on that appellation in a moment). In Hegel’s Idealism, Pippin 
 
1 Paul Redding, Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 89.  
2 Simon Lumsden, “Satisfying the Demands of Reason: Hegel’s Conceptualisation of Experience,” Topoi 22 (2003): 
44.  
3 I discuss these positions at length in section 2.2.  
4 James Conant, “Why Kant Is Not a Kantian,” Philosophical Topics 44, no. 1 (2016): 75-125. 
5 Conant, “Why Kant in Not a Kantian,” 97. 
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argues that Kant’s philosophy is conceptualist and that this conceptualism motivates Hegel’s post-
Kantian project, a line broadly adopted here. On Pippin’s interpretation, Kant argues that “there is no 
possibility that an intuited manifold could fail to conform to the categories… To the later idealists, it is 
this claim that must have looked like a serious blurring of the distinction between concept and 
intuition.” 6  That for Kant intuitional representation requires conceptual mediation to issue in 
determinate cognition of an object “undercuts his strict separation of concept and intuition,” in turn 
enabling the Hegelian attempt to account for objective determinacy without reference to an 
independent “extraconceptual” faculty of sensible intuition.7 In a more recent work, however, Pippin 
subtly shifts this earlier reading. It is not that Kant intends a sharp distinction between concept and 
intuition and then unwittingly “undercuts” it, opening the door to Hegelianism; it is rather that, similar 
to Conant’s reading, Kant’s distinction is already dialectical: 
 
Throughout his life Hegel characterised his own position by partly invoking and appropriating, 
and partly criticizing, what he took to be the Kantian understanding of the relation between 
understanding and sensibility, concept and intuition… But all the passages in Kant already have 
a dialectical and somewhat unstable form as if already foreshadowing Hegelian logic. Both 
distinctness and necessary intertwining (inseparability in any claim to knowledge) are 
emphasised.8  
 
Pippin thus motivates Hegel’s project by a reading of Kant in which concept and intuition are already 
not rigidly opposed. The question is then how exactly the ostensibly “dialectical” “distinctness” and 
“necessary intertwining” of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction shows up in Hegel’s Logic, and how 
Hegel articulates and understands this inseparability or togetherness. 
On this point it must be said that Hegel himself, unlike Conant, levels the blame for “two-stage” 
readings entirely at Kant’s door, rather than his “Kantian” interpreters. Hegel argues that Kant fails to 
consistently present a dialectical account of logical opposition as it is glimpsed in the concept/intuition 
model, a failure ultimately traceable to his unwillingness to consider the logical structure of 
representation in abstraction from sensibly-conditioned human cognition. Before considering Hegel’s 
arguments on this point, I should say here that it does not matter much whether it is the actual Kant 
or the contemporary “Kantian” or Hegel’s “Kant” that is committed to the layer-cake view; what is 
important is that both Conant’s Kant and my Hegel are opposed to it. And, as we will see, Conant’s 
Kant and my Hegel go about their opposition to layer-cake readings of conceptual and intuitional form 
in very different ways.  
The Logic’s abstraction of the logical features of intuitional form from our sensibility leads me 
to the second problem entailed by the brevity of Lumsden’s formulation. It is prima facie odd to take 
the Logic to be the critical site of Hegel’s contestation of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction. Hegel’s 
Phenomenology is a more obvious basis for the Kant-Hegel comparison in terms of concept/intuition. 
The Phenomenology speaks, like Kant’s critical philosophy, to the non-empirical conditions of empirical 
knowledge; it begins with a critical account of sensible givenness, arguing that “Sense-certainty” is not 
sufficient for epistemic entitlement.  Hegel’s “critique of the Myth of the Given” – to use Wilfrid Sellars’ 
 
6 Robert Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 30. 
7 Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, 37. 
8  Robert Pippin, “Finite and Absolute Idealism: The Transcendental and the Metaphysical Hegel,” in The 
Transcendental Turn, ed. Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 160. 
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terminology – is broadly consonant with Kant’s argument in the constructive half of the Critique, i.e. 
that mere “sensation” is epistemically insufficient, and that forms not derivable from immediate 
sensory input must be brought to bear by the cognising subject for empirical knowledge to obtain.  
The problem with comparing the Critique to the Logic – rather than the Phenomenology – is 
that it is not concerned with sensibly-conditioned cognition. It is not primarily epistemic but 
ontological: it is not primarily concerned with reasons for legitimate belief about objects, but the 
reasons why being is the way that it is. As I intimated above, while I follow Pippin in reading Hegel’s 
Logic through Kantian conceptualism, I follow Stephen Houlgate in arguing that Hegel’s Logic is an 
ontological logic, that is, the conceptual categories developed in the logic “are forms inhering in what 
there is and not just forms in terms of which we think; they are ontological and not merely logical 
structures.”9 Houlgate’s position might be called a “revised metaphysical” position, insofar as it does 
not claim that Hegelian philosophy is committed to a substantial metaphysical entity (“Spirit”) on 
which all beings are really dependent (“Spirit Monism”), but more modestly to thought’s capacity to 
disclose the categorial structure of being.10 While Pippin’s “non-metaphysical” and Houlgate’s “revised 
metaphysical” positions could be taken as competing strands in contemporary Hegel interpretation, a 
typology of Hegel studies organised around the question of one’s commitment or otherwise to a “non-
metaphysical” view is waning.11 The reasons for this are fairly easy to appreciate: to take Pippin and 
Houlgate as examples, both define themselves in opposition to spirit monist metaphysics, and both 
views are comfortable attributing much of Hegel’s motivation to Kant’s conceptualism: if our cognition 
of sensible objectivity in general is transcendentally dependent on conceptuality, then conceptuality 
determines what counts as objectivity as such. The question is then whether the conceptuality 
determinative of objectivity can be legitimately said to be valid only for thought, or whether 
conceptuality as it is disclosed in our thought also determines mind-independent objectivity. The 
difference here is much finer than a rapid realist/anti-realist opposition would suggest. Pippin’s 
formulation is that the Logic sets out “all that ‘being’ could intelligibly be” such that Hegel’s idealism 
 
9 Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2006), 116. 
10 The Spirit Monist view of Hegel in Anglophone philosophy is usually associated with Charles Taylor’s glossing 
of “Geist” as “cosmic spirit” in Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 80. 
11 This is in part due to partial reconciliations and retractions of key protagonists: Stephen Houlgate has recently 
mollified his critical characterisation of Pippin in The Opening. See Houlgate “Thought and Being in Hegel’s Logic: 
Reflections on Hegel, Kant and Pippin” in Wirklichkeit: Beitrage zu einem Schlüsselbegriff der Hegelschen 
Philosophie, edited by Luca Illetterati and Francesca Menegoni (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2018). Pippin 
in a 2015 essay distances himself from the “non-metaphysical” label. “Finite and Absolute Idealism,” 159. With 
that said, Pippin’s most recent statement of his Logic interpretation in the 2017 Oxford Handbook continues in 
my view to overemphasise the differences between his position and others. “Hegel on Logic as Metaphysics” in 
The Oxford Handbook of Hegel, ed. Dean Moyar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). I discuss this 
overemphasis briefly in footnote 153 below.  The waning of the centrality of this opposition is also in part due to 
arguments that the metaphysical/non-metaphysical or “traditional/non-traditional” difference does not capture 
what is most interesting in Hegelian philosophy. See James Kreines, “Changing the Debate” Philosophy Compass 
1.5 (2006): 466–480. I consider the implications of Kreines’ claim for the reading adopted here in conclusion. I 
should also add that it is possible that the revised metaphysical/non-metaphysical opposition I advance here 
does not capture the salience of Houlgate’s reading. Dean Moyar’s introduction to the Oxford Handbook provides 
a tripartite typology of the Hegelian interpretive landscape: Pippin’s Kantian reading, Spinozist “substance-first” 
readings, and Houlgate’s “no priority” approach to the question of the Logic’s ontological status, in which “one 
takes Hegel at his word that thought and being are identical, and one refuses the question of whether the 
categories are either our activity or the workings of substance.” Dean Moyar, “Introduction” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Hegel, ed. Dean Moyar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), xxxi. This typology sits well with 
Houlgate’s claim that Hegel’s Logic is both “quasi-Kantian” and “quasi-Spinozist” (The Opening, 130).  
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can have no meaningful “realist competitor.” 12  Houlgate argues that Pippin tacitly appends “for 
thought” to this claim, and that Hegel’s Logic is not limited to a concern with “all that ‘being’ could 
intelligibly be (for thought)” but rather with “all that ‘being’ could intelligibly be.”13 Given that these 
positions are differentiated only by qualification and emphasis, it is difficult to consider the choice 
between them to be defining of one’s Hegel interpretation. In other words, I take it that a “non-
metaphysical” reader of this thesis will have interest in and meaningfully engage with the Hegelian 
structures of intelligibility as I present them – they are, after all, the same structures on both accounts 
– even if a qualified form of the purport of these structures is preferred.  
The problem with comparing the Critique’s and the Logic’s respective structures of 
intelligibility is that the latter – although certainly targeting Kant’s concept/intuition distinction in 
some way – does not talk about sensible intuitions at all, nor does it directly treat the pure or non-
empirical forms that for Kant organise such intuitions, i.e. space and time. And although the Logic 
articulates the same fundamental concepts (or “categories”) as Kant’s Critique, it does so in a different 
register. Like the Critique, the Logic articulates an ostensibly complete conceptual scheme; however, 
unlike the Critique, the Logic’s conceptual scheme is not demonstrated in terms of its applicability to 
the sensibly-given manifold of intuition. From this perspective, it does not seem as if Hegel 
“overcomes” Kant’s concept/intuition, but is rather guilty of changing the subject. For this reason, a 
number of prominent Kantians suggest that Hegel’s Logic is reductively conceptualist or “super-
conceptualist.”14 On this view, Hegel does not merely claim that intuitions require concepts to be 
determinate, but reduces intuitional to conceptual form entirely. From the Kantian perspective, 
Hegel’s claim for a conceptual grasp on being’s intelligibility looks like a return to pre-Kantian 
rationalism. However, on my reading, Hegel’s Doctrine of Being does treat intuitional form as a 
moment or way of being’s own determinacy. The Being Logic provides an account of the logical 
structure that characterises Kantian intuitional form at its maximum generality, and in its togetherness 
with conceptual mediation. That is, Hegel derives the structure of external relationality (logically 
characteristic of Kantian intuitions) and takes that structure to be constitutive of qualitative 
determination as such (for Kant, the purview of conceptual form). In the Doctrine of Being, Hegel 
generalises concept/intuition togetherness as the logical form of qualitatively determinate 
individuality. 
This brings me to my third point. The use of “overcoming” to articulate the Kant-Hegel relation 
is I think misleading; I instead use the term “generalising.”15 “Overcoming” has its closest textual 
analogue in Hegel’s “sublation” [Aufhebung]. Sublation, as is well-known, is for Hegel an operation in 
which a philosophical account is both “cancelled” and “preserved” (SL 81-2/21.94). I reconstruct 
Hegel’s derivation of this concept in Chapter 6, but to unpack it a little here: sublation for Hegel is the 
process by which an ostensibly complete and self-consistent position is revealed to be self-
contradictory and so disqualified as a candidate for completeness, or, in Hegel’s language, is not 
“absolute.” Such a disqualified account is not simply negated or dismissed, however, but is preserved 
as a moment of the truth, insofar as it furnishes resources for the more coherent account that replaces 
 
12 Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, 98. 
13 Houlgate, “Thought and Being in Hegel’s Logic,” 111. See also Houlgate, The Opening, 141.  
14 The “super-conceptualist” claim is Robert Hanna’s in “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual Content,” 
Hegel Bulletin 34, no. 1 (2013): 26. I deal with Hegel’s alleged reductive conceptualism in section 3.1. 
15 McDowell frames the Hegelian appropriation of Kantian epistemology in terms of “radicalisation.” Having the 
World in View (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009), 69. I avoid this term due to (a) my 
preference for retaining “radical” as a descriptor of political rather than philosophical activity;  and (b) my 
reservations concerning McDowell’s framing of the Kant-Hegel relation, discussed at length in Chapter 3.1. 
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it. Hegel takes the logic of sublation to be operative in a systematic account of knowledge (in the 
Phenomenology), of being (in the Logic), as well as detectable in the historically actual progress of 
philosophy itself (as outlined in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy). There is much more to be 
said here, of course. The upshot for introductory purposes, however, is that “overcoming” does not 
quite catch the moment of preservation in Hegel’s appropriation of his philosophical predecessors. If 
Hegel is to sublate – rather than simply “overcome” – Kant’s concept/intuition distinction, something 
of it is to be preserved in Hegel’s own system. In my view, which can only be legitimated in the course 
of this thesis as a whole, what is preserved is the concept/intuition distinction as a logical account of 
the necessary conditions of determinacy in general. That is, Hegel’s Logic sublates the 
concept/intuition distinction by ontologically generalising its logical structure. 
To argue for the thesis that Hegel’s Logic generalises Kant’s “togetherness principle,” however, 
requires setting aside the specifically cognitive context of Kant’s formulation of that principle. Or, put 
differently, the concept/intuition distinction must be “lifted” from the cognitive register of Kant’s 
Critique so as to be legible in Hegel’s Logic. I achieve this by taking up a pair of terms common to the 
Critique and the Logic: namely, determination and indifference. Taking Kant’s pre-Critical work into 
account, the concept/intuition distinction is effectively an anti-rationalist account of determination 
[Bestimmung], and it is in this way that Logic speaks to it. Hegel asks in the first remark of the first 
chapter of the first book of the Logic: “What brings determinacy to indeterminateness?” And then 
adds: “Kant has answered this question, in his way…” (SL 72/21.83). I hope to show the way in which 
Hegel’s Logic uses the logical resources of the concept/intuition distinction to articulate his own 
answer to the question of determinacy. Secondly, in this quote, Hegel obviously opposes 
determination to indeterminacy. That indeterminacy is the negation of determinacy is obvious. But 
what is not obvious is the centrality of indeterminacy to both Kant and Hegel – they argue, albeit in 
different ways, for their respective conceptions of determination through its oppositional pair. 
Moreover, in both Kant and Hegel, determination is opposed to indeterminacy understood more 
concretely as indifference. Kant’s concept/intuition model of determination results (at least in part) 
from his pre-Critical confrontation with the content indifference of conceptuality operating alone. In 
turn, Hegel’s ontological model of determination results (at least in part) from what he takes as 
indifferent indeterminacy maintained in Kant’s concept/intuition model, this time at the level of 
intuitions. Or that at least is the story I want to tell. The remainder of this introduction serves as a 
preliminary justification for an approach to the relation between Kant’s Critique and Hegel’s Logic 
through the vocabulary of determination and indifference.  
1. “Determination” in Kant’s Critique 
Given that this thesis connects concept/intuition to Hegel’s Logic via the problematic of determination, 
the reader could reasonably expect as its point of departure a definition of “determination” in Kant. 
There are two difficulties, however, with providing such a definition – the latter of which will get us to 
the salience of “indifference” for this project. 
The first difficulty with defining determination is that Kant uses Bestimmung and its cognates 
in multiple contexts. As Lewis White Beck memorably puts it, “Bestimmung is one of Kant’s favourite 
words, and he overuses it.”16 Karl Ameriks has more recently noted that “to determine” [bestimmen] 
 
16 Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1960), 78. This quote and the Beck’s text was brought to my attention by Seung-Kee Lee, “The 
Determinate-Indeterminate Distinction in Kant’s Theory of Judgment,” Kant-Studien 95, no.2 (2004): 204-225.   
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is a “multiply ambiguous key term” throughout Kant’s work.17 This ambiguity is primarily traceable to 
a foundational distinction in Kant between “theoretical” and “practical” philosophy: Kant uses 
Bestimmung and its cognates in logical, epistemological and metaphysical registers (the “theoretical”) 
as well as in his moral and political philosophy (the “practical”). In the latter practical usage, Kant trades 
particularly on the term’s German polysemy: alongside the obvious Kantian emphasis on self-
determination [Selbstbestimmung], Bestimmung can also mean “vocation” and “destiny.” This 
polysemy is continued in post-Kantian idealism, in Fichte’s 1799 The Vocation of Man [Die Bestimmung 
des Menschen] and Hegel’s Science of Logic.18 I should note here that, given the limits of this project 
and the complexity of “determine” in its theoretical sense, the practical senses of “determine” and 
“self-determine” will be raised here only insofar as they frame the theoretical uses of the term.  
The second difficulty will be treated directly. While Kant in the New Elucidation of 1755 does 
provide a definition of determination, this definition will be problematized and transformed – without 
for that matter ever being completely abandoned – throughout Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical periods. 
Proposition IV of the New Elucidation holds: “To determine is to posit a predicate while excluding its 
opposite” (TP 11/I:392). Determination is predication issuing in a non-contradictory proposition. Kant 
in his pre-Critical writings will however come to see this definition of “determine” to be an adequate 
description only of logical determination, inadequate on its own to provide determinate knowledge of 
empirically real objects. The pre-Critical Kant thus distinguishes between logical and “real” or 
“objective” determination, against the illegitimate and unreflective extension of merely logical 
determination to real existence he takes to be endemic to the German rationalist tradition.   
In the Critique, the concept/intuition distinction is formulated to provide an account of the 
non-empirical conditions for objective determinacy. As we will see in some detail, the Critical Kant 
holds that logical determination needs to be supplemented by “sensations” “placed and ordered” 
“next to” and “after” one another in the a priori forms of our sensible intuition (space and time) in 
order to constitute determinate objective knowledge or “cognition” [Erkenntnis]. In short, the first 
constructive part of the Critique, the Transcendental Aesthetic, argues that our immediate cognitive 
relation to singular empirical objects is structured by the pure (non-empirical) forms of space and time, 
which are specific to our sensible receptivity. We do not access empirical objects independently of 
these forms (“things in themselves”) but only as “appearances” defined as the conceptually 
undetermined objects of intuition (A20/B34). In the second constructive part of the Critique, the 
Transcendental Logic, Kant provides an account of the conceptual conditions for determination of 
objects as appearance. Kant still understands these conceptual conditions in terms of logical 
determination: concepts (whether empirical or a priori) are understood as predicates of possible 
judgment (A69/B94), non-contradiction remains the sine qua non of truth (A59/B84), and the minimal 
logical forms of judgment constitute the pure or a priori concepts (“categories”) as rules for the 
cognition of objects (B128). That is, the logical forms of judgment not only regulate logically 
 
17 Karl Ameriks, “Some Persistent Presumptions of Hegelian Anti-Subjectivism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society Supplementary Volume 84 (2015): 57. 
18 As we will see briefly in Chapter 6.2, Hegel’s account of the logical category of determination [Bestimmung] in 
the second Chapter of the Logic self-consciously appropriates Fichte by making reference to the “vocation” or 
“destiny” of the “human being” [Die Bestimmung des Menschen]. For a reading of Fichte’s use of the term and a 
brief, though suggestive account of the relation between Kant’s “thoroughgoing determination” [durchgängiger 
Bestimmung] in the Logic, see Angelica Nuzzo, “A Question of Method: Transcendental Philosophy, Dialectic, and 
the Problem of Determination.” Fichte-Studien 39 (2012): 37-66. “Thoroughgoing determination” will be 
considered briefly in relation to Kant’s Critique of Judgment conception of intellectual intuition (immediate grasp 
of the totality of possible determinations) in Chapter 5.1.  
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determinate claims, but also have a determinate objective function: they are ultimately responsible 
for the mediation of singularities given in the spatio-temporal forms of our sensibility, allowing spatio-
temporally individuated objects to be brought together under more general categories (A79/B104-
105). Concepts also – and this is what is primarily at stake here – are the ground of the “synthesis of 
apprehension” that enables singular intuitions to appear “next to” and “after” one another in the 
forms of space and time at all (on the conceptualist reading followed in this thesis, at least).  
There is of course much more to be said on Kant’s concept/intuition model. Here I just want 
to note that, although predication for the Critical Kant has “real” use only when related to sensible 
intuitions, logical determination nonetheless remains the minimal form of objective determination. 
Understanding Kant’s critique and re-deployment of logical determination in his formulation of the 
concept/intuition model of objective determination is the task of Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis.  
 
2. “Indifference” 
A systematic account of just how much of the rationalist edifice remains in Kant’s Critical period is 
outside the scope of this thesis.19 I am concerned only to understand Kant’s transformation of logical 
determination into objective determination via the concept/intuition distinction, and Hegel’s response 
and alternative to Kant on this point. My point of departure in this is to approach “determination” in 
Kant through its oppositional pair. The threat of indeterminacy is an over-arching worry in Kant’s pre-
Critical work and the first Critique itself, appearing under a string of more or less poetic synonyms and 
related terms: “emptiness,” “blindness,” “without all content,” “nothing at all” [gar nichts], and most 
importantly, “indifference” [Gleichgültigkeit]. Henry E. Allison, contrasting Kant’s work with the early 
modern Cartesian and Lockean paradigm preceding it, suggests that “the Kantian spectre is one of 
cognitive emptiness rather than global scepticism.”20 This worry or spectre is front and centre in Kant’s 
togetherness principle and the “blindness” and “emptiness” of its poles in isolation.  
However, it is not immediately clear how empty thoughts are without intuitionally-given 
content, and, conversely, just how blind intuitions are without conceptual determination. As I 
mentioned above, the ongoing debate between conceptualist and non-conceptualist readings of 
Kant’s Critique testifies to the difficulty of deciding on the kind or degree of objectivity provided by 
intuitional form prior to or in abstraction from conceptual determination: the non-conceptualist 
argues that intuitions, although conceptually undetermined, do indeed provide us with spatio-
temporally discriminable objects; the conceptualist holds in contrast that spatio-temporal 
discrimination is itself dependent upon conceptual synthesis, such that intuitions without concepts 
are in fact utterly blind, in the sense that no conscious representation of spatio-temporal individuals is 
possible. I deal with this debate at some length in Chapter 2.  Leaving questions of the cognition of 
unsynthesised intuitions to one side for the moment, what I want to suggest here is that the 
indeterminate emptiness and blindness that Kant refers to in his “togetherness principle” are both 
systematically related to the problem of indifference. Indifference in German is Gleichgültigkeit, 
 
19 For an introduction to the debate here, see Karl Ameriks, “The Critique of Metaphysics:  Kant and traditional 
ontology,” Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992), 249-79. 
20 Allison, Henry E. Transcendental Idealism, 160. From a certain (pop-psychological) perspective, Kant’s overuse 
of Bestimmung and its cognates is consistent with Allison’s picture of a Kant haunted by indeterminacy: he doth 
protest too much. 
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literally “equal-validity.” This term will be used by both Kant and Hegel in a number of disparate 
contexts, but those considered here are each relevant to the problem of objective determination.21  
My treatment of Kant begins with the word Gleichgültigkeit as it appears at the very start of 
the Critique, in relation to Kant’s polemic against “Indifferentism to metaphysics.” For the 
indifferentists, all metaphysical claims are equally valid, at least if the criteria for judgment is 
substantive contribution to scientific knowledge. Kant’s answer to indifferentism to metaphysics will 
be to articulate what has remained indifferent within metaphysics. Most broadly, rationalism and 
empiricism both assume that our knowledge conforms to already individuated objects (an assumption 
that for Kant constitutes “transcendental realism”). More specifically, on the rationalist side, formal 
logic in its extension to objective determination is indifferent to the existential status and real relation 
of its terms: non-contradictory propositions are taken to be valid regardless of whether their content 
is empirically-drawn or merely thought. Kant’s pre-Critical work demonstrates that, with the resources 
of formal logic alone, we may find ourselves thinking or judging of nothing (no empirically possible 
thing) when we take ourselves to be meaningfully thinking or judging of something (something 
empirically possible), and not being able to tell the difference. In other words, we need to know the 
conditions under which our judgments are objectively meaningful or have objective purport, i.e. 
constitute knowledge of an empirically real object. The Critical Kant formulates his revolutionary 
distinction between conceptual and intuitional representations to provide this: thought of an object 
will amount to determinate knowledge if empirical intuitions are brought together (“synthesised”) 
under (“subsumed”) the rules provided by a priori conceptual form.  
 As such, I want to claim that “not being able to tell the difference” – being indifferent to a 
difference, lacking the cognitive resources to determine a difference – is the structure of 
indeterminacy diagnosed by the early Kant. For Hegel, however, Kant has solved the indifference of 
logical determinations of existence only to shift the problem of indifference down a representational 
level, to intuitions. I argue that Hegel’s Logic picks up on and systematically treats Kant’s account of 
intuitions – the placement of objects as appearances in the forms of space and time – as themselves 
indifferent to one another.22 These existential and intuitional forms of indifference have a common 
structure insofar as, in both, distinct terms are indistinguishable; they however treat this problem at 
different representational levels. In existential indifference, one is not able to determine the difference 
between something and nothing at all; in intuitional indifference, one is not able to determine the 
difference between something and another something.23  
For Hegel, the external relation characteristic of Kantian intuitional form means that each 
intuitionally-given singular object is “indifferent” to every other such object. Intuition represents 
objects as “outside” of each other, each object excluding other such objects from itself in order to be 
the spatio-temporally delimited object that it is. However, in the external form of relation proper to 
intuition, there is no ground in an object’s immediate representation for contrastive comparison to – 
and so qualitative distinction from – objects external to it. In their immediacy, externally related 
 
21 For example, I leave out for a later project Hegel’s account of indifference in the sense of “habit” as a necessary 
condition of embodied agency in the Anthropology section of the Philosophy of Spirit.   
22 This argument draws on Robert Stern’s account of Kant’s “bundle theory” of the object in Hegel, Kant and the 
Structure of the Object (London: Routledge, 1990), 17-21, as well as James Kreines’ account of humean 
indifference in Reason in the World: Hegel’s Metaphysics and Its Philosophical Appeal (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2015). 
See section 3.2.  
23 Readers of the Logic will already recognise in these forms a similarity to the indistinguishability of being and 
nothing in the Doctrine of Being’s first chapter and the indistinguishability of self-relating somethings in its 
second, and I approach these chapters in terms of indifference in Chapter 6. 
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objects appear without relation. Kant is aware of this problem, and in the synthesis of apprehension 
and reproduction in the A Deduction argues that, in order for intuitions to be distinguishable from one 
another, conceptuality – understood minimally as spontaneous synthetic activity – is required to bring 
intuitionally-given, externally related objects together in one thought (as I will argue in Chapter 2.2, it 
is this moment in Kant’s A Deduction that scuttles the non-conceptualist interpretation). But for Hegel, 
Kant in framing the relation of conceptual mediation and intuitional immediacy in this way has 
generalised the external relationality characteristic of intuitional form to the concept/intuition model 
as a whole: the indifference of intuitions to one another is resolved only by the application of a 
conceptuality entirely external to intuitionally-given objectivity. What is required, on Hegel’s view, is a 
model of determination in which indifference of itself is shown to entail the mediation that Kant figures 
as an external conceptual operation on intuitional objectivity. Once this is established I hope to show 
that indifference provides a thematic and conceptual thread linking together Hegel’s various critiques 
of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction, and in turn connecting those critiques to Hegel’s alternative 
model of determination as it is presented in the Logic.  
 
3. “Determination” in Hegel’s “Doctrine of Being” 
In my reading of the Logic in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis, I aim to show that for Hegel 
determinateness is the logical result of indifference itself, and that this constitutes a re-formulation of 
Kant’s togetherness principle as constitutive of qualitative determinacy in general. A sense of this 
generalisation can be indicated by Hegel’s take up and transformation of one implication of Kant’s 
togetherness principle in the introduction to the Doctrine of Being or Seinslogik, entitled “With what 
must the beginning of science be made?” Hegel writes: 
 
… there is nothing in heaven or nature or spirit or anywhere else that does not contain just as 
much immediacy as mediation, so that both these determinations prove to be unseparated 
and inseparable and the opposition between them nothing real (SL 46).24 
 
On the one hand, Hegel agrees with Kant that immediacy and mediation (and we will see in a moment, 
also singularity and generality) must be brought together in any contentful thought. But Hegel 
disagrees with those moments in Kant in which the mediation or synthesis definitionally lacking from 
intuitional representation is framed as being brought to objects in their immediacy. Rather, Hegel 
makes the ontological claim that the logic of determination – understood as the co-presence of 
mediation and immediacy – is operative in all object domains (“heaven,” “nature” and “spirit” – that 
is, those domains whose modes of determination are accounted for by the three parts of the Hegelian 
system, i.e. by Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit), such that an account in 
which objectivity is presented as somehow in itself lacking mediation is incoherent.  
However, to understand how Hegel takes himself to be licensed to shift the concept/intuition 
model in this ontological direction, we need to acknowledge and unpack another Kantian resource: 
Kant’s doctrine of Intellectual Intuition. This complex, multifaceted doctrine – really doctrines – and 
its take up in post-Kantian idealism is the subject of Chapter 4. Per the concept/intuition model, Kant 
holds that our thought can “only think” – is limited to the synthesis and subsumption of intuitionally-
given objects. In both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgment, however, 
 
24 Hegel repeats a version of this claim in EL §21. 
 18
Kant argues that we must be able to form the thought of a “divine” intellect that would not be 
dependent on the forms of our intuition for immediate access to singular objects, and that the logical 
possibility of such a cognition brings the sensible conditions of our “peculiar” cognition into relief 
(CPuR B145-46, CPJ 271-79/5:401-11). Hegel however, following Fichte, takes Kant’s intuitive intellect 
to describe our thought’s capacity to immediately grasp its own mediating activity.  For Hegel, then, 
thought is as much immediately aware of its own activity of mediation.  
Hegel’s compression of immediate intuition into thought is present in the Logic’s first category, 
“pure being.” Hegel draws immediacy into the ambit of thought by defining being as “… pure 
indeterminateness and emptiness [reine Unbestimmtheit und Leere]. – There is nothing [Nichts] to be 
intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting [Anschauen]; or, it is only this pure empty intuition itself 
[oder es ist nur dies reine, leere Anschauen selbst]” (SL 59). Hegel may appear to be vacillating here in 
first questioning whether “intuiting” is relevant to or valid in an ontological logic, but then nonetheless 
characterising the thought of being in its immediacy as pure “intuition itself” [Anschauen selbst]. 
Indeed, if intuition is considered to be only ever empirical intuition, then one cannot speak of intuition 
in a logical ontology. But if Kant’s forms of pure (non-empirical) intuition (space and time) are broken 
down into their logical components – immediacy and singularity – then thought can be said to 
immediately intuit its own being, i.e. that there is thought. And this immediacy is “singular” in the 
Kantian sense reserved for the pure forms of intuition – pure being, like space and time for Kant, is not 
a general concept under which individuals can be subsumed (A24-25/B39). But in contrast to Kant’s 
way of proceeding in the Transcendental Deduction, the Logic demonstrates that immediacy is 
necessarily mediated of itself, without reference to independently derivable conceptual form. The 
thought of pure Being is immediately mediated by what it is not – pure nothing – insofar as pure being 
is indistinguishable from pure nothing. Being and nothing are indifferent in the sense that they are 
neither identical (being is not nothing) nor distinguishable on the basis of any content. They are “non-
identical indiscernibles.”25 But the structure of this indifference, if attended to, is already itself a 
minimal form of mediation:  insofar as being in its indifference to nothing “vanishes” into that nothing 
– and vice-versa – that vanishing movement issues in the category or “thought determination” 
[Denkbestimmung] of “becoming,” which allows the immediate difference between being and nothing 
to be articulated.   
This in turn enables Hegel, in the second chapter of the Logic (“Existence”) to think through 
the ontological structure that enables individuals to be both related to and distinct from other such 
individuals. Again, Hegel’s starting point is indifference. In its immediacy, “something” cannot be 
distinguished from another such something (its “other”) – Hegel here explicitly calls them “indifferent 
[Gleichgültig] to one another” (SL 90). Hegel shows that a qualitative determination of something (a 
something that is not another such something) is dependent on a moment of mediation internal to 
externally related somethings themselves: the determinateness that something receives by being put 
into merely external relation with an other is in fact dependent on that other-relatedness being 
intrinsic to that something itself: “the determining [Bestimmen] from outside is at the same time 
determined by the something’s own immanent determination [Bestimmung]” (SL 97/21.112).  In 
Hegel’s terminology, determinateness [Bestimmtheit] as the simple negation that distinguishes one 
something from another (this not that) is a corollary of determination proper [Bestimmung] which 
accounts for the self-identity of something in and through its constitutive relatedness.  
 
25 Michael Rosen, Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 152. 
Quoted in Houlgate, The Opening, 265.  
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Once these sections of Hegel’s Logic are worked through, it becomes clear that a shared 
concern of both Kant’s Critique and Hegel’s Logic is a vindication of the togetherness principle, 
understood more concretely as an articulation of the relation between indifference and determinate 
difference. Kant’s account of the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction in the A Deduction and 
Hegel’s alternative derivation of the logical structure of “something” may be seen as determinations 
of immediate difference, articulating the mediation necessary for qualitative distinguishability 
between individuals to obtain. In both cases, mediation and immediacy must come together: without 
conceptuality understood as synthesis, Kant suggests that we could not have more than an immediate 
and so indeterminate difference between spatio-temporal objects. Similarly, without the spontaneous 
generation of a mediating thought-determination, Hegel thinks we cannot have more than an 
immediate, indeterminate difference between pure being and pure nothing, and further, between 
something and other.  
The difference is that, in Kant, togetherness means the bringing together of two independently 
articulated forms: the external relationality that provides us with individual objects on the one hand, 
and the conceptual functions of mediation ultimately traceable to the categories derived from 
propositional logical form on the other.  In Hegel mediation and immediacy emerge together as part 
of a single category derivation: as I have said above, Hegel derives the structure of external relationality 
(logically characteristic of Kantian intuitions) and takes that structure to be constitutive of qualitative 
determination as such (for Kant, the purview of conceptual form). In the Doctrine of Being, Hegel take 
the togetherness of the logical components of concept/intuition as constitutive of qualitatively 
determinate individuality in general. 
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Chapter 1. Kant and Indifferentism 
Chapter 1.1 seeks to demonstrate that the Critique’s introductory polemic against “Indifferentism” is 
salient to Kant’s self-presentation of his own project as a critical diagnosis and correction of the 
“transcendental realism” common to early modern empiricist and rationalist traditions. In Chapter 1.2 
I examine two key pre-Critical essays published in 1763: The Only Possible Ground of Proof for a 
Demonstration of the Existence of God and Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes 
Into Philosophy. Kant argues that the indifference of rationalist “logicism” to the difference between 
logical and “real” objectivity results in objective indeterminacy. This prepares for Chapter 2’s 
consideration of the concept/intuition distinction, first introduced in the 1770 Dissertation but revised 
for the 1781 Critique, as an attempt to supplement the indifference of logical form in order to account 
for determinate knowledge of objects. 
 
1.1. Indifferentism to Metaphysics 
In the Preface to the A Edition of the first Critique (1781) Kant allegorises philosophy as a “battlefield” 
[Kampfplatz]. The armies in this military metaphor are the competing rationalist “dogmatists,” whose 
civil war is repeatedly interrupted by “skeptics,” a “kind of nomads,” and by “empiricists,” who have 
“recently attempted” (Kant has Locke in mind) to re-ground metaphysics in “physiology.” Taken 
together, the failure of dogmatists to build from sure foundations, the sceptical hostility to any 
foundation, and the improper physiological foundation provided by empiricism means that the 
philosophical battlefield has produced no clear victor. In this allegory, “victory” would be the 
presentation of a metaphysical “science” capable of the epistemic certainty associated historically with 
geometry and, more recently, Newtonian physics. These armies are followed by a fourth: 
“Indifferentism.” The endless disputes of metaphysics results for Kant in a growing indifference to the 
continued project of philosophy as a science: 
Now after all paths (as we persuade ourselves) have been tried in vain, what rules is tedium 
and complete indifferentism [Indifferentism], the mother of chaos and night in the sciences, 
but at the same time [zugleich] also the origin, or at least the prelude, of their incipient 
transformation and enlightenment, when through ill-applied effort they have become 
obscure, confused, and useless (Ax). 
In everyday language, a person is said to be indifferent if they are “unconcerned” by certain 
circumstances. Indifference, when carried to an extreme, has moral connotations: we can be callously 
indifferent to the suffering of others; we can be stoically indifferent to our own. What interests me 
here – and what I think is relevant to Kant’s account of “indifferentism” – is that an indifferent stance 
to an object or domain is bound up with an epistemic claim for the indistinguishability of qualitatively 
distinct terms. For both the callous bystander and stoic sage, the distinction between suffering and its 
negation is not counted as valid—though admittedly only the stoic is concerned to provide reasons for 
this claim.26 The stoic believes pain and pleasure to be equally rational, and so acts as if pain and 
 
26 For an overview of the stoic justification for indifference to suffering via a certain rationalist metaphysics in the 
Hellenistic period, see Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995) 126-29. Stoicism is of course a wide-ranging historical 
phenomenon and not fairly represented here; I use only the Hellenistic school as an example of an attempted 
rational legitimation of indifference as a practical attitude. This stoic program in fact extends to a subtle system 
of “preferred” and “non-preferred indifferents.” John Sellars, Stoicism (Durham: Acumen, 2006), 110-14. 
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pleasure were identical. To put this is in the language of contemporary pragmatist readings of Kantian 
and post-Kantian idealism, the stoic’s epistemic claim and practical action are to be taken together as 
commitments. 27 The upshot of the generalised language of commitment is that it clarifies the way in 
which actions and knowledge-claims must be taken together in order to draw a satisfactory picture of 
rational agency: if an agent makes an epistemic claim for the indistinguishability of pain and suffering, 
failure to act on that indifference – by, say, actively seeking pleasure – would provoke a justified 
challenge to the coherency and consistency of that agent’s ensemble of commitments.28 With this 
epistemic component of indifference in view, the everyday usage of “indifference” can be filled out: a 
person can be said to be indifferent in a situation in which a difference doesn’t “count” for that person 
as a difference. Indifference means not being able, not wanting, or not licensing a qualitative 
difference between terms. Indifferent terms thus appear as equally-valid alternatives for action: each 
is as justified or legitimate as the other, or, put negatively, neither is to be preferred.  
Although Kant uses the Romantic “indifferentism” above, the German word for indifference – 
which Kant prints in bold in the next quoted passage – makes this explicit: “Gleichgültigkeit,” “Equal-
validity,” “being valid” or “counting” [gelten] as the same or equal [gleich].  Kant’s indifferentist 
behaves as if the rationalism/empiricism/skepticism difference makes no difference. The belief 
licensing this stance is the ostensible failure of metaphysics in all its historical variants to be set on the 
“secure path of a science” (B ix). For the indifferentist, all metaphysical paths “have been tried in vain,” 
i.e. attempted without demonstrable extra-philosophical results; judged solely in these terms all 
metaphysical systems count as the same. For our purposes, Kant’s characterisation as indifferentism 
to metaphysics can be (perhaps anachronistically) summarised as: differences within metaphysics have 
not made a difference outside of philosophy, and the latter is the standard by which they are to be 
judged.29 All metaphysicians are “as bad as each other” – or, in an ironic mode, as good.  In the case of 
 
27 To use the language of Robert Brandom, epistemic claims and practical stances are both best understood as 
revisable, normatively answerable “commitments.” Brandom gives a clear introduction to his way of subsuming 
epistemic contents under normative ones in his reading of Kant in the introduction to Tales of the Mighty Dead. 
For example: “One of Kant’s master ideas is that what distinguishes thinkers and agents from merely natural 
creatures is our susceptibility to certain kinds of normative appraisal. Judgments and actions essentially involve 
commitments as to how things are or are to be. Because they can be asserted according to their correctness 
(truth/error, success/failure), we are in a distinctive sense responsible for what we believe and do. Kant makes a 
normative turn: a shift from the sort of ontological demarcation Descartes offers of selves as loci of 
responsibility.” Robert Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead: Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2002), 21. As we will see in section 2.2 when treating Kant’s account of concept 
use in the Deduction, concepts are normative in these sense that they furnish a rule for the synthesis of the 
manifold of intuition. When one subsumes particulars under an empirical concept, one is tacitly committed to 
providing reasons for that classification, and to integrating that classification with the others that one holds. 
28 This understanding of rational agency is developed in Christine Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, 
and Integrity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).   
29 Something of contemporary Anglophone quietism is detected in Kant’s indifferentists, insofar as practical 
relevance must motivate and justify philosophical thinking. Richard Rorty has recently presented Anglophone 
quietism in these terms: “Most people who think of themselves in the quietist camp, as I do, would hesitate to 
say that the problems studied by our activist colleagues [aka “the naturalists”] are unreal. They do not divide 
philosophical problems into the real and the illusory, but rather into those that retain some relevance to cultural 
politics and those that do not. Quietists, at least those of my sect, think that such relevance needs to be 
demonstrated before a problem is taken seriously. This view is a corollary of the maxim that what does not make 
a difference to practice should not make a difference to philosophy” “Naturalism and Quietism,” in Naturalism 
and Normativity, ed. Mario De Caro and David MacArthur (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 57. Kant’s 
characterisation suggests that, for the indifferentist, metaphysics is to be abandoned tout court; for Rorty, 
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Kant’s indifferentists, each metaphysical school is as justified as every other, which is to say, equally 
unjustified.  
I want to suggest that “indifferentism at the opening of the Critique opens onto the 
philosophical question of determination. That is, indifferentism directs our attention to the conceptual 
activity of qualitative distinction. Taking “determination” in the logical sense that Kant inherits from 
rationalism, two subject concepts can be identified under one predicate concept while being 
determined as distinct under another possible predication. In this way, empirical concepts abstract 
from differences in the particular objects they subsume. That is, taking as determinative a different 
classificatory empirical concept will produce a judgment of difference between objects instead of 
identity (sorted as “chairs,” without further determination, objects A and B are identical; determined 
as “red,” objects A and B may be distinguished). As Frederick Beiser puts it: “when a particular is 
subsumed under a universal there are other universals true of it, and there are other particulars that 
instantiate this universal.”30 In other words, objects determined through empirical concept predication 
remain different in some respects, and the same in others. The upshot of this is that such predication 
is contestable: one can point to those properties not subsumed under the predicate concept in a 
determination of identity, or to shared properties in a judgment of difference. As such, one way to talk 
about the problem that Indifferentism presents for Kant is that it illegitimately makes a determination 
of identity, instead of difference (“all metaphysical argument is useless” should read: “some 
metaphysical argument is useless”). 31 In order to contest this indifferentist claim, Kant’s Critique will 
seek introduce and legitimate criteria under which valid metaphysics can be distinguished from invalid 
forms.  
Kant’s metaphorical language – his description of Indifferentism as the “mother of chaos and 
night in the sciences” – already indicates Kant’s response to indifferentism. The metaphorical contrast 
between obscurity and clarity (Enlightenment, Aufklärung) is perhaps to be expected in an 18th 
Century thinker, but there are two twists on this theme here in Kant. 32  Firstly, the “night” of 
indifference is at the same time [zugleich] ambiguously seen to give rise (is “the origin or at least the 
prelude”) to “Enlightenment.” That indifference for Kant is taken to prepare for or coincide with a new 
clarification is indicative of the track taken in this thesis: as mentioned in Introduction, determination 
is here articulated through an account of its oppositional pair. The metaphors of night and light, used 
polemically here by Kant, are also used by Kant and by Hegel in presenting their respective accounts 
 
however, philosophy is not itself to be abandoned but practiced in a different way or under a different self-
understanding. 
30 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivity 1781-1801. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002), 581. 
31 I am drawing here on Beatrice Longuenesse’s commentary on the logical forms of universality and particularity 
in Kant: a logical determination of identity has the form of the universal judgment (“All As are B”) and 
determinations of difference have the form of the particular judgment (“some As are Bs”). Longuenesse, Kant 
and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, trans. Charles T. Wolfe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 131-134, and Kant on the Human 
Standpoint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 220-226. 
32 For a nuanced examination of the light metaphor in philosophy, see Hans Blumenberg, “Light as a Metaphor 
for Truth: At the Preliminary Stage of Concept Formation” in Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision, ed. David 
Michael Levin, Berkeley: University of California Press (1993), 30-62. As we will see in Chapter 6, light and 
darkness will be Hegel’s preferred metaphors when articulating the emergence of determinacy out of immediate 
indifference. 
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of objective determination. 33  Secondly, as we see in the next section, Kant’s indictment of 
Indifferentism suggests an extreme form of the Enlightenment contrast. As we will see, if taken to their 
limit, the reasons indifferentists give for the failure of metaphysics would for Kant shut down the 
practice of reason-giving in general – or at least the discipline whose vocation is to investigate 
rationality as such. 
 
Kant’s Response to Indifferentism 
For Kant, indifferentism misrecognises the determination of the human as thinking, a determination 
[Bestimmung] that is also a vocation [Bestimmung]. That is, Kant’s response is to oppose the 
indifferentist charge with his own understanding of human being and the project in which that being 
is properly engaged. A “philosophical anthropology” – a characterisation of the being of being human 
– is present from the Critique’s very beginning.34 To return to the Critique’s Introduction: 
 
For it is pointless to affect indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] with respect to such [metaphysical] 
inquiries, to whose object [Gegenstand] human nature cannot be indifferent [nicht gleichgültig 
sein kann]... these so-called indifferentists [Indifferentisten], to the extent that they think anything 
at all [überall etwas denken], always unavoidably fall back into metaphysical assertions, which they 
yet professed so much to despise (Ax). 
For Kant, indifferentism is untenable because it fails to understand the determination of the human as 
thinking, and the imbrication of metaphysics in thinking “anything at all.” There are two things going 
on in this passage: (1) the anthropology noted above, and (2) a certain deflated sense of metaphysics.  
1. For Kant, thinking constitutes our necessary determination. I use “necessary” here in the 
rationalist sense: to negate its predication would “cancel” the subject concept, would contradict it. 
Were we not to think, we would not be human. As we will see in a little more detail in Chapter 6, Hegel 
will say the same thing: “the human being is himself thinking, he exists as thinking, thought is concrete 
existence and actuality… the determination of the human being” in opposition to the “natural and 
sensuous being” of the animal or “brute” (SL 96/21.112). This philosophical anthropology helps to 
clarify the sense of indifference discussed above. In Kant’s view, “indifferentism” marks a failure – 
wilful or otherwise – to articulate an essential or necessary difference, in this case between the human 
(whose necessary predicate is rationality) and the animal (characterised by the negation of this 
predicate). 
2. To be human is to think “metaphysically,” albeit in deflated sense of the word. Metaphysics 
for Kant’s audience meant what is now sometimes called German School Metaphysics or 
Schulphilosophie, i.e. Wolff’s and then Baumgarten’s formalisation of some Leibnizian doctrines.35 
 
33 Hegel’s account of qualitative determination begins with a consideration of the identity of being and nothing 
in terms of the metaphor of pure light and pure darkness (SL 69/21.80). Kant’s account of the distributive (rather 
than successive) determination of objects in a putative intuitive understanding also proceeds in terms of 
darkness and light. See Longuenesse’s discussion of Reflexion 5270 in Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 309-10. I 
consider Kant’s account of intellectual intuition in Chapter 4.    
34 In this formulation I am indebted to Andrew Benjamin’s work, in particular Virtue in Being (Albany: State 
University of New York, 2016). I think it is more historically appropriate to call this project a “metaphysical 
anthropology,” in the sense that it would be a branch of special metaphysics (not concerned with what it is to be 
in general, but the being of a certain domain of beings). 
35The association and hyphenation of Leibniz and Christian Wolff’s respective philosophies as constitutive of the 
“School Metaphysics” of Germany in the 18th Century is traceable to the work of Wolff’s contemporary G.B. 
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Wolff and Baumgarten’s systems were divided into “general metaphysics” or ontology, which concerns 
“being qua being,” those determinations (in the logical, predicative sense) shared by all possible 
beings, and Special Metaphysics, consisting of psychology (metaphysics of the soul), cosmology 
(metaphysics of the universe), and theology (metaphysics of God).36 It is sometimes suggested that 
Kant’s Critical writings are anti-metaphysical, or that Kant is the “gravedigger” of metaphysics.37 But 
the above quote suggests otherwise. Karl Ameriks and more recently Nicholas F. Stang have drawn 
attention to the continuity between “pre-Critical” or “Leibnizian” and “Critical” Kants – the many 
senses in which Kant remains concerned with traditional metaphysical questions, while at the same 
time altering their significance.38  In the remainder of this chapter we will see that Kant in the pre-
Critical writings offers a critique of the objective purport of special metaphysics, primarily with a 
critique of the “ontological” argument for the necessary being of God. This culminates in the Critical 
deflation of general metaphysics from the determinations of all possible beings to the cognitive 
conditions for our determinate representation of possible objects. If General Metaphysics is the inquiry 
into the determination of “pure” (non-empirical) thought, then for Kant a deflated form of such 
metaphysics is irreducible insofar as non-empirical concepts are a condition of our representation of 
an objective world. Even our most immediate acquaintance with “physical” objects, we are all 
“metaphysicians” to the extent that we “think anything at all.” We will see Kant’s account of the 
irreducibility of non-empirical thought in detail over the remainder of this chapter. Here I just want to 
note that this conception of pure thought’s relation to the world of experience means a critical 
correction and re-orientation of metaphysical inquiry as an answer to the Indifferentist charge. It is on 
this basis that Kant will claim that “There has always been some metaphysics or other to be met with 
in the world” (Bxxxi). Hegel will echo this point, claiming pure categories of thought are always “mixed 
in” with our empirical experience of an objective world (EL §38).  
Although Kant does not raise it, it is possible for the indifferentist position to renew itself with 
a familiar argument: if there is always some form of metaphysics in the world, no escape from 
metaphysics, then there is no “neutral” position from which to judge the value of a given metaphysics. 
Kant however tacitly responds to this further argument by asserting that reason possesses the 
necessary reflexivity to determine which of its “metaphysical” determinations – which non-empirical 
categories of thought – are legitimate. Once reason self-determines its standard, one would be able 
to determine “better” and “worse” forms of metaphysics in the world, i.e. categories legitimated and 
 
Bilfinger, and does not entirely reflect the wishes of either Leibniz or Wolff. See Catherine Wilson, “The Reception 
of Leibniz in the 18th Century” in The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley, 445-449. For Kant, 
the best example of this Wolffian attempt to systematise metaphysics is Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. For a brief 
but very helpful account of the differences between Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten, see the translators’ 
Introduction to Alexander Baumgarten, Metaphysics: A Critical Translation with Kant’s Elucidations, Selected 
Notes, and Related Materials, ed. and trans. Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 
13-22. I follow Brady Bowman in emphasizing Wolff’s priority in the tradition of “German school metaphysics,” 
which Hegel refers to as the “former metaphysics” [vormalige Metaphysik]. Kant taught from Baumgarten’s 
Metaphysica, but Wolff’s systematization of Continental Rationalism (Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibniz) 
is the model. Brady Bowman, Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 62-72. 
36 Here for ease of exposition I am relying on Nicholas F. Stang’s introductory summary in Kant’s Modal 
Metaphysics (Oxford: OUP, 2016), 3.  
37 Jean Grondin introduces Kant as “gravedigger” only to problematise such a characterisation. Introduction to 
Metaphysics: From Parmenides to Levinas, trans. Lukas Soderstrom (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 
132.  
38 Ameriks, “The Critique of Metaphysics:  Kant and traditional ontology” and Stang, Modal Metaphysics, 1-12.  
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de-legitimated by that standard. The normative dimension of Kant’s project is foregrounded in Kant’s 
immediate recourse to juridical analogy, the Critique’s eponymous “self-trial” of reason by reason: 
... reason [Vernunft] should take on anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-
knowledge [Selbsterkenntnis], and to institute a court of justice, by which reason may secure 
its rightful place while dismissing all its groundless pretensions… this court is nothing other 
than the critique of pure reason itself (Axi). 
In Chapter 5 we will see this juridical  understanding return in Hegel’s insistence on radically self-critical 
thought. For Kant, as for Hegel after him, reason sets its norms itself. Reason self-determines in the 
sense that it is able to establish which rational forms have a legitimate relation to the world. It is able 
to “self-correct.”39  
I said above that Kant’s project can be seen as a deflated “General Metaphysics.” It is 
important that Special Metaphysics will be preserved by Kant also, albeit again in a suitably deflated 
form. Both limbs are essential to the rebuttal of Indifferentism. As we will see once we work through 
the concept/intuition distinction, that distinction is both intended to answer the Indifferentist charge 
by placing metaphysics on the secure path of a science (a deflationary investigation into cognitive 
determination), and to integrate into the Critical Philosophy the practical perspective that gave rise to 
an Indifferentist attitude. Thinking in abstraction from intuitions can provide us with moral ideas – of 
the Soul and of God – indispensable to our practical self-understanding and efficacy.  But to understand 
this move we need to consider briefly Kant’s relation to the other three armies on the field – 
rationalism, empiricism, and scepticism, and in turn the concept/intuition distinction itself. 
Indifferentism in Metaphysics 
Kant’s critical re-orientation of metaphysical inquiry can be introduced by drawing attention to a 
second possible sense of “Indifference to Metaphysics,” though one not explicitly present in Kant’s 
Introduction. This is the intra-philosophical question of what is indifferent to metaphysics itself, what 
is as yet (from Kant’s perspective) indeterminate for it, what it does not have the resources to 
distinguish. When Kant in the Amphibolies and the Canon of Pure Reason outlines what he takes to be 
the key desiderata of Transcendental Idealism, his self-presentation is in terms of the intervention he 
takes to be making into rationalism, empiricism, and scepticism and their relation. The “indifferentism 
to metaphysics” considered above has dropped out of the picture, suggesting that Kant considers it an 
intellectual position on or about philosophical practice, but not philosophical as such. What I want to 
suggest in this section however, is that the rationalism-empiricism-scepticism historical nexus, at least 
as Kant understands it, can be economically approached in terms of indifference as it is sketched in 
outline above. 
For Kant, the dominant strands of early modern philosophy both assume that knowledge 
means a correspondence of thought to independently determinate objects. While this “transcendental 
realist” position and the “Copernican turn” that Kant initiates by presenting an opposed 
“transcendental idealism” is well known, I will briefly set it out. The rationalist metaphysics of the 
Leibniz-Wolff school and British empiricism both present foundationalist epistemologies. That is, both 
hold some knowledge to be non-problematic or immediately self-evident, with the validity of all other 
knowledge claims to be assessed in terms of its relation to this non-problematic foundation. Prima 
facie, however, the respective foundations of German “School Metaphysics” and British empiricism 
 
39 Lumsden, “Satisfying the Demands of Reason,” 41.  
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seem completely opposed.  For the German metaphysical tradition knowledge of mind-independent 
reality is secured by the activity of the intelligence. As Beatrice Longuenesse puts it, this rationalism is 
grounded in an “assumption that logical principles (defining the relations between concepts or 
propositions) are also ontological principles (defining the relations between existing things and states 
of affairs), and that one can derive the latter from the former.”40 Stang defines this as logicism: The 
rules of thought hold for all possible being, and the first rule of thought is non-contradiction.41 As such, 
the rules of logic can be applied to clarify the “confused” representations of being we gain through 
sensory perception (more on this in a moment). Formal logic thus provides a secure foundation for 
knowledge claims. In contrast, for British empiricism, i.e. the historical trajectory from Locke to Hume, 
knowledge claims are not to be clarified by recourse to logic, but by reference to discrete perceptual 
episodes. As immediate sense-perception is taken to be free from epistemic doubt, it can be deployed 
as a criterion for the evaluation of discursive knowledge claims. 
At this admittedly extremely high altitude – an altitude that is at times Kant’s own – Kant 
argues that the empiricist-rationalist difference is not really a difference at all: they are in fact 
symmetrical or complementary positions operating under a common assumption. Kant presents this 
symmetry in his famous statement on Leibniz and Locke in the first Critique’s “Appendix on the 
amphiboly of the concepts of reflection” (henceforth “the Amphibolies”): 
 
In a word, Leibniz intellectualized the appearances, just as Locke totally sensitivised the 
concepts of understanding…  Instead of seeking two entirely different sources of 
representation in the understanding and the sensibility, which could judge about things with 
objective validity only in conjunction, each of these great men holds on only to one of them, 
which in his opinion is immediately related to things in themselves, while the other does 
nothing but confuse the order of the first (A271/B327). 
 
Leibniz holds to the intellect as “immediately related to things in themselves,” while Locke takes 
sensibility to have this immediate relationship to mind-independent reality. Either the intellect 
operating in isolation can clarify the activity of the senses (rationalism) or the senses taken as providing 
foundational perceptual episodes can clarify the conceptual (empiricism). The senses for rationalists 
are only a confused form of reasoning (and therefore can be done away with in reasoning); for the 
empiricists, our reasoning, if not directly linkable to discrete perceptual episodes, is confused or 
unreal. Taking these together, it appears possible for one pole or source of knowledge to do the work 
of the other. Sensibility is reducible to the intellect or vice-versa (“intellectualized appearances” or 
“sensitivised concepts”). So the apparent either/or (either sensibly-grounded or intellectually-
grounded knowledge claims) is dependent on a deeper sense of identity: rationalism and empiricism 
in fact come at the same epistemic framework from different ends. 
Put in terms of the vocabulary introduced above, the empiricist and rationalist intend a 
difference that is not, from the perspective of the new criteria for determining philosophical positions 
introduced by Kant, a difference at all. The empiricist-rationalist difference is for Kant indifferent at 
two levels. These levels are interrelated. Firstly, both empiricism and rationalism assume the possibility 
and desirability of realism (which I take to mean epistemic “access” to a mind-independent reality of 
 
40 Longuenesse, “Kant and the a priori,” 131. 
41 Stang, Modal Metaphysics, 14.  
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“thing-in-themselves”) and the normative framework such an assumption of desirability entails.42 
Secondly, both empiricism and rationalism assume that the intellect and sensibility are different only 
in degree of clarity of access to that reality. That is: one pole is taken to be “clear” in its relation to 
mind-independent reality, the other a “confused” version of that relation. In other words, empiricism 
and rationalism start from poles on a continuum different in degree but not in kind; they only disagree 
as to which pole in fact grounds the desired realism. As Allison puts it, Kant seeks to show that, “despite 
their many interesting differences, all [other philosophical positions] are at bottom nothing more than 
variant expressions of the same underlying confusion.”43 
Kant’s identification of Leibniz and Locke has been criticised as simplistic or reductive. As I 
suggested above, judgments of identity (“all As are Bs”) can always be problematized or contested by 
marking differences unsubsumed by the classificatory concept at work (here “transcendental 
realism”).44 But for Kant the identification of Leibniz and Locke is philosophically unavoidable: to fail to 
mark it consigns philosophy to an uncertainty it cannot as philosophy accept, because we human 
beings in our determination as thinking cannot accept it. As long as (1) knowledge is assumed to 
conform to the mind-independent properties of objects and (2) knowledge is taken to be reducible to 
one form or source (either sensible or intelligible), scepticism will insist. As Kant puts it: the 
“transcendental realist later plays the part of empirical idealist” (A371). 
In the case of empiricism, the charge of empirical idealism is relatively straightforward. It is 
precisely the assumption that objects are already determinate in themselves that leads to fears that 
our representations of the object do not meet the object. In empiricism, the fear that conceptual 
activity misses its object is expressed in the need to legitimate conceptual activity with reference to 
ostensibly already determinate objects in perceptual episodes. As we will see in some detail in section 
3.1, with Hume the concept-empiricist legitimation project (“verification empiricism”) does not 
possess the resources with which to overcome sceptical doubt regarding the correspondence of 
cognition to its object (cognitive claims for the mind-independent persistence of objects and for a 
universally necessary relation between objects cannot be provided by experience). This same 
assumption leads to a symmetrical problem in rationalism: as much as rationalism holds that thought 
 
42 I am aware that the “epistemological realism” at stake here is only one of many senses of “realism” 
(contrast, for example, realism about scientific entities, or realism about moral value).  
43 Allison, Transcendental Idealism, 23. 
44“...Leibniz and Locke, for all their differences, [are for Kant] guilty of a common error: Leibniz and Locke are 
alike in supposing that the intellectual and the sensory, thinking and sensing are on a continuum with one 
another. Kant argues that in reality faculties of understanding and sensibility are two different stems of human 
cognition...In his opposition of Leibniz and Locke we find the germs of the canonical division of early modern 
philosophers into the camps of Rationalists and Empiricists… it is well to recognise that Kant’s own habit of 
treating Leibniz and Locke as opposed to one another is philosophically somewhat self-serving.” Nicholas Jolley, 
Leibniz (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 213-214. With that said, it is important however to note that the opposition 
between rationalist and empiricist forms of foundationalism was not lost on its respective proponents. Hume’s 
critique of “substance” in the Treatise as without experiential ground will be briefly cited in Chapter 3. Also 
important is Leibniz’s long dialogue contrasting his positions with Locke’s, which contests Locke’s “physiological” 
reduction in terms that Kant himself will substantially appropriate: “That raises another question, namely 
whether all truths depend on experience, that is on induction and instances, or if some of them have some other 
foundation. For if some events can be foreseen before any test has been made of them, it is obvious that we 
contribute something from our side.” G. W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. and ed. Peter 
Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 49. Kant’s critique of the 
German rationalist tradition is an attempt to maintain its commitment to a priori truth, but in such a way as to 
fully and determinately connect to it to objective knowledge, as the condition of such knowledge – the difficulty 
of this move will become apparent when we turn to its proof in the Transcendental Deduction (2.2 below).  
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can provide us with access to the reality of things, Kant’s argument – present and persistent from his 
very earliest work – is that logic cannot provide a determinate claim about a real object. No amount 
of purely logical argumentation will bring one to knowledge of the real existence of an object. We will 
deal with this problem in the next section.45  
I said above that the assumption of the possibility and desirability of realism understood as 
epistemic access to mind-independent reality (knowledge of things as they “really are”) carries 
normative implications. As Henry Allison shows, the fear that human cognition is inadequate to 
knowing the objects “out there” requires the postulation of divine knowledge as the normative 
standard for human knowledge. For the rationalist, conceptual proofs clarify the confusions of 
sensuous affection, and the normative model for this process of clarification is God’s knowing. If our 
rational deduction from first principles were as perfect as God’s, we could deduce the determinacy of 
individual objects without sensory data, because reason and sense are only different in degree. For 
the empiricist, the problem with the rationalist position is not the continuity of intelligible and sensible 
worlds, but, to quote Locke, the rationalist tendency to “begin at the wrong end.”46 Rather than clarify 
sense with concept, a phenomenological investigation of sense-impressions clarifies which of our ideas 
are legitimate. The normative model for this alternative process is again a certain conception of God’s 
knowledge, but approached from the “other end,” as it were, in sensory terms: God’s knowledge is 
characterised by his ability to “see” what is immediately with his “microscopical eyes.” The empiricist 
seeks a clarity that God’s immediate cognition of particulars provides the model for.47 In short, Allison 
argues that Kant recognises and then seeks to correct a shared “metaphilosophical” or “meta-
epistemological” norm in both Lockean empiricism and Leibnizian rationalism.48 Sense-knowledge and 
reason are on a continuum, and the only question is what end of that continuum we place God. Or 
differently put: whether our knowledge is confused because it is too sensuous or not sensuous enough. 
The normative aspect of the latter formulation should be clear. 
Kant even goes so far as to suggest that philosophy as a whole was indeterminate before the 
critique of reason: “until the critical philosophy all philosophies are not distinguished in their 
essentials.”49 For Kant the only way to properly adjudicate the competing claims of Locke and Leibniz 
is to (1) expose their shared realist assumption and its sceptical implications and (2) undo the sense-
reason continuum taken to ground this realism. Kant achieves these goals through the innovation of a 
series of related conceptual distinctions – analytic/synthetic judgments; formal logic/transcendental 
logic; and concept/intuition. In other words, the Kantian response is to construct or produce a real 
difference in philosophy, the difference between rationalism and empiricism as species of 
transcendental realism on the one hand, and transcendental idealism on the other. Before this 
 
45 Perhaps the more economic way to present these points is via explanation of the relation of objectivity and 
logical determination. As Robert Hanna points out, neither Descartes nor Leibniz can explain the connection of 
a priori truth with objective experience except through a “question-begging deus ex machina” (Descartes “god 
is not a deceiver” and Leibniz’s pre-established harmony). “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual 
Content,” 11. Kant himself refers to Plato, Malebranche and Leibniz as introducing a “deus ex machina” to explain 
the correspondence of a priori truth and real existence in the 1772 Letter to Herz. Immanuel Kant, 
Correspondence, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 134/10:131. On the 
other side, classical empiricism can only explain a posteriori knowledge, but not the objective purport of 
concepts not experientially traceable.   
46 John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Roger Woolhouse (London: Penguin, 1997), 58. 
47 As we will see in Chapter 4.1, this is one sense of Kant’s “Intuitive Intellect.” 
48 Allison, Transcendental Idealism, 35.  
49 Quoted in Alison, Transcendental Idealism, 24.  
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differentiation there is only a difference (rationalism/empiricism) that, in the last analysis, should not 
count as one. 
The first Critique famously puts this intervention as a “Copernican revolution” in philosophy: 
 
Up to now it has been assumed that all or cognition must conform [richten] to the objects; but 
all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend 
our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us try whether we do 
not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform 
to our cognition… (Bxvi). 
 
“Come to nothing” suggests the indifferentism to metaphysics of the practical Enlightenment above. 
Indeed, Kant’s treatment of the shared ground of rationalist and empiricist epistemologies, if 
irresolvable, would justify indifferentism: both alternatives end in an impracticable scepticism. But 
Kant claims in the famous passage above that a reversal along the object-subject axis overcomes the 
sceptical results of transcendental realism. The level on which the transcendental idealist revolution 
or reversal operates is decisive. Kant does not propose another reversal along the sensible-intelligible 
axis (beginning again at the “other end”). To privilege one or the other without undoing their 
grounding realist assumption would not be an intervention but a repetition. Kant proposes a reversal 
or revolution on the level of the priority of the object and subject, reinventing the intellectual-sensible 
relation on that basis. 
 
1.2. Kant and Rationalist Indifference 
In his pre-Critical work, Kant shows 18th Century German school metaphysics to unreflectively and 
illegitimately extend logical determination to empirically real objects and their relations. Kant argues 
that the indifference of rationalist “logicism” to the difference between logical and “real” objectivity 
results in objective indeterminacy. Indeterminacy here means not being able to know whether one’s 
judgments have empirical objective purport, i.e. whether one is making a judgment about some really 
existing thing or nothing at all. Non-contradictory predicative judgments remain logically determinate, 
but indeterminate from the point of view of knowledge of empirical objectivity.50   
 
50 From a contemporary perspective the indeterminacy Kant diagnoses in rationalism’s merely logical 
determination has epistemic, semantic, and intentional elements. Epistemically, something more than logical 
determination is required for knowledge of contingent matters of fact – this may seem obvious, but the 
rationalist placing of “confused” sensory and “distinct” intellectual representations on a continuum leads to an 
in principle privileged epistemic function for thought operating alone. Semantically, something more than logical 
determination is required to secure the existential content of the subject concept of a judgment, i.e. the 
“something,” the singular “this,” about which and on which logical determination operates (by predicating 
concepts of that something in judgment). Kenneth Westphal refers to this condition as “singular cognitive 
reference,” “Hegel’s Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant’s System of Principles in the Logic and 
Encyclopedia.” Dialogue 15: 1-37, 6. The conceptual content of the “this” will be discussed in more detail in the 
consideration of Kantian intuitional form in Chapter 2.1. As a question of reference or aboutness, these epistemic 
and semantic issues clearly go to intentionality. As Robert Hanna makes clear, the problematic of intentionality 
in Brentano and Husserl is traceable to Kant’s concern with intuitional content. Hanna, “Trancendental Idealism, 
Phenomenology, and Intentionality” in The Impact of Idealism, ed. Karl Ameriks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2013), 191-225. “Epistemic,” “semantic,” and “intentionality” however are not Kant’s terms, and all three come 
together in his account of objective determination: “cognition” for him is a contentful judgment (semantic) about 
(intentionality) a possible object, assessable as knowledge of a contingent “states of affairs” (epistemic). 
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The concept/intuition distinction can and has been understood as a reinvention of the 
intellectual-sensible relation as conceived under transcendental realism.51 For the Critical Kant, neither 
the senses nor the intellect has privileged foundational access to “things in themselves.” Both concepts 
and sensible intuitions are “representations.” Concepts are discursive or mediate representations, 
intuitions are immediately related to singular objects but representations nonetheless. The corollary 
here is that senses and the intellect are distinct sources of knowledge. They are different in kind: one 
is not a confused version of the other. As a result, these two “faculties” of representation – or two 
“capacities” [Vermögen] for two different forms of representation – must work together. In the quote 
from the “Appendix on the amphiboly” above, Kant holds that only in the “conjunction” of sensible 
and intellectual representations can we “judge about things with objective validity.” But what 
“objective validity” could possibly mean in the absence of sensory or intellectual access to “things in 
themselves” will have to be completely reconceptualised. In short, Kant breaks the continuum of 
sensibility and intellect that ostensibly connects us to the world and then differently connects our 
cognitive capacity to objectivity. As Longuenesse puts it: 
 
Kant’s primary tool for his twofold enterprise - first prying apart logic and ontology, but then 
finding new grounds for the grip our intellect has on the world - is the distinction between two 
kinds of access that we have to reality: our being affected by it or being ‘receptive’ to it, and 
our thinking it or forming concepts of it.52 
 
This “twofold enterprise” actually comes in two stages in Kant’s career: the “prying apart” of the 
rationalist assumption of logic and ontology is a consistent feature; the second (reconnecting thought 
and world) comes on the scene quite late, and its emergence necessitates the first Critique. The 
“prying” starts in Kant’s 1755 New Elucidation, continues throughout the 1760s, and is finally named 
in terms of the concept/intuition distinction in the 1770 Inaugural Dissertation (though the 
representational capacity of concepts there still provides grounds for epistemic realism; determinate 
knowledge of “things-in-themselves” will only be fully abandoned in the first Critique). 
Now, although Kant does not want to start at either “end” of the intellectual-sensible 
continuum but rather break it, he has to start somewhere.  Kant’s self-presentation in the Prolegomena 
makes it sound as if the Critical philosophy is devised as a response to Humean scepticism.53 But this 
is perhaps only an opportune self-characterisation: Kant’s pre-Critical writing is a sustained attempt to 
correct Leibnizian metaphysics. 54  It is as a part of this corrective effort that the logic-ontology 
identification comes under attack. In other words, the intellectual-sensible continuum is pulled apart 
from the rationalist rather than the empiricist direction, i.e. the real is pulled away from the possibility 
of its purely logical determination. This overriding emphasis in Kant’s pre-critical work on what will 
come to ultimately be presented as the “dogmatic” opponent is legible in the title of the Critique of 
Pure Reason. As Paul Redding puts it: “...reasoning from concepts alone can result in no substantial 
 
51 Lumsden, “Satisfying the Demands of Reason,” 42. In his account, Lumsden opposes empiricism to 
transcendental realism – in fact the former is a species of the latter genus. Lumsden’s essay is extremely helpful 
otherwise. 
52 Longuenesse, “Kant on a priori concepts,” 136. 
53 Pro 7/4:257.  
54 Ameriks for one claims that Kant could have reached a substantially similar transcendental idealism without 
the Humean provocation. Ameriks, “On Reconciling the Transcendental Turn with Kant’s Idealism” in The 
Transcendental Turn, ed. Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013), 38. 
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knowledge at all. It is in this sense that it is a “critique” of “pure reason” (reasoning from concepts 
alone).”55 
From the perspective adopted in this thesis, Kant’s shift from transcendental realism to 
idealism determines philosophically what in metaphysics remains indifferent and has licensed 
indifferentism to it. We have seen that the advocate of practical Enlightenment acts as if extant 
philosophies are the same, but with nothing but anecdotal proof of this identity. In contrast, Kant 
accounts for their indifference philosophically: the reason why, for all their differences, they “count” 
as the same in tacitly committing to an epistemic paradigm that gives rise to scepticism. 
The pre-Critical pulling apart of logical and real determination and the Critical claim for 
independent intuitional representations will be dealt with in this section. Kant’s “putting back 
together” – his legitimation for the grip of a priori concepts on the world as conditions for determinate 
experience of that world – in Chapter 2.  
But why exactly for Kant must the rationalist identification of logic and ontology be “pried 
apart”? The pre-Critical Kant approaches the deficiency of purely logical determination in a number of 
ways. Here I will focus on two of Kant’s early arguments for rationalist indeterminacy, as unable to (1) 
prove by predication (however non-contradictory) the existence of the subject of a categorical 
judgment and (2) account for the status and structure of extra-logical relation. As we saw in 1.1 above, 
Wolff and his followers take formal logic to have a privileged epistemic function. Here I argue that the 
epistemic limitations of this position are traceable to the limitations of formal logic itself. What counts 
for logic, in Kant’s view, is that its terms – whatever their existential status – are related in judgments 
according to the law of non-contradiction. Formal logic is (1) structurally indifferent to whether its 
terms are empirically-given or merely thought; and (2) structurally indifferent to extra-logical forms of 
relation.  
 
Indifference to Existence 
Kant consistently argues – from his pre-Critical to his Critical work – that ontological arguments for 
God confuse logical determination with existence (“real determination” or “real predication”). We 
cannot know by thinking alone if our judgments are about something really existent or about nothing. 
No amount of logical consistency between subject and predicate and between predicates of a subject 
can prove the existence of that subject. As Guyer and Wood put it, Kant’s early claim “that a genuine 
or ‘real possibility’ is not established just by demonstrating that a concept is free from contradiction 
but must have some sort of affirmative ground in actual existence, was remarkably deep-seated in 
Kant’s thought…”56 In The Only Possible Argument [Beweisgrund] in Support of the Demonstration of 
the Existence of God (1763). Kant follows the claim that “Existence is not a predicate or determination 
[Determination] of a thing” with the following lines: 
 
This proposition [Satz] seems strange and absurd [widersinnig], but it is indubitably certain. 
Take any subject you please, for example, Julius Caeser. Draw up a list of all the predicates 
which may be thought to belong to him, not excepting even those of space and time. You will 
quickly see that he can either exist [existieren] with all these determinations [Bestimmungen], 
or not exist at all. (TP 117/2:72). 
 
55 Redding, Continental Idealism: Leibniz to Nietzsche, 50. 
56 “Introduction,” 30 
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Note that Kant in the above quote uses “predicate” [Prädicat] and determination [Determination in 
the title, Bestimmung in the body] as synonymous. As I mentioned in the Introduction, for the pre-
Critical Kant, to determine something is to predicate a property of it in judgment. Now, Kant argues 
here that nothing in the act of predication itself bestows existence on the subject. We can check to 
ensure that none of the predicates attributed to the subject contradict any other attributed predicate. 
But non-contradiction gets us no closer to real existence. Merely logical judgment leaves the 
distinction between possible and real existence undecided. It does not have the resources to posit this 
difference, such that any distinction between possibility and actuality must come from outside logical 
form. Kant of course recognises that in everyday speech we deploy existence as a predicate. In Kant’s 
example, we say that the sea-unicorn [Seeeinhorn, the narwal] is (existence belongs to it), but the 
“land-unicorn,” that is, the mythical unicorn, is not (existence does not belong to it).  For Kant, that 
such a proposition only establishes the possibility and not the existence of the subject is evidenced by 
the way in which we set about verifying the truth of such a proposition: 
 
… one does not examine the concept of the subject in order to demonstrate the correctness 
of the proposition about the existence of such a thing. The concept of the subject only contains 
predicates of possibility. If one wishes to demonstrate the correctness of such a proposition, 
one examines the source of one’s cognition of the object. One says: ‘I have seen it’ or ‘I have 
heard about it from those who have seen it.’ The expression ‘A sea-unicorn (or narwal) is an 
existent animal’ is not, therefore, entirely correct. The expression ought to be formulated the 
other way round to read ‘The predicates, which I think collectively when I think of a sea-
unicorn (or narwal), attach to [zukommen] a certain existent sea-animal. (TP 118/2:72-73). 
This is an extremely important passage for an understanding of Kant’s account of logical indeterminacy 
and objective determination, and the development of concept/intuition as a means to account for the 
latter. To verify existence, we must – and in fact do – go to the empirically-given, to a “certain existent” 
particular to which the set of non-contradictory predicates “attach.” Here we have a nascent version 
of Kant’s mature argument for the “sensible condition” of any determinate cognition of any object – 
that such an object be given in intuition – though here without the transcendental understanding of 
the constitutive role of concepts in the determination of objects of experience in general (see 2.2). 
Indeed, Kant says in the first section of the Doctrine of Method of the Critique, “If one is to judge 
synthetically about a concept, then must go beyond this concept to the intuition in which it is given” 
(A721/B749). 
As Kant’s example of the “sea” and “land” unicorns shows, the criterion of non-contradiction 
is indifferent to the content of the terms placed in non-contradictory relation – that is, whether the 
terms have some empirical ground or not. Kant explicitly uses the word indifference to characterise 
formal logic (there “general logic”) in the Critique: “[General logic] teaches us nothing at all about the 
content of cognition, but only the formal conditions of agreement with the understanding, which are 
entirely indifferent with regard to the objects [welche übrigens in Ansehung der Gegenstände gänzlich 
gleichgültig sein]…” (A62/B87). More specifically, formal logic does not distinguish its terms along the 
possibility/actuality axis; that is, it is indifferent to the existential status of its terms. This indifference 
gives rise to the constant possibility of epistemic emptiness, in which one claims knowledge of a merely 
possible being. We can begin to see this by turning from the empirical example to proofs of God’s 
existence. In the above, Kant suggests there is nothing irreparably wrong with the predication of 
existence in the representation of empirical concepts [Erfahrungsbegriff] such as the sea-unicorn – 
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such empirical concepts can be reorganised in such a way that the distinction between logical 
possibility and existence is maintained (“The predicates, which I think collectively when I think of a 
sea-unicorn (or narwal), attach to a certain existent sea-animal”). The irreparable problem emerges, 
however, when the predication of existence is carried over into “reflection of a subtler and deeper 
kind” (119/2:73) – i.e. to claims of necessary existence. Kant has in mind here what he in the Critique 
dubs the “ontological proof” of God’s existence – a name that has stuck. For Kant, this proof is 
characterised by “deriving existence from merely possible concepts, as one is accustomed to do when 
one wants to prove absolutely necessary existence. For then one seeks in vain among the predicates 
of such a possible being; existence is certainly not to be found among them.” (118/2:72). Existence is, 
in other words, not a predicate: predicate concepts mark out only possible existence (above: “The 
concept of the subject only contains predicates of possibility”). Actual existence is furnished, as in the 
example of the sea-unicorn, by going to experience for verification.  
 
Indifferent Relations 
Relating logical terms in accordance with the law of non-contradiction does not for Kant account for 
certain forms of real relation. In the 1763 paper Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative 
Magnitudes into Philosophy (hereafter Negative Magnitudes), Kant argues that the result of modelling 
“real opposition” between two magnitudes on contradiction results in saying “nothing at all” [gar 
nichts] when some content is empirically demanded. As well as further linking logicist indifference and 
epistemic emptiness, Negative Magnitudes also has the benefit of introducing us to the mature 
Kantian problematic of “analytic” and “synthetic” judgments as well as to the deep entanglement of 
the Kantian project with the problem of cause and effect.57 Negative Magnitudes works through a 
series of relations that are not reducible to logical contradiction but must be considered as “real” 
opposition. As Allison notes, this position is continued into the first Critique (A272-73/B328-39).58 In 
Negative Magnitudes, Kant argues: 
 
 Two things are opposed to each other [Einander entgegengesetzt ist] if one thing cancels 
[aufhebt] that which is posited by the other. This opposition [Entgegensetzung] is twofold: it 
is either logical [logisch] through contradiction [Widerspruch], or it is real [real], that is to say, 
without [ohne] contradiction. 
The first opposition [Opposition], namely logical opposition, is that upon which 
attention has been exclusively and uniquely concentrated until now. (TP 211/2:171). 
 
Logic thinks opposition as contradiction, while the “real” is characterised by opposition without 
contradiction. Kant’s example of the former is as follows. A body in motion is something [Etwas], a 
body not in motion is also something. Kant calls such somethings “cogitable” [cogitabile],” i.e. “capable 
 
57 Kant’s account of causal relation – let alone its relation to Hegel’s own account of causality – is a thesis of its 
own. However, the category of causality is so central to Kant’s account of objective determination (in the 
Analogies it appears as if only substance, cause, and reciprocal cause are the only categories that necessarily 
condition objectivity) that it is impossible not to discuss it in passing; moreover, Hegel’s account in the 
“Objectivity” section of the Begriffslogik determines the object in a way that directly contests Kant’s account of 
the logical content of causality. 
58 “Kant’s anti-Leibnizian claim in the Amphiboly [is] that, quite apart from any logical contradiction, realities 
might conflict with one another, that is, exhibit a ‘real opposition’…” Allison, Transcendental Idealism, 403. 
 34
of being thought.”  In other words: “A body is in motion” and “A body is not in motion” are contentful 
judgments – if predicated of different subjects.59 However, a body both in motion and “in the very 
same sense” [Verstande] or “simultaneously” [zugleich] not in motion is “nothing at all” [gar nichts] or 
“nihil negativum irrepraesentabile,” glossed in the Cambridge edition as “a negative nothing which is 
incapable of being represented.” The content of the judgment “S is P and not P” is an empty, 
unrepresentable nothing, i.e. no content at all. 
Real opposition – opposition without contradiction – also opposes two predicates of a thing. 
These predicates also “cancel” [aufhebt] each other, but the consequence is “something (cogitabile)” 
rather than nothing. The predicates, though directly opposed, do not contradict each other but are 
“simultaneously possible in one body.” The consequence [Folge] of such a real relation (continuing the 
example of motion from the above) is rest, which is “something (repraesentabile).” The content of real 
opposition can be both thought and represented. Or – and Kant alters his terminology slightly within 
the same paragraph – the content of real opposition is “also nothing, but nothing in another sense.” 
Kant shifts his characterisation here I think because he wants to emphasise the specific form of 
cancellation that occurs in real opposition. “The motive forces of one and the same body which tend 
in exactly the opposite direction; and here the grounds cancel their reciprocal consequences, namely 
the motions” (2:193). Kant throughout has a ship in mind: “The passage of the ship westwards is just 
as much a positive motion as its passage eastwards; but if we are dealing with one and the same ship, 
the distances thus covered cancel [aufheben] each other out, either completely or in part.” (TP 
216/2:176). The result of this real opposition – wind driving westward and sea-current flowing 
eastward – is not something unthinkable and unrepresentable but a nothing that can be thought as “a 
lack of motion,” i.e. rest. The cancelling of the opposed predicates (this same body is in motion and 
not in motion) in this case results not in an empty nothing but “nothing” as a determinate state of 
affairs. 
Kant notes another form of the indifference to content operative at the logical level: “In the 
case of logical repugnancy, no attention is paid to which of the two predicates is truly affirmative 
(realitas), and which truly negative (negation).” (TP 211/2:172). In keeping with the Enlightenment 
metaphor discussed in 1.1 above, Kant takes dark and being not-dark as an example. “The first 
predicate is logically affirmative, the other logically negative, although in the metaphysical sense, the 
former is a negation.” The rule of contradiction and judgments determined by it are indifferent to the 
“metaphysical” determination of darkness as the absence of light. In saying “metaphysical,” Kant is 
referring to the rationalist principle in which all predicable properties are either affirmations or 
privations logically dependent on the affirmations they negate. As such, if we were to represent the 
terms light and dark with respect to their content, it would only be possible to present, say, a 
disjunctive judgment as “either light or not-light.” Logical relation in terms of the law of non-
contradiction however, is indifferent to metaphysical affirmation or negation, and can present a 
negation (non-light) as logically affirmative (dark), and an affirmative property (light) as privative (not-
dark).  
Against this characterisation of logic as indifferent to whether its terms are positive or merely 
privative, Kant then introduces the affirmative status of both predicates in real opposition. In 
contradiction, P and not-P are opposed in S (without however being able to say which is actually 
 
59 There is another kind of indeterminacy in this judgment, insofar as its subject is indefinite, “a body” – but 
which body? As we will see at the end of 2.2, intuition in its presentation of spatio-temporal individuals gives 
furnishes judgment with the demonstrative this body, which is then thought by being synthesized through the 
concept “body.” 
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positive), in reality a P and a Q come into a reciprocal relation of opposition in S. Kant does later use 
the example of two really existing different balls in motion. But here he wants to note and consider 
that the P and Q, so to speak, in their relation, are necessarily presented in terms of negation – in 
determining the difference of this negation over against logical negation Kant draws on mathematics. 
In maths, the minus as the cancelling of an equal positive magnitude results in nothing determined as 
zero. Kant uses the example of the active and passive debt of a 100 thalers.60 In short, being owed 100 
thalers minus owing 100 thalers equals 0 thalers, but this result is not a logical contradiction: the nihil 
negativum, the gar nichts, cannot Kant says be “expressed” by zero = 0, because no contradiction 
obtains in this expression (TP 211/2:172).  The mathematical zero is a non-contradictory nothing, a 
nothing that is thinkable, that passes the “test” of the logical law of contradiction (this “test” will for 
Kant remain important, as the sine qua non of truth) but that also says something “certain” about a 
really existing relation. 
To this extent, the mathematical minus cannot be understood as the negation of the existence 
of the plus in the same sense that not P negates the existence of P. In logic on Kant’s understanding 
coexistence of opposed determinations in the same subject is unthinkable. Kant then emphasises the 
constitutive relationality of the + and -, such that their meaning is only determinate when taken 
together; this is quite the opposite of what happens when we take “P” and “not P” together at the 
same time, which results in indeterminacy. 
Of course, in the mathematical relation of + and -, indifference emerges again, but only at the 
level of symbolisation: “one would arrive at the same result if the ship’s course with the east wind had 
been indicated by ‘-’ and its course with the west wind by ‘+’. The only difference is that the final 
balance would have been designated by ‘-’” (TP 213/2:174). But this symbolic indifference does not 
cancel the content being represented: a determinate magnitude. In short, Kant is trying to show that 
there are two negations (two processes of cancellation) and two nothings (as results of that process) 
that must be distinguished. The logical negation (“not”) is different from the mathematical negation 
(“-“), which symbolises relation between “affirmative” terms. Similarly, the “nothing” that results from 
the logical and real opposition is distinct. In saying 0, I am saying something certain: I have, for 
example, equal grounds for giving as for receiving money (I am “flat broke”); the ship moves as much 
eastward as westward (it is at rest). “On the other hand,” Kant continues, “in the case of cancellation 
through contradiction it is absolutely nothing [schlechtin Nichts] which exists.” Again, while logical 
opposition produces an empty nothing – a nothing about which absolutely nothing can be said – real 
opposition, even in the reciprocal instances of equal positive and negative magnitude, has a 
determinate outcome. 
 To sum up. The law of non-contradiction, when applied to a proposition that asserts 
contradictory predicates of the same subject, results in non-representable nothing: the proposition is 
emptied of representable content. This is unsatisfactory in cases of real opposition. Obviously, more 
than “gar nichts” must be said about an object determinable in terms of really existing opposition. 
From the perspective of this thesis, Kant is here pointing out a particular indifference in the sense we 
have suggested in our reading of his introductory Kampfplatz above: there is here a difference – 
between a non-representable nothing and a real magnitude of 0 – that doesn’t, on the rationalist set 
of presuppositions, count as one. The logical mode of determination is, in its application to really 
existing states, completely indeterminate: it says nothing of them, and does not have the resources in 
 
60 The 100 thalers will recur significantly in Kant’s distinction between real and logical predication in general in 
the Critique’s famous refutation of the ontological proof of God – and again in the first chapter of the Logic.  
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itself to mark that indeterminacy.  
Real Causation and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction 
Kant in Negative Magnitudes presents some cases of real opposition as “grounds” cancelling their 
“consequences.” However, Negative Magnitudes concludes by putting this logical relation (if ground, 
then consequent) into question concerning the possibility of its “real use,” that is, when applied to 
cases of cause and effect. Kant’s criticism of ground-consequent runs along formally similar lines to 
the questioning of logical opposition: “The distinction between logical opposition and real opposition, 
which we drew above, is parallel to the distinction between the logical ground and the real ground” 
(Ak 2:203). Causation is, like opposition, a real relation: it cannot be posited by conceptual analysis 
conducted according to the law of contradiction. The inability of conceptual analysis to provide a 
determination of really existing states is perhaps clearer in the case of the ground-consequent/cause-
effect distinction – in fact Kant’s account of the limitations of ground-consequent to explain real 
relations clarifies the treatment of real opposition with which he began, by allowing him to 
straightforwardly state it in terms of what the Critique will call “analyticity.” 
Kant’s demand for an explanation that does not illegitimately superimpose ground and 
consequent onto cause and effect is particularly helpful in understanding the overhauling of 
determinacy undertaken in the Critique, and deserves quoting at length: 
 
I fully understand how a consequence [Folge] is posited by a ground [Grund] in accordance 
with the rule of identity: analysis [Zergliederung] of the concepts shows that the consequence 
is contained in the ground. It is in this way that necessity is a ground of immutability; that 
composition is a ground of divisibility; that infinity is a ground of omniscience, etc., etc. And I 
can clearly understand the connection [Verknüpfung] of the ground with the consequence, for 
the consequence is really identical with part of the concept of the ground (TP 239/2:202).   
 
This is precisely what the Critique describes as analytic judgment: “Analytic judgments… are thus those 
in which the connection of the predicate is thought through identity…” (A7/B10). Kant also puts it as 
follows: in an analytic judgment, “the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is 
(covertly) contained in this concept A…” (A6/B10). These two definitions show that, for Kant, 
analyticity has both logical and epistemological elements. On the one hand, the criterion of truth for 
an analytic judgment is the law of contradiction (thinking “through identity”). As George Dicker puts 
it, “There is an important relationship between analyticity and contradiction: the negation (denial) of 
an analytic statement is always a contradiction, and conversely the negation of a contradiction is 
always an analytic statement.” 61  On the other hand, analytic judgments imply knowledge in the 
judging subject: in such a judgment we do not need to go beyond what we already (covertly) know, 
but simply clarify – or “draw out” – what is already present. Hence Kant’s claim that “through analytic 
judgments our knowledge is not in any way extended… the concept which I already have is merely set 
forth and made intelligible to me” (A10/B14). There is of course much to worry about in Kant’s 
definition(s) of analyticity, in particular the cognitive status of the “clarification” or “extension” of 
knowledge at stake in the second limb.62 
 
61 George Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Analytic Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
11.  
62 I leave the tenability of the analytic-synthetic distinction in general to one side, content here to track its 
motivation and purported value. But see Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, 225.  
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Kant in any case – in both Negative Magnitudes and the Critique – does not take this linking of 
logical criteria to states of knowledge to be controversial. It is rather central to Kant’s contestation of 
rationalism: what Kant wants to draw attention to is that certain judgments cannot be determined to 
be true or false solely according to logical criteria, and it just these types of judgments in which our 
knowledge is “extended” or “amplified.” In such “synthetic judgments” the predicate “B lies entirely 
outside the concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection [Verknüpfung] with it.” The point is 
that this connection cannot be thought in terms of identity or contradiction – in a synthetic judgment, 
P is neither synonymous with nor a component of the concept S. Logic here is not determinative of 
the truth or falsity of a proposition; rather, to quote Dicker again, “the way the world is determines 
whether the proposition is true or false.”63 In synthetic judgments, knowledge requires an extra-logical 
criterion of truth and falsity: experience. In the pre-Critical work, Kant’s attempt to supplement the 
limitations of logical analysis for the verification of certain propositions again remains no more than a 
plea. Moreover, it is still submerged in a particular (however crucial and continuously relevant) 
example, i.e. causality: 
 
But what I should dearly like to have explained to me, however, is how one thing issues from 
another thing, though not by means of the law of identity. The first kind of ground I call the 
logical ground, for the relation of the ground to its consequence can be understood logically. 
In other words, it can be clearly understood by appeal to the law of identity. The second kind 
of ground, however, I call the real ground [Realgrund], for this relation [Beziehung] belongs, 
presumably, to my true concepts, but the manner of the relating can in no wise be judged. 
 As for this real ground and its relation to its consequence my question presents itself 
in the following simple form: How am I to understand the fact that, because something is, 
something else is? (TP 239/2:202). 
 
No amount of conceptual analysis will explain how two completely different things come to be causally 
related. To close this discussion of Negative Magnitudes, I should note that Kant’s treatment of logical 
ground and real cause in terms of logical identity and real difference (analyticity and syntheticity) 
enables him to clarify the example of negative magnitudes with which he began: 
 
The former distinction, that between logical and real opposition, is clearly understood by 
means of the law of contradiction. And I understand how, if I posit the infinity of God, the 
predicate of mortality is cancelled by it, and it is cancelled because mortality contradicts 
infinity. But how the motion of one body is cancelled by the motion of another body – that is 
another question, for the motion of the second body does not stand in contradiction to the 
motion of the first body. (TP 241/2:203). 
 
That both forms of relation under consideration in this pre-Critical work can be reduced to the 
presence or absence of subject-predicate identity helps to explain the centrality that the analytic-
synthetic distinction assumes in the Critique. Also indicative of Kant’s project in the first Critique is 
Negative Magnitudes closing with a challenge, one addressed as much to Kant’s colleagues still 
“dogmatically slumbering” in the indifference of logical and real relation as to Kant himself, unable at 
this point in his work to explain real relation:  “Now, let the attempt be made to see whether real 
 
63 Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, 13. 
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opposition in general can be explained… those philosophers who lay claim to the possession of an 
understanding which knows no limitations will test the methods of their philosophy to see how far 
they can advance in a question such as this present one.” (2:203-4; emphasis mine).64  In this closing 
challenge it is significant that Kant already suggests that a limitation of the understanding (in its purely 
logical use) would be required for its legitimate extension to real relation – that the unlimited faith in 
the power of the understanding on its own to clarify everything as it really is will need to be curtailed 
in order to “advance in a question” like real relation. That project of limitation will be presented in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, which draws the boundaries on the legitimate usage of “concepts operating 
alone” by distinguishing between conceptual and intuitional forms of representation. 
In a pithy line that can be taken to summarise the above account of rationalist indifference, 
the Kant of the Critique puts the inability of logic to issue in objective knowledge in this way: “For 
although cognition may be in complete accord with logical form, yet it can always contradict the 
object” (A59/B84). That is, we may always make a logically non-contradictory judgment that bears no 
relation to the really existing thing that it is taken to predicate (really determine) properties of. In the 
language developed above, logical determination is indifferent to the existential status and relation of 
its terms (in the following Chapter we will see the Critique use the word Gleichgültig in just this way). 
As a result of this indifference, logical determinacy is insufficient on its own for “real determination” 
or “real predication” of extra-logical objects (A598/B626). It cannot make legitimate knowledge claims 
about those objects: we cannot claim to know what could always be merely thought. Without a means 
to mark the difference between empirically-drawn and merely thought contents, it is possible to 
represent nothing when one means to represent something, a determinate state of affairs. 
  
 
64 As Paul Guyer and Allen Wood put it in their introduction to the Cambridge edition of the first Critique: “The 
problem of understanding real opposition, real causation, and more generally real relations becomes the 
fundamental substantive problem of theoretical philosophy.” “Introduction,” in Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 35. 
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Chapter 2. Intuitions and Concepts 
In the first chapter, we saw Kant diagnose the indifference of logical and real endemic to German 
rationalism, and the epistemic indeterminacy that results. In this chapter, we consider the Critique’s 
distinction between conceptual and intuitional representation as a response to rationalist indifference. 
As is well known, the Critical Kant holds that the pure concepts of the understanding (the “categories” 
[Kategorien]) and the pure forms of sensible intuition (space and time) together constitute the a priori 
conditions for objectively determinate cognition [Erkenntnis]. Put in terms of our discussion of 
existential indifference above, sensible intuition for Kant is that which provides logical determination 
with an empirically real “something” [Etwas] to be determined as the subject of a possible judgment. 
How exactly sensibility gives an individual something that is logically undetermined (i.e. merely 
logically determinable), and how such an undetermined something relates to or enters into logical 
determination, however, is a difficult matter. To provide an answer, Chapter 2.1 reads closely the 
account of intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic section of the Critique, while 2.2. works through 
the Critique’s account of concepts (and their a priori relation to intuitional form) in the Transcendental 
Analytic and the Transcendental Deduction section of that Analytic. 
2.1. Intuitions in the Aesthetic 
In the pre-Critical work, Kant takes “objective” or “real” determination to go to really existing objects 
in their really existing relation to one another. Taking Chapters 1.1 and 1.2 together (in their respective 
treatments of the realism/idealism and logical/real distinctions), there is something at least 
immediately confusing about Kant’s choice of terminology in the Critique. Why would an open demand 
for an account of real relation issue in a transcendental idealism? As we saw in 1.2, Kant claims that 
the assumption that our cognition conforms to objects constitutes transcendental realism, which in 
turn gives rise to empirical idealism; on the contrary, it is Kant’s revolutionary transcendental idealism 
that guarantees epistemic realism. The status of intuitions is decisive in Kant’s characterisation of his 
Critical project as transcendental idealism. The intuitional forms that organise sensibly-given content 
are transcendental because they are necessary conditions of experience; they are “ideal” in the sense 
that they are, to borrow Paul Franks’ phrase, “orders of relations” not obtaining between real objects 
but specific to human sensibility.65 Taking these two limbs together, Kant seeks to establish that our 
empirical cognition cannot be judged on the basis of conformity to objects as they really are (in 
abstraction from our cognition), because any objective cognition is about sensibly-given content 
necessarily conditioned by the a priori relational forms of our sensibility.  
With this move, Kant’s Critical formulation of intuitional representation jettisons the 
rationalist understanding of sensibly-given contents as “confused” versions of “clear” ideas: intuitions 
are our only access to objectivity, and so cannot be meaningfully considered an “inferior” form of 
representation. Insofar as all determinate empirical cognitions are conditioned by intuitional form, the 
“subjective universality” of this form – its universality for finite human knowers – guarantees the 
objectivity of empirical determinations. Thus, what remains constant in Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical 
periods is the claim for the indeterminacy of merely logical form when contrasted with “objectivity,” 
but the existential status of that objectivity undergoes a shift with the introduction of intuitional 
representations. Empirical objects are determinations of appearance [Erscheinung] – sensible contents 
 
65 Franks steps through the Leibnizian origin of Kant’s understanding of space and time. For Leibniz, space and 
time are “orders of relations,” “nothing more than imaginary relations that enable us, with our finite minds… to 
represent in a confused way the harmoniousness of the world.” All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental 
Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005), 24.  
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organised by the forms of space and time – not of “things in themselves” [Dinge-an-sich]. The latter 
for Kant are not the intrinsic properties of objects thought “clearly” through conceptual predication 
alone, but rather the logically necessary but epistemically “empty” thought of objectivity in general in 
abstraction from intuitional form. The thought of things-in-themselves, though necessary, does not 
undermine or problematise objective knowledge of appearances, insofar as such knowledge is the only 
kind possessed by creatures with our sensible conditioning.  
The distinction between appearances and things in themselves is of course notorious in the 
reception of Kant’s philosophy, and Hegel’s often misplaced criticisms of the Kantian thing-in-itself will 
be considered briefly in Chapter 3. In short: Kant scholars take Hegel to relapse into rationalism by 
considering intuitionally-conditioned determination to be inferior, i.e. “appearance” in Hegel is 
ostensibly taken to be a pejorative term, a “second-best” option that falls short of a purely conceptual 
determination of “really real” thing in themselves. This misrepresentation of Kant’s position has some 
basis in Hegel’s text, but is only part of the story. In order to prepare for what I think are Hegel’s more 
successful critiques of Kant on the basis of the logical structure of intuitional and conceptual 
representation and their relation, I here step through Kant’s definition of intuitional representation at 
the start of the Transcendental Aesthetic. That will fill out the Kantian picture, i.e. the way in which 
Kant holds pure and empirical intuitions to have the logical characteristics of singularity and immediacy 
turns ultimately on intuitional form understood as external relation. We can then ask how contentful 
the Aesthetic holds singular immediacy to be in abstraction from determination by concepts in 
judgments. “Intuitions without concepts are blind” – but what kind of blindness do they exhibit at this 
stage of the Critique’s argument?   
 
Defining intuition 
Kant defines “Intuition” [Anschauung] as the means through which cognition relates immediately to 
objects. “In whatever way and through whatever means [Mittel] a cognition [Erkenntnis] may relate 
[beziehen] to objects [Gegenstände], that through which it relates immediately [unmittelbar] to them, 
and at which all thought is directed as an end [und worauf alles Denken als Mittel abzweckt], is 
intuition [Anschauung]” (A19/B33). Intuitions are immediately related to objects and relate thought 
and objects. Note that because intuitions are immediately related to objects, they themselves do not 
require a mediator between themselves and objects. There is thus no infinite regress of mediation: 
thought is related to intuitions as an end or “aim,” and, in so aiming, have a relation to objectivity. 
“Sensibility” [Sinnlichkeit] is the receptive faculty/capacity to acquire intuitions. “The capacity 
(receptivity) [Fähigkeit (Rezeptivität)] to acquire representations [Vorstellungen] through the way in 
which we are affected [affiziert] by objects is called sensibility [Sinnlichkeit]. Objects are therefore 
given [gegeben] to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions…” (A19/B33). Kant is 
claiming that immediate representation of objects is possible “at least for us humans” [uns Menschens 
wenigstens] (A19/B33) – the phrase is a B edition addition – only if that object is given to us sensibly. 
This is reinforced at the start of the Transcendental Logic: “It comes along with our nature that intuition 
can never be other than sensible, i.e. that it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects” 
(A51/B75). As we will see in Chapter 4, this constitutive reference to us and our nature – a nature that 
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is given to us such that we are affected by objects as given – will for Hegel, following Fichte, be 
extremely problematic.66   
The next two short paragraphs of Kant’s Aesthetic move through five key definitions and their 
interrelation very quickly. (1) “Sensation” is the effect of an object on our sensibility as a capacity for 
immediate representation, “insofar as we are affected” by that object. (2) “Empirical intuitions” are 
those intuitions related to objects through sensation, through the effect of that object on sensibility 
as our capacity to be affected by objects. What empirical intuitions give us is (3) an “appearance” 
[Erscheinung] “the undetermined object [der unbestimmte Gegenstand] of an empirical intuition” 
(A20/B34). To understand that claim, we have to move to the next two definitions, given in short order. 
“I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its [4] matter [Materie], but that which 
allows the manifold of appearance to be ordered in certain relations I call [5] the form [Form] of 
appearance.” “Matter” in an appearance corresponds to sensation, but as an appearance, that 
sensation has been “ordered into certain relations.” Matter is sensation that has been informed by 
form, such that matter and sensation are not “identical” but only “correspond.” Kant then gives a very 
brief version of the argument for the a priority (the non-empirical origin) of the form of intuitions, the 
longer version of which will occupy the remainder of the Aesthetic. Kant’s introductory version of the 
argument runs: 
Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form 
cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori, 
but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori, and can therefore be considered 
separately from all sensation (A20/B34). 
So, bringing all of Kant’s definitional work together, empirical intuitions are sensations organised into 
relations and so turned into matter by the forms of intuition. These forms are not themselves the affect 
of an object on our capacity for representation (“themselves a sensation”) but are the organisation of 
that capacity for representation. These forms are thus pure forms, i.e. not empirically-derived.  
To sum up our progress thus far: that which is represented in an empirical intuition is the object 
as appearance, i.e. a conceptually undetermined object. An appearance is conceptually undetermined, 
but already intuitionally individuated by being “ordered and placed” in the forms of pure intuition. We 
are, however, yet to uncover what that order and placement is.  
The Transcendental Aesthetics’ longer argument for the structure and a priority of intuitional 
form begins with a double abstraction. Even though intuitions are defined as the means of conceptual 
thought’s relation to objects, the first step here is to “isolate” [isolieren] empirical intuition by 
“separating off” [absondern] all understanding through concepts. The second step is then to detach all 
sensation, all the “matter” in the appearance, so we are left only with form (A22/B36). Note however, 
that we do not abstract from our capacity to be affected by objects, just any particular affection 
(sensations). For us humans at least, these forms are space (the form of “outer sense”) and time (the 
form of “inner sense”), which individuate appearances (conceptually undetermined objects). I have 
thus far attempted to retain “determination” and its cognates for conceptually determined objects 
only, and not for conceptually undetermined objects “ordered and placed” in the forms of intuition. I 
have opted for “individuation” to describe the operation of the latter structure because “individual” 
 
66 This “for us” is important, both for Hegel’s subjectivist critique of Kant, and for Kant’s account of the 
necessary thought of a divine “Intuitive Intellect,” which Hegel think provides the resources to overcome the 
deficiencies in Kant’s model of objective determination (treated in Part II and Part III respectively). 
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[der Einzelne] is linked to “singular” [der Einzahl] in German, intuitional representations are for Kant 
logically singular, and “singularisation” is awkward in English. But note that Kant himself uses 
“determination” in his description of intuitional form: “In space [the objects’] shape, magnitude, and 
relation to one another is determined or determinable [bestimmt oder bestimmbar]” (A22/B37). In 
the case of time, “everything that belongs to the inner determinations [Bestimmungen] is represented 
in relations of time.” (This latter will be central to the argument of the Deduction and the Analogies, 
as will see). No argument in this thesis directly hangs on this use of “determination” for both intuitional 
and conceptual form. The terminological ambiguity only buttresses the post-Kantian conceptualist 
position raised via Pippin in the Introduction, namely, that Kant’s distinction between intuitional and 
conceptual form is not a clean one – a point that I will approach in detail in terms of the A Deduction 
in section 2.2.  
After defining space as outer sense and form as inner sense, Kant makes an argument for their 
a priori status. Note that as Kant’s argument for time closely follows the argument for space, I will only 
rehearse what he says about space. Kant argues: 
 
“Space is not an empirical concept [empirischer Begriff] that has been drawn from experiences 
[ausseren Erfahrungen]. For in order for certain sensations to be related to [auf etwas 
bezogen]  something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in 
which I find myself), thus in order for to represent them as outside <and next to> one another 
[ausser <und neben> einander], thus not merely as different but in different places [mithin 
nicht bloss verschieden, sondern als in verschiedenen Orten], the representation of space must 
already be their ground” (A20/B34). 
 
Two crucial points here. Firstly, and most crucially for the trajectory of this thesis, we have the structure 
of spatial form set out, as “outside <and next to> one another” (the “next to” is added in the B edition). 
Time is similarly understood as external placement of appearances, though temporal placement is 
“successive” (“after” [nach]) rather than contiguous (“next to” [neben]). I accordingly refer to the 
“order of relation” instantiated by intuitional form as “external relation,” insofar as each term is 
represented as being outside of other such representations. As such, when we come in Chapter 3 to 
Hegel’s definition of sensations in Kant as “outside-one-another-being” [ausseinanderseinde] in an 
empirical intuition, and when in Chapter 6 we see “existence” in Hegel’s Logic presented as “that-
which-exists-outside-itself” [Ausser-sich-Seiende] we can understand the externality component of 
Hegel’s formulations to be an explicit reference to the structure of Kantian intuition. With that said, 
the consequences of this understanding of intuitionally-given individuals as external to one another 
for Kant’s account of objective determination will only be clear once we treat the Transcendental 
Deduction in the following 2.2.   
Secondly, the success of the above quote as argument for a priority has been debated. Kant 
elaborates a little later in the Aesthetic, saying: 
 
For in order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me (i.e. to something in 
another place in space from that in which I find myself) and similarly in order that I may be 
able to represent them as outside <and next to> one another, thus not merely as different but 
in different places, the representation of space must be presupposed. (A23/B38). 
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It is clear that Kant holds the account of spatial relation as external to ground the claim for its a priority: 
the representation of space as external relation is logically prior to my experience of empirical objects 
as in different places, and in a different place to me. I could not experience objects outside of myself 
were I not already in possession of the form of spatial intuition characterised as the “outside and next 
to” placement of appearances. The problem is that this argument appears tautological. Kant seems to 
be saying: “In order to perceive anything as existing spatially (outside of myself or outside of other 
things), I must perceive it as being in space.” Is Kant saying anything more than “in order to represent 
space I must represent space”? Allison in Transcendental Idealism thinks Kant is not tautological here. 
For Allison, when Kant says “outside of,” he actually means “distinct from” in an ontological as well as 
a spatial sense. On this view, Kant is really saying that in order to represent objects as ontologically 
distinct individuals, I must represent space, i.e., “somethings” being outside of other such 
somethings.67 It is understandable why one would want to read Kant’s argument in this way. Not only 
does it avoid tautology, it dovetails neatly with Kant’s general anti-rationalist strategy (insisting that 
concepts must be given intuitional content in order to be determinate), and in particular with his 
critique of Leibniz’s principle of the “identity of indiscernibles” or “non-discernibility.” For Leibniz, 
because concepts operating in isolation from sense-experience are epistemically privileged (as we saw 
in 1.2), and because concepts cannot distinguish between qualitatively identical objects, such objects 
are held to be actually identical, regardless of their spatio-temporal position. 68  Reading spatial 
representation as an individuating condition allows us to get around Leibniz’s conflation of logical and 
real: space allows us to distinguish objects even if they are logically indistinct. For Allison this kind of 
guaranteed distinction via spatiality means that the representation of space is “a necessary condition 
of the possibility of distinguishing objects from one another.”69  
Daniel Warren in “Kant and the Apriority of Space” however contests Alison’s reading, arguing 
that taking spatial representation to go to individuation doesn’t by itself amount to an argument for 
the apriority of space.70 The a priori is distinguished from the a posteriori by its necessity; an a priori 
principle of experience must be presupposed (i.e., taken as necessary) in order for experience to be 
the kind of experience (more on this “transcendental” form of argument in the next section). Warren 
argues that the strong sense of necessity is lacking in Allison’s argument. For Allison, it is necessary to 
distinguish objects spatially only because qualitative difference in certain situations may prove 
insufficient. But what this in fact means for Warren is that two objects A and B can be distinguished by 
qualitative difference (A has quality X and B does not) rather than spatial difference; the need to 
distinguish via spatial representation for Warren at most amounts to a pragmatic need to distinguish 
quickly between qualitatively very similar objects, but this is not a strong enough sense of necessity 
for Allison’s would-be transcendental argument. 
In making this argument Warren suggests that there may be no qualitatively identical logical 
“indiscernibles” in our experience, but his argument does not need to commit to this denial of 
qualitative identity. To show this, Warren formulates a possible counter-argument from Allison’s camp: 
Allison could suggest that spatial relations have a “special place when it comes to distinguishing 
objects.” 71  That is, qualitative properties may or may not help in identifying numerically distinct 
 
67  P.F. Strawson I think very broadly supports this kind of reading in The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason (London: Methuen, 1966), 49. 
68 This is at least Kant’s gloss in the Amphiboly section of the Critique (A263-4/B319-20). 
69 Allison, Transcendental Idealism, 83.  
70 Daniel Warren, “Kant and the Apriority of Space,” The Philosophical Review 107: 2 (1998), 179-224. 
71 Warren, 189.  
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objects, but spatial outsideness is “guaranteed” to distinguish them, no matter what properties they 
have, and even in the limit case of qualitative identity (regardless of whether qualitative identity is 
taken to exist or not). But again, Warren asks, “is this capacity really a condition of having any 
experience at all?”  All it says is that we must have the capacity for spatial representation to distinguish 
objects even if we never use that capacity.   
Warren’s own position returns fairly squarely to Kant’s own formulation. “The representation 
of space is presupposed by the representation of objects as spatially related (as spatially outside me 
or outside one another).” But this for Warren is not tautological because “spatial relation” is not 
synonymous with “representation of space.” Rather, “representation of space” should be taken to 
mean specifically “a representation of the occupation of places in space.” To represent objects as 
spatially related, we need (in the strong, transcendental sense) a representation of space in terms of 
spatial place in order to ground those relations. Again, Leibniz provides the contrast. Leibniz holds that 
our idea of a unified, singular space in which objects find a place is abstracted from our experience of 
particular relations between objects. As such we can move from the representation of relations to a 
representation of space without spatial representation being presupposed. So our representation of 
space is abstracted from our experience of relations between objects, and is not a priori. For Kant, no 
amount of abstraction from experiences of relation gets one to a representation of space required for 
specifically spatial relation.  “When we represent objects as bearing a spatial relation to one another 
(for example, being outside of one another), we presuppose a representation of the space these 
objects are in.” Warren conducts a thought experiment to prove the Kantian argument against 
Leibniz’s narrative. Consider a simple non-spatial relation, A being “brighter than” B. This “brighter 
than” relation as conceptual is independent of any representation of space. But to put A and B into 
specifically spatial relation, as points along a “brightness-line” or occupying a “brightness-space,” we 
“presuppose a representation of that space that these objects are in,” in the sense of occupying place. 
No amount of experience of relational terms will provide us with the space in which to place the 
objects in (spatial) relation. Space in the sense of places in space is thus presupposed in experience, 
or is a priori.72 So Warren’s full formulation runs: “When we represent objects as spatially related 
(namely, as outside me or outside one another), we presuppose the representation of space (the space 
of which these places or spaces are parts).”73 This formulation neatly accounts for Kant’s account of 
the distinction of conceptual and intuitional representation as turning on the difference between 
subsumptive and part/whole relations, which I will discuss next.   
Kant argues that space is, like the appearances placed in it, an immediate and singular intuition 
– just an a priori one. That space is itself immediate and singular is established by its difference from 
conceptual generality, as follows:  
 
Space is not a discursive or, as is said, a general concept of relations of things in general, but a 
pure intuition. For, first, one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many 
spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. Secondly, these 
parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space, as being, as it were, constituents out of 
 
72 “For, given that the representation of ‘brighter than’ relations does not presuppose the representation of 
brightness space, we can form the latter representation from the former. By contrast, in the case of spatial (or 
temporal) relations, we cannot proceed in an analogous fashion, forming the representation of space (or of 
time) from a concept of spatial (or temporal) relations which has been independently acquired… from 
experience.” Warren, 204. 
73 Warren, 202.  
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which it can be composed; on the contrary, they can be thought only as in it. It is essentially 
single; the manifold in it, thus also the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on 
limitations… Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. Now one must, to be sure, 
think of every concept as a representation that is contained in an infinite set of different 
possible representations (as their common mark), which thus contains these under itself; but 
no concept, as such, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations within 
itself. Nevertheless space is so thought (for all the parts of space, even to infinity, are 
simultaneous). Therefore the original representation of space is an a priori intuition, not a 
concept. (A24-25/B39-40). 
 
The forms of intuition are not logical determinations; they are not a more general concept to be 
predicated of a less general subject concept. While Kant will only give a detailed account of conceptual 
functions in the Analytic, for Kant concepts are (in the first of their two functions at least) 
“subsumptive,” in the sense that we represent as “under” a concept those other representations that 
have that concept “as their common mark.” Under the concept “red” are all things which have red as 
a predicate, but they cannot be coherently represented as being “in” red insofar as those 
representations will have other conceptual determinations. Conceptually determined objects 
potentially belong in multiple conceptual “places,” as it were, e.g., under the empirical concepts “red” 
and “flag.” As Frederick Beiser puts it: “when a particular is subsumed under a universal there are 
other universals true of it, and there are other particulars that instantiate this universal.”74 In contrast, 
intuitionally determinate objects belong within the one “all-embracing space,” whose singularity we 
immediately intuit as the field in which spatial objects are placed. Kant repeats the argument for time 
at A32/B48: “The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of 
time is only possible through limitations of a single time grounding it.” All objects – we are still talking 
here of conceptually undetermined objects, appearances – take place in one space and one time, take 
up parts of that one space and time, or limit it. As we will see in a little more detail in treating Kant’s 
account of Intellectual Intuition in Chapter 4, the singularity of space and time for Kant is defined as 
totality, i.e. one unlimited whole.  “Unlimited” is appropriate here because no other time or space can 
be conceived outside of and so limiting the time and space of which we are immediately aware. Rather, 
appearances in space and time are external to one another, and in that externality exclude one 
another, i.e. set limits within the totality. Representation of an individual as a part limiting a whole 
cannot for Kant be conceptual, insofar as concepts in their generality are only (here Kant’s choice of 
words is confusing) a “partial” representations the objects they subsume (A32/B38). In our example 
above, the empirical concept “red” does not represent the red flag as an individual occupying a certain 
place within the totality of space, but only one of its marks common to other neither spatially or 
temporally contiguous objects.  
 This understanding of appearances as limitations of totality has implications for Hegel’s 
account of determination in the Logic. As Paul Franks’ has shown, Kantian idealism is distinguished 
from post-Kantianism idealism by an attempt to extend the relational individuation characteristic of 
intuitional form to a derivation of a priori conceptuality. The historical link is F.H. Jacobi, who draws 
Kant into the Pantheismusstreit by linking the Critique’s account of intuitions with Spinoza’s account 
 
74 Beiser, German Idealism, 581. 
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of “determination by negation.”75 In Franks rendition, Jacobi “seems to think that… just as Kant thinks 
of regions of space and spans of time as limitations of infinite wholes, so Spinoza thinks of what we 
ordinarily call things as possessing determinacy only insofar as they are limitations of a prior, infinite 
whole.”76 Now, as Robert Stern has recently shown, Hegel’s account of determination is not Spinoza’s, 
despite his repeated invocations of the Spinozist formula “omnis determination est negatio.”77 But it 
is nonetheless possible to trace Fichte’s and Hegel’s respective attempts at a “unitary derivation” – 
what Franks calls “Derivation Monism” – to Jacobi’s comparison. As we will see in more detail in 
Chapters 4 and 5, Hegel seeks to demonstrate that the conceptual conditions for determinacy are 
related to one another as limitations within an immediately intuitable but non-sensible “space” 
(“Intellectual Intuition”), culminating in an understanding of each such conceptual condition as a 
logical (not temporal) moment of an exhaustive or total set of such conditions –  all a priori concepts 
would have a “place” within that totality, such that no other conceptual space would be cognisable as 
an external limit to that developed within the Logic. However – and this is crucial – intellectual intuition 
is non-sensible; it is not limited to the external relationality that characterises sensible intuition. It 
rather furnishes the ground from which the logical structure of external relationality (and the degree 
of determinacy it affords) can be derived. This link can only be substantiated by working through the 
doctrine(s) of Intellectual Intuition, which I endeavour to do in the latter stages of this thesis.  
I began this section with the question of the “blindness” of intuitions in abstraction from 
conceptual form. Our definitional work above is helpful here in two ways. Firstly, at this point in the 
Critique’s account of cognitive conditions it appears that intuitions are not blind at all. Rather they are 
the representation of externally-related somethings excluding one another as limitations of the 
totalities of space and time. Secondly, as we will see in the following section, it is possible to make 
good on Kant’s claim for intuitional blindness by confusing intuitions with sensations. Sensations in 
abstraction from the external relations provided by spatio-temporal form would be blind, an 
indistinguishable mass, lacking external relation and so collapsed on one another. To understand how 
Kant can claim intuitions without concepts to be blind, however, we need to follow Conant’s lead and 
read on, rather than taking Kant to be producing independently intelligible accounts of separate 
cognitive conditions. As we will see in treating the Transcendental Deduction in the next section, on 
the conceptualist reading of Kant followed in this thesis, intuitional form is not sufficient for differences 
between appearances to be discriminated. Despite the seeming independence of intuitional form 
established in the Aesthetic, Kant thinks that to cognise an immediate something here and now, 
“ordered and placed” outside of other such somethings, some minimal form of conceptual spontaneity 
must be involved. In short: the relational individuation of singulars in intuition is dependent upon 
conceptuality understood not merely as subsumption via predication but as the synthesis or 
combination of intuitionally-given individuals. 
 
75 For a detailed historical and philosophical account of the Pantheismusstreit, see Chapter 2 of Beiser, The Fate 
of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
76 Franks, All or Nothing, 89.  
77 Robert Stern, “‘Determination is Negation: The Adventures of a Doctrine from Spinoza to Hegel to the British 
Idealists,” Hegel Bulletin, 37:1 (2016), 29–52. Stern authoritatively demonstrates that Hegel and Spinoza 
conceive of negation and determination very differently. In my understanding, while Hegel thinks that negation 
(in the sense of opposition) is necessary for a thought or being to have content, Spinoza thinks of each 
determinate being as a negation (in the sense of privation) of substance.  Franks hits on the core of this way of 
distinguishing Hegel and Spinoza in the following characterisation of Jacobi’s account of Spinozism: “since only 
the infinite whole may properly be called a real being, what we ordinarily call things are… neither beings nor 
‘ideas of things’ but rather ‘Nonbeings.’” All or Nothing, 89.  
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2.2. Concepts in the Analytic 
In order to introduce the way Kant takes conceptual representation to determine appearances given 
in sensibility, I want to look at his first articulation of the concept/intuition distinction in On the Form 
and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World (the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770). Kant there for 
the first time delimits two distinct representational faculties: 
Cognition, in so far as it is subject to the laws of sensibility, is sensitive, and, in so far as it is 
subject to the laws of intelligence, it is intellectual or rational. 
In the schools of the ancients, the former was called a phenomenon and the latter a 
noumenon. 
It is thus clear that things which are thought sensitively are representations of things as they 
appear, while things which are intellectual are representations of things as they are. 
(384/2:392) 
Readers of the Critique will only find the last clause of the last quote above strange: in the Critique, 
the status of intellectual representations will indeed be “noumena,” but their ontological and 
epistemic status will be deflated. The Aesthetic establishes that intellectual representations in 
abstraction from sensibility are not of substantial things as they are, but only things as they must be 
thought – this thought in its epistemic emptiness is for Kant not damaging to empirical realism.  
The Inaugural Dissertation is thus a clear “transition” document. On the one hand, it makes 
the important claim that concepts and intuitions have different forms. As such, to provide a full 
account of the conditions of cognition, we need an account of the non-empirical “laws of sensibility” 
and “laws of intelligence.” This is not available in either rationalism or empiricism (at least in Kant’s 
reconstruction of these traditions), in which one is a confusion of the other. On the other hand, the 
Dissertation comes down on the side of rationalism in its affording really real knowledge of things to 
transcendent metaphysics. While intuitions are limited to appearance, concepts have access to the 
world as it really is.  
This further entails that, on the Dissertation’s transitional model, concept and intuition are 
independent in their operation: Kant does not in 1770 feel the need to give an account of the relation 
between concepts and intuitions. As such, the second limb of Kant’s critical “twofold enterprise” – 
Longuenesse’s “finding new grounds for the grip our intellect has on the world” – is not yet present as 
a problem: concepts have an independent grip on the world as it in itself; intuitions have an 
independent grip on the world as it appears. Once conceptual grip on the world as it is in itself is 
relinquished – as the argument of the Aesthetic ostensibly forces us to do – the problem of conceptual 
grip on appearances as immediate objectivity emerges as central.78 This is not immediately a problem 
in the case of empirical concepts (where the concept is generated in experience). It is however a 
problem in cases of a priori conceptual form where that apriority is taken to have a relationship to 
objectivity. 
Experience for Kant must be “in agreement” with such concepts, yet such concepts cannot be 
derived from experience. How is this agreement to be conceived? The Analytic provides the answer in 
essentially four stages: (1) to conceive of a logic that would, like formal logic, be a priori but, unlike 
formal logic, be related to objectivity (“Transcendental Logic”) – a possibility secured by the isolation 
 
78  The force and difficulty of this problem is recognised by Kant in the famous 1772 Letter to Herz. See 
Longuenesse’s discussion in Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 18-20.  
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of pure forms of sensibility in the Aesthetic; (2) to nonetheless draw the functions of transcendental 
logic from formal logic, namely the forms of judgment (“the Metaphysical Deduction”); (3) to ground 
conceptual determination of objects given in intuition by those logical forms as functions of the 
transcendental unity of the subject (“the Transcendental Deduction”); and (4) to demonstrate that 
three key a priori categories (substance, cause, and reciprocal causality or “community”) are conditions 
of the possibility of the experience of objectivity in general (“the Analogies of Experience”). I do not 
intend a complete account of the Deduction or the Analytic that houses it, but only those elements 
salient to Hegel’s reading of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction. Stage (4) will be left out almost 
completely – though causality will be discussed in more detail when we look at Hegel’s grouping 
together of Kant and Hume in the Encyclopedia Logic in Chapter 3.  
Vis-à-vis Hegel, the most important moments of the Analytic is are (1) Transcendental Logic 
understood as a non-formal but a priori logic of objective determination; (2) the maintenance of formal 
logic, both its principle of non-contradiction and its understanding of concepts as predicates of 
possible judgments; and most importantly (3) this account of conceptuality and its apperceptive 
ground in the Transcendental Deduction in terms of “synthesis” of the singulars immediately given in 
the forms of sensible intuition. (1) and (3) together can be seen to constitute a revolutionary 
understanding of conceptual determination, not immediately compatible with the predication model 
borrowed from rationalism and maintained in (2). In my view, elements (1) and (3) are taken up and 
elaborated by Hegel’s Logic. But seeing this clearly means understanding Hegel’s way of lifting the 
Critique from its cognitive context. Kant’s Analytic as a whole constitutes an argument for the non-
empirical conditions of possibility for conceptual determination of empirically real objects for beings 
with our sensibly-conditioned cognition. From the Hegelian perspective, however, what is most crucial 
is that Kant’s argumentation proceeds through a logic of relations. It is Transcendental Logic 
understood as a typology of the relations that condition determinate objectivity – not logic simply or 
immediately exhausted by judgment and syllogism – that clearly links Kant’s Critique to Hegel’s Logic, 
and the Doctrine of Being in particular. For Hegel, thoroughly answering the question “What brings 
indeterminacy to determinacy?” means abstracting (at least at first) from questions of the conditions 
of empirical knowledge for our sensibly-conditioned cognition and providing a coherent logical 
account of the relation between the “intuitional” form of relation (singular immediate objects given 
external to one another) and the synthesis of intuitions afforded by conceptual mediation as a function 
of unity.  
 
Transcendental Logic 
Kant begins the Analytic with a section entitled “The Idea of a Transcendental Logic.” To introduce this 
novel idea, Kant starts with a definition of the faculty of the understanding [der Verstand] symmetrical 
to the definition of sensibility as receptivity to receive representations: “on the contrary the faculty 
[Vermögen] for bringing forth representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the 
understanding” (A51/B75). The representations of the understanding are concepts [Begriffe]. In 
keeping with this symmetry, we also get the Kantian “togetherness principle” in its context, in fact in 
three versions: 
 
Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither 
concepts without intuitions corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without 
concepts can yield a cognition (A50/B74). 
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Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be 
thought. 
 
And the next (infamous) sentence: 
 
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Gedanken ohne 
Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind]. It is thus just as necessary to make 
the mind’s concepts sensible [sinnlich zu machen] (i.e., to bring them under concepts) as it is 
to make its intuitions understandable [verständlich zu machen] (i.e., to bring them under 
concepts) (A51/B75). 
  
As should be clear, Kant’s stated position in the Critique is that neither conceptual representations nor 
intuitional representation (as above, an immediate relation to a conceptually undetermined object) 
constitute a cognition [Erkenntnis] in isolation. The symmetry continues in Kant’s next determination 
of the understanding: just as we saw intuitions divided into pure and empirical forms, so too with 
concepts: concepts are empirical if sensation is “mixed” into the representation, pure if no sensation 
is mixed in. Sensation is the “matter of sensible cognition,” but the Aesthetic and now the Analytic are 
concerned with the non-empirical form of representations: “Thus pure intuition contains merely the 
form under which [he should say, in which] something is intuited, and pure concepts only the form of 
thinking an object in general.” The crucial question to be addressed in the Analytic and in particular its 
Deduction – the question missing from the concept/intuition distinction as it is presented in the 1770 
Dissertation – is how the pure (i.e. a priori, i.e. necessary) sensible and conceptual conditions relate to 
one another so as to produce determinate thought of an object.  
To answer this question, Kant draws a distinction between “general” and a new 
“transcendental” logic. The former has two subdivisions, pure and applied. A general pure logic is what 
we have been calling “formal logic,” a convenient designation that is justified by Kant’s definition 
below: 
A general but pure logic therefore has to do with strictly a priori principles, and is a canon of 
the understanding and reason, but only in regard to what is formal in their use, be the 
content what it may (empirical or transcendental) (A59/B84). 
“Be the content what it may” – in other words, indifferent to that content. Nonetheless, Kant maintains 
that such a logic is prescriptive, a “canon” (in the sense of a body of rules) of the understanding and 
reason. It contains the “absolutely necessary rules of thinking, without which no use of the 
understanding takes place.” The first rule is, as we have seen, non-contradiction, “thought’s agreement 
with itself,” which remains for Kant the “conditio sine qua non and thus the negative condition of all 
truth” (A59/B84). On this basis pure general logic is distinguished from applied general logic, which is 
descriptive of thought “under the subjective empirical conditions that psychology teaches us” 
(A53/B77). The latter provides not how we must think, but how we do under certain empirical 
conditions.79 It has been argued that Kant’s account of the ostensibly non-empirical conditions for 
 
79 For an incisive Hegelian account of the prescriptive/descriptive and formal/transcendental distinctions, see 
the first chapter of Richard Winfield, From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel’s Subjective Logic 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006). 
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objective experience is in fact only valid under our given psychological conditions.80 Part of what I want 
to show in Chapter 3 is that Hegel’s critique of Kant’s philosophy as “subjectivist” is not entirely 
reducible to a psychologist charge, but goes rather to Kant’s account of the concept/intuition relation.  
In any case, a prescriptive general logic, as a negative condition of all truth, is only ever a limit. 
For both the pre-Critical and the Critical Kant, this limit is unrecognised and so overstepped in 
rationalism. The Critical Kant puts this overstepping in terms of canon and “organon” (tool). In German 
rationalism, what is merely a canon for the self-consistency of logical determinations “has been used 
as if it were an organon for the production of at least the semblance of objective assertions, and thus 
in fact it has been misused” (A61/B85). As I indicated in 1.2 above, Kant explicitly links this illegitimate 
extension of logical determination to objectivity to indifference. The full quote: 
For since it [pure general logic] teaches us nothing at all about the content of cognition, but 
only the formal conditions of agreement with the understanding, which are entirely indifferent 
with regard to the objects [welche übrigens in Ansehung der Gegenstände gänzlich gleichgültig 
sein], the effrontery [Zumutung] of using it as a tool (organon) for an expansion or extension 
of its information, or at least the pretension of so doing, comes down to nothing but idle 
chatter [Geschwätzigkeit], asserting or impeaching whatever one wants with some plausibility 
(A62/B87).   
Its canon is self-agreement, non-contradiction, which does not go to the content of the terms so 
related. The nothingness of this idle chatter might lead us to take to the “togetherness principle” at 
face value: thinking alone, even in self-agreement, is empty in the sense of “meaningless.” But the 
emptiness Kant is drawing our attention to here only arises once logical determination is considered 
from the standpoint of objective determination, “with regard to the objects.” Thought without the 
immediate relation to objects provided by intuitions – without the “matter of cognition” provided by 
that intuitional relation – is empty in the sense of lacking demonstrable objective purport. But to say 
that thought without intuitions is entirely meaningless cannot be a correct reading of Kant, as is clear 
from Kant’s novel claim for the possibility of a new kind of logic, i.e. transcendental logic, which makes 
the pure forms of thought conditions of objectivity in general. Such a re-tooling of formal logic’s 
objective purport will depend on a demonstration of its objective content, its a priori contribution to 
objective knowledge (that is, its status as synthetic a priori). This content would be different in kind to 
the empirical content of intuitions (sensations, the “matter of sensible cognition”), and different in its 
form to the equally pure forms of intuition (externality).  
In other words, we are here concerned with a pure but contentful logic, whose content goes 
not to sensation, matter in appearances, but the relations that order that content – or rather, the 
relations that order the matter already “ordered and placed” in appearances by the pure forms of 
intuitions.81 The relationships that concepts have to the empirical matter of appearances cannot by 
 
80 Longuenesse provides a brief but comprehensive outline of the history of this psychologist charge against 
Kant’s strategy in the Transcendental Deduction (namely in Gottlob Frege, Hermann Cohen, and Martin 
Heidegger) in Kant on the Human Standpoint (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), 109-116. This material is an 
expansion of introductory remarks in Kant and the Capacity to Judge (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998), 4-7.   
81 Longuenesse explains this difficult picture and its key “in general” locution as follows. With the distinction 
between concepts and intuition in place, Kant has made possible “a logic that is just as pure as formal logic, 
because it does not derive its rules from empirical-psychological considerations… but that is not as general as 
formal logic, in that the rules it considers are specified by the content of thought they are relevant for. They are 
the rules for combining representations given in sensibility, whatever the empirical (sensory) content of these 
representations may be. Those rules are thus not merely formal (concerning only the forms of thought in 
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definition be determined a priori, but the way they combine the pure forms of intuition can be. In 
Kant’s words:  
 
Transcendental Logic… has a manifold of sensibility that lies before it a priori, which the 
transcendental aesthetic has offered to it, in order to provide the pure concepts of the 
understanding with a matter, without which they would be without any content, and thus 
completely empty. Now space and time contain a manifold of pure a priori intuition… (A76-
77/B102). 
Transcendental Logic is objective because it limits itself to that which is given in intuition; it is pure 
because it goes to pure intuitions, not the empirically-given matter in intuitions (sensation). So again, 
if general logic “abstracts from all content” (A76/B102) or treats that content “without distinction” 
(A57/B81-82) between empirical and non-empirical contents, Transcendental Logic has an a priori 
content in virtue of having pure intuitions as its “matter.” Kant has now cleared the site for a novel, 
transcendental form of logic: on the one hand, it is distinguished from pure general logic because it is 
not indifferent to objectivity; on the other hand, it is distinguished from applied general logic (and 
empirical thinking in general) because it concerns only the pure form of objectivity in general, in 
abstraction from the empirically-given content of any particular objective cognition.  
The Metaphysical Deduction: the “dual function” of conceptuality 
Thus far, Kant says, “The understanding has above been explained only negatively, as a non-sensible 
faculty of cognition” (A67/B92). To explain the understanding positively, Kant in the next section of the 
Analytic (entitled “On the Clue [Leitfaden] to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding,” 
§§8-12) makes two crucial moves. Firstly, he identifies the understanding as a faculty of judgment 
which unifies representations (§8) and outlines the logical forms of judgments (§9). But unification of 
representation can be either the unification of subject and predicate concepts in a judgment (synthesis 
intellectualis) or the unification of intuitional representation (synthesis speciosa). As such, Kant’s 
second claim is that these a priori forms as “pure concepts of the understanding” or “categories” effect 
a kind of unification or connection (a “synthesis”) of intuitions (§10). Kant thus advances a dual-
function account of conceptuality. Most importantly, the second conceptual function will turn out to 
be the condition of the first function being about empirical objects: in effecting the synthesis of 
intuitions, the categories constitute the a priori conceptual conditions for the kinds of conceptual 
determination (judgments) treated in §§8-9 being about intuitionally-given objectivity, because 
conceptuality now has a hand in the constitution of that objectivity itself. The Transcendental 
Deduction then has the difficult task of proving this claim, which will ground both conceptual 
unification in judgments and intuitional synthesis in the unity of the subject, with the categories the 
means by which that unity is achieved.  
Note that as the relevance to Hegel’s Logic here is primarily synthesis in its second function 
(synthesis of externally related terms), I will not at this point be providing a full account of the table of 
the logical forms of judgment and its corresponding category in §§9 and 10 (though some of Kant’s 
 
combining concepts and judgment for arriving at valid inferences), but they concern the way a content for 
thought is formed by ordering manifolds in intuition (multiplicities of qualitatively determined spatial and 
temporal parts). These rules are the rules of ‘transcendental logic.’” Beatrice Longunesse, “Kant on a priori 
Concepts: The Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2006), 137-38. 
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account of the categories of quality will be considered in comparison to Hegel’s Seinslogik account in 
Chapter 6).  
 Kant begins his characterisation of the faculty and forms of the understanding with the 
position established in the Aesthetic: “we cannot partake of intuition independently of sensibility.” 
Because sensibility and understanding are distinct, “the understanding is therefore not a faculty of 
intuition.” Now because for Kant the sphere of “cognition” (Kant uses it here in the broad sense, rather 
than the technical sense of objective determination) is exhausted by being either intuitive or 
conceptual, Kant concludes: “thus the cognition of every, at least human, understanding is a cognition 
through concepts, not intuitive but discursive [discursiv]” (A68/B93). If intuitions rest on “affections,” 
discursivity is a matter of “functions,” and that means judging, “ordering different representations 
under a common one [my emphasis],” distinct from the “ordering and placing” within intuition. Kant 
then uses an example judgment to illustrate the ordering under characteristic of judgments, as well as 
the way in which judgments establish unity among our representations. It is important here to 
understand the way in which judgments for Kant effect unity among representations in order to later 
understand the Deduction’s identification of a priori conceptual activity, the synthesis of intuitions, 
and the unity of the subject.  
In every judgment there is a concept that holds of many, and that among this many also 
comprehends a given representation which is then related immediately to the object. So in 
the judgment, e.g., “All bodies are divisible,” the concept of the divisible… is here particularly 
related to the concept of body, and this in turn is related to certain appearances that come 
before us. These objects are therefore mediately represented by the concept of divisibility 
(A68-69/B93-94).  
The predicate “divisible” through this judgment “holds of many” subject concepts, i.e. any “body.” The 
immediate relation of this subject concept to objects is, per Kant’s pre-Critical anti-rationalist 
desideratum, supplied not by any further conceptual representations but by “certain appearances that 
come before us.” Given an appearance conceptually determined as an object subsumable under the 
concept “body” (Kant will not until the Deduction explain how this step happens), it follows from the 
judgment that that object will have the predicate “divisibility.” That is, that which is determined as a 
body is through the judgment – or “mediately represented” by the judgment – also determined by the 
concept of divisibility. In other words, the concepts of body and divisibility are brought together into a 
unity, such that the determination of an appearance as a body necessarily (in the sense of “inescapably 
demands”) that it also be determined as divisible.82 This necessary relation between a subject and its 
predicate properties (and between its predicate properties) in conceptually determinate objects will 
be crucial when we come to the Deduction. But at this point what I want to emphasise is that the 
conceptual determination of judgment extends the sensibly-given immediacy of any singular object 
beyond the “place” of that object in space and time. Rather than merely encounter this object “outside 
of <and next to>” that object, concepts enable this object to be conceptually related to objects not 
spatially or temporally contiguous with it. In being able to refer a spatio-temporally present object to 
a spatio-temporally absent object nonetheless conceptually united by shared properties, conceptual 
form in some sense “frees” us from the point in time and space in which we presently are, and the 
 
82 The helpful phrase “inescapably demands” is Longuenesse’s. Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 49. 
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singularity of each intuitional encounter in that time and space.83 Indeed, if we could not so mediate 
our spatio-temporal moment with thought of absent but conceptually related objects, we would not 
be able to experience difference in our spatio-temporal moment itself. That is – and again this is a 
conceptualist reading – the differentiation of this object from that object next to and outside of it is 
itself the minimal form of conceptual achievement, a Kantian insight that will loom large in the 
Deduction. In any case, Kant’s above account of judgement fills out what Kant means in his definition 
of concepts as mediated and general representations: the function of concepts is to represent generic 
identity across multiple episodes of sensible immediacy.  
Having demonstrated with an example the generality and mediation provided by judgment, 
Kant then outlines the minimal possible forms of judgment, by “abstract[ing] from all content of a 
judgement in general, and attend[ing] to the mere form of the understanding in it….” (A70/B95). These 
yield four “titles” – quantity, quality, relation and modality – each with three moments. This is as yet 
however only a re-presentation of formal logic – Kant claims the forms are “readily found” in the work 
of the logicians – though Kant makes two key amendments.84   
However, as I indicated above, the grip of an empirical concept on an appearance is still 
unexplained. “Concepts, however as predicates of possible judgments, are related to some 
representation of a still undetermined object.” (A69/B94) – but what is this relation? Empiricism has a 
story here, running in terms of psychological association of sense-impressions and words. But we have 
seen in 1.1 that, contra transcendental realism, Kant thinks that if our representational powers have 
to accord with an already constituted object, some form of sceptical gap will obtain, and that 
empiricism in particular cannot explain the relation between a priori conceptuality and objects – only 
the a posteriori content of concepts. We have seen in 2.1 in the Aesthetic that the immediate 
representation of a (conceptually) undetermined object is an appearance. Now in §8 of the Analytic 
we have an account of the subsumptive, unifying, and mediating function of concepts operative in and 
through the logical forms of judgments. So we are at the problem of the Deduction: how are logical 
forms to relate to empirical objects? 
To connect this problem up with the consideration of Kant’s pre-Critical work in 1.2. Kant 
characterised logical determination in terms of content indifference.  In the Analytic, we saw this 
indifference emphasised in the argument for the necessity of Transcendental Logic. It is taken up again 
in a different way at the opening of the Transcendental Deduction (§14), this time in terms of 
“determinate” and “indeterminate” judgments. Kant seeks to show “the same categorical form of 
judgment (‘S is P’) can be employed in two different ways, viz., indeterminately and determinately.”85 
 
 
83 Paul Redding makes a similar point in one of his discussions of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction. “Separating 
out intuitive and conceptual forms of representation, Kant could identify the influence of spatiotemporal location 
with the contribution of sensory intuition… But to the extent that the content of thought is conceptual, its 
content is neither spatial nor temporal… This facet of logical space is reflected in the idea that if a proposition is 
true, it is eternally true—genuine propositional contents must be free from tethering to any particular place and 
time” Continental Idealism, 59. Redding notes the Platonic and Neoplatonist heritage of the idea that conceptual 
thought enables “indifference to spatiotemporal location” and Kant’s deflation of such a God’s eye view of things 
insofar as “purely conceptual knowledge must be ‘empty,’” Continental Idealism, 58-59. The “Indifference to 
spatiotemporal location” of conceptual form is another point of entry into the content indifference discussed in 
1.2 above.  
84 Kant’s distinguishes singular from universal judgments and infinite judgments from affirmative ones, whereas 
these judgments are treated as identical in predicate logic. The latter pair we will have an opportunity to consider 
in Hegel’s alternative account of qualitative determination in the Logic.  
85 Lee, “The Determinate-Indeterminate Distinction in Kant’s Theory of Judgment,” 205. 
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…the function of the categorical judgment was that of the relationship of the subject to the 
predicate, e.g., “All bodies are divisible.” Yet in regard to the merely logical use of the 
understanding, it would remain undetermined [blieb es unbestimmt] which of these two 
concepts will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate. 
For one can also say: “Something divisible is a body” (B128-9). 
Because formal or “general” logic is content-indifferent, the content of S can be exchanged with the 
content of P without compromising the truth-value of the statement from the perspective of and 
within the resources of formal logic. The criterion of non-contradiction is still met. Given that criterion 
alone, it is impossible to tell which content should be in the position of S in the categorical judgment, 
and which in the position of P. Bringing this reversibility problem into contact with the first use of the 
“All bodies are divisible” example treated above, the question is: what constrains the judging agent to 
relate this immediately given object as appearance to the subject concept of body, such that divisibility 
would be predicated of and necessarily entailed by bodiliness?86  
Kant’s answer is the dual-function discussed above:  
 
The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives 
unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed 
generally, is called the pure concept of understanding (A79/B104-105). 
So Kant claims – and at this point it is only a claim – that the logical functions of judgment are 
responsible for unification of representations on two levels. Firstly, there is unification of conceptual 
representations via the logical forms of judgments. But this activity of unification does not go only to 
the logical relation of thought contents (indifferent to their either empirical or a priori origin). Those 
logical forms as “pure concepts of the understanding” or categories are also responsible for 
synthesising different representations “in an intuition” – or effecting “synthetic unity of the manifold 
of intuition” (A79/B105). It is because they are so responsible that Kant can solve the problem first 
formulated in the letter to Herz: in synthesising intuitions, the categories “then are related necessarily 
and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be 
thought at all” (A93/B126). In other words, empirical concept application (e.g. the predication of the 
concept “body” of a singular and immediate appearance, “that is a body”) will be dependent on the 
categories insofar as these are responsible for synthesising intuitions such that individual objects can 
be cognised at all.   
The Transcendental Deduction 
Conceptual and Non-Conceptual Interpretations 
I must pause to directly address the ongoing interpretive debate about the aims and intended results 
of the Deduction. For the conceptualist reader, the togetherness principle secures not only conceptual 
determination of an object, but objectivity in general. Per Longuenesse: “these functions [of the 
 
86 Another way to put the problem might be: Kant claims that all judgments are potentially the major premise of 
a syllogism. This is clear in the above example: All bodies are divisible; this object is a divisible; therefore, it is a 
body. But in this syllogism, the second step contains not a general and mediated representation, but a singular 
and immediate one: this object here and now (i.e. the object as appearance).  How is it to be conceptually 
determined, such that it can be subsumed under the concept of body, and so brought together with necessity in 
thought with other objects so subsumed?  
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understanding] are not only conditions of the subordination of concepts according to logical use, but 
conditions of the very presentation of appearances in sensible intuition…”87 On this view, the dual 
function thesis means that, without certain conceptual conditions obtaining, intuition does not give 
us appearances (conceptually undetermined objects) at all, and thus the stakes of the Deduction are 
so high as to risk loss of the representation of objects all together. The opposed non-conceptualist 
reading is that intuitions unmediated by concepts nonetheless give us a non-conceptual objectivity.88 
As such, Allais is right to more concretely characterise the Deduction as attempting to show the 
conceptual conditions “for representing intuitions as connected with necessity and universality and 
that without this we would have perceptual particulars but no objects of thought.”89 On this view, the 
Deduction is not about securing determinate representation of spatio-temporal objects, but only the 
thinkability of intuitionally-given objects as instances of more general kinds, i.e. the transcendental 
conditions for concept predication.90 Using the terminology worked through in 2.1, we can say: the 
goal of the Deduction for non-conceptualist readers is to demonstrate that spatio-temporally 
organised but conceptually undetermined objects (appearances) are in principle conceptually 
determinable; for the conceptualist, the Deduction seeks to show that a priori conceptuality is a 
condition of there being cognition of objects at all.  
There is textual support in the Critique for both interpretations. Indeed, the non-conceptualist 
Kantian Robert Hanna does admit that Kant’s Critique, and the togetherness principle in particular, is 
the origin of contemporary non-conceptualist and conceptualist views – going so far as to call Kant a 
“conflicted conceptualist.” 91  Kant himself explicitly reinforces the non-conceptualist intuitional 
 
87 Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 28. Another example of the conceptualist reading, and perhaps the key 
representative of that position in Lucy Allais’ non-conceptualist account, is Lorne Falkenstein, Kant’s Intuitionism: 
A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1995). As Falkenstein puts it 
like this in his more recent summary account of the Transcendental Aesthetic, “For Kant, our sense are 
insufficient for the perception of particular objects. Perception occurs only when the information acquired by 
the senses is recognised by us as an instance of an object of a particular kind.” Lorne Falkenstein, “Kant’s 
Transcendental Aesthetic,” in A Companion to Kant, ed. Graham Bird (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 141.  
88 In his long defence of a Kantian non-conceptualism, Robert Hanna defines conceptualism as the claim “that all 
mental concepts are strictly determined by minded animals’ conceptual capacities.”   And then a little later: 
conceptualism “says that our cognitive access to the targets of our intentionality is always and necessarily 
mediated by concepts.”  This then leads to the “fundamental philosophical issue: can and do we sometimes 
cognitively encounter things directly and pre-discursively (Non-Conceptualism), or must we always cognitively 
encounter them only with the framework of discursive rationality (Conceptualism)?” Robert Hanna, “Beyond the 
Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 
(2011) 19(3): 325-6.  
89 Lucy Allais, Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and His Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 275.  
90 Here some differences in the non-conceptualist camp open up. Robert Hanna thinks Kant is “conflicted” about 
his conceptualism because the foundational transcendental idealist commitment – as a thesis about space and 
time – means that he is unable in the Deduction to bring spatio-temporal appearances under the categories 
without remainder (the possibility of “essentially rogue objects” is not foreclosed), while Allais argues that the 
Deduction is successful in accounting for concept predication of empirical objects. Hanna, “Kant, Hegel, and the 
Fate of Non-Conceptual Content,” 21-22. See also Hanna’s more closer working through of this argument in 
“Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and The Gap in the B Deduction,” International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies (2011) 19(3): 399-415. Allais in contrast claims that the Deduction “vindicates” the 
categories, Manifest Reality, 260.  
91 “Kant is clearly and undeniably also a Conceptualist, and indeed the philosophical discoverer or inventor of 
conceptualism.” Hanna, “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual Content,” 13. Hanna makes the same 
point in, “Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content,” International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 19(3), 323-398, 333.  
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independence in the following passage at the start of the Deduction, which can be read as a kind of 
“mission statement” for the Deduction as a whole: 
 
“The categories of the understanding, on the contrary, do not represent to us the conditions 
under which objects are given in intuition at all, and hence objects can indeed appear to us 
without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding, and therefore 
without the understanding containing their a priori conditions. Thus a difficulty is revealed 
here that we did not encounter in the field of sensibility, namely how subjective conditions of 
thinking should have objective validity, i.e. yield conditions of the possibility of all cognition 
of objects; for appearances can certainly be given in intuition without the functions of the 
understanding” (A90/B122).92 
 
This quote suggests that the Aesthetic has demonstrated that the pure forms of sensibility are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for objects as appearance, and it is because the pure forms of 
sensibility are independent of the similarly pure “functions of the understanding” that the problem of 
the Deduction arises.93 In other words, the question to be addressed in the Deduction, i.e. how the 
non-empirically-drawn forms of judgment (the “subjective conditions of thinking” above) can relate to 
appearances, is both separate to and dependent on the question treated in the Aesthetic, i.e. how the 
forms of our sensibility place and order sensation such that objects can be immediately given to us as 
appearances. Further textual support for the non-conceptualist reading can be found in Kant’s 
approach to his favourite category. For Kant, causality is an a priori “rule of synthesis” – a concept - “in 
which given something A something entirely different B is posited according to a rule.” As objects given 
in intuition are not structured according to this conceptual rule – but merely placed side-by-side and 
after one another – it is a priori possible that “such a concept is perhaps entirely empty and finds no 
object anywhere among the appearances” (A90/B122). But even if this Humean conclusion were 
correct, Kant claims that “Appearance would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition 
by no means requires the functions of thinking” (A91/B123).   
With these textual resources, the non-conceptualist can charge the conceptualist with 
conflating intuitions and sensation, because such a reading neglects the immediate spatio-temporal 
objectivity we have seen afforded by intuitional form. As I said in concluding 2.1 above, if intuitions 
were just sensation, then intuitions would be radically or completely “blind,” because sensations 
 
92  Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais quote this passage as direct textual evidence in defense of their non-
conceptualist reading. Allais, Manifest Reality, 162. Hanna, “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual 
Content,” 2. 
93 Both Hanna and Allais argue that the problem of the Deduction presupposes independent non-conceptual 
content, and that failing to see this misses the distinctiveness of the Aesthetic and Analytic. As Allais says, “By 
seeing the concern of both the Deduction and Aesthetic as being with perceptual particulars, the conceptualist 
reading, in my view, fails to see what is distinctive in both sections.” Manifest Reality, 268. Hanna similarly argues 
that given Kant’s commitment to non-Conceptual content, “as a consequence, there is a prima facie difficulty for 
him about how to demonstrate the a priori necessity and objective validity of the categories,” i.e. because he 
has to show that non-conceptual contents (appearances) are in principle determinable by the categories, despite 
being organised themselves in an irreducibly non-conceptual way. Furthermore, as the Aesthetic’s 
demonstration of the a priority of intuitional form (from the possibility of geometry) “will not work for pure 
concepts, therefore there must be a logically distinct argument for the a priori necessity and validity of pure 
concepts…”  Hanna, “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual Content,” 13-14.  
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without intuitional form are indeed without individuation.94  Unfortunately, as we will see in 3.1 below, 
this conflation is present in certain Hegelian readers of Kant, which has enabled Kantians to argue that 
Hegel himself is guilty of misreading Kant. However, I argue against both non-conceptualism and 
reductive “Hegelian” conceptualism that one can recognise the distinction between intuitional form 
in distinction and the sensible matter it organises and still hold that concepts are required for that 
intuitional form to function as it does for creatures with our conceptual capacities.  
In my view, Kant’s explicit non-conceptualist statements are trumped by the argumentative 
movement of the Critique itself. Again, I agree with Conant’s argument that Kant’s Critique 
demonstrates the constitutive inter-dependence of intuitional and conceptual form. As Conant shows, 
recognising this inter-dependence requires attention not only to Kant’s immediate definitions of such 
forms in the Aesthetic and the start of the Analytic, but to the “dialectical” argumentative movement 
that undermines an understanding of their function based on immediate definitions alone. Conant’s 
reading clearly has Hegelian methodological resonance, something I discuss in more detail in Chapter 
5. Here, however, what is important to this dissertation’s comparative analysis is the picture of the 
concept/intuition distinction in Kant that emerges from taking up and elaborating Conant’s line of 
approach.  
To provide this picture in advance: Kant does not think – and begins the Deduction by denying 
– that intuitional form can provide on its own cognition of any kind of relation between singular and 
immediate representations, not even external relations. The definitional work of the Aesthetic makes 
it sound as if intuitional form on its own furnishes cognition of relationally-determined individuals, i.e. 
appearances as mutually exclusive limitations of one space and one time. But once we read on to the 
“synthesis of apprehension in an intuition” in the A Deduction, and the synthetic activity of the faculty 
of imagination in both A and B Deductions, it becomes clear that intuitions provide us with immediate 
cognition of individuals, but not cognition of the relations that individuate them. Cognition of the 
“relational” aspect of intuitional form turns out to be dependent on Kant’s second function of 
conceptuality, i.e. his novel characterisation of conceptual spontaneity not only or immediately as 
concept predication, but as the “grip” or “grasp” of immediately indifferent singulars in the 
“construction” of relations between terms. (The etymology of “Concept” in English is to “take 
together”’ likewise, the German equivalent Begriff is from greifen, “to grab,” and Kant suggests the 
etymological relevance at A103). For Kant, I will argue, an immediate singular representation requires 
conceptuality to articulate its relations with the other singular objects that it excludes from a particular 
place in space and time. In other words, conceptuality is required to represent the form of relation 
specific to intuitions, i.e. external relationality; conceptuality is required to think singular 
representations in relation to one another such that they can be cognised as “outside one another,” 
 
94 For Allais, the conceptualist idea that intuitions require concepts to present us with particulars attributes in 
turn to Kant the view that “without concepts we would merely have a mass of sensory input, an unorganised 
sensory mush, rather than any awareness of distinct, discrete individuals” Manifest Reality, 148. Allais cites Lorne 
Falkenstein, and references McDowell’s Mind and World and Longuenesse’s Kant and the Capacity to Judge as 
evidence of the “dominance” of the conceptualist view, as well as two more recent commentators: Hannah 
Ginsborg, “Empirical Concepts and the Content of Experience,” European Journal of Philosophy (2006) 14(3): 
349-72 and Aaron Griffith, “Perception and the Categories: A Conceptualist Reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason,” European Journal of Philosophy 20, no. 2 (2010): 193-222. Ginsborg’s 2008 paper “Was Kant a 
Conceptualist?” Philosophical Studies 137(1): 65-77 in focussing on the problematic status of imagination in the 
Deduction does highlight the non-binary character of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction, as we will be see 
below. Mind and World and the impact of its particular conceptualist reading of Kantian idealism on the Kant-
Hegel debate will be treated in detail in 3.1.   
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i.e. so that we can be conscious of the specifically intuitional mode of difference as difference in place. 
On my reading, intuitional representations without conceptual mediation are “blind” in the sense that 
they are blind to – have no reference to – other such representations. 
My version of Kantian conceptualism does not mean that intuitional form as relational 
individuation is jettisoned as Allais fears.  It is rather that conceptual work is required for the relational 
component of that individuation to show up. Intuitional form is successful in the sense that it provides 
us with individuals. But intuitional form is, if one can put it like this, too successful: each individual is 
represented as excluding all other such individuals from its place in space and time, such that those 
excluded are not represented at all. We have in an intuition one object, not the others outside of it. To 
cognise that individual as in relation to those it excludes, conceptual spontaneity must connect singular 
representation up with other such representations. Put slightly differently: individuals are the “after-
effects” of relations, but in their immediacy individuals appear without those relations explicit.95 
Immediacy just means “without mediation,” without connection to another, such that mediation is 
required for the relational structure of intuitional form to be cognised – or, to put it closer to the 
language of Hegel’s post-Kantian, non-cognitive account of determination in the Logic – for that 
structure to be posited or made explicit. 
Note that this interpretation can take on board some of Allais’ most central claims. In Allais’ 
phrase, repeated at least twice in Manifest Reality: conceptual syntheses are “primarily something 
that is done to intuition, not something that produces intuition.”96 I do not take conceptualism to mean 
that all the work is done by conceptual form, but rather that conceptual form is required to represent 
and so cognise the relational component of intuitional form. In other words, I can agree with Allais’ 
non-conceptualism up to the point at which relationality is ascribed to our sensibility: As Allais puts it, 
because the Aesthetic argues that “intuitions are singular and immediate representations which give 
us objects… [t]his means that a manifold of outer intuition is an immediately presented array of 
distinct, spatio-temporally located and related particulars.”97 Intuition does give us distinct, spatio-
temporally located objects one by one, outside and after one another. But because it gives us objects 
one by one, outside and after one another, the cognising subject must actively bring them into relation.   
My version of Kantian conceptualism is I think reflected in Hegel’s treatment of “outside-one-
another-being” in the Encyclopedia Logic and Logic. In my view, Hegel is attentive to the necessity that 
intuitional form – understood logically as singular immediacy – be mediated in order to be 
determinate, and he understands mediation in a way suggested Kant himself: namely, conceptual 
determination is minimally understood to be the activity of introducing relations into the “outside-
one-another-being” that characterises singular immediacies.  
 
 
95 The language of singulars as an “after-effect” of constitutive relationality is Andrew Benjamin’s. Towards a 
Relational Ontology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015), 3. Benjamin in that work and its follow-
up Virtue in Being (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016) considers the history of philosophy as an 
“effacement” of relations, instead erroneously affording singularity a foundational role. See my review of Virtue 
in Being in The Oxford Literary Review 40.1 (2018): 124–136. This thesis obviously contests that such a historical 
characterisation is appropriate to either Kant or Hegel. It also provides an alternative explanation as to why that 
relationality is “effaced,” namely, because relations do not appear immediately, and immediacy is logically bound 
up with singularity as such.    
96 Manifest Reality, 150. And later: “the syntheses are something that is done to intuitions…”, 169.  
97 Manifest Reality, 170. 
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Synthesis and Spontaneity 
Kant presents “synthesis” in this way: “Only the spontaneity of our thought requires that this manifold 
first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be made out 
of it. I call this action synthesis [synthesis]” (A77/B103). This “only” is important. Both A and B 
Deductions makes it clear that the comparison and connection required for cognition is not available 
in sensibility in any way. Connection is neither present a posteriori in sensations (because any such 
connection would not be a connection for us, would not be a representation, would merely be sensory 
modification), nor is this connection present in the pure forms of intuition. At the start of the A 
Deduction: “receptivity can make cognitions possible only if combined with spontaneity” (A97). The 
“with” here is ambiguous, but the opening of the B Deduction clarifies Kant’s position: “the 
combination [Verbindung] (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the 
senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of sensible intuition; for it is an 
act of the spontaneity of the power of representation” (B129-30). And therefore: “we can present 
nothing as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves, and that among 
all representations combination is the only one that is not given through objects…” (B130). Synthesis 
or combination, then, is not an operation or function of our receptivity – the faculty of sensibility 
through which objects are given to us – but is a function of the spontaneity that characterises the 
faculty of the understanding. So concepts will in some way be said to be doing the combining, as 
already announced by the dual function thesis above.   
In line with this thesis, Kant in both versions of the Transcendental Deduction does not present 
a priori concepts (the categories) understood per the Metaphysical Deduction as “logical forms of 
judgment” as immediately responsible for synthesis the manifold of intuition. The categories are the 
transcendental ground of activities of synthesis of the manifold, i.e. conceptuality in its second, non-
predicative function. Kant in the “Transition” section to both A and B Deductions distinguishes: “… 1) 
the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense; 2) the synthesis of this manifold through the 
imagination; finally 3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception” (A94/B127).  This 
threefold move toward categorial applicability to empirical objects is clear in the A Deduction, whose 
“Second Section” “prepare[s] rather than instruct[s]” the reader by working four numbered sections 
corresponding to these three combinatorial functions plus (4) the synthetic activity of the categories 
in and through which apperception obtains (A98-A115). The A Deduction then repeats these steps in 
a more integrated way in its “Third Section” (A115-A128).98 In the A Deduction, then, a consideration 
of the empirical and pure syntheses of intuition and imagination turn out to be conditioned by the 
“transcendental unity of apperception.” In short: representations to be synthesised must necessarily 
belong together in the unity of one subject. The categories are then introduced as the functions by 
which this necessary unity is obtained, and therefore, synthesis of intuition is grounded in the 
categories.  
In contrast, The B Deduction begins by effectively summarising the treatment of synthesis in 
intuition from the A Deduction under the formula “synthesis of the manifold” (B130), but considers in 
detail its condition in the unity of apperception (B131-142, §§15-19), so that §20 can claim “All sensible 
intuitions stand under the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come 
together in one consciousness” (B143). This leads Longuenesse in her close reading of the Deduction 
 
98 Longuenesse points out that this third section in fact repeats the four-step movement of the second section 
twice, first by moving through the a priori syntheses of sense and imagination to apperception (clearly 
distinguished from their a posteriori versions at A116) and then again “by beginning from beneath, namely with 
what is empirical” (A120). Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 36. 
 60
to suggest that the two versions are complementary – with one beginning where the other left off.99 
In short, in both A and B versions it is only after the argument that synthesis in intuition and 
imagination is grounded in apperceptive unity is established that the objective purport of the 
categories established as functions of that unity.  
It is important to see that this line of approach (through synthesis of the manifold to the 
objective purport of the categories) is made necessary by Kant’s commitment to the form of intuitional 
representation as that of discrete individuals: 
“If every individual representation were entirely foreign to the other, as it were isolated and 
separated from it, then there would never arise anything like cognition, which is a whole of 
compared and connected representations” (A97).  
This is an extremely important statement. Firstly, this way of setting up the problem – how “foreign” 
and “isolated” intuitional representations come to be combined by our spontaneity so as to constitute 
thinkable objects – follows necessarily from the Aesthetic’s characterisation of intuitional form as we 
have discussed it above, i.e. as representing individuals as excluding other such individuals from their 
place within space or time. Robert Stern emphasises this point in Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the 
Object: “Kant’s atomistic picture of intuitions, his conception of unity as the relating together of pre-
existing elements, and his account of synthesis through the categories are therefore really all of a 
piece.”100 Even before the detail is filled in, Kant’s claim that “combination does not lie in the objects” 
either in themselves or as they are given in intuition means that objectivity will be understood as “the 
result a synthesizing activity, while the material our which the object is composed is taken to be an 
intrinsically unrelated plurality.” 101  As Kant himself puts it, to say that “appearance contains a 
manifold” means that “different perceptions by themselves are encountered dispersed and separate 
in the mind” thus “a combination of them, which they cannot have in sense itself, is therefore 
necessary” (A120). So the “placing and ordering” of intuition turns out to be, from the perspective of 
cognition – of objective determination – to be inadequate: Intuition gives us one thing after and next 
to one another, but in so doing, it provides us with representations of individuals without reference or 
connection to those individuals after or next to them. Although Hegel does not quite explicitly say it, 
Hegel’s Logic will be shown to argue that Kant’s way of getting from intuitional non-relation to the 
relation characteristic of spontaneity and required for generality cannot consistently overcome the 
arbitrariness that Kant is worried about.  
Central to the Deduction’s argument for the necessity of conceptual synthesis of the 
intuitional manifold is Kant’s drawing attention to what would happen to empirical cognition if the 
transcendental grounds of synthesis did not obtain, if intuitions were left in their atomistic “side-by-
side.” George Dicker characterizes the transcendental argument as “the attempt to account for the 
kinds of experience that we indisputedly have.”102 Mark Sacks characterises transcendental arguments 
 
99 Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 34. Longuenesse there points out that Kant make a similar point at Bxlii.  
100 Robert Stern, Structure of the Object, 20.  
101 Structure of the Object, 21. Stern quotes a passage from the Bounds of Sense in making this point, which I 
reproduce here: “Belief in the occurrence of the process of synthesis as an antecedent condition of experience 
and belief in the antecedent occurrence of disconnected impressions as materials for the process to work on are 
beliefs which support each other and are necessary to each other.” P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, 32. 
Strawson’s characterisation of the manifold of intuition as “impressions” is imprecise and indicates a 
conceptualist reading, in which conceptuality is required for sensations to constitute individuals (which on a non-
conceptualist reading is already constituted by the ordering of intuitional form).  
102 George Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Analytic Introduction (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004), 13.  
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as starting “from premises that are so rudimentary and indisputable that the interlocutor, presumably 
the sceptic, cannot fail to accept them, and then by a series of valid moves they yield a conclusion that 
is precisely of the sort that [the interlocutor] did question.”103 We can parse this structure as follows: 
transcendental arguments have the form: “Our experience has a certain feature F. Experience with 
feature F would not be possible if it were not true that p. Therefore p.”104 Filling this in with some of 
Kant’s content: because our experience is indisputably one of “compared and connected 
representations,” and this would not be possible without the synthesis of the manifold whose ultimate 
ground is the categories, therefore the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience. This 
way of characterising transcendental argument, as becomes clear on both Dicker’s and Sacks’ account, 
is a way of explaining the synthetic a priori content they purport to contain. That is, the indisputable 
experience from which we begin leads to conclusions not contained or entailed in the propositional 
content by which that experience is designated.105  
What is neglected in this characterisation of Kantian argument is that, in the Deduction, this 
argument’s first step includes a negation. Kant’s begins in fact with the claim that our experience has 
a certain feature F because it indisputably does not have feature X. The accent – the “indisputable” – 
falls on the negation. Putting Kant’s content into this revised form: “Our experience has the feature of 
comparison and connection, because it indisputably is not one of confusion, blindness, etc. Our 
experience as a “whole of compared and connected representations” would not be possible if it were 
not true that certain conceptual conditions hold. Therefore they hold.”106 So my commenting on this 
reference to indeterminacy in the Deduction is not the result of the peculiar trajectory of this 
comparative work, but is essential to understanding the argumentative strategy of the Deduction as a 
whole.  
Apprehension, Reproduction and Apperception 
Again, the second section of the A Deduction provides an account of three spontaneous syntheses: (1) 
the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition; (2) the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination; 
and (3) the synthesis of recognition in the concept (which will turn out to be apperception). Each of 
these, at a different level of complexity, holds representations together as conditions of the possibility 
of propositional concept use, i.e. properties being picked out by predicate concepts. So while the three 
syntheses go to work on different representative strata (more detail in a moment) they belong to the 
same act, which Kant late in the A Deduction calls transcendental imagination, and in the B Deduction 
figurative synthesis or “synthesis speciosa” to distinguish it from the synthesis effected by logical forms 
 
103 Mark Sacks, “The Nature of Transcendental Arguments,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13, no. 
4 (2005): 400.  
104 I draw this formalization from Johannes Roessler’s graduate seminar on Kant at the University of Warwick.    
105 Sacks’ worry is not so much with the initial, “empirically established” premise, which is “so basic that it cannot 
be denied.” He is rather concerned with the “nature of the moves that come later,” en route to the “ampliative” 
claim that characterises synthetic a priori content. “Sacks, “The Nature of Transcendental Arguments,” 439-441. 
106  Now, on this reconstruction, we can begin understand Hegel’s problems with Kant’s position – and his 
motivation for re-doing determinacy via an ontological rather than transcendental Logic. Firstly, in order to get 
transcendental argument running, we have to determine our experience as being one of determinacy, by 
opposing it to indeterminacy. Determinacy is then already assumed here to be of the form this and not that, F 
and not X. We thus slip in the logical form of determination via negation or contrastive comparison without 
accounting for this form. Now, this is not a problem for Kant, who has already taken the forms of judgment – 
including negative judgments – to be the minimal units of sense. As we will see in Chapter 6, the “quality” section 
of the Science of Logic provides an alternative derivation of negation, and then of negation as determinative of 
qualitative contrast. 
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in abstraction from intuition, “synthesis intellectualis.” 107  In other words, the Metaphysical 
Deduction’s presentation of conceptuality in terms of logical forms of judgment gives way via the dual-
function thesis to an account of a more primary spontaneous activity, indicated by the etymology of 
the word itself – concepts [Begriffe] as grasping or grabbing – and whose faculty is the transcendental 
imagination.108   
The dual-function thesis falls out in such a way that conceptuality in this sense is the condition 
for the unification of empirical concepts of objects in judgments. To say that this activity is “more 
primary” and “conditions” empirical concept application is licensed by Kant’s text:  Kant in the A 
Deduction describes at each level a synthesis of empirical intuitions and then that synthesis as it 
operates on purely formal intuition alone, with this latter the transcendental condition for any 
empirical synthesis. This is summarised when he turns to the third section of the A version: 
“The possibility of an experience in general and cognition of its objects rest on three subjective 
sources: sense, imagination, and apperception; each of these can be considered empirically, 
namely in application to given appearances, but they are also elements or foundations a priori 
that make this empirical use itself possible.” (A115) 
Kant then spells out the transcendental content of the three syntheses: 
“But pure intuition (with regard to it as representation, time, the form of inner intuition) 
grounds the totality of perception a priori; the pure synthesis of the imagination grounds 
association a priori; and pure apperception, i.e. the thoroughgoing identity of oneself in all 
possible representations, grounds empirical consciousness a priori.” (A115-116).  
I want to pay attention very carefully to the way in which the pure forms of intuitions are connected 
by spontaneity in these steps.  
“1. On the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition” (A98-100). In the Aesthetic Kant has 
shown that all our representations belong to “inner sense,” whose form is time. Kant now holds that 
it is in the “one thing after another” structure of time in which synthesis must be effected. As he puts 
it, all our representations belong to inner sense, “and as such all of our cognitions are in the end 
subjected to the formal conditions of inner sense, namely time, as that in which they must all be 
ordered, connected and brought into relations [Verhältnisse].” He then remarks: “This is a general 
remark on which must ground everything that follows” (A99), which should be taken seriously. The 
pure forms of sensibility “place and order” sensations after one another in appearances in the form of 
inner sense, but do not without some contribution of our own spontaneity bring them into cognised 
relations. Unrelated – that is, aconceptual – appearances would for Kant issue in the first form of 
“blindness” or indeterminacy we encounter in the account of the syntheses: 
 
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such 
if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another; for 
 
107 A118, B151. See Longuenesse’s spelling this unity of synthetic activity out in Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 
35-36.  
108 Note that I raise imagination here not to link to a later discussion of Hegel’s claims in the Differenzschrift and 
Faith and Knowledge that Kant’s “imagination” unbeknownst to Kant represents the unity of subject and the 
objective world, which Kant’s limitation of knowledge to appearances has divided. That early way of putting the 
critique has been treated in detail by Sally Sedgwick, Hegel’s Critique of Kant (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012), 108-118. 
Rather, I consider synthesis here to provide a basis in Kant’s text for Hegel’s mature critique and transformation 
of Kant’s cognitive model of determination in the Logic. I discuss Sedgwick’s work at some length in 3.1. 
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as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything other absolute unity. 
Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say, in the representation 
of space), it is necessary first to run through and then take together this manifoldness, whose 
action I call the synthesis of apprehension… (A99). 
 
This is a difficult paragraph because it begins by saying that we need the synthesis of 
apprehension in order to have a manifold and not an “absolute unity”; and then that we need that 
same synthesis “for unity of intuition to come from this manifold.” This sounds contradictory until it is 
recognised that both identity (here “unity”) and difference (here the “manifold”) is required for there 
to be a determinate difference. In other words: distinction requires relation and vice-versa. If we had 
no way of relating one appearance in inner sense (in time) from the appearance that comes after or 
before it, each appearance would be identical to the next in the sense that we would have no way of 
telling the difference between them. A phenomenological mode best draws out the threat of 
indeterminacy here: were no relation between intuitions in place, each temporal representation would 
completely fill our consciousness, before being replaced by the successive appearance that would 
completely fill consciousness in turn. Without another representation to compare the present one to, 
each moment would be a self-contained whole, collapsed on itself, as it were, “an absolute unity” in 
which there is no determinateness that could be picked out before the next representation swallowed 
it whole. Note that the “before” of the phenomenological mode might confuse the logical point, 
because it could be read as: if one only had more time, one could pick out difference in the present 
determination of inner sense. But time is here exactly what we have more of – the next moment is 
coming – and it is precisely because we have more of it that we cannot pick out any “manifold” in the 
absolute unity filling consciousness.  My point here is that if our cognition were saturated by mutually 
exclusive, sequentially ordered representations of inner sense, appearances would be indifferent to 
one another; they would be unrelated and therefore in absolute unity with one another. So, for Kant, 
some conceptual spontaneity has to go to work on the manifold of intuitions to relate and so 
distinguish them. 
“2. On the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination” (A100). Kant thinks that synthesis as 
apprehension, while necessary for apprehending relation and therefore distinction between the 
manifold of spatio-temporal objects, is only a moment of the synthetic activity of our spontaneity. That 
activity also contains reproduction of representations in inner sense; this spontaneous capacity for 
reproduction is a non-empirical condition for us having the kind of empirical associations that we do, 
and Kant’s strategy for proving this is to show that reproduction is also a condition of a priori 
representations (geometric constructions). The empiricist explanation of association, as we will see in 
some detail in section 3.2, is that experiences of constant conjunction enable us to move from one 
representation to another. Kant does not dispute this: in both the empiricist and Kantian accounts, 
there must be a given regularity of representations in order for association to obtain. In Kant’s 
example, “if cinnabar were now red, now black, now light, now heavy… then my empirical imagination 
would never even get the opportunity to think of heavy cinnabar on the occasion of the representation 
of the colour red” (A101). Here is another instance of the reference to indeterminacy constitutive of 
Kant’s argumentative strategy in the Deduction. If there were no regularity in that which is given to 
me (no “affinity of the manifold”), then I would not have the kind of experience I indisputably have 
(empirical associations), namely not an experience of empirical objects inexplicably altering their 
properties. But against empiricism, Kant thinks that association is conditioned by a spontaneous 
capacity to reproduce representations not immediately present in the representation of the present 
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time. Kant’s proof of the spontaneity and so non-empirically-given character of this activity of 
reproduction is to demonstrate that it is also operative in a priori representations: 
 
Now it is obvious that if I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one noon to the 
next, or even want to represent a certain number to myself, I must necessarily first grasp 
[fassen] one of these manifold representations after another in my thoughts. But if I were 
always to lose the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of 
time, the successively represented units) from my thoughts and not reproduce them when I 
proceed to the following ones, then no whole representation… could arise (A102).  
Three points here. The first reinforces the above discussion: apprehension is explicitly presented as 
“grasp[ing] one of these manifold representations after another in my thought” – that is, apprehension 
relates individuals in external relations, i.e. it enables us to cognise the difference constituted by 
intuitional form rather than collapse each sequentially-given intuition into an “absolute unity.” 
Secondly, Kant thinks that in order to grasp one representation after another in apprehension, the 
prior representation needs to be reproduced “when I proceed to the following one” in order for a 
relation between those representations to arise.  As this reproduction cannot be provided by the 
receptivity of our sensibility – either a posteriori in its matter or a priori in intuitional form – an a priori 
spontaneous activity must condition the achieved unity of representations.  Thirdly, in Kant’s examples 
of a priori reproductive synthesis, we have yet another version of the conditional modality of 
transcendental argument: if I didn’t reproduce prior representations, I would not have an experience 
of the kind of “whole representations” that I indisputably have. Unlike the previous threat of radically 
indeterminate “absolute unity,” the indeterminacy here is an empirically possible one: one can fail to 
reproduce prior representations, that is, forget them, but this exception only speaks to the capacity 
for reproduction that is exercised whenever either an empirical or an a priori connection between a 
current and a previous singular representation in inner sense is made. Kant summarises the synthesis 
of reproduction at the beginning of “3. On the synthesis of recognition in the concept,” making clear 
his understanding of conceptuality as holding together or grasping: 
If, in counting I forget that the units that now hover before my senses were successively added 
to each other by me, then I would not cognise the generation of the multitude through 
successive addition of one to the other, and consequently, I would not cognize the number; 
for this concept consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis. 
 The word “concept” itself could already lead us to this remark (A103).  
 
As is already implicit in this recapitulation, Kant’s next step is to argue that the unity of the manifold 
achieved in the synthetic moments of apprehension and recognition are themselves possible only if 
contained in one consciousness. The next sentence is “for it is this one consciousness that unifies the 
manifold that has been successively intuited, then also reproduced, into one representation” (A103). 
So in Kant’s thinking the ground of conceptual activity understood as grasping together intuitionally-
given individuals is the unity of consciousness.  
In first introducing apperception in the A Deduction Kant blurs empirical and transcendental 
registers by discussing our consciousness of the unity of consciousness as “often” “weak,” as if the 
belonging of all representations to one subject as the condition of possibility of their apprehensive and 
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reproductive synthesis were somehow dependent on reflexive recognition of that fact.109 Later the A 
Deduction (A107) and the start of the B Deduction very clearly distinguishes empirical consciousness 
from “pure apperception,” distinguishing the latter via the purely formal possibility of appending “I 
think” to any one representation, and so bringing it into possible relations with other representations 
themselves to which the “I think” also attaches (B132). 
In the A Deduction, Kant argues for the necessity of the unity of consciousness as ground of 
synthesis of the manifold by indicating with a metaphor what it would be like were this condition not 
to obtain. Such an experience totally lacking synthesis is a possibility we can only imagine (in the non-
technical non-Kantian sense), given that we are constituted by that possibility not obtaining: 
Unity of synthesis… were it not grounded on a transcendental ground of unity [apperception], 
it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to fill up our soul without experience ever 
being able to arise from it. But in that case all relation of cognition to objects would also 
disappear, since the appearances would lack connection in accordance with universal and 
necessary laws, and would thus be intuition without thought, but never cognition, and would 
therefore be as good as nothing for us (A111).  
There are two points to make here. “The swarm” that would obtain without apperceptive unity 
reinforces apperception as the ground of the first synthetic moments: the swarm is here equivalent to 
the “absolute unity” that would “fill up” our consciousness were immediate temporal representations 
not related to temporal representations before and after it; and, as we saw, this relation is only possible 
if those other representations are reproduced. But Kant adds here the insight that if our consciousness 
were so filled by a succession of immediacies without mediation to one another, we would not only 
not have the kind of spatio-temporally distinct individual objects before us that we do, but also no 
unity of self. This is clear in the B edition: it is “only because I can comprehend [the] manifold in a 
consciousness do I call them all together my representations; for otherwise I would have as 
multicolored, diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious” (B134). A new self would 
arise with each self-contained singular representation excluding all other such representations. What 
this means is that the processes of syntheses, from the intuitional manifold to its reproduction and 
finally its belonging together to one (transcendentally conceived) subject are mutually conditioning: 
“Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as given a priori, is thus the ground of the identity of 
apperception itself, which precedes a priori all my determinate thinking” (B134). The synthesis in and 
between intuitions is dependent upon those intuitional representations belonging to one 
consciousness, and if consciousness did not produce that unity in and between intuitions (i.e. unity in 
the sense of relation and so distinction) unity of consciousness itself would not obtain.  
Secondly, Kant says that were this loss of synthetic unity to occur, appearances would be “as 
good as nothing for us.” If we did not relate intuitional representations in inner sense via spontaneous 
syntheses, spatio-temporal individuals would be nothing for us, i.e. for rational agents. In line with the 
conceptualist reading advanced here, Kant reaffirms intuitions do provide us with individuals in 
abstraction from conceptual spontaneity, just that, per the togetherness principle, intuitions without 
thought do not constitute cognition, i.e. determinate objective knowledge. Now, what distinguishes 
cognition is the “connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws.” The necessity of an 
objective determination we first encountered in the “Bodies are divisible” example from the 
 
109 See Pippin’s discussion of the untenability of a “conflationist” theory of apperception, in which reflexive 
recognition of apperceptive unity is a condition of that unity obtaining, in Hegel’s Idealism, 20-23.  
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Metaphysical Deduction has not yet been accounted for – we have in apprehension and reproduction 
the transcendental condition for empirical association (this representation is connected to that 
representation on the basis of repeated but nonetheless contingent experience) but not for 
connections involving necessity. We have since seen, however, that the apprehensive and reproductive 
syntheses of intuition were found to have their ground in the unity of consciousness, and the unity of 
consciousness in those syntheses of intuition. Now that we have the mutual conditioning of objective 
and subjective syntheses, the necessity that characterises cognition – i.e. objective determination – 
can be understood: 
“We find, however, that our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object carries 
something of necessity with it, since namely the latter is regarded as that which is opposed to 
our cognitions being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily rather than being determined a 
priori, since insofar as they are to relate to an object our cognitions must also necessarily agree 
with each other in relation to it, i.e., they must have that unity that constitutes the concept of 
an object.” (A105).  
So for our thinking to have relation to an object, our thoughts must necessarily agree with one another, 
i.e. must be thoroughly related or unified. Necessary connection in the object (say, between an object 
thought as a body and divisible) is in fact a function of the necessary agreement of representations 
about the object in the form of the judgment (in the case of our example, a categorical judgment). 
Kant can so connect empirical objects and concept use in the sense of predicative judgments without 
a sceptical gap for two reasons. (1) the Aesthetic has shown that our concepts “have only to do with 
the manifold of our representations” and that the object thought in abstraction from our forms of 
sensible representation is “nothing for us” (A105) (that formula again, but here meaning the cognitive 
emptiness of the thing-in-itself, not intuitions “as good as nothing for us” if not brought into relations 
via synthesis). (2) The above account of synthesis has argued that the unity of the subject in which 
representations are brought into relation is the condition for synthesis of the manifold, and vice-versa. 
As such, given that any reference to objects outside the forms of our sensibility (other than objects as 
appearance) would be empty of content (for theoretical cognition), synthesis of the manifold of 
appearances under the unity of apperception brings logical form “down” to empirical objectivity 
because the synthesis of the manifold under the unity of apperception is achieved through the 
categories understood as rules for effecting that unity in intuition: “Hence we say that we cognise the 
object if we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition. But this is impossible if the 
intuition could not have been produced through a function of synthesis in accordance with a rule” 
(A105).   
Kant’s first example is again geometrical construction, after which he modulates to empirical 
objectivity. We think a triangle “by being conscious of the composition of three straight lines” – i.e. 
apprehending and reproducing those lines as related and distinct in that relation – “in accordance with 
a rule according to which such an intuition can always be exhibited” (A105). This is very neat: 
apprehension and recognition are necessary conditions to relate and so distinguish those moments of 
the construction of a triangle, but obviously insufficient. Synthesis must also be “recognition in a 
concept.” That is, we must relate and reproduce lines in accordance with the concept “triangle,” which 
governs, as it were, that relation and reproduction. As such “unity of rule determines every manifold, 
and limits it to conditions that make the unity of apperception possible.” The empirical conceptual 
example is again the concept “Body,” but now its grip on appearances is explicable via the worked out 
understanding of conceptuality as synthesis: “Thus the concept of body serves as the rule for our 
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cognition of outer appearances by means of the unity of the manifold that is thought through it” 
(A106). Kant immediately notes, however, that this concept is a rule only insofar as it “represents the 
necessary reproduction of the manifold of given intuitions, hence the synthetic unity in the 
consciousness of them.” 110  That is, the rule “inescapably demands” that we reproduce certain 
representations in determining an appearance as a body: “thus in the case of the perception of 
something outside of us the concept of body makes necessary the representation of extension, and 
with it that of impenetrability, of shape, etc.” (A106) – and, of course, divisibility. As Longuenesse 
makes clear, the synthesis of recognition in the concept moves from subjective association to necessity, 
in the sense of a rule for synthesis. Constant conjunction between impenetrability and extension can 
lead, on the condition of our spontaneous capacity for apprehensive and reproductive synthesis, to 
association of these representations, “But to have made a concept of body out of this conjunction is 
more than the expression of this merely subjective habit. My apprehension of empirically given spatial 
multiplicities is henceforth guided by the concept.” 111  Importantly, however, such concepts are 
revisable – if something with extension turns out not to be impenetrable, either I have mistaken it for 
a body, or I will need to revise my concept of body.112 
However, Kant holds that some concepts are not revisable, but are a priori rules for effecting 
the synthesis of the manifold and so the unity of self-consciousness. These categories are the functions 
through which “thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness” stands, “that in which alone apperception 
can demonstrate a priori its thoroughgoing and necessary identity.” At the start of the B Deduction 
Kant offers this definition of the categories, again through the same example judgment: 
 
I will merely precede this with the explanation of the categories. They are concepts of an 
object in general, by means of which its intuition is regarded as determined with regard to one 
of the logical functions for judgments [Sie sind Begriffe von einem Gegenstande ueberhaupt, 
dadurch dessen Anschauung in Ansehung einer der logischen Funktionen zu Urteilen als 
Bestimmt angesehen wird]… Through the category of the substance… if I bring the concept of 
a body under it, it is determined [wird es bestimmt] that its empirical intuition in experience 
must always be considered as a subject, never as a mere predicate, and likewise with all the 
other categories (B128).  
To make sense of this, let us apply the definition of categories to the content of the category “cause” 
rather than body. Cause is a concept of an object in general, by which an intuition is regarded as 
determined with regard to the “ground” (the “if” clause) in a hypothetical judgment. If I synthesise the 
manifold in an intuition in accordance with the rule given by the concept of cause, and through that 
synthesis I effect thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness (it must necessarily agree with my other 
representations), then that object cannot be indifferently put in the position of ground or consequent. 
So the function of conceptuality as the activity of synthesis of the manifold of intuition – and ultimately 
as the a priori rules for that synthesis– solves the indeterminacy of merely logical judgment, and at the 
 
110 This is directly mirrored in a passage from the B Deduction: “… an object is that in the concept of which the 
manifold of a given intuition is united. Now all unification of representations demands unity of consciousness 
in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of 
representation to an object, and therefore their objective validity…” (B137). 
111 Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 50. 
112 Ibid.  
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same time connects the forms of logical judgment to appearance, “which is just what we really wanted 
to know” (A111).  
I would like to conclude this analysis of the Deduction by pointing to its salience for the 
comparison with Hegel. As briefly noted in the Introduction, Pippin in Hegel’s Idealism is right to point 
out the centrality of the theme of apperception in Hegel’s critical transformation of the Kantian 
concept/intuition distinction. The Logic can be read as a series of syntheses, in which one holds or 
grips both poles of an opposition (say, being and nothing, or something and other) together in order 
for a determinate thought-determination to obtain. For example, if we hold being and let go of 
nothing, or vice-versa, both will remain indeterminate; what is required is a concept – in this case, 
becoming – which makes explicit or posits the necessary relation of being and nothing. But equally 
important in Hegel’s account of determinacy in the Seinslogik is the logical structure of intuition, 
because what characterises being and nothing in (a) immediacy and (b) their indifference to one 
another, in the sense that they in their immediacy have not been brought into relation and therefore 
are indistinguishable. However, Hegel takes indifferent immediacy to constitute a component of 
thought itself – rather than sensibility – and he takes the movement from indifferent immediacies to 
determinate differences to characterise not just our cognition but being itself. To understand and to 
motivate Hegel’s account of determination as an ontological generalisation of Kant’s togetherness 
principle, we need an account of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s cognitive model of determination as 
“subjectivist” (Chapter 3), and an account of Hegel’s appropriation of Fichte’s appropriation of Kant’s 
doctrine of Intellectual Intuition (Chapter 4).  
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Chapter 3. Hegel’s Critique of Kant 
This chapter aims to explicate Hegel’s critical relation to Kant in terms of the concept/intuition 
distinction reconstructed above. I hope to show the way in which Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s 
concept/intuition distinction motivates his reworking of the logical content of that distinction into an 
alternative account of determination. Put briefly, Hegel’s criticism is that Kant’s framing of the logical 
content of concepts and intuitions solely in terms of empirical cognition distorts the togetherness 
principle, insofar as this framing makes concepts and intuitions external to one another in the manner 
of intuitional form. As such, Hegel’s reworking of determination is directed not at the conditions for 
empirical cognition – i.e. the synthesis and subsumption of sensible intuitions by and under concepts 
– but at an ontological account of determination in general. However, I argue that Hegel motivates the 
ontological program of the Logic through a critical transformation of the concept/intuition distinction, 
not by straightforwardly misreading that distinction, or by a reductive conceptualism that would 
disregard Kant’s account of intuition in the Aesthetic altogether. 113  Hegel is rather attempting to 
vindicate the togetherness principle with maximum generality.  
 To begin again with another military metaphor: 
 
The system knows how to resolve and assimilate the determinations in which these 
assumptions conflict with it, so that they re-emerge in it, but duly modified accordingly… 
Effective refutation must infiltrate the opponent’s stronghold and meet him on his own 
ground; there is no point in attacking outside his territory where he is not (SL 512/12.15). 
This quote refers to Hegel’s claim to have presented in the “Actuality” section of the Wesenslogik “the 
one and only true refutation of Spinozism.” However, the cited passage also raises in nuce some of the 
problems of Hegel’s critique of Kant to be addressed in this chapter. Above all there is the accuracy of 
Hegel’s critique of Kant, and the concept/intuition in particular. Does Hegel meet Kant on his “own 
ground”?  Or does Hegel attack Kant “where he is not,” where only a straw-man is?  I want in this 
chapter to understand to what extent Hegel’s critical interpretation of Kant is successful by his own 
criteria, i.e. whether it successfully constitutes what is now called “immanent critique.” 114  To 
understand the “immanence” or otherwise of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s cognitive model of 
determination, we need above all to understand the way in which Hegel’s system attempts to “resolve 
and assimilate” Kant’s problematic, i.e. the way in which Kant’s concept/intuition “re-emerges… duly 
modified” in Hegel’s Logic, and the system more generally.  That means attending to the way in which 
Hegel “translates” key Kantian terms into his own vocabulary and way of thinking. As we will see in 
3.2, Hegel abstracts the logical content of intuitions and concepts (singularity or individuality and 
immediacy on the one hand, and mediation or relation and generality or universality on the other) 
 
113 For an overview of the repeated charges of Hegel’s lax relation to the letter of Kant’s text, see John McCumber, 
Understanding Hegel’s Mature Critique of Kant (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2014), 25-26. I 
treat the more substantial issue of reductive conceptualism at length below.  
114 The familiar formula “immanent critique” is not, to the extent of my reading at least, actually present in 
Hegel’s writing. That phrase, while Hegelian in inspiration, is foundational for the Critical Theory tradition and 
has entered academic vocabulary in the humanities in that manner. James Gordon Finlayson has recently argued 
that a claim for continuity between Hegel and 20th Century critical theory on this point should be rejected. 
“Hegel, Adorno, and the Origins of Immanent Criticism,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22, no. 6 
(2015): 1-25. Robert J. Antonio’s much earlier paper can be taken as an example of the continuity claim: 
“Immanent Critique as the Core of Critical Theory: Its Origins and Developments in Hegel, Marx and 
Contemporary Thought” The British Journal of Sociology 32, no. 3 (1981): 330-345. 
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from Kant’s cognitive model. Most importantly, Hegel considers the singularity and immediacy of 
Kantian intuitional representation to give rise to a problematic of “indifference” [Gleichgültigkeit], in 
a sense related to but distinct from that discussed with regard to Kant’s critique of rationalism above. 
Interestingly, Hegel’s call for internal critical refutation and systematic appropriation is, in the 
case of his reading of Kant, in a way doubly immanent, insofar as immanent critique is itself legible in 
Kant. As we saw in Chapter 1, Kant takes the Critical philosophy to integrate rather than merely dismiss 
the apparently opposed perspectives of rationalism, empiricism, and indifferentism. Hegel does Kant 
the honour of turning his principle of systematic integration back onto Kant himself.115   
 
3.1. McDowell and After 
In order to advance my claim that Hegel generalises Kant’s togetherness principle, I need first to treat 
the view in which Hegel reductively misreads the concept/intuition distinction in Kant. That is the 
purpose of this section. I mentioned in the Introduction that prominent Kantians consider Hegel to 
neglect Kantian intuitional form entirely, reducing it to conceptual form. This charge of reductive 
conceptualism is I think in part traceable to – or at least reinforced by – the way in which Hegel’s 
reception of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction is set up in John McDowell’s 1994 Mind and World. In 
my view, McDowell’s book is importantly right in that he holds both Kant and Hegel to be concerned 
to account for the thinkability of the objective world: thought sets the terms for what it is to be an 
object as such; there is thus no ineffability or inaccessibility of objects to knowledge of the kind that 
would legitimate scepticism.116 As I suggested in my reading of Kant above, that we can think of 
objectivity in abstraction from our thinking (as things-in-themselves) does not in any way undermine 
epistemic realism, and Hegel’s version of this argument will be treated later in this chapter. McDowell 
however takes the Kantian commitment to things-in-themselves to undermine Kant’s commitment to 
thinkability, and characterises Hegel as a corrected and consolidated Kant. According to McDowell, 
Hegel drops the commitment to things-in-themselves, so that our concepts determine sensibility 
without remainder. However, McDowell’s account of thinkable contents does not explicitly make a 
place for intuitional form (the external relationality elaborated above), thus effecting the reduction of 
intuitions to concepts. As we will see, Kantians have conveniently taken McDowell’s reading of Kant to 
be Hegel’s.  
As is well known, Mind and World begins with the diagnosis of what McDowell takes to be a 
binary oscillation in late 20th Century analytic epistemology: between an unsatisfactory Davidsonian 
“coherentism” on the one hand, and an equally unsatisfactory empiricist foundationalism on the other. 
McDowell takes the Kantian concept/intuition framework to arrest this oscillation, on the proviso that 
it is corrected in what he takes to be a Hegelian way. For McDowell, the oscillation between 
coherentism and a renewed foundationalism is begun by Sellars’ famous diagnosis of the “Myth of the 
Given” in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1956). What is “mythical” for Sellars is the 
widespread foundationalist belief that data “given” to cognition from outside cognition can play a 
justificatory role for epistemic commitment. Here the classical empiricist program is exemplary, in 
which knowledge claims are justified (or found to lack justification) by tracing their contents back to 
 
115 This stance of “rational reconciliationism” is traceable in fact to Leibniz, as Redding shows in his synoptic 
Continental Idealism, 3. 
116 That Hegel is opposed to “ineffability” is Jean Hyppolite’s way of framing Hegel’s relation to the sceptical 
impulses of philosophical modernity. Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, trans. Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 7-22.   
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perceptual episodes (more on that in 3.2). Sellars shows that such sensible givenness, if taken as 
epistemically foundational, has to be contradictorily conceived as both related to propositional claims 
(insofar as it justifies them) and outside of that relation at the same time (insofar as it connects 
conceptual content to a non-conceptual foundation).117 The given either enters into relations with 
what it is intended to justify – other cognitions – and thereby loses its status as “given,” or it preserves 
its status as “given” at the cost of remaining outside of inferential patterns of justification. While this 
myth is at least operative in classical empiricism, Sellars more proximate targets are Russell’s 
“knowledge by acquaintance” and logical positivism’s verifiability theory of meaning.118 
Davidson’s coherentism, at least in McDowell’s reconstruction, recognises the force of Sellars’ 
diagnosis of givenness by maintaining that “only a belief can justify another belief.” For Davidson, given 
sense data is causally relevant to conceptual content, but cannot play a justificatory role. From 
McDowell’s perspective, Davidson avoids the Myth of the Given only by failing to account for our desire 
that beliefs be constrained by the world in some way. If what constrains a belief is only ever another 
belief, mind loses touch with the world in a “frictionless spinning in the void” – a line almost as over-
quoted as the togetherness principle. “Davidson recoils from the Myth of the Given all the way to 
denying experience any justificatory role, and the coherentist upshot is a version of the conception of 
spontaneity as frictionless, the very thing that makes the idea of the Given attractive.”119 McDowell 
detects this reaction to coherentism, this attraction to the given, in Gareth Evans’ account of essentially 
nonconceptual content. 120 So for McDowell neither Davidson’s coherentism nor Evans’ non-
conceptualism will do.  
From McDowell’s perspective, when treating the legitimacy of an epistemic claim, we are not 
asking for an exculpation, a causal history in which agency is irrelevant, but a rational justification from 
an agent. “I believe that X because I was caused to do so by brute fact Y” would be on this model an 
exculpation, in the sense that no responsibility for belief is here entailed. In contrast, a justification 
would have the form: “I believe that X because it is rational for me to do so” where rational means 
“consistent with my beliefs that Y, Z, etc.” But in our expectation that our interlocutor’s beliefs are self-
consistent, we are also asking that they be consistent with the way the world in fact is. As McDowell 
puts it: “The world itself must exercise a rational constraint on our thinking.”121 We have seen this 
answerability to self-consistency in one’s judgments of the world in Kant’s account of apperception 
above, and so it is understandable that McDowell looks to Kant to break the coherentism v. empiricist 
foundationalism deadlock.  
 
117 Here I rely on Willem de Vries’ excellent reconstruction of Sellars’ argumentation: “To have efficacy, a basic 
cognition must be capable of participating in inferential relations with other cognitions; it must possess 
propositional form and be truth-evaluable. However, to satisfy the criterion of givenness, such a propositionally 
structured cognition must possess its epistemic status independently of inferential connections to other 
cognitions. No cognitive states satisfy both requirements.” Willem de Vries, Wilfrid Sellars (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2005), 45. 
118  A critical account of Russell’s knowledge by acquaintance from a Hegelian perspective can be found in 
Kenneth Westphal, “Hegel, Russell, and the Foundations of Philosophy,” Hegel and the Analytic Tradition 
(London: Continuum, 2010), 173-193. An accessible critical introduction to logical positivism’s verifiability theory 
and its relation to classical empiricism can be found in Peter Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality: An Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), ch. 2. 
119 Mind and World, 14.  
120  Evans’ non-conceptualism is not straightforwardly a variant of the Kantian non-conceptualism discussed 
above below. For that reason I leave out any detailed account. See however Paul Redding, Return of Hegelian 
Thought, 34-55.   
121 Mind and World, 42.  
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Incipit Kant’s togetherness principle, with which McDowell’s book beings. As Allais says, and 
as I have repeated, the togetherness principle as metaphorical must be interpreted. Further proof of 
the necessity of its interpretation is that McDowell’s reading is at odds with the one I have presented 
above. Taking the first limb, “Thoughts without content are empty,” McDowell suggests that for a 
thought to be empty “would be for there to be nothing that one thinks when one thinks it, that is, for 
it to lack what I am calling ‘representational content.’” Representational content he glosses as that 
which follows a “that” clause in a belief statement. McDowell says that on this model an “empty” 
thought would be an unfinished statement, “I think that…,” lacking the representation that we expect 
to follow. Because for McDowell such an unfinished statement “would be for it not really to be a 
thought at all,” a lack of content understood in this way is not what Kant is driving at: “he is not, 
absurdly, drawing our attention to a special kind of thoughts, the empty ones.” McDowell interprets 
Kant’s “empty” here literally or at face value, as having no content whatsoever. As Chapter 1 shows, 
Kant is in fact drawing our attention to a special kind of thoughts, undiagnosed in rationalism, that do 
not meet the conditions for empirical knowledge or cognition, and are empty in that sense – though 
only in that sense. Such objectively empty thoughts nonetheless have content for both logical 
determination and for practical purposes. It is indicative that, in presenting his interpretation of 
Kantian “emptiness,” McDowell considers the “unfinished” “I think…” to be empty of content. But for 
Kant, the “I think,” whether abstracted from any representational content or not yet appended to a 
content, is not empty in the radical sense of “not being a thought” at all, as McDowell puts it. It has, 
as we have seen in 2.2., transcendental content as index the unity of apperception, the transcendental 
condition of syntheses of the manifold and so for objective determinacy. McDowell’s interpretation 
disregards the a priori content of thought. 122  
This is made clear when McDowell turns to the second limb of the togetherness principle: 
 
Thoughts without content—which would not really be thoughts at all—would be a play of 
concepts without any connection with intuitions, that is, bits of experiential intake. It is their 
connection with experiential intake that supplies the content, the substance, that thoughts 
would otherwise lack.123 (4). 
 
For McDowell, thought without sensible intuition is entirely without content – or at least McDowell 
does not note the non-empirical contexts in which pure thought does have content for Kant, i.e. pure 
concepts as a transcendental condition of empirical knowledge, and the thought of the unconditioned 
as transcendental condition of free agency. McDowell’s skipping Kant’s account of the a priori content 
of thought is followed by his skipping of the a priori form of intuition. McDowell’s definition of intuition 
– “bits of experiential intake” – overwrites the sensation/appearance distinction outlined in the faculty 
of sensibility, as set out in 2.1 above. It is worth noting that this insists in later work, in which intuition 
is defined as “a having in view.”124 In other words, McDowell’s understanding of the content of thought 
and his vague characterisation of intuition effectively misses Kant’s key definitional step, in which 
 
122 Allais makes the same critique of McDowell’s reductive account of “empty” thought in a footnote introducing 
her reading of the concept/intuition distinctions. “[McDowell’s] cannot be Kant’s view. While transcendent 
metaphysics [i.e. thoughts without possible sensible data], for Kant, is less than cognition, he clearly thinks that 
it is, to some degree, understandable, and that it contains thoughts which play a crucial role in ethics. Empty 
thoughts are ones for which there is no possibility of our securing referents and which therefore are not, in Kant’s 
terms, objectively valid, and do not qualify as cognition proper.” Manifest Reality, 152, n. 16.  
123 Mind and World, 4. 
124 Having the World in View, 260. 
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concepts and intuitions are both said to be either pure or empirical. In saying that intuition is 
“experiential intake” and leaving it at that, he runs the risk of skipping the Aesthetic’s argument for 
the a priority of intuitional form. In saying that concepts without bits of experiential intake would have 
no substance at all he is describing only empirical concepts – at a pinch we could say that Kant’s pure 
concepts (the categories) have no substance if not demonstrably applicable to the manifold of pure 
intuition. But because McDowell has not distinguished between pure and empirical intuitions, a 
distinction between the operation of pure and empirical concepts is not available to him either. We 
will consider the entirely appropriate Kantian criticisms of McDowell’s understanding of intuition here 
in a moment. We need to press on, however, in order to see how Hegel is worked into McDowell’s 
story. 
McDowell’s next interpretive move is to fill out his account of concepts and intuitions by 
emphasising Kant’s description of the faculty of understanding as spontaneous and the faculty of 
sensibility as receptive (see Chapter 2 above). This comparative axis – activity versus passivity – is 
singled out, and the immediacy/mediation and singularity/generality axes that constitute the logical 
content of concept/intuition are ignored.  
The result of McDowell’s first two interpretive moves is the following. Our passive receiving of 
sense data is not a merely causal affection of sense organs (the sensibly given), but the conceptual 
capacities operative in their receptive aspect or mode (taken as intuitions). He thus suggests at the end 
of the first Lecture: “in order to escape the oscillation, we need a conception of experiences as states 
or occurrences that are passive but reflect conceptual capacities, capacities that belong to spontaneity, 
in operation.” 125  The start of the second lecture then fills in the detail of McDowell’s proposed 
solution: 
We must not suppose that spontaneity first figures only in judgements in which we put a 
construction on experiences, with experiences conceived as deliverances of receptivity to 
whose constitution spontaneity makes no contribution. Experiences are indeed receptivity in 
operation; so that they can satisfy the need for an external control on our freedom in empirical 
thinking. But conceptual capacities, capacities that belong to spontaneity, are already at work 
in experiences themselves, not just in judgments based on them; so experiences can 
intelligibly stand in rational relations to our exercises of the freedom that is implicit in the idea 
of spontaneity. 126  
The core of McDowell’s view is here. We should not conceive of our conceptual capacities as going to 
work on an already constituted – and then merely given – sensory input, but rather as operative in the 
constitution of experience itself, all the way from sensory contact to discursive thinking itself.  
McDowell’s understanding of this constitutive role of conceptuality in experience is put in the 
distinction between actualised and exercised conceptual capacities. In a sensible intuition, my 
conceptual capacities are in operation, are actualised in that experience, but not intentionally 
exercised in a judgment. The content of an experience and the content of a judgment are the same: 
“That things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a 
judgment… So it is conceptual content” (26). The content is conceptual throughout – first implicit in 
its actualisation in an experience and then explicitly exercised.  
 
125 Mind and World, 23.  
126 Mind and World, 24. 
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 So the result of McDowell’s line of reading is conceptualism in the following sense: conceptual 
capacities are operative in our experience “all the way down,” such that there is no limit at which our 
mindedness might meet a non-conceptual content, i.e. merely brutely given input inadmissible to 
justificatory reasoning. This “unboundedness of the conceptual” does not, McDowell thinks, lead us 
back to the coherentism he began by rejecting. For McDowell, the conceptualist position guarantees 
direct realism. As he puts it: 
 
That things are thus and so is the conceptual content of an experience, but if the subject of 
the experience is not misled, that very same thing, that things are thus and so, is also a 
perceptible fact, an aspect of the perceptible world. Thus the idea of conceptually structured 
operations of receptivity puts us in a position to speak of experience as openness to the layout 
of reality.127 
 
Another way McDowell puts this is to say that the world must be “made up of the kind of things one 
can think.” This is not to say that those things are themselves thinking. There are acts of consciousness, 
“thinking,” and inanimate being does not “think” in this sense – does not cogitate. But being is a 
thinkable content. Despite McDowell’s partial reading of concept/intuition in Kant, this is certainly a 
broadly Kantian position: as we have seen, appearances are not conceptually indeterminate objects 
but merely conceptually undetermined objects. The work of the Deduction is to show that there is in 
principle no intuitionally-given object that escapes categorisation; objectivity is conceptually 
determinable through and through. Now, so far, this aligns the deflationary Kantian emphasis on 
empirical realism treated in Chapter 1 above. Accordingly, deflationary Kantians do not object to this 
outcome in McDowell, just McDowell’s following move. Namely, that Kant cannot consistently provide 
us with this empirical realism, and so we must move to Hegel. 
 Because this kind of thinkability is the goal, what McDowell takes to be Kant’s “two-worldism” 
emerges, at the end of Lecture II, as a kind of failure of nerve to which Hegel provides the solution. 
McDowell asks, “Does Kant credit receptivity with a separable contribution to its cooperation with 
spontaneity? It seems that the answers ‘No’ and ‘Yes’ are both correct” (41).128 The ‘No’ answer 
coincides with the thinkability discussed above. For Kant, “experience does not take in ultimate 
grounds that we could appeal to by pointing outside the sphere of thinkable content” (41). This broadly 
aligns with the reading of Kant given above: Kant’s empirical realism is epistemically indifferent to the 
empty indeterminate thought of things-in-themselves, outside of or in abstraction from intuitional 
representation, and to the positive noumenon that must be held to cause appearances. In empirical 
experience we do not need to point to positive or negative noumena in order for determinate 
cognition to obtain.  
The ‘Yes’ answer – that receptivity does make a separable contribution – is for McDowell 
implicated by Kant’s “transcendental story,” in which the “space of concepts” is “circumscribed” by 
the supersensible, i.e. things-in-themselves. McDowell, contrary to the deflationary two-aspect 
reading of Kant, thinks that we cannot be epistemically indifferent to thought of the noumenal. 
McDowell’s primary concern here is affection by the positive noumenon: “In the transcendental 
perspective, receptivity figures as a susceptibility to the impact of a supersensible reality, a reality that 
is supposed to be independent of our conceptual reality…”, to which McDowell makes the standard 
 
127 Mind and World, 26. 
128 Mind and World, 41. 
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criticism: the content of sensible intuition is caused by positive noumena, but “by Kant’s own lights we 
are supposed to understand causation as something that operates within the empirical world.”129 The 
“transcendental story” robs us of the desired thinkability of the empirical world, by shifting the seat of 
“true objectivity” a step back, to the in-principle unknowable noumenal ground of appearances: “as 
soon as [noumenal reality] is in the picture, [it] strikes us as the seat of true objectivity.”130 As such, 
Kant’s successors (namely Hegel) were right in urging “that we must discard the supersensible in order 
to achieve a consistent idealism,”131  one in which objectivity is not ultimately ascribed to an in-
principle unthinkable ground of appearances. The result of all this is to characterize Hegel as a 
corrected and consolidated Kant. Kant’s insight was that “the empirical structure of the world is 
somehow a product of subjectivity,” and Hegel completes Kant by abandoning any outside to thought 
and fully embracing the conceptualist implications of Kant’s position. The sticking point is that 
McDowell’s reference to Hegel, or way of inserting Hegel into his reading of Kant, makes Hegel the 
exemplary representative of conceptualism as McDowell conceives it, and this is susceptible to an 
immediate Kantian rejoinder. 
The Kantian Rejoinder 
From the perspective of Kantians and non-conceptualists, McDowell’s conceptualism ends up on the 
coherentist side of the divide he takes himself to be straddling. For Kantians and non-conceptualists, 
the Sellars-derived assumption that experience is either conceptual “all the way down” or brutely 
given is not adequate to Kant’s cognitive architecture: what is missed in this either/or is the idea of an 
independent intuitional form irreducible either to concepts or to given sensation.  
This Kantian rejoinder is best represented by Michael Friedman, who in “Exorcising the 
Tradition” argues that maintaining the concept/intuition distinction while undoing the distinction 
between appearances and things-in-themselves is not possible on the Kantian account: “Indeed these 
are just two aspects of the same distinction, for Kant, since the idea of a thing in itself arises by 
abstracting the concepts of the pure understanding from their necessary application to sensibility.”132 
It follows that “Giving up the opposition between appearances and things in themselves therefore 
means giving up the notion of a distinct and independent faculty of intuition as well.”133 So McDowell, 
on Friedman’s view, does not preserve the togetherness principle he so foregrounds, but in fact 
reduces intuitional form to conceptual form. And because McDowell does not take there to be brutely 
non-conceptual restraints on concept-use, he is back at the coherentism he took himself to be 
opposing. 
The Kantian argument can be rephrased as follows. In Kant we have the following three-part 
distribution: (1) sensation as merely causal affection; (2) appearances as the placing and ordering of 
sensation in the non-conceptual but nonetheless a priori forms of sensibility; (3) determination of 
appearances by empirical concepts whose transcendental condition are transcendental syntheses 
grounded in apperception, whose “function” is the categories. In McDowell (2) is missing, such that 
Kant’s account of the architecture of the faculty of sensibility in the Aesthetic gets split between (1) 
and (3): on the one hand, intuitions are merely given sensory input (1) that cannot legitimately enter 
 
129 Mind and World, 42. 
130 Ibid.  
131 Mind and World, 44.  
132 Michael Friedman, “Exorcising the Tradition” in Reading McDowell: On Mind and World, ed. Nicholas H. 
Smith (London: Routledge, 2002), 33-34.  
133 Friedman, “Exorcising the Tradition,” 34. 
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justificatory reasoning; on the other, intuitions are the receptive operation of conceptual capacities 
(3). There is in McDowell then no space for “appearance” understood as the content of sensation 
placed and ordered in the a priori forms specific to intuition: just greater and lesser degrees of 
explicitness of conceptual form.  
Importantly, for Friedman as for Allison, maintaining the distinction between appearances and 
things-in-themselves does not implicate a two-world ontology – the deflationary position we have 
outlined in 2.1 above. Two-worldist readings Allison has termed the “myth of the noumenal,” in which 
appearances are a “pale substitute” for the “genuine knowledge” that would be provided by epistemic 
access to the noumenal realm.134 But it is important to note that both the deflationary reading of Kant 
and McDowell’s argument for a shift from Kant to Hegel emerge from a desire to have Kant’s empirical 
realism without ontologically substantial things-in-themselves. The deflationist reads noumena down 
to a merely thinkable aspect of empirical objects, while McDowell suggests that such a reading down 
is not consonant with Kant’s text. With Kant taken to be irredeemably metaphysical, McDowell tries to 
rehabilitate Kantian empirical realism by moving – or suggesting the validity of the move – to a Hegel 
that jettisons both a priori intuition and noumenal objectivity.  But from the deflationary perspective, 
McDowell’s twofold misreading of Kant – missing the a priori contribution of intuition and 
consequently charging Kant with a two-worldist ontology – are the very same mistakes that Hegel 
makes, and so it is no wonder that McDowell enlists Hegel at this point in his ultimately coherentist 
argument: “It is entirely natural, then, if post-Kantian absolute idealism views the objects of rational 
knowledge as manifestations of an absolute rational freedom entirely unconstrained by anything 
outside itself.”135  
 
The Hegelian Alternative 
Again, in my view, McDowell is right to link Hegel to “thinkability” as a key Kantian desideratum. Both 
Kant and Hegel are committed to some version of the “idealist” claim that objectivity is determined by 
thought. But in its broadness, this claim can be worked out in different and perhaps incompatible ways. 
Hegel does not get to his post-Kantian version of idealism in the way that McDowell frames it, by 
claiming that our conceptual capacities determine empirical experience “all the way down” and then 
appropriately dropping out Kant’s false transcendental bottom. Hegel rather generalises the logical 
content of the concept/intuition distinction such that being itself is determinate on account of the 
necessary togetherness of opposed terms. In my view, Hegel’s critique of Kant and alternative model 
of determination is not as easily susceptible to the Kantian rejoinder as McDowell’s is. We saw above 
that McDowell (1) does not identify an independent intuitional form; and (2) advances a two-worldist 
account of the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction. While it is understandable that McDowell would 
advance these claims as Hegelian – there is some evidence in Hegel’s text for both – in my view Hegel 
is subtly different on both points. Elaborating Hegel’s alternatives, however, will occupy the remainder 
of this thesis; here I only provide a programmatic map to be substantiated.  
(1) Hegel does not reduce intuitional to conceptual form, but rather “nests” the logical form 
of intuitional representation as a “semi-autonomous” moment within conceptuality as it is elaborated 
 
134 Henry E. Allison, “We Can Only Act Under the Idea of Freedom,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 71, no. 2 (1997): 45. This relegation of Kantian appearance to mere “illusion” is the 
oldest misreading of Kantianism, incipient in the Garve-Feder review of 1782. Kant responds at length in the 
Prolegomena, 126-27/4:374-76.  
135 Friedman, “Exorcising the Tradition,” 34.  
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within the Logic.136 We have seen above that McDowell presents the immediate determinations of our 
sensibility (the immediate sensible apprehension of certain state of affairs) as only an implicit form of 
conceptuality understood on the model of judgments (an explicit propositional claim about such a 
state). Hegel’s Logic also understands conceptuality as on a continuum of greater and lesser degrees 
of explicitness: the concepts elaborated in the Doctrine of Being are less stable, less reflexive, and less 
comprehensive than those outlined in the Doctrine of Essence, less stable again than those in the 
Doctrine of the Concept. The crucial difference between McDowell’s reading and Hegel is that the 
logical form of Kantian intuition – external relationality – is included as an early, but nonetheless 
constitutive, moment on this continuum. As such, Hegel’s approach is conceptualist in that intuitional 
form is a moment of the purportedly complete conceptual scheme provided in the Logic; Hegel is not 
reductively conceptualist, however, insofar as intuitional form is nonetheless granted a semi-autonomy 
not countenanced in Mind and World. That is, while external relationality leads on to more self-
consistent and comprehensive conceptual structures, it nonetheless has a relatively independent 
structure that organises both inorganic nature and our immediate cognition of individuals. Or, to lean 
on James Kreines Hegel interpretation, indifference would be the concept of physical nature, a distinct 
moment within the conceptuality articulated in the Logic as a whole (“The Concept”). In other words, 
some ontological domains are rendered determinate by external relationality, even though such 
relationality is an insufficient explainer, of, say, the more complex structures of organic life or of 
concept predication (both of which are outlined in the Doctrine of the Concept).  This claim for “nested 
semi-autonomy” will be motivated in my reading of the Encyclopedia Logic in 3.2, and demonstrated 
in the Logic itself in Chapter 6. 
(2) Hegel’s account of Kant’s appearance/thing-in-itself distinction shares in the ambiguity of 
Kant’s text and Kant scholarship. In the pre-Phenomenology work of the Differenzschrift and Faith and 
Knowledge, Hegel’s “two-worldist” reading of Kant’s Critique is repeatedly bound up with a claim for 
Kantian subjectivism. Hegel claims that, for Kant, reality in itself must really be an indeterminate or 
“formless lump” insofar as determination is a function of our merely subjective cognitive capacities 
 
136 The picture of the Logic sketched in this paragraph, as providing a series of increasingly adequate explanatory 
schemes corresponding to distinct object domains, is drawn from James Kreines and David V. Ciavatta. Kreines’ 
reading has two key elements: (1) A claim that Hegel’s fundamental interest is “reason in the world,” namely, 
explanatory reason – “the why or because” of things – rather than merely epistemic reason, “the why or because” 
of belief. Reason in the World, 8. This I take to be a more sophisticated and more general version of my opposition 
between Kantian “cognitive” and Hegelian “ontological” accounts of objective determination. (2) Hegel’s Logic 
provides a systemic and hierarchical account of explanatory reason: the teleological conceptuality derived in the 
Doctrine of the Concept is the standard by which the concepts derived in the Doctrine and Being (qualitative and 
quantitative individuality) and Doctrine of Essence (lawful or universal relations between terms, ultimately 
causality and reciprocal causality) are judged as incomplete or insufficient forms of reason in the world. “…the 
laws of nature cannot possibly be anything but an extremely incomplete form of reason in the world; teleology 
sets the standard or measure of completeness of reason in the world, and in that sense has metaphysical 
priority.” Reason in the World, 4. Ciavatta comes to a similar view via a reflection on practical agency; only 
teleologically organised, practically purposeful individuals are genuinely individuated: Hegel conceives “of 
external things as inadequately individuated, as compared to living agents…” “Hegel on the Idealism of Practical 
Life” Hegel Bulletin 37, no. 1 (2016), 1. But nonetheless, the qualitative individuality set out in the Doctrine of 
Being that concerns me in this thesis is a “why or because” of things, just one inadequate to fully explaining 
either natural lawfulness or our activity as living, normatively-constrained agents. As we will see in Chapter 6, 
for Hegel, everything that exists – living agents included – must have the logical structure of something, and so 
are at least finite in the sense of necessarily ending. It is just that this sense of “end” does not explain our having 
autonomously set “ends” (in the sense of goals) as practical agents – although finitude is of course a part of the 
explanatory story.  
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(FK 76).137 This persists in the mature Encyclopedia, in which Kantian appearances are taken to be 
“untrue” (§45). This line of reading is problematic, insofar as it suggests that Hegel has bought into 
Allison’s “myth of the noumenal,” reading Kant’s account of the conceptual determination of nature 
as appearance as only a “pale substitute” for real determination. Stephen Houlgate admits in a recent 
paper that such a reading “is not entirely fair” to Kant, insofar as Kant’s concept of things-in-
themselves does not entail an existential claim, but merely the necessary possibility of abstracting 
from our mode of sensibility (in making this concession, Houlgate clearly follows the deflationist 
reading of Kant). As I suggested in 2.1 above, Kant argues for a principled indifference to things-in-
themselves: their merely thinkable possibility does not undermine epistemic determinacy. But Hegel 
does not always present Kant’s things-in-themselves as ontologically substantial in the manner of Faith 
and Knowledge; in his mature work, most notably in §44 of the Encyclopedia Logic and the second 
chapter of the Logic proper (93/21.109), Hegel recognises that for Kant things in themselves are 
“things of thought,” i.e. objectivity considered in abstraction from our sensibility. This more judicious 
reading of Kant however sets the stage for two distinct Hegelian criticisms of the Kantian position, 
which Houlgate outlines in The Opening of Hegel’s Logic. 
(2a) Houlgate suggests that Hegel recognises the thing-in-itself as an abstraction in order to 
motivate a further abstraction from sensibility, arguing essentially that “Kant’s notion of the thing in 
itself is in fact not abstract enough.”138 Houlgate’s argument falls out as follows. Hegel agrees with 
Kant that thought is determinate of what counts as objectivity (McDowell’s “thinkability”). In 
Houlgate’s words, “Kant believes that the understanding itself stipulates what is to count as an object 
of experience and so can know a priori the necessary structure of any such objects without needing to 
gain ‘access’ to them” through “pure thought” (i.e. rationalism) or “perception” (i.e. empiricism).139 
And, because pure thought provides only the conditions of determinacy for the object in general, Hegel 
also agrees with Kant that, contra rationalist metaphysics, pure thought cannot provide knowledge of 
empirical objects independent of sensibility, nor knowledge of purported objects that are in-principle 
independent of sensibility (God, the totality of the world, the soul). Hegel however argues that Kant’s 
derivation of the conceptual conditions of determinacy is marred by his failure to abstract from a 
“common-sense” understanding of objectivity shared by empiricism and rationalism. This “common-
sense” view, taken up into early modern epistemology, is that our thinking is confronted by an 
 
137  Karl Ameriks in a 2015 paper argues that Hegel’s charge of Kantian “subjectivism” is dependent upon 
mistakenly characterising Kant’s philosophy as a “short argument” to idealism. For Ameriks, such a 
characterisation puts too much weight on Kant’s B Introduction account of his philosophy as effecting 
“Copernican revolution,” as if such a revolution meant beginning from a “general subjectivist turn to the self 
rather than to objects, and then simply to proceed from there.” “Some Persistent Presumptions of Hegelian Anti-
Subjectivism,” 44. Rather, Kant’s first step is to argue that objects are given to us (and therefore have mind-
independent reality, unlike Berkleyan “subjectivism”) and then to argue that they are given to us only in the 
forms of space and time. “Persistent Presumptions,” 44-45. In Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, Ameriks traces 
the emphasis on short arguments to idealism to Kant’s immediate reception in Reinhold (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). According to Ameriks’ 2015 piece, Houlgate’s (and Sally Sedgwick’s, and Brady 
Bowman’s, and John McCumber’s) defence of Hegel’s critique of Kant continues this misreading of the Kantian 
project as a whole, in particular overlooking the doctrine of sensibility presented in the Transcendental Aesthetic. 
The view being argued for in this chapter is that while McDowell does so overlook Kant’s Aesthetic, Hegel does 
not: as we will see in 3.2, Hegel explicitly addresses and integrates intuition’s logical components (singularity and 
immediacy) as well as its form (external relationality); indeed Hegel’s critique of Kant is that Kant treats concepts 
and intuitions as external to one another, i.e. takes up the concept/intuition distinction from the perspective of 
intuitional form.  
138 The Opening, 339.  
139 The Opening, 132.  
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independently constituted objectivity set over against it. For Hegel, as long as we do not suspend the 
assumption that thought is minimally our thought about a sensibly-given something outside and 
opposed to thought, we will not be able to escape the thought that the “seat of true objectivity” lies 
in the object as it really is, not merely as it appears to our thinking in the forms peculiar to our sensible 
make-up.  
Suspending the common-sense – but not necessarily rationally legitimate – frame in which 
thinking as a purely subjective activity is opposed to sensibly-given objects outside of thought 
necessitates for Hegel an alternative deduction of categorial function. For Hegel, a truly self-critical 
critique of reason would begin not from a priori determinations of the a priori sensible manifold, but 
simply with thought’s immediate awareness. In Houlgate’s words, Kant  
 
… never suspends the assumption, however, that thought is essentially concerned with objects 
and so never sees that thought is minimally the understanding not of objects but of immediate 
being. Accordingly, Kant never reaches the point from which Hegel thinks a thoroughly self-
critical philosophy must begin.140   
 
So the critique of the thing-in-itself is intended to motivate an alternative beginning for category 
derivation: one that derives the conditions of objectivity from the thought of immediate being, rather 
than from the logical forms of judgment, and an assumption that thought is minimally an operation 
on sensibly-given objects (however transcendentally that operation is treated, i.e. in terms of the pure 
sensible manifold). Immediate being as alternative Hegelian beginning and its relation to intuitional 
immediacy will be discussed via the complex Kantian and post-Kantian doctrines of “Intellectual 
Intuition” in Chapters 4 and 5. 
(2b) Hegel’s alternative model of and beginning for category derivation, in part motivated by 
the Kantian account of things-in-themselves, makes possible in the body of the Logic a new logical 
account of the something that Kant takes to be determined as the object of our thinking. This new 
logical account also constitutes a further critique of the Kantian Ding an sich. Houlgate notes that this 
further critique is “subtly different” from (2a) discussed above. In the “Existence” chapter of the Logic 
– the subject of section 6.2 – Hegel argues that having a moment of “being-in-itself” is a necessary 
component of any determinate something whatsoever. It is logically necessary that minimally 
qualitatively determinate objects of thought (Hegel’s word for such objects is “something” [Etwas]) 
are constituted by two distinct but necessarily related moments – “being-in-itself” and “being-for-
other” – in order to be relationally determined as qualitatively distinct individuals. We are not to think 
of “things-in-themselves” as substantial entities somehow “behind” appearances or “beyond” thought 
– nor are we, with deflationary Kantians, to argue that the thinkable possibility of things-in-themselves 
emerges from rational reflection on our sensibility. That things have being “in-themselves” is rather a 
constitutive moment of determinacy in general, and this is demonstrable from within pure thought 
alone. To repeat: Hegel argues for the necessity of the thought of things-in-themselves not by 
reflecting on the kind of immediate sensible representations that we as so-constituted creatures have, 
but by attendance to the immediacy of thought itself. The critical upshot of Hegel’s logical account of 
the “in-itself” is that it must be taken together with “being-for-other” in order for the qualitative 
determinacy of objects to be properly accounted for. Kant has in fact abstracted the moment of in-
itselfness from its necessary counterpart, by suggesting that the in-itself of things has no relation to 
 
140 Ibid.   
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their being-for-other – in Kant’s case, that what something is in-itself has no relation to (neither 
contributes to nor undermines) what we as epistemic agents know of the object in its appearance for 
us.141  
So, taking Houlate’s arguments in (2a) and (2b) together, we might say that, for Hegel, Kant’s 
conception of the thing-in-itself is both too abstract and not abstract enough. Again, it will take the 
remainder of this thesis to step through Hegel’s arguments here – namely that an exhaustive and 
properly self-critical account of conceptuality must begin not from sensible immediacy but the 
immediacy of thought (Chapters 4 and 5), and that qualitative determinacy is constituted by being-in-
itself and being-for-other (Chapter 6). Nonetheless, the implication vis-à-vis McDowell’s reading and 
its Kantian rejoinder should already be clear. Hegel’s “critique” of things-in-themselves is not a 
jettisoning of that concept altogether (as McDowell would have it), but rather a reformulation of its 
sense and significance.142 
In my view, Houlgate’s way of approaching Hegel’s account of things-in-themselves is a more 
promising response to the Kantian rejoinder than that adopted by Sally Sedgwick. Sedgwick in “Hegel, 
McDowell, and Recent Defences of Kant” argues that the above anti-McDowellian, anti-Hegelian 
arguments do not meet the force of the Hegelian allegation of Kantian subjectivism.143 Sedgwick notes 
that Friedman and Allison, in arguing that the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction does not issue in 
a “sceptical gap” between our objective knowledge and the “really real,” proceeds by contrasting 
Kant’s position with transcendental realism in its rationalist version. As we saw in 1.2 above, it is the 
“transcendental realist” assumption that our concepts have to “access” an already determinate object 
that opens the threat of a sceptical “gap” between our thinking and its intentional objects. As Sedgwick 
very economically shows, Friedman’s response to McDowell is effectively a reminder of the three steps 
Kant’s Copernican philosophy takes vis-à-vis rationalism: (1) sensibility is not reducible to or on a 
continuum with conceptuality, but is an independent contributor to knowledge; (2) the a priori forms 
of our sensibility means that we are given objects as appearances, not as things in themselves; and (3) 
the analytic demonstrates all appearances are thinkable only on condition of certain a priori concepts.  
On this account, the “gap” that Kant closes “is the gap between our a priori concepts and nature as 
appearance.”144  Sedgwick’s argument is that Kant’s closing this gap requires keeping a second gap 
open, namely concepts (determination of appearances) and intuitions (nature as appearance) as our 
cognitive capacities together on one side, and reality in abstraction from such capacities on the other: 
“the success of Kant’s Copernican alternative depends on keeping the gap open between our 
subjective conditions and things considered in abstraction from them.” 145  The problem with 
questioning this second gap, however, is that Kantians, as we have seen in their critiques of McDowell, 
will immediately charge the Hegelian with submitting to the “myth of the noumenal,” and remind us 
that things considered in abstraction from sensibility do not undermine empirical knowledge. The 
deflationary or two-aspect Kantian would object to the language of “gap” to describe the 
appearance/thing-in-itself distinction: for such Kantians, there can be no gap because there is only one 
domain of objects; it is just that this domain can be approached in two logically distinct ways.   
 
141 This argument is eloquently made by Houlgate, The Opening, 338-345.   
142 In Hegel’s terminology, the Logic does not submit the Kantian Ding-an-sich to “abstract negation,” simply 
cancelling the concept as incoherent. It rather cancels and preserves [aufhebt] the Kantian Ding-an-sich, 
reconfiguring it as a moment of a determination as such. See my brief account of Aufhebung in the Introduction. 
143 Sally Sedgwick, “Hegel, McDowell, and Recent Defences of Kant” in Hegel: New Directions, ed. Katerina 
Deligiorgi (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2006), 49-68. 
144 Sedgwick, “Hegel, McDowell, and Recent Defences of Kant,” 56.  
145 Ibid.  
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In my view, the problem with Sedgwick’s approach here is that, like McDowell, Hegel is 
considered to provide an account of determination within Kant’s cognitive frame: Sedgwick appears 
to think that Hegel is, like Kant, primarily concerned with the conditions for the determination of 
sensibly-given objects; that for Hegel determination is a question of how “far down” concepts 
determine an ultimately recalcitrant and alien givenness. In fact, the Hegelian system’s logical 
beginning abstracts from the opposition of our conceptual capacities and an externally-given world of 
objects entirely, in order to derive an account of determination in general.   
Sedgwick’s approach to the charge of reductivism is I think more suggestive, though it 
ultimately suffers from a similar problem. Sedgwick suggests throughout her critical treatment of 
Friedman and Allison that Hegel is not guilty of reducing intuitional form to conceptuality: “contrary 
to what is commonly supposed, Hegel is in sympathy with Kant’s claim that our knowledge requires 
not one faculty but two, neither reducible to the other.”146 The difference between Kant and Hegel is 
not that between a claim for independent intuitional form and a reductive conceptualism, but rather 
in the way those faculties are related: in Kant they are “originally heterogeneous,” while in Hegel they 
are “originally identical,” without that identity meaning the reduction of one to the other.147 What 
Sedgwick means here is later drawn out in Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity (2012). 
There Sedgwick argues that Hegel’s critique of Kant’s concept/intuition is not a reduction in either 
direction, but results in an “identity” or “true unity.” In Hegel, 
 
Identity or unity is achieved not because one component of cognition is either eliminated or 
discovered to be a mere species of the other. The concepts and intuitions of an intuitive 
understanding are identical in that they are separate but mutually determining components 
of its mode of cognition. Each component is somehow necessary for the nature and existence 
of the other. 
Although Hegel’s remarks in Faith and Knowledge do not explain precisely how he 
thinks concepts and intuitions reciprocally determine or cause one another, they lend support 
to the conclusion that he is not committed to a reductive account of the relation between 
these two components of cognition.148 
 
And then on the following page: “For our mode of cognition, then, the identity of concepts and 
intuitions is achieved by means of reciprocal determination, rather than reduction.”149  
Sedgwick’s evidence for this claim for reciprocal determination is Hegel’s direct reference in 
Faith and Knowledge to Kant’s togetherness principle. Hegel identifies concept/intuition as the 
centrepiece of transcendental idealism, explicitly referencing the claim that thoughts without content 
are “empty” and intuitions without concepts “blind.” 150  But while doing this, Hegel subtly but 
 
146 “Hegel, McDowell, and Recent Defences of Kant,” 58. Sedgwick takes this point to constitute a defence of 
McDowell’s approach, but on my reading McDowell has not been careful to preserve the a priori form of 
intuition, reducing it to an implicit propositional content.  
147 Ibid.  
148 Hegel’s Critique of Kant, 9. 
149 Hegel’s Critique of Kant, 10. 
150 Sedgwick renders the Kantian togetherness principle, following Hegel, as “concepts without intuitions” (rather 
than “thoughts without content”) are empty. This is the only example in the literature I have yet found of this 
“misquote” – if one can call it that, given it follows Hegel’s own formulation – despite Westphal’s suggestion that 
this misquoting is commonplace and even severely damaging to the philosophical discipline as a whole. Kenneth 
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nonetheless comprehensively changes the core significance of the concept-intuition model. The value 
of concept and intuition for Hegel is not only or primarily that, in their relation, they secure 
determinacy for the empirical objects of knowledge. It is rather that they are an instance of the 
“idealist” insight that relations between opposed terms is constitutive of determinacy in general.151 In 
other words, the real value of Kant is not the explicit doctrines of transcendental idealism as an account 
of the sensible and discursive conditions of possibility for determinate knowledge, but as the working 
out of a general idealist principle within the specific domain of epistemology. Quoting the passage in 
full (which Sedgwick does not do) reveals this subtle but extremely important transformation of the 
significance of the concept/intuition distinction in Hegel’s thinking: 
 
“Philosophy is idealism because it does not acknowledge either one of the opposites as 
existing for itself in its abstraction from the other. The Supreme Idea is indifferent [indifferent] 
against both; and each of the opposites, considered singly, is nothing. The Kantian philosophy 
has the merit of being idealism because it does show that neither the concept in isolation nor 
intuition in isolation is anything at all […die Kantische Philosophie hat das Verdienst, Idealismus 
zu sein, insofern sie erweist, dass weder der Begriff für sich noch die Anschauung für sich allein 
etwas]; that intuition by itself is blind [blind] and the concept by itself is empty [leer]; and that 
what is called experience [Erfahrung], i.e. the finite identity of both in consciousness is not a 
rational cognition [vernünftige Erkenntnis] either. But the Kantian philosophy declares this 
finite cognition to be all that is possible.” (FK 68/302-303). 
 
This passage effects a lifting out of the concept/intuition model as one instance of a generalised model 
of determination called “idealist,” and defined by the reciprocal determination that Sedgwick 
emphasises. Hegel will continue this specific sense of “idealism” into the Logic and Encyclopedia Logic. 
For example, in approaching the classical question of rationalist psychology, i.e. whether the soul is 
immortal or not, “idealism will say: the soul is neither wholly finite nor wholly infinite; instead it is 
essentially the one as well as the other and thus neither the one nor the other; that is to say, such 
determinations in their isolation are invalid…” (EL §32). Hegel’s logical enterprise is however not 
content with Sedgwick’s rather vague definition of “reciprocal determination” (“each component is 
somehow necessary for the nature and existence of the other”). Hegel’s Logic, as we will see, 
painstakingly derives the “somehow” of determination understood as the necessity of relation 
between opposed terms. Crucially, the first terms that emerge within the Logic’s derivation are the 
logical constituents of the concept/intuition distinction, treated however in abstraction from their 
status within Kant’s account of our cognition, and whose togetherness is constitutive of determination 
as such.  
Togetherness, however, is not simple identity. Hegel’s early Schelling-inspired talk of “identity 
and unity” emphasised in the title and body of Sedgwick’s Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to 
 
R. Westphal, “Hegel’s Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant’s System of Principles in the Logic and 
Encyclopaedia,” Dialogue (2015), 6n. 
151 Two points I think legitimate this definition of Hegel’s “idealism.” Firstly, Leibniz refers to space and time as 
orders of relation as ideal representations (see note 62 above). Secondly, in the Logic, Hegel refers to that which 
is “sublated” [das Aufgehobene] as the “idealised” [das Ideelle] (SL 81/21.94). I will briefly treat the structure of 
“sublation” [Aufhebung] in Chapter 6. Suffice to say here that sublation is an operation in which the necessary 
complementarity, togetherness, or relation between two immediately opposed terms is explicitly posited.  
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Identity is thus at best an approximation of Hegel’s mature alternative.152 The emphasis on “original 
identity” drawn from Schelling’s Identitätsphilosophie is replaced in the Logic by an understanding of 
determination as containing moments of both identity and difference. Also bound up with the Hegel-
Schelling relation is Hegel’s use of “indifference” in the above quote. As we will see in Chapter 5, 
Schelling’s Identitätsphilosophie characterises the absolute beginning and end of philosophical 
knowledge as indifference [Indifferenz], in the sense that no distinction or determinacy is thinkable 
within it. Hegel understands indifference to be a moment of the philosophical Absolute, but contra 
Schelling takes it to resolve of itself into an account of determination in general. We treat Hegel’s 
relation to and critique of Schelling’s Identitätsphilosophie in Chapter 5. 
 
3.2. Hegel’s Vorbegriff Critique of Kant 
In the remainder of this chapter I seek to show that the “Preliminary Conception” [Vorbegriff] of the 
Encyclopedia Logic systematically treats Kant’s concept/intuition in the manner only announced in the 
Faith and Knowledge passage above, and that the Vorbegriff treatment of concept/intuition neatly 
aligns with and reinforces Houlgate’s defense of Hegel’s critique of Kantian subjectivism (treated under 
2(a) above). In other words, the Vorbegriff shows that Hegel contests the Kantian thing-in-itself not by 
remaining within the Kantian cognitive frame, i.e. insisting that our cognition saturate sensibly-given 
objectivity (McDowell’s and Sedgwick’s respective approaches), but rather by attempting to justify the 
shift to an ontological register (Houlgate’s reading), in which determination is understood as the 
togetherness of the logical constituents of the concept/intuition distinction operative in being as such. 
The first six sections of the Vorbegriff (§§19-26) introduces Hegel's account of “pure thought” 
(often shortened just to “thought” or “thinking”), which constitutes the “element” of the Concept. The 
Vorbegriff makes it clear that the problem of the relation of pure thinking to objectivity – which, as we 
have seen in Chapter 2.2, is the problem of Kant’s Critical period – is central to Hegel’s Logic. §24 ends 
with Hegel’s initial definition of what he calls “objective thoughts.” Hegel says there that the forms of 
thought examined in “ordinary logic” are “usually taken to be only forms of conscious thought.” Hegel 
however considers his Logic to be an account of these forms not only as conscious thoughts – thought 
in the sense of our cogitation – but as thoughts that constitute objectivity as such: “Logic thus 
coincides with metaphysics, i.e. the science of things captured in thoughts that have counted as 
expressing the essentialities of things.” Prima facie this line supports the “revised metaphysical” 
reading of Hegel’s Logic supported in this thesis: again, that Hegel takes the categories of the Logic to 
directly disclose ways of being (Houlgate’s way of speaking) or that rational form is operative “in the 
world” (Kreines’ formula), rather than a conceptual scheme limited to or demonstrably valid only for 
our thinking.153 I submit that the doctrine of “objective thought” does indicate the Logic’s claim to 
 
152 I here agree with Pippin’s reading of Hegel’s move away from Schelling’s “identity talk” in Hegel’s Idealism, 
70-73.   
153 Recently, Robert Pippin has suggested that the past tense in the above quote (“have counted”) means that 
Hegel does not intend to revive rationalist logicism, but that an anti-rationalist interpretation has become “oddly 
controversial among some Hegel scholars.” If the target here is the “revised metaphysical” position as I have put 
it above, Pippin’s attack misses the mark: neither Houlgate nor Kreines nor Bowman nor Beiser suggest that 
Hegel is claiming that “logical reasoning… provide[s] knowledge of objects” in the manner of Krug’s pen, nor of 
supersensible objects (God, the Soul, the World) in the manner of Wolffian rationalism. Houlgate, to take only 
the line to which I am closest, only claims that the Logic provides a post-Kantian account of objectivity in general, 
without the Kantian claim that things-in-themselves may have intrinsic properties in principle separable from 
such an account. As I mentioned in the Introduction, the difference between Pippin and Houlgate’s respective 
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ontological – rather than merely epistemic – purport, and this emerges once §§26-78 have contrasted 
Hegel’s position with three alternative historical philosophical “Positions of Thought Toward 
Objectivity,” namely: (a) metaphysics (both Classical and the “old” [really “former,” vormalige] 
Wolffian school metaphysics); (b) empiricism and Kantianism; and (c) “immediate knowing” (F.H. 
Jacobi, but also Romanticism more generally).  
Of these three historical positions, the empiricism-Kantian is the most contentious grouping; 
as we know, the Critical Kant represents himself as opposed to empiricism’s “physiological” account of 
conceptuality. It is also the most crucial, insofar as Kantianism is presented as a kind of fault-line 
between “subjective” (empiricist) and “objective” (Hegelian) understandings of thought. Hegel uses 
Kant’s own Critical account of objectivity to mobilise a critique of Kant’s subjectivist tendencies, which 
for Hegel are the result of a certain empiricist inheritance in Kantian philosophy. Indeed, Hegel’s 
understanding of “objective thought” is presented as a Kantian doctrine, if only Kant had consistently 
followed through on the logical implications of his togetherness principle.  
By advancing a scheme in which empiricism and Kantianism share an underlying identity, Hegel 
replaces Kant’s history of philosophy, in which the Critical Philosophy mediates and integrates 
rationalism and empiricism (a self-presentation reinforced by Kant’s opposing Locke to Leibniz in the 
Critique’s “Amphibolies” and its brief concluding “History of Pure Reason” section), with a historical 
scheme in which empiricism and the Critical Philosophy taken together abstractly negate the 
metaphysical tradition. Hegel can then present his absolute idealism as the genuine synthesis of both 
rationalism and empiricism: synthesising the metaphysical claim for knowledge of the real (the “things 
captured in thoughts” of §24 above) with the outcomes of Kant’s account of determinate knowledge. 
The Vorbegriff, in other words, is the closest we have to Hegel’s take on Kant's philosophical 
“battlefield,” in which (to soften the metaphor from war to sports) Kant is no longer the umpire but 
another player in the game. 
I want to quote §40 in its entirety because it will be the focus of discussion for the remainder 
of this chapter. Hegel says: 
 Critical philosophy shares with empiricism the supposition that experience is the sole basis 
 of knowledge, except that it lets that knowledge count, not for truths, but only for 
 knowledge of appearances. 
  The initial point of departure is the difference between the elements that result from 
 the analysis of experience: the sensory material and universal relations. Insofar as this is 
 combined with the reflection cited in its preceding section (that only the individual and only 
 what occurs is contained in perception), the fact is insisted upon at the same time that 
 universality and necessity are to be found in what is called experience as equally essential 
 determinations. Now, since this element does not issue from the empirical as such, it 
 belongs to the spontaneity of thinking or is a priori. – The thought-determinations 
 [Denkbestimmungen] or concepts of the understanding constitute the objectivity of 
 experiential knowledge. They generally contain relationships, hence they are instrumental in 
 the formation of synthetic judgments a priori (i.e. original relationships between opposed 
 elements). 
The fact that the determinations of universality and necessity are found in knowing 
is not disputed by Humean skepticism. It is also nothing but a presupposed fact in 
 
interpretations is very fine, and lines like this from Pippin do not aid our understanding of the issues at stake. 
Pippin, “Hegel on Logic as Metaphysics,” 201.  
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the Kantian philosophy. In the usual language of the sciences one can say that it has 
merely put forward a different explanation of that fact (§40/82-83). 
Hegel here claims that empiricism and Kantianism share a “point of departure” in that both consider 
experience to be constituted by two elements: “sensory material” and “universal relations.” On 
Hegel’s reading, the former only provides “individuals” such that the latter is required to account for 
our cognition, in which individuals are related in terms of universality and necessity (paradigmatically 
in the causal relation).154 I will step through these elements as Hegel takes them to be presented in 
empiricism and Kantianism, showing that Hegel thinks the sensory in terms of indifference and – as 
should already be clear from the above – conceptuality as essentially relational. This will enable an 
understanding of the way in which Hegel takes Kant to both escape and remain within the empiricist 
“subjectivist” understanding of determination.  
 
1. Indifference and Relation in Humean Empiricism155 
James Kreines in Reason in the World notes that Hegel's word for external relation is “indifference” or 
“equal-validity” [Gleichgültigkeit]. In Kreines usage, the term means that objects organised are 
“indifferent” to their ordering, such that any ordering is as “equally valid” as any other. Kreines 
considers indifferentism to be a “humean” position and defines it as the view in which “reality is akin 
to a mosaic, exhausted by individual tiles whose features would have allowed them equally well to 
have been placed in any conceivable other arrangement.”156 Kreines leaves aside the question as to 
whether this really is Hume’s view or not (hence the lower-case “humeanism”), only citing a passage 
in which Hume seems to support such a view. In the Treatise, Hume claims that: “All events seem 
entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between 
them. They seem conjoined, but never connected.”157 Sensorily determined objects are placed and 
ordered next to and after one another in the relations of contiguity and succession. In the absence of 
a rule determining which objects are to be related to one another (as causes and effects), any so-
determined object can be placed next to or after any other. Indifference in Kreines’ sense corresponds 
to what Ciavatta calls a “naïve realism that would take the world to consist ultimately of self-contained, 
self-sufficient individuals whose relations to one another are fundamentally external to their 
identities.”158 In other words, there is nothing in the determination of a sensorily-given object itself – 
or in the nature or structure of our perception of such objects – that would necessitate it being placed 
next to or after any other object, and, in turn, nothing in that other object that would necessitate its 
being placed next to or after the first. Instead, necessary relation is dependent on a rule (causality) 
itself external to the externally-related terms it connects. It is this picture, in which conceptuality is 
itself external to the external terms it synthesises, that Hegel detects in both Hume and Kant, and seeks 
in the Logic to overcome via a generalisation of togetherness, such that externally-related terms are 
 
154 In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel similarly introduces Kant via Hume: “The general sense of 
the Kantian philosophy is that, as Hume has shown, categorial determinations [Bestimmungen] such as 
universality and necessity are not to be found in perception, and therefore they have a source other than 
Perceiving” (LHP, vol. 3, 170). 
155 An earlier, longer, more convoluted version of the below account of Humean empiricism is presented in Gene 
Flenady,  “A Doctrine of Unfreedom: Hegel’s Critique of Empiricist Indifference,” The Online Journal of Hegel 
Studies 13, no. 22 (2016).  
156 James Kreines, Reason in the World, 58.  
157 Quoted in Kreines, Reason in the World, 58.  
158 Ciavatta, “Hegel on the Idealism of Practical Life,” 1.  
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themselves the result of mediation. Again, this claim is already legible in a conceptualist reading of 
Kant’s Deduction, insofar as mediation is a condition of intuitional individuality. 
The Vorbegriff certainly attributes indifference in Kreines’ sense of the term to the historical 
Hume’s account of perception, and I hope here to show briefly that Hegel has good reason to do so.159 
The Vorbegriff account drops the reference to the Protestant historical ground of empiricism argued 
for in Faith and Knowledge (57/2:289). Instead empiricism is put in its relationship to metaphysics. In 
§37: 
 
What first led to empiricism was both the need for a concrete content, in contrast to the 
abstract theories of the understanding that is incapable of progressing from its generalities to 
particularisation and determination [Bestimmung] on its own, and the need for a firm foothold 
against the possibility of being able to prove [beweisen] everything on the plane of, and by the 
method of, finite determinations. Instead of looking for the true within thought itself, 
empiricism sets out to fetch it from experience, the inwardly and outwardly present (§37/78).  
Hegel here tacitly traces Kant’s pre-Critical treatment of rationalist indeterminacy vis-à-vis empirically 
real objects and their relations to an empiricist perspective. Logical determination alone – here Hegel’s 
“abstract” “understanding” – cannot progress from the general to the particular, and so cannot per 
Leibniz determine an individual solely by predication. The “proving” [beweisen] in this quote refers 
back to the ontological proof [Beweis] addressed in the preceding paragraph §36, whose rebuttal is 
central to the Kant’s critique of logicism. As we saw in 1.2, Kant argues that existence is not a predicate: 
for objective or real determination of an object, we have to “fetch” that individual from experience, 
so to speak (recall the example of the sea-unicorn, in which we “go to” experience to verify whether a 
certain bundle of non-contradictory predicates attach to any real thing).  
Hume’s Treatise begins by re-affirming the empiricist ambition to gain this “firm foothold,” i.e. 
to ground knowledge claims in sensuous experience. As Hume puts it: “And tho’ we must endeavour 
to render all our principles as universal as possible… ’tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience… 
or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority” (0.8).160 The goal of the first book 
of the Treatise is to develop a method to determine the experiential authority of such “principles” – a 
kind of “Verification Empiricism.”161 Importantly, and in accordance with Hegel’s Vorbegriff account, 
this verification project is undertaken in terms of the contrast between individual “perceptions” and 
“relations,” the first distinction advanced in the Treatise.162  
Hume shares the assumptions of the “Modern Way of Ideas” instantiated by Descartes and 
carried on in Locke: that is, that the mind is only immediately aware of mental entities that represent 
 
159 My emphasis here on Hume (rather than Locke) is motivated by Kreines work, but also justified by Hegel's 
text – in the last of the Vorbegriff’s three numbered paragraphs on empiricism, Hegel says “the preceding 
reflection chiefly proceeds” from Hume (§39). 
160 Hume’s Treatise will be cited by book, part, section and paragraph, with the exception of lines from its 
introduction, marked by “0” and paragraph number. Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. Norton, D. 
F. and Norton, M. J. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
161  Kenneth Westphal’s summary definitions of “concept,” “verification,” “meaning,” and “judgement” 
empiricism has been helpful here. “Verification empiricism” is only that aspect of Hume’s empiricist approach 
that is most salient here. Westphal’s definition will be given shortly. Westphal, Kenneth. Hegel’s Epistemological 
Realism. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 48. 
162 “Perceptions and relations… are the basic features of all the philosophical relations found in the treatise.” 
Norton, D.F. “Introduction to A Treatise of Human Nature,” by David Hume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), I17. 
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or are in some way about objects in the world, not the world itself.163 “Perceptions” is Hume’s name 
for these entities, which are in turn divided into “Ideas” and “Impressions.” Ideas and impressions are 
different not in kind but in degree of “force,” “vivacity” and “liveliness.” Importantly, impressions are 
held to cause ideas. 164  The net result of this definitional work is to hold simple impressions as 
foundational and continuous with simple ideas, and ultimately foundational in the case of complex 
ideas (once the mediation of the “imagination” in combining simple ideas is accounted for). This 
delineates a methodology for establishing the legitimacy of knowledge claims: “the examination of the 
impression bestows a clearness on the idea” (1.3.2.4). If such an examination is impossible or 
incoherent, the idea in question does not constitute legitimately grounded knowledge, but something 
with a non- or extra-rational status (designated by the linked terms “fiction,” “custom,” “habit,” 
“belief” and human “nature”). 
 In the Vorbegriff, Hegel puts the empiricist verification project this way: "universal 
determinations (e.g. force) are to possess no other meaning and validity for themselves than that taken 
from perception, and that no connection [Zusammenhang] is to be supposed to be legitimate unless 
it has been exhibited in the appearances" (§38/79). Kenneth R. Westphal in Hegel’s Epistemological 
Realism similarly defines verification empiricism as: “For any (non-logical) proposition that is known 
to be true, there is a sensory experience that confirms the proposition.”165 The problem for Hume’s 
project is that there are some concepts which, while lacking sensory ground, cannot be given up 
without losing explanatory grip on our experience. Hume will find it impossible to ground any form of 
necessary relation between particulars, of which causal law is the paradigm. 
For Hume, the idea of causation is a special and problematic case because it seems to allow us 
to “discover the real existence of the relations of objects” (1.3.2.2), but it does so only by extending 
beyond or outside of the sense impressions that would ground such an existential claim. Other 
philosophical relations, e.g. “identity” and “relations of time and place” do not in establishing real 
existence and relation lead the mind “beyond what is immediately present to the senses...” (1.3.2.2). 
In contrast, “an assurance from the existence or action of one object, that ‘twas follow’d or preceded 
by any other existence or action… beyond the impressions of our senses can be founded only on the 
connexion of cause and effect” (1.3.2.2). For Hume, the uniqueness of the causal claim is that it moves 
from something whose existence is assured by a present impression to something immediately 
unavailable to sense but nonetheless purportedly real and in a real relation with that which is present. 
As Henry E. Allison puts the problem, recalling the problem of indeterminate judgments discussed in 
2.2 above, “causal connections cannot be immediately perceived, as if some objects come stamped as 
causes and others as effects.”166 This lack of immediacy makes it a “double-edged sword” – on the one 
 
163 Garrett, Don. Hume (London: Routledge, 2015), 36. This is the representationalist or “Cartesian picture of 
perception” that Allais calls “indirect” because the object which causes the perceptual state is not itself a 
constituent of the mental state, but requires “mental intermediaries.” Kant for Allais is opposed to such a view, 
and is rather a “direct realist” or has a “relational” account of perception. On the relational view, “the presence 
to consciousness of the object is part of what makes the mental state the state that it is.” Manifest Reality, 12. 
Hegel seemingly does not take account of this difference between Kant and Hume in his argument for their 
shared “subjectivism.” 
164 This causal connection between particular impressions and ideas is cited by Allison in Custom and Reason in 
Hume as evidence of Hume’s belief in the real existence of causal powers – his scepticism only goes to our 
knowledge of such powers. Garrett briefly lists the positions available in the “sharp interpretive dispute” 
surrounding the philosophical status of Hume’s account of causation. Hume, 172-174. 
165 Westphal, Hegel’s Epistemological Realism, 48. 
166 Allison, Custom and Reason, 90. 
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hand, “… it is a necessary condition of the relation serving as a principle of inference from the observed 
to the unobserved, whereas, on the other, it makes it problematic and in need of criteria to justify its 
inferential use.”167 In short, Hume asks if stable criteria for an exercise of causal inference can be drawn 
from experience. 
As is well known, Hume suggests an examination of the experiential legitimacy of claims for 
causal relation: we are to examine two objects that we assume to be causally related, and determine 
whether any impression is available to ground causality (1.3.2.5). When we claim that two events are 
standing in a relationship of cause and effect to one another, we are in fact inferring from our 
impression of two distinct relations that are available to perception: contiguity and succession. 
Contiguity names the two events “lying” next to one another in space, while “succession” names the 
relation of two events as following after one another in time (1.3.12). The attempt to trace cause and 
effect to experience leads to two forms of relation that in themselves do not amount to a causal 
relation. Hume finds that his verification empiricism cannot ground the causal “connexion” between 
events, insofar as causation implies the necessity and universality of that relation (that something 
always follows from something else in all instances). Put differently, the claim that something always 
follows from something else in all instances is never present to us in sense-experience. Hegel in EL §39 
puts it like this: 
 
Empirical observation does indeed show many, indeed countless, perceptions that are alike. 
Still universality is something entirely different from a large amount [Menge]. Similarly, 
empirical observation indeed affords us perceptions of changes following upon one another 
[aufeinanderfolgenden Veränderung], or of objects lying side-by-side 
[nebeneinanderliegenden Gegenständen]. Now insofar as perception is to remain the 
foundation of what is to count as the truth, universality and necessity appear to be something 
unwarranted [Unberechtigtes], a subjective coincidence [Zufälligkeit], a mere habit 
[Gewohnheit], and its content might just as well be as it is or otherwise (§39/82). 
 
Note here in Hegel’s thinking the link between external relations of succession and contiguity (“after” 
and “next to”) and indifference as emphasised by Kreines. As long as the external relationality of 
perception “counts as” truth, universal and necessary relations cannot be said to be objective in the 
sense of possessing ontological explanatory purport. Causality, for example, can be a reason for belief, 
but cannot legitimately be taken to be a reason for beings being as they are. Such relations are 
superimposed onto an indifferent perceptual material, with “indifferent” here meaning that any such 
imposition, if taken to be a realist claim, is ultimately equally valid.  Note that this is not to say that we 
cannot distinguish between better and worse reasons for belief in certain causal relations. It is just 
that all such beliefs, regardless of their relative strength, have equal justification with regard to being, 
insofar as causality is held to be a determination of our thinking, not of being as such. To use the 
Humean example, it is better to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow rather than not, if only 
ultimately for practical purposes; but if we take such a belief to entail a realist claim, i.e. to predict 
events on the basis of some really existing causal relation, there is equal justification for the opposite 
view.168   
 
167 Ibid. 
168 Kreines discusses in some detail the contemporary versions of this Humean or humean take on universality, 
namely that laws of nature are ultimately only generalisations or summaries of “the arrangement of indifferent 
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Again, Hegel’s account here is not at a great distance from the historical Hume. As is well 
known, Hume finds that our belief in causality is not legitimated by experience but is in some sense a 
habitual association contributed by the psychology of the minded subject. Aping the presumed 
surprise of his reader at reaching his conclusion for the reducibility of seemingly objective causal 
determinations to psychological habits of association, Hume exclaims: “What! the efficacy of causes 
lie in the determination of the mind!” (1.3.14.26).  
Now, from Hegel’s perspective, Kant’s transcendental philosophy substantially follows the 
above outlined Humean pattern. Kant similarly claims that, because sensibility is only capable of giving 
us singular objects lying next to and after one another, causality is a “determination of the mind.” For 
Hegel, Kant and Hume’s respective attributions of necessity and universality to the activity of the 
subject – made necessary by their arguments for the impossibility of locating necessary relations in 
and between objects themselves – renders both subjectivists, in the sense that necessary relations 
must be “projected” onto a sensible manifold itself taken to lack necessary relations entirely.169  
Clearly, Hegel’s way of framing both Kant and Hume in terms of an opposition between 
sensibly-given individuals and universal relations neglects crucial differences between the Humean 
and Kantian doctrines of sensibility and conceptuality.  
Firstly, regarding the sensory, we have seen that Kant distinguishes between sensations and 
intuitions. For Kant, the outside-one-another placement of spatio-temporal intuitions is not given with 
perception as it is with Hume, but is rather an a priori contribution of our sensibility.  
Secondly, this transcendental account of sensibility alters Kant’s account of conceptual 
determination: because a priori intuitional form can be abstracted from sensation, the Analytic can 
demonstrate a priori (and thus with necessity) that concepts condition the cognition of matter 
organised in that form. Like Hume, Kant does not take a priori concepts, like causality, to be derivable 
from empirical experience; unlike Hume, he is able to demonstrate the legitimacy of their relation to 
experience as its condition.  
This leads to a third, and less obvious, point. As we have seen, Kant’s dual-function thesis 
understands conceptuality not only as predicative determination, but also as synthesis or connection 
of the sensible manifold as such. Per the conceptualist reading advanced above, it follows that a priori 
conceptuality conditions the cognition of specifically intuitional (i.e. external) relationality. Hegel’s 
treatment of the Kant-Hume relation in the Vorbegriff however focuses entirely on what Kant terms 
“synthesis in the concept” (in this case, cause) rather than the syntheses of apprehension and 
reproduction. This is understandable given Hume’s preoccupation with causality and Kant’s references 
to “Hume’s problem” in the Prolegomena (not to mention the discussion of causality in Negative 
Magnitudes in 1.2 above). However, it draws attention away from the link between the Vorbegriff 
critique of Kantianism and the Doctrine of Being’s account of determination in general that I am 
concerned to establish. In fact, leaving the above reading of the Vorbegriff at this point would suggest 
a non-conceptualist reading of Kantian determination: sensibility gives us externally individuated 
objects in space and time; conceptuality is only required for universal and necessary determinations 
via conceptual subsumption. In other words, conceptual synthesis as a condition of intuitional 
relationality itself does not figure in Hegel’s Vorbegriff account.  
 
particulars.” Reason in the World, 59. It follows that such summaries can have stronger or weaker predictive 
power, but they cannot be understood to govern future events.   
169 The language of “projection” is Allison’s; he refers to Kantian and Humean philosophies as different forms of 
the “imposition” or “projection” of causal relations onto things. Custom and Reason, 204-5. 
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In this thesis however I am seeking to draw attention to the similarity of Kant and Hegel’s 
respective accounts not of causal determination (synthesis in a concept) but minimal qualitative 
contrast between individuals (synthesis of apprehension): in Kant the togetherness of singularity and 
mediation in the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction is required for cognition of qualitative 
difference between intuitionally-organised objects or appearances to obtain; this same togetherness, 
I will argue, is present in Hegel’s account of quality in the Logic. At bottom, however, both causality 
and quality are bound up with the opposition between sensory individuality and conceptual 
relationality that Hegel identifies: both synthesis intellectualis and synthesis speciosa are concerned 
with the bringing into relation of terms which, in their sensible immediacy, are given as without 
mediation.  
This similarity has not been lost on commentators. Kenneth Westphal reinforces Stern’s 
account of Kant’s quasi-empiricist “bundle theory” (see 2.2 above). Importantly for this thesis, Hegel 
subsumes the problem of causality under the problem of “perceptual synthesis” – that is, the cognition 
of sensations as belonging together in discrete objects of thought:  
 
The main point is that, on Hume’s view as well as Kant’s, the relata of a supposed causal 
relation, or analogously our sensory representations of that relation, ‘which succeed one 
another or [stand] next to one another’ are originally ‘of themselves altogether indifferent to 
each other.’ That holds of Humean ‘objects,’ which are supposed to be indifferently either 
outer things or sensory impressions, and it holds as well of Kantian sensations 
(Empfindungen): in principle they are completely independent of each other. In order to solve 
the problem of causal relations, as well as to solve the problem indicated here (if not named 
in these terms) of perceptual synthesis, Hegel already recognises their relata must be 
reconceived in fundamentally different terms.170  
This is legible in the Encyclopedia account: Hegel states the problem in terms of necessary relation, 
and makes this the problem of both the causal relation between objects and the perceptual synthesis 
of objects themselves. That is, Hegel holds on to the Kantian understanding of objective determination 
in terms of synthesis, but conceives individuality in such a way as to make synthesis a moment of 
individuality as such, not something brought to already constituted individuals. As Westphal has it 
above, Hegel fundamentally reconceives the relata of Kantian synthesis. That Hegel considers synthesis 
in the concept and synthesis in apprehension to turn on the relation between relation and individuality 
is indicated by his rehearsing a moment of the “Perception” chapter of the Phenomenology in the 
Vorbegriff. Hegel argues that a relation of unity between “simple impressions” cannot be 
demonstrated in observation. “Consider, for instance, a piece of sugar. It is hard, white, sweet, and so 
on. But now we say that all these properties are united in one object, and this unity does not exist in 
sensation” (§42z/87). Thinking back to Kant’s A Deduction, the form of inner sense would account for, 
in this example, sequentially given sensations of sweetness, hardness, and whiteness. Apprehending 
them as belonging together in one object distinguishable from other objects, however, requires 
holding together (and reproducing as a condition of holding together) these discrete sensible 
moments. This example of course involves predication, insofar as these properties are judged to hold 
of different objects regardless of their spatio-temporal placement. The comparative work of this thesis, 
 
170 Kenneth Westphal, “Hegel and Hume on Perception and Concept-Empiricism.” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 36, no. 1 (1998): 107-108. 
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however, is limited to the way in which mediation is conceived as giving rise to immediate qualitative 
distinction between individuals.  
 
2. Indifference and Relation in Kant 
We have seen in the above the Hegel takes both Hume and Kant to oppose sensory individuals to 
conceptually-supplied relation. The Vorbegriff’s identification of Kantian intuitional form specifically 
with indifference begins in §19. This paragraph presents prima facie evidence against my claim that 
intuitional form is a concern of the Logic. Hegel claims that logic (in his sense of the word, as 
“coinciding” with metaphysics) is “the most difficult science because it has not to do with intuitions 
[Anschauungen] – and not even with abstract sensory representations as in geometry – but with pure 
abstractions” (§19/47). Now, as we saw, Kant’s deduction of the objectivity of pure concepts turns 
crucially on their applicability to pure intuitions, and that geometrical construction is crucial in both 
the Aesthetic (in arguing for the a priority of spatio-temporal form) and in the A Deduction (in 
introducing apprehensive synthesis). Hegel’s opening account of “objective thoughts” thus seems to 
begin by explicitly disregarding intuition in Kant’s sense – a vindication of the Kantian rejoinders to 
McDowell spelt out above. But in §20, Hegel differentiates between the “sensory dimension” [das 
Sinnliche], “representation” [Vorstellung], and “thoughts” [Gedanken]. For Hegel, reference to our 
senses is insufficient for an explanation of the sensory: 
 
The sensory is initially explained by reference to its external origin, i.e. the senses or 
instruments of sensation. However, mention of the instrument does not by itself afford a 
determination of what is meant by it (§20/51). 
A determination of the sensory requires an account of the logic of sensory relation. Hegel in the 
remainder of §20 distinguishes the sensory thought on the basis of the relation proper to sensoriness:  
 
The difference between the sensory and thought is to be located in the fact that the 
determination of the former is its individualness [Einzelheit], and insofar as the individual 
(taken quite abstractly as an atom) also stands in connection [im Zusammenhange steht] with 
other things, whatever is sensory is outside-of-something-else [Aussereinander], the abstract 
forms of which are, more precisely, those of being side-by-side and after one another [das 
Neben- und das Nacheinander] (§20/51). 
 
What is presented in sensoriness is “individualness,” which here translates Einzelheit, Kant's word for 
the singularity of intuitions (and sometimes translated as “singularity” in Hegel also). 171  So the 
singularity component of Kantian intuition is emphasised in Hegel from the outset of the Vorbegriff. 
Hegel indicates his acquaintance with Kant’s Aesthetic by claiming that these individuals are connected 
with other individuals in the “side-by-side” or “next to” [neben] and coming “after” [nach] that for 
Kant characterises spatio-temporal relation, i.e. the “placing and ordering” afforded by the pure forms 
of intuition. Hegel rightly takes both spatial and temporal relationality to be characterised by external 
relationality, which is made clear by the compound, “outside-one-another-being.” For Hegel, Kant’s 
intuitional form articulates a way of being in which an individual is outside of its others. As we have 
 
171 The di Giovanni translation of the Science of Logic renders Der Einzelne and Das Einzelheit as the “singular” 
and “singularity,” while the Miller translation has it as “individual” and “individuality.” 
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seen, Kant's word for the relation that intuitions have to one another through the syntheses of 
apprehension and reproduction is connection [Beziehung], which is to be distinguished from the 
“relation” [Verhältnis] established by categorial synthesis. Hegel does not use the Beziehung or 
Verhältnis in the above. Rather, objects in the form of the sensory “hang together” 
[Zusammenhangen], which suggests the indifference of intuitional form in Kant in Kreines sense: that 
externally related objects could be “hung together” or connected to one another in a different (even 
an opposite) way is equally conceivable.  
 Hegel makes the link between Kant’s Aesthetic and his own thinking in terms of “indifference” 
clear later in §20 by calling “being-outside-of-one-another [ausseinanderseinde] proper to space 
[Raum].” If we go to Hegel's definition of space in the Philosophy of Nature, we find it described as:  
 
The first or immediate determination [unmittelbare Bestimmung] of Nature is Space: the 
abstract universality of Nature's self-externality [abstrake Allgemeinheit ihres 
Aussersichseins], self-externality's mediationless indifference [vermittlungslose 
Gleichgültigkeit]. It is a wholly ideal side-by-sideness [Nebeneinander]... (EPN §254/28)  
 
Note the phrase “mediationless indifference” opposes indifference to mediation. This dovetails with 
Hegel’s way of framing Hume and Kant’s respective accounts of objectivity: mediation or relation is 
not present in the sensory (regardless of whether our sensibility is physiologically or transcendentally 
conceived); thus the indifference of its externally-related terms are by definition mediationless.  
Hegel’s use of the word indifference to characterise spatio-temporality is continued in the 
Encylopedia system, this time in terms of our sensible intuition of spatio-temporal objects. In the 
Psychology section of the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel defines intuition, like Kant, as immediate 
apprehension of objects in space and time. And, like Kant, he sees intuitive form as the organisation 
of sensation. But he is concerned to emphasise the logical possibility of relations available in these 
forms: 
 
 Sensations are thus posited spatially and temporally by intuition. The spatial presents itself 
 as the form of indifferent juxtaposition [gleichgültigen Nebeneinanderseins] and quiescent 
 subsistence [ruhigens Bestehen]; the temporal, by contrast, presents itself as the form of 
 unrest [die Form der Unruhe], of the internally negative, of successiveness, of arising and 
 vanishing, so that that the temporal is, in that it is not, and is not, in that it is. But the forms 
 of abstract externality are identical with one another in the sense that each is utterly discrete 
 within itself and at the same time utterly continuous (EPM §448/181). 
 
Three points need to be addressed here. Firstly, one might ask how space and time can be considered 
instances of indifference. Space is the easier case: the “indifferent juxtaposition” of spatial 
determinations lines up directly with the Vorbegriff language of “Zusammenhangen” treated via 
Kreines above, as does its “quiescent subsistence.” Quiescence of the spatial suggests that nothing in 
a merely spatially determined object brings it into relation with an other so-determined object; spatial 
objects in some sense allow themselves to be determined from without, by a conceptuality that is not 
legible within or between them. Time is a more complex case: “Zusammenhangen” is a spatial 
metaphor, and Hegel above only explicitly characterises space as indifferent. But there is a kind of 
indifference operative in time. As Hegel says in the quote above, “the forms of abstract externality” - 
i.e. space and time - “are identical” in that they are both at the same time discrete and continuous. 
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This combination of discreteness and continuity is characteristic of quantitative determination in the 
second section of the Doctrine of Being, which I will discuss briefly in Chapter 6 after the role of 
indifference in qualitative determination is made out. But even with only the Kantian material covered 
so far, it is possible to see the sense of Hegel's claim: there is, as we saw in 2.1, one space and one 
time, and the forms of intuition are singular in that sense. But singularity in the sense of “totality” is a 
condition of the representation of discrete singulars within space and time. Space and time are thus 
“filled” with discrete objects, but the condition for the representation of these discrete objects (for 
the representation of discontinuity) is the “continuity” of one space and one time.  
More complexly again, in the case of time affirmation and its negation come together and 
cannot be pulled apart without undoing the essential determination of time itself. If one said only that 
“time is” one would only be offering a one-sided account of time. It is equally important to say of each 
temporal moment that it is not, insofar as each moment passes in its very arising. Hegel of course 
directly treats time in terms of negation in the Sense-Certainty chapter of the Phenomenology. But this 
same structure will be treated in abstraction from temporality at the very start of the Logic in the 
“immediate indifference” of being and nothing: to say that being is is only a one-sided determination; 
one must also mark or posit its identity with its negation, i.e. nothing. These two terms are then further 
determined as the arising and passing that constitutes being as essentially becoming. 
The second point I want to make is that the linking of space to indifferent juxtaposition and 
time to the indifference specific to “becoming,” can make it sound as if indifference and becoming are 
treated in the Logic as specifically or essentially spatial and temporal. But although Hegel treats spatio-
temporality and its intuition in minded creatures under the logic of indifference, for Hegel that logic is 
treatable in abstraction from spatio-temporality. The Logic abstracts from reference to space and time, 
but derives from immediate being logical forms that will later be demonstrated, in Hegel’s progression 
from Logic to the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit to be determinative of spatio-
temporality and its intuition.  
True to his characterisation of logical thinking as pure abstraction (§19), Hegel in determining 
the form of the sensory has followed Kant's abstraction from concepts and particular sensations in 
treating intuitional form in the Aesthetic (see 2.1 above). But Hegel in the comparative arguments of 
the Vorbegriff prepares for the Logic by going a step further: he has abstracted again from any 
reference to or representation of “space” and “time,” leaving only the logical form of spatio-temporal 
determination and relation between individuals so determined. Hegel makes this commitment to 
abstraction clear a little later in §20: “Incidentally, when it was said that the determinations of the 
sensory are those of individuality [Einzelheit] and being-outside-of-one-another, it can also be added 
that the latter too, are in turn thoughts and universals themselves.” As such, the forms of indifferent 
relation that the Logic's Doctrine of Being will show to necessarily hold of beings qua beings will then 
determine certain moments in the Realphilosophie, i.e. some natural and geistige objects, events, 
actions, institutions and so on. Space and time are characterised by indifferent relation, but Hegel will 
also suggest the same thing of atomistic individualism in modern states (EL §98/155). So in the Logic, 
what for Kant is introduced as and understood to be only the a priori form of our faculty of sensibility 
is in fact treated, but in its utmost generality, in thought. It is clear that Hegel’s movement or 
translation of pure intuitional form into abstract thinking is a conceptualism of a kind – albeit one in 
fact attendant on Kant’s own characterisation of intuitional representation as externally related 
individuals. 
Thirdly, something briefly needs to be said here about the difference between Hegel’s realist 
account of our intuitional representation of spatio-temporality and Kant’s anti-realism: for Hegel, the 
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logical structure of indifference organises space and time in themselves, as well as our intuition of 
them. After treating “the sensory” in terms of indifference, Hegel then turns to “Representation 
[Vorstellung].” Hegel claims that representation “has such sensory material [sinnliche Stoff] for its 
content, but posited in the determination of being mine, i.e. the determination that such content is in 
me, and of universality, the relation-to-self, simplicity.” To mark Hegel’s difference to Kant regarding 
the realist status of intuition as a kind of representation, we need to follow these comments into 
Hegel's account of intuition in the Psychology section of the Philosophy of Spirit. For Hegel, the sensory 
material whose form is singulars placed and ordered outside one another furnishes in turn the stuff or 
matter for representation. In representation, for Hegel, that sensory material determined as outside-
one-another [Aussereinander] is further determined as being in me. This is not Kant's position, because 
the “outside-of-one-another-being” of intuitional representation is “transcendentally” in us, not things 
themselves. Sensation is or “corresponds” to the a posteriori matter in an empirical intuition, but 
setting that matter in the forms of space and time [Neben- und nacheinander] is the result of a priori 
intuitional form and the conceptual activity that synthesises it, and not in or proper to that matter in 
itself.172  In contrast, as Hegel puts it in the Subjective Spirit, in our determinations of the form of the 
sensory we do empirical sensations the “honour” of representing them to and for ourselves in the 
forms at the same time proper to them, not as mere modifications of our sense organs.173 So an 
important difference between Kant and Hegel is already present in Hegel’s distribution of sensory 
material and representation: the sensory material is in itself organised in the form Kant identifies as 
belonging only to our capacity for intuitional representation.174 There is not an in-principle difference 
between the spatio-temporal relations extant between conceptually undetermined objects of outer 
sense and our representation of them, except that representation puts those relations “in us.”   
The remainder of §20 is important because Hegel also translates Kant’s account of concepts 
and the Ideas of Reason into his own thinking, namely as characterised by opposition to – or not being 
entirely saturated by – the external relations proper to the sensory. Alongside the form of sensoriness 
we have “thinking” or “thought,” with the “representation” I have discussed above as a kind of half-
way house between the sensory and thinking. In §20 Hegel says that representation contains, in 
addition to the sensory material that it makes its own, “material that has originated from self-
conscious thought.” So representation contains sensory material in the form proper to that material, 
but also the content of thought, whose form we can infer will not be that of the sensory. The examples 
 
172 B34-36. Houlgate puts it as follows: For Hegel, “space is not wholly absent from [e.g.] visual sensation... For 
Kant, there is nothing of space or time in sensations themselves, since the latter are a posteriori, whereas space 
and time are the a priori forms of sensibility.” Houlgate, “Hegel, McDowell, and Perceptual Experience: A 
Response to McDowell” in Hegel's Philosophical Psychology (New York: Routledge, 2016), 62. 
173 When, therefore, our intuitive mind does the determinations of sensation the honour of giving them the 
abstract form of space and time, thereby making them into proper objects as well as assimilating them to itself, 
what happens here is by no means what happens in the opinion of subjective idealism, namely, that we receive 
only the subjective manner of our determining and not the determinations belonging to the object itself.” (§448z, 
181-82/253) 
174 Hegel thus follows the “neglected alternative” argument against Kant’s aesthetic, i.e. that space and time 
might be both forms of sensibility and properties or relations obtaining between things themselves. For a brief 
overview of the history of this argument and a Kantian rejoinder, see Henry E. Allison, Idealism and Freedom: 
Essays on Kant’s Theoretical and Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 8-11.  
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Hegel gives are: “what is right, ethical, religious, or even thought itself.” The right, ethical and (at least 
the rational moral content of) religion would be, from a Kantian perspective, examples of Ideas of 
Reason; indeed “virtue” as “moral worth and un-worth” is Kant’s way of introducing the Ideas of 
Reason at the start of the Transcendental Dialectic (A315/B372). Hegel then says that “it is not easily 
noticed how the difference between such representations and the thoughts of such content is to be 
marked.” Hegel marks the difference between representation and thought in the same way and using 
the same determination as earlier used to mark the difference between the sensory and thought. That 
is, representation presents thought materials in the form of the sensory, which is a form improper to 
thought – as I said, representation functions as a kind of halfway house between sensoriness and 
thoughts irreducible to the sensory.  
Just like Kant’s Ideas of Reason, what Hegel here calls “thoughts,” are not spatio-temporal 
appearances: 
 
To be sure, the right, the just, and similar determinations do not occupy the sensory [position 
of] being-outside-one-another proper to space. They may indeed appear to be somehow 
successive in time, but their content as such is not represented as being encumbered by time, 
as transient and alterable in it (§20/52). 
 
However, when the material that has originated from self-conscious thought is represented, it is 
represented in the form of sensoriness, i.e. as individuals outside and next to one another. “The 
distinctiveness of the representation,” what distinguishes it from thought, “is generally to be located 
in the fact that in it such content [of thought] at the same time remains isolated.” Hegel’s immediate 
example here is predicating concepts of the subject-concept “God.” This example is confusing, at least 
from a Kantian perspective, because Hegel has shifted from a discussion of representation as the 
representation of a content drawn from sensation (what Kant would call an intuition) to what for Kant 
is the form conceptual representation, i.e. predication. That is, Hegel has moved from receptive 
representations (sensibility as our capacity to be affected by objects) to spontaneous ones. From a 
Hegelian perspective, however, it is possible to suggest that Hegel is taking seriously Kant’s use of the 
term Vorstellung for both intuitions and concepts. We need to press on with Hegel’s example to see 
the force of this. 
 When, for example, the thought of God is represented in the form of judgment (is logically 
determined), Hegel presents two alternative manifestations of the “isolation” proper to the sensory. 
The first is that representation “remains at a standstill,” as in the tautologous “God is God.” Here, even 
the minimal conceptual representational unit, i.e. the self-consistent because tautological judgment, 
there is a kind of outside-one-another-being. To say “God is God” is even typographically to put the 
content of God – the predicate that would determine the subject-concept – outside and next to God 
as the subject of the judgment. The second manifestation of sensory form commingled with thought 
in representation is perhaps more straightforward. Representation “adds determinations, for instance, 
that God is the creator of the world, all wise, omnipotent, etc.” Note the continuation of the formal-
logical sense of “determine” in this sentence. The uniquely Hegelian point however is that in such 
predication, we bring the self-relation proper to thinking and the external connection proper to 
sensory content together in a tenuous mixture. In predication, “several isolated simple determinations 
are similarly strung together, remaining outside one another, despite the bond assigned to them in the 
subject possessing them.” 
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This tells us that Hegel takes conceptual representation to be ridden with a  kind of ambiguity 
or amphibiousness. Per the reading of Kant given in 2.2 above, we know that the logical forms of 
judgment constitute “the pure forms of the understanding,” i.e. the a priori concepts or categories. 
Hegel is thus quite close to Kant’s system when he in §20 refers to these categorial forms as the activity 
of the “understanding” in representation. Hegel claims that the understanding differs from 
representation “only in that it posits relationships of the universal and the particular or of cause and 
effect, etc. It thus establishes relations of necessity among the isolated determinations of 
representation, while representation leaves them standing side-by-side in its indeterminate space, 
connected only by the bare also.” So if representation – either as our putting sensory material before 
us as ours, or our discursive activity in judgment – inappropriately reduces thought to the form proper 
to sensory material, the understanding is that in representation that determines sensory material by 
introducing necessary relations between the terms nonetheless still standing side-by-side. So this use 
of the term “understanding” is in fact Hegel's re-description of the function that the categories of the 
understanding have in Kant.  
To sum up, in §§19-20 of the Encyclopedia Logic Hegel undertakes to translate the 
concept/intuition distinction at the core of Kant’s cognitive model of objective determination into a 
typology of logically distinct forms of relation: intuition is treated as presenting objects in the form of 
indifferent externality, while the concepts of the understanding introduce necessary and universal 
relations between such terms. However, insofar as this opposition between external and necessary 
relationality is also present within Humean philosophy, and issues there in a scepticism regarding 
necessity, Hegel is in a position to suggest that Kantianism does not or cannot account for objectivity 
in the way it takes itself to. 
 
3. Kant’s Subjectivism 
Having filled out Hegel’s opposition between sensory indifference and relationality advanced in §40, 
we are now in a position to articulate Hegel’s critique of Kantian subjectivism. There are two ways of 
understanding the subjectivity/objectivity distinction. The first is the common-sense presupposition 
that Hegel takes to condition empiricism: thoughts are merely subjective because “in our heads,” 
opposed to independent objects “out there.” The second is the sense that comes through strongly in 
Kant’s Prolegemena, particularly in the “How is natural science possible” section, as well as in Hegel’s 
reading of Kantian objectivity in the Vorbegriff. That is, objectivity is a question, not of the quality of 
representations, but of the quality of connection between them. As Kant puts it in the Prolegomena, 
“The difference between truth and dream, however, is not decided through the quality of the 
representations that are referred to objects, for they are the same in both, but through their 
connection according to the rules that determine the connection of representations in the concept of 
an object, and how far they can or cannot stand together in one experience” (P 4:290).175 As we saw 
in 2.2, objectivity is conditioned by spontaneous synthetic activity, the grasping together of discrete, 
externally related intuitions, such that they can be held together in the unity of consciousness; pure 
 
175 The “quality” he is referring to is the rationalist distinction between intellectual and sensible representations 
in terms of clarity and confusion: “After all philosophical insight into the nature of sensory cognition had 
previously been perverted by making sensibility into merely a confused kind of representation, through which 
we might still cognize things as they are but without having the ability to bring everything in this representation 
of ours to clear consciousness, we showed on the contrary that sensibility consists not in this logical difference 
of clarity or obscurity, but in the genetic difference of the origin of the cognition itself.” (4: 290). See Chapter 1.1. 
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conceptuality is then understood as the function of such unity insofar it furnishes rules for synthesis. 
Hegel thinks that Kant’s revolution is the introduction of this second sense of “objectivity,” in which 
objectivity is understood as synthetic, but that he then retreats to the first sense presupposed in 
empiricism, in which objectivity is given as already independently determined.  
The second Zusatz to §41 steps through in an accessible way Hegel’s understanding of the 
terms “subjectivity” and “objectivity” and its ambiguity in Kantian philosophy. This account has three 
stages. 
 
A. For ordinary consciousness, objectivity is “what is on hand outside of us and reaches us from 
the outside by means of perception.” Presumably, then, thoughts would be something inside 
us. Following Hume, Kant maintains this common-sense picture at the level of philosophical 
reflection: Kant denies that “thought-determinations” can have objectivity in the ordinary 
sense of the word; as thought-determinations are not given in perception but generated by 
the “spontaneity of thinking” they are therefore subjective in the ordinary sense.  
B. “This notwithstanding,” Hegel says that Kant also reverses ordinary consciousness insofar as 
“Kant calls what is thought, and more specifically the universal and necessary, the objective, 
and what is only sensed the subjective.” We have seen in the Deduction that objectivity is to 
be distinguished from mere spatio-temporal association by the synthesis of intuition through 
universal and necessary rules.  
Hegel, however, then provides his own twist on this Kantian position, by making 
independence the mark that distinguishes the objective from the subjective. From Hegel’s 
perspective, Kant’s definition of objectivity as universality and necessity reverses ordinary 
consciousness by claiming that, contrary to common sense’s faith in the independence of 
objects, “what is perceivable by way of the senses is what is genuinely dependent and 
secondary, and thoughts are by contrast what is truly independent and primary. It was in this 
sense that Kant called what belongs to thought (i.e. the universal and the necessary) the 
objective element, and in this he was entirely right” (EL §41z/84). The last sentence of this 
quote certainly reflects those moments in Kant in which objectivity is understood to be 
conditioned by conceptuality. However, I will not explore whether Hegel’s further ascribing 
objectivity dependence on conceptuality, with the latter thus determined as independent, is 
licensed by the Kantian language of transcendental conditions. What matters is that, for Hegel, 
the conceptual, understood as a certain structure of relation, is for Hegel to have explanatory 
primacy over sensibly-given objects in their immediacy. This primacy is clearly stated in the 
Logic’s Introduction, in which Hegel claims that “Logic has nothing to do with a thought about 
something which stands outside by itself as the base of thought… rather, the necessary forms 
of thinking, and its specifics determinations, are the content and the ultimate truth itself” (SL 
29/21.34). Hegel then immediately notes that to get an “inkling” of this philosophical 
orientation, “one must put aside the notion that truth must be something tangible” (SL 
29/21.34). That Hegel has in mind the common-sense presupposition of empiricism, in which 
objects of the senses are to ground or license truth-claims, is made clear later in the passage, 
where “sensuous self-externality belongs to this null side” (SL 30/21.35), i.e. that which is 
dependent on conceptuality. Note however, that this is not a mere dismissal of the form of 
self-externality, which will be itself derived as a moment nested within the Logic’s 
systematically derived conceptual scheme.  
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C. In the third moment, Kant reverses his reversal of common sense: “even the Kantian 
objectivity of thinking itself is in turn only subjective insofar as thoughts, despite being 
universal and necessary determinations, are, according to Kant, merely our thoughts and 
distinguished from what the thing is in itself by an insurmountable gulf” (EL §41z/85). Note 
that Hegel’s claim here is not that Kant’s account of objectivity as it conceived at stage B above 
gives rise to two-worldism and subjectivism, but that a return to or failure to abandon an 
empiricist presupposition or picture of thinking is responsible. As such, Hegel will claim that 
the way forward is to orient philosophy around Kant’s reversal at stage B, i.e. to claim that 
thought does not separate us from things in themselves, but that thinking discloses the logical 
structure that determines objectivity as such. Importantly, this disclosure will include the 
logical form specific to the sensory as one of its moments.  
 
This three-step argument constitutes a diagnosis of – not yet the solution to – Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy as strung between empiricism and a new understanding of objectivity. Hume, as we saw, 
when faced with the idea of cause and the sensory impressions of contiguity and succession, sides 
with the sensory – our idea of cause cannot be verified or grounded by perception, and therefore is 
merely a “determination of the mind.” Despite the differences between transcendental idealism and 
Humean scepticism outlined above, Hegel considers Kant to have made an analogous decision. On the 
one hand, per the conceptualist reading of Kant presented in 2.2 above, Kant takes conceptual 
synthesis of the intuitional manifold to condition objectivity as such.  On the other hand, Kant falls 
back into the empiricist position in which thought is outside of and opposed to genuine objectivity, 
and so merely “subjective.” For Hegel, this empiricist position amounts to treating thought and being 
on the model of intuitional form, i.e. as externally related and indifferent to one another.  
What this means is that, despite advancing the claim that togetherness of concept/intuition is 
constitutive of objectivity, Kant vitiates togetherness by holding the concept/intuition pair to be 
legitimate only if intuitional externality characterises their relation. That is, conceptuality is presented 
as external to the intuitional form it determines, such that concepts and intuitions are related by the 
form of intuitional relation. Logically, as we have seen, Kant holds that the determining mark of 
conceptuality (connection or synthesis) is lacking in sensibility. Conceptuality, in other words, logically 
excludes sensibility. In Kant’s Critical account of cognition, this logical exclusion reinforces a certain 
spatial understanding of the relation between thought and objectivity, one present, as we have seen, 
in Kant’s pre-Critical objections to existence as a predicate: that we must go outside of thought to 
provide it with an existence independent of it is central to Kant’s solution to the content indifference 
of merely logical determination. For the Critical Kant, conceptuality is given objects from a sensibility 
outside it; sensible representations in lacking connection require conceptual contributions in order to 
be determinate, minimally as qualitatively distinguishable spatio-temporal objects and ultimately as 
the subject of a judgment. In other words, Kant is guilty of a tacit and unjustified privileging of 
intuitional form over conceptuality, insofar as the concept/intuition distinction is itself understood in 
terms of the externality of intuitional form.  
This critique of Kantian subjectivism motivates Hegel’s attempt in the Logic to abstract from 
the assumption that thought is opposed to objects, and to derive the logical components of conceptual 
and intuitional representation (and the necessity of their togetherness) from a unitary ground.176 The 
 
176 The argument of this chapter section thus constitutes an alternative framing of Houlgate’s defence of Hegel’s 
critique of Kantian subjectivism in terms of the concept/intuition distinction, indifference, and determination 
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Hegelian alternative will be to demonstrate that the logical components of intuition (singularity and 
immediacy, and, more concretely, the indifference that characterises singular immediacy) are always 
already conditioned by the co-presence of mediation and generality. There is, in other words, no 
immediacy that is not already mediated in order to be the immediacy that it is. One is not, pace Kant, 
confronted with a sensible manifold alien to mediation: the qualitatively determinate objects that 
immediately appear to us are already in themselves in relation to other such objects in order to appear 
as singular terms at all. This demonstration, however, requires abstracting from the generalisation of 
intuitional externality that characterises Kant’s cognitive model of determination, such that externality 
as a logical moment of determination can itself be derived and appropriately placed.  
Given the way objectivity and Kantianism are intertwined from the beginning in the Vorbegriff, 
there is undoubtedly a sense that Hegel takes himself to be “completing” Kant’s account of objective 
determination – an account that only falls at the final hurdle. But there is also a sense in the Vorbegriff 
that Kant’s “position of thought toward objectivity” is failed from the start, insofar as it takes its leave 
from empiricism and never (for Hegel at least) genuinely interrogates empiricist presuppositions 
regarding objective knowledge. What is required to complete Kant’s philosophical revolution is not a 
last step but to begin all over again, this time from intellectual rather than sensible immediacy. It is to 
Hegel’s arguments for intellectual immediacy that we now turn.    
 
 
  
 
understood as relationality (on the model of Kantian synthesis speciosa). See argument 2(a) under “Hegelian 
alternatives” in 3.1 above.  
 100 
Chapter 4. Intellectual Intuition 
This chapter’s working through of Intellectual Intuition is intended to address the difference in register 
of the Critique and the Logic. As I have formulated it, Kant’s is a “cognitive model” of determination 
concerned with our cognitive capacities; Hegel’s alternative “ontological model” is concerned with 
determination understood to be operative in both thought and being. The primary difficulty in 
understanding the Logic’s account of determination as an alternative to the first Critique’s is not – or 
not immediately – mapping Hegel’s categories onto their Kantian counterparts. As Brady Bowman has 
recently emphasised, Hegel treats, like Kant, categories of quality, quantity, relation and modality.177 
The immediate difficulty is that Hegel’s Logic does not frame objective validity or purport of those 
categories in the same way as Kant does in the Transcendental Logic.  
In contrast to Kant’s Logic, the Logic works out the content and operation of conceptual 
categories without constitutive reference to conceptuality’s propositional synthetic function (the 
logical forms of judgement as ground of the categories in the Metaphysical Deduction) and alters their 
second function as rules for synthesis of the sensible manifold (the subject of the Transcendental 
Deduction). Hegel’s categories are rules of synthesis (or connection or mediation) in general, not 
limited in their operation on sensible form. With Kant, Hegel takes the conceptual categories to be 
synthetic; against Kant, this synthetic activity is not minimally directed at or operative within the 
immediacy of the form of the sensible manifold. For Hegel, the categories are syntheses in and of the 
immediacy of the thought of being. Rather than function as an irreducible given for cognition, the 
sensible manifold – and its structure of “outside-one-another-being” – shares in the logical structure 
of determination that thought itself discloses. In other words, for Hegel, the necessary forms of 
thinking are the necessary forms of being, such that the structures of determination disclosed in 
thought are shared by being. Objective purport is secured by an ontologisation of the categories, i.e. 
an understanding of conceptual form as operative in being and the being of thought.  
The goal in this chapter and the next is to show how Hegel utilises or draws on resources within 
the Kantian and post-Kantian doctrines of Intellectual Intuition (or “Int Int” for short) in order to effect 
this ontologisation. Hegel’s Logic begins by compressing or drawing the immediacy and singularity of 
intuitional representation into the generality of thought. Hegel wants to claim that thought shares in 
being because thought immediately itself is, such that the thought of being is equally the being of 
thought. Hegel’s Logic thus beings at a point unavailable within Kant’s approach to the togetherness 
of concepts and intuitions, in which two independently articulated forms (the form of intuitions argued 
for in the Aesthetic, and conceptual form derived in the Metaphysical Deduction) are drawn together 
via an account of synthesis in the Transcendental Deduction. As we have seen, Kant builds in the 
independence of these forms to his account – however “dialectical” that account may turn out to be 
– by claiming that our thought can “only think” (only mediate representations via common “marks”), 
and that immediacy, singularity, and existence are provided only by intuition. In contrast, Hegel claims 
that thought itself is immediate and that, further, the structure and functions of mediation can itself 
be derived from this immediacy. This enables the Logic to tackle the Kantian problem at what I take to 
be its highest level of generality – how does immediacy come to be determinate? – without making 
constitutive reference to immediacy of sensible intuition, but rather by observing the ways in which 
the immediacy of thought comes to determine itself. Importantly, however, Kant’s doctrine of 
Intellectual Intuition already points in this direction by arguing for the thinkability of a non-discursive 
 
177 Brady Bowman, “Self-Determination and Ideality in Hegel’s Logic of Being,” The Oxford Handbook of Hegel 
Studies, ed. Dean Moyar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 221.   
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intellect in contrast to our own discursiveness. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel each argue that 
philosophical cognition must be characterised as non-discursive in some way in order for the Kantian 
project to be realised. It is to this complex set of claims we now turn.  
 
Intellectual Intuition in the Literature 
Kant uses the formulae “Intellectual Intuition” [Intellektuelle Anschauung] and “Intuitive 
Understanding” [Anschauender Verstand] to mark a logically possible but existentially problematic 
“divine” cognitive faculty that would not be dependent on sensible intuitions in its determination of 
objects.178 Kant intends the thinkability of divine cognition to reinforce his account of the sensible 
limits of human dual-faculty cognition. Just because we can think the logical possibility of such a divine 
intellect, does not mean – for all the reasons considered in Chapters 1 and 2 above – that we can know 
or cognize that it exists, precisely because we could have no sensible intuition of it (even if such a 
divine understanding appeared to us, it would appear to us in the forms of our intuition). The idea of 
a divine understanding is thus a remarkably reflexive or involuted moment in Kant: Kant argues for the 
irreducibility of distinction between merely thinking and genuinely cognising by having us think but 
not cognise an intellect for which that distinction would not hold. That is, the thinking/cognising 
distinction foundational to the Critical Philosophy constitutes both the form and the content of the 
thought of intellectual intuition: intellectual intuition is the merely thinkable collapse of the distinction 
between thinking and cognition. In other words, “Intellectual intuition” is used by Kant to denote 
thinkable (logically determinate) but unknowable (epistemically indeterminate) exceptions to the 
thinkability/cognisability distinction that characterises the human cognitive condition.  
It is well known that Fichte, Schelling, and the early Hegel affirm that our philosophical 
cognition is or has access to such a cognition, thereby taking up Intellectual Intuition to transgress 
Kant’s epistemic limits, not reinforce them. (The irony here is that the first step toward a non-cognitive 
model of determination is the appropriation of another capacity for our cognition). Importantly, 
however, the major post-Kantian idealists do so to fill what they take to be an explanatory gap in Kant’s 
category derivation, and thereby to “complete” the Kantian revolution. 
I will substantiate these claims in detail shortly. However, I want to begin by flagging the 
plurality of Intellectual Intuition: the post-Kantians formulate Int Int in different ways, emphasizing 
different logical senses of the term in Kant himself. Moltke S. Gram has argued that Int Int in Kant is 
not a unified doctrine, nor does it retain a univocal meaning in post-Kantian Idealism – there is no 
“continuity” between Kant or his self-appointed successors.179 Per Gram, Kant’s phrase “Intellectual 
Intuition” groups together three logically distinct arguments without Kant himself acknowledging their 
distinction. Intellectual Intuition means: (1) a cognition that would be capable of objective knowledge 
without sensible intuition (knowledge of positive noumena); (2) an intellect that creates objects in 
thinking them (the “archetypal” intellect); and (3) an intellect that intuits the sum-total of reality (the 
totum realitatis of the first Critique’s “Transcendental Ideal”). Gram then distinguishes Kant’s three 
senses from what he takes to be (4) Fichte’s sense, which concerns the subject’s immediate awareness 
 
178 Eckhart Förster takes these two formulae to name distinct concepts. The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy, 
trans. Brady Bowman (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012), 250-276. I rather treat the multiple senses of Kant’s 
Intellectual Intuition using Moltke S. Gram’s tripartite typology.   
179 Moltke S. Gram, “Intellectual Intuition: The Continuity Thesis,” Journal of the History of Ideas 42 (1981): 287-
304.  
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of its own activity; 180  and (5) Schelling’s claim that Int Int gives us immediate access to the 
“Absolute.”181 In short, the narrative pitting Kantian limits versus post-Kantian transgression does not 
distinguish the multiple meanings of the term in Kant and post-Kantian idealism. At the same time, 
however, Gram’s position is not conclusive. Yolanda Estes has recently argued for more senses of the 
term in Kant, and more continuity between Kant, Fichte, and Schelling than Gram allows, namely: Kant 
does consider Intellectual Intuition in terms of the I’s self-activity (B68) and immediate recognition of 
its freedom, both of which link directly to Fichte’s reflection on the activity of the I.182  
Neither Gram nor Estes discuss Hegel, presumably because Hegel in his mature writings (from 
the Phenomenology onwards) is frequently dismissive of the term. In the Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy, Hegel says that “Intellectual Intuition” is a “convenient” way to justify “what pops into 
one’s head” (LHP III 202). In the introduction to the Seinslogik, “Intellectual Intuition” is characterised 
as “the violent rejection of mediation” (SL 55).  As such, claiming that the Kantian and post-Kantian 
doctrines of Int Int has anything to do with Hegel’s Science of Logic is contentious. Kenneth Westphal 
argues that Int Int is endorsed and understood by the early Hegel in a Schellingean way, namely as the 
faculty for an “aconceptual” grasp of the “Absolute” (sense 5 in Gram’s typology). This aconceptualist 
Schellingean version of Int Int is then decisively rejected by Hegel by the time of the 1804-5 Jena 
system.183  For Westphal, as for Longuenesse, Hegel comes to see Schelling’s conception of Int Int as 
question-begging.184 If access to the Absolute is aconceptual, that access can in no way be justified. 
One just asserts that one knows the Absolute, and knows precisely to the extent that one does not 
think, does not discursively articulate that purported knowledge. This view makes sense of three 
striking and important lines in the Preface and Introduction to the Jena Phenomenology: Schelling’s 
Intellectual Intuition is not only targeted in the “night in which all cows are black” (PhS §16/9). It is also 
 
180 “Fichte claims that we have a faculty of intellectual intuition. But he affirms neither an insight into things in 
themselves (whose existence he denies), nor the synoptic view of the totality of phenomena (which he claims to 
be impossible), nor the possibility of acts of cognition identical with their objects. Fichte's problem lies 
elsewhere: he wants to know whether we can be immediately aware of the self.” Gram, “The Continuity Thesis,” 
289 
181 Although Gram does not mark it, this Schellingean sense clearly has some connection to sense 3, insofar as 
the Absolute can be understood as totality. I will indicate briefly their connection in 4.2.   
182 Yolanda Estes “Intellectual Intuition: Reconsidering Continuity in Kant, Fichte, and Schelling,” Fichte, German 
Idealism, and Early Romanticism, ed. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 165-177, 
169-170.  
183 “It is widely assumed that, because it is nondiscursive, an intuitive intellect is aconceptual. That is how 
Schelling understood it, and that is often the view of the early Hegel, too.” Westphal, “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate 
of ‘The’ Intuitive Intellect” in The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, ed. Sally 
Sedgwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 283-305, 283. Westphal dating Hegel’s break with 
Schelling to the “Jena System” of 1804-5 is corroborated by H.S. Harris in “Hegel’s Intellectual Development to 
1807” in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 25-51.   
184 “The problem with Hegel’s [pre-1804] contention is far more serious than has been noticed. The problem is 
that the very model of an intuitive intellect is a model of a kind of knowledge in which there is no distinction 
between thinking and knowing. Because Hegel not only espoused this model, but was enthralled by it, he 
(mistakenly) assumed that the ability to conceive or think this model shows that the model is true and is known 
to be true.” Westphal, “Fate,” 287.  Longuenesse is dismissive on similar grounds: “The argument seems quite 
lame. To imagine what a knowledge would be which escaped the limitations of our own is not to assert such a 
knowledge, or to determine any object by means of it.” “Point of View of Man or Knowledge of God” in The 
Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, ed. Sally Sedgwick (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 200), 253-281, 264. This dismissal fails to acknowledge that Kant does not simply imagine Int 
Int, he thinks it as a limit concept, and - in the Transcendental Ideal of the first Critique – actually works out how 
such an intellect would determine objects (“distributively” rather than “successively”). 
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a crucially relevant example of the “one bare assurance that is worth as much as any other” (§76/49). 
And, in its anti-democratic implications, Int Int means taking the criterion of truth as the “oracle within 
one’s breast… trampl[ing] underfoot the roots of humanity” (§69/43).  
In my view, Westphal is right to argue that the mature Hegel detects the question-begging 
implications of Schelling’s aconceptualist understanding of Int Int. As I briefly flagged above in treating 
the Schellingean patterns in Sedgwick’s Hegel’s Critique of Kant, Robert Pippin is similarly right to 
emphasise that Hegel comes to see the Schellingean insistence on the “identity” of thought and being 
as one-sided and ultimately incoherent (a point I shall spend time on when considering Schelling in 
the next chapter). But in their attempt to distance a respectably Kantian Hegel from Schellingean 
romanticism, Pippin and Westphal seemingly presume that all senses of Int Int formulate non-
discursivity as necessarily entailing aconceptuality. 185  Hegel’s mature account of thought is non-
discursive in the technical sense that “discursivity” has for Kant and for Alison’s reconstruction of 
Kantianism, namely, that our thought can “only think,” i.e. mediate representations whose content is 
given independently in intuition. For Hegel, thinking itself can be meaningfully characterised as 
immediate, singular, and indeed to exist – i.e. possessing logical features that Kant ascribed to intuition 
and excluded from thought. But thought characterised thus by Hegel remains conceptual, because it 
proves to be the mediation of the immediacy that it is. Hegel understands the minimal structures of 
mediation to be derivable from thought’s own immediacy. As such one should not take the mature 
Hegel’s polemics against Int Int at face value: while Hegel does not use the words “Intellectual 
Intuition” or “Intuitive Intellect” in his account of the category of “being” in the Seinslogik, he defines 
that category as an “empty thinking” that is equally a “pure empty intuiting” (SL 59). And, in reflecting 
on the Logic’s course in its final chapter (“Absolute Idea”), Hegel is explicit in referring to the first 
category of the Logic as an “inner intuition” [innerliches Anschauen].186 
I cannot present here a full typology of Intellectual Intuition in post-Kantianism. I am 
attempting only to cut a path to the Seinslogik. Intellectual Intuition plays a role in Hegel’s Logic both 
 
185  Westphal and Pippin’s ways of framing the Kant-Schelling-Hegel relation serves to downplay Schelling’s 
influence on Hegel. As Pippin puts it in Hegel’s Idealism, Schelling’s is a “indefensible metaphysics of an Absolute 
Subject or God in which all beings are pantheistical related” (66), and Pippin’s strategy is to argue that Hegel 
even in his early writings never straightforwardly rejected Kantian “critical idealism” in favour of Schelling’s 
“romantic elements” (66). This narrative is certainly serviceable to the rehabilitation of Hegel as Kantian. In 
Westphal and in Pippin, after breaking from Schelling, Hegel’s work returns to a broadly Kantian program by 
defending an account of our intellects as discursive, even if Hegel seeks to extend or deepen the conceptual 
grasp that such intellects can have on the world as it is in itself. “Hegel’s mature epistemology built on Kant’s 
account of discursive judgment in articulating the possibility and defending the legitimacy of a conceptual grasp 
of the totality of the world.” Westphal, “Fate,” 286. This is true up to a point, but does not sit well with the anti-
Kantian realism of Hegel’s concept thesis, and the corollary ontological overhaul of Kant’s epistemology at stake 
in this dissertation. 
186 To be fair, Westphal does note the presence of intuition in the Logic. “In the Science of Logic, on those very 
few occasions where he mentions intellectual intuition in connection with his own views, Hegel stresses as 
strongly and as clearly as possible that such supposed intuitions are definite and determinate—and thus 
genuinely contentful or significant—only insofar as they are articulated conceptually. Hegel’s [291] mature 
account of absolute knowledge repudiates the aconceptual accounts of knowledge that are central to Schelling’s 
and Hegel’s own earlier versions of the intuitive intellect.” (290-91). But there is nothing distinguishing 
Westphal’s description of Hegel’s position in the Logic in the above quote from the conceptualist account of 
Kantian epistemology we have worked through in Chapters 1 and 2. If this is the end of the Hegelian story (from 
an aconceptualist Schelling back to a conceptualist Kant) then the Hegelian criticisms of Kantian epistemology 
we have also seen in Chapters 1 and 2 would remain unresolved (at least within Hegel’s own work). Hegel, I am 
suggesting here, does contest the discursivity thesis, and this needs to be accepted in order for the Logic’s 
derivation to function as it does.  
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as its point of departure, and it has direct consequences for the Logic’s strategy of category derivation. 
I will in 4.1. deal with Kant’s first two senses as they inform the immediacy of mediation that opens 
the Logic. Their presence in Hegel’s Logic comes via Fichte’s claim, contra Kant, that we can have an 
“immediate non-sensible awareness” in addition to sensible intuition as “an immediate sensible 
awareness.” 187  That immediacy is not restricted to the forms of sensibility but extends to the 
understanding has serious implications for category derivation, which in 4.2 we will see Fichte begin 
to work out. While Kant in the “Doctrine of Method” wants to keep mathematics and philosophy 
methodologically distinct, philosophical cognition for the Fichte of the 1790s is a “construction in 
intellectual intuition” analogous with the “construction in intuition” characteristic of mathematics. In 
a construction in intellectual intuition, we immediately grasp or “see” the necessity of a synthetic a 
priori knowledge claim. Angelica Nuzzo, Paul Franks, and Daniel Breazeale have each in their own ways 
suggested that Int Int is legible in Hegel’s mature thinking via Fichte, though only Nuzzo gets as far as 
the Logic, and only briefly.188 In turn Schelling’s critique of Fichte on this score is crucially relevant to 
Hegel’s Logic, insofar as Schelling divorces the immediacy provided by intellectual intuition from the 
subject – a crucial step in the move from a cognitive to an ontological model of determination. What 
we are immediately aware of in Schelling is thought in general, not “our” thinking. Schelling also 
crucially considers Int Int to apprehend the totality, which is crucial to Hegel’s derivations in the 
Seinslogik.  
4.1. … in the first Critique 
Gram’s first sense of intellectual intuition in Kant is a faculty that would know things independently of 
the conditions of sensibility. In Gram’s own words: “If space and time are what Kant says they must 
be—formal properties of our mind's way of perceiving objects—then it is logically possible to conceive 
of an intellect that can be acquainted with the same things without those forms.”189 This is to claim 
that such an intellect would know things-in-themselves. But Gram shows that we must be careful 
about which kind of thing-in-itself is being known: the intuitive intellect in Kant’s first sense knows 
“positive” rather than “negative” noumena.190  The latter we have encountered in Chapter 2: our form 
of intuition gives rise to thought of the thing-in-itself as empty indeterminate thought of an object in 
general. This “negative” or limit concept of the thing-in-itself as object in general follows aspects of 
Kant’s doctrine of intuition: it is produced by an always possible act of abstraction from the conditions 
of our sensibility through which objects are given to us.  To this we should contrast “positive” 
noumenon, which is the necessary thought of the ground of appearance. When something appears to 
us, it must be the appearance of something which affects our sensibility, which we are constrained to 
think as the source of the matter of intuitions – or else we get the “absurd” thought of “an appearance 
 
187 These formulae are Este’s. “Reconsidering Continuity,” 176.  
188  Paul Franks, All or Nothing. Franks notes that “Hegel is closer to Fichte in this respect. For him, the 
abandonment of the claim to universal validity is intolerable, and the suggestion that the system is intelligible 
only to those with innate or divine gifts must be repudiated” (374). Anjelica Nuzzo, “A Question of Method.” 
Breazeale’s approach is treated at length below.  
189 Gram 289. 
190 “If by a noumenon we understand a thing insofar as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, because we 
abstract from the manner of our intuition of it, then this is a noumenon in the negative sense. But if we 
understand by that an object of a non-sensible intuition, then we assume a special kind of intuition, namely 
intellectual intuition, which, however, is not our own, and the possibility of which we cannot understand, and 
this would be the noumena in a positive sense… If therefore, we wanted to apply the categories to objects that 
are not considered as appearances, then we would have to ground them on an intuition other than the sensible 
one, and then the object would be a noumenon in a positive sense.” (B307-8).    
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without anything that appears” (Bxxvi-vii). As such, the positive noumenon is that which is thought as 
the cause of the manifold given in the forms of our intuition (though Kant’s use of “cause” is here 
notoriously problematic).191 A putative Int Int in its first sense, then, is not distinguished from our 
cognition because it can know objectivity “in general” (negative noumena) but because it is able rather 
to apply the categories to particular objects independent of sensibility (positive noumena). Thus the 
first sense for Gram in fact has three elements: (1) the exclusion of sensible intuition; (2) knowledge 
not of indeterminate objectivity in general but a particular object; and (3) the “understanding must 
provide the conditions of intuition.”192  
Gram’s second sense of “intellectual intuition” in Kant, as stated above, is that of an intellect 
that knows objects without the conditions of sensibility because it creates those objects. This second 
sense is not subsumable under the first for Gram because it supposes a different conception of the 
object that is known – neither negative noumena (the “empty” thing-in-itself) nor strictly speaking 
positive noumena. The first sense knows the positive noumenon as given without sensible 
conditioning, the second sense knows the object as produced. “Here the problem is not another case 
of using pure concepts to know positive noumena or things-in-themselves, for even if we were capable 
of using the categories to know things-in-themselves” – that is, capable of skipping over intuition – 
“we could not produce or literally create those particulars.”193 
This difference, however, does not make a difference to the function of Intellectual Intuition 
in the first Critique. Both senses are raised, though Kant does not distinguish them, in §21 of the B 
Deduction, as a “divine understanding, which would not represent given objects, but through whose 
representation the objects would themselves at the same time be given, or produced” (B145). The 
equivocation in this instance between “given” and “produced” goes to Kant’s logical blurring of the 
first and second senses that Gram draws attention to. In this passage, the co-presence of first and 
second senses is indicated by the ambiguity of this “or” – ambiguously signalling either the or of 
equivalence or the or of disjunction. Either way, the reference to “intellectual intuition” in both senses 
is used in the B Deduction for a unitary purpose, in support of the discursivity thesis. Kant uses the 
thought of an intellectual intuition in order to clarify what categories are for us: the categories “are 
only rules for an understanding whose entire capacity [Vermögen] consists in thinking.” Our 
understanding has the function of “bringing the synthesis of the manifold that is given to it in intuition 
from elsewhere to the unity of apperception, which therefore cognizes nothing at all by itself.” Kant’s 
point should by now be clear: the discursivity thesis holds that the only legitimate epistemic use of the 
categories is the determination of the material given in intuition. It is thus possible to argue, in contrast 
to Gram, that at least the first two senses of Int Int in Kant have something (rather than “nothing”) in 
common: they are all used as part of a Kantian argumentative strategy which attempts to determine 
human cognitive faculties by reference to what they are not, to the kind of experience of ourselves as 
knowers that we indisputedly do not have (see Chapter 2.2 above). We know our intellects to only 
think because we can think of an intellect that would not only think, and know that our intellects do 
not function in this way. 
As such, Kant’s claim for the thinkability of an understanding we do not have comes very close 
to determining our cognitive capacities by negation. Take Kant’s reference to intellectual intuition in 
the B edition Aesthetic. In §8 (“General Remarks on the Transcendental Aesthetic”), in the context of 
 
191 Incipit the problem of “Double Affection.” Nicholas Stang very precisely formulates the problem in “Who’s 
Afraid of Double Affection?” Philosophers’ Imprint 15, no. 18 (2015): 1-28.  
192 Gram 290. 
193 Gram 291. 
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a discussion of “natural theology,” Kant claims our intuition is “called sensible because it is not original, 
i.e. one through which the existence of the object of intuition is itself given (and that, so far only 
pertain to the original being); rather it is dependent on the object, thus it is possible only insofar as 
the representational capacity of the subject is affected through that (B72). Here sense 2 predominates 
in Kant’s characterisation. But note the structure of Kant’s argument: our intuition is “not original,” 
and therefore it is “derivative.” Now, in fairness to Kant, this determination by negation (“this because 
not that”) as an argumentative strategy is not Kant’s argument for the specifically spatiotemporal form 
of our intuition – as we have seen in 2.1., for Kant the pure forms of our intuition are introduced as 
the conditions of possibility for geometry.  
Kant in §21 of the B Deduction goes on to explicitly consider the “peculiarity” of our intellect: 
 
But for the peculiarity of our understanding, that it is able to bring about the unity of 
apperception a priori only by means of the categories and only through precisely this kind and 
number of them, a further may be offered just as little as one can be offered for why we have 
these and no other functions for judgment or for why space and time are the sole forms of our 
possible intuition (B145-46). 
 
From Fichte’s and from Hegel’s perspectives, we have here Kant’s explicit acknowledgement of the 
explanatory deficit in the concept/intuition framework. There can be no answer to the question, “why 
12 categories corresponding to just those 12 forms of judgment?” nor to “why just these 2 forms of 
intuition?” The answer can only be: “that is just how we are,” or less casually, “these are our given 
cognitive capacities.” Kant strongly suggests in the above passage that the particular form of our 
capacity to know is arbitrary, in the sense that no rational justification can be found for it.194  
A reading of Kant that takes seriously the theme of self-determination in the Critiques will find 
this admitted explanatory deficit inconsistent with Kant’s assurances that a critically corrected 
metaphysics, while not claiming determinate knowledge of really existing objects, would nonetheless 
be able to account for human rationality as grounded in itself alone: “Nothing here can escape us, 
because what reason brings forth entirely out of itself cannot be hidden, but is brought to light by 
 
194 It should be noted that, from a Kantian perspective, it is possible to suggest that Kant plain-facedly raises 
questions unanswerable within his philosophy (why 12 categories? why 2 forms of pure intuition?) because he 
does not take their going unanswered to be damaging: they are neither capable of nor require answers. I thus 
take issue with Stephen Houlgate’s characterisation of Kantian critique in Cartesian terms as “radical self-
criticism” (The Opening 24-28). Kant’s strategy is not radical doubt but the seeking of non-empirically derivable 
conditions for certain indubitable experiences: of geometry, of real determination, of morality, of aesthetic 
experience. Here a similarity to the “question” of the thing-in-itself should be suggested: on the “two aspects” 
reading, we can neither know things in themselves nor do we need to for epistemic success. In fact, it is the claim 
that there is such a distinction and, simultaneously, that this distinction is irrelevant to our empirical cognition 
that guards empirical realism against sceptical attack. I repeat this material because it helps us here to 
understand how the logical possibility of intellectual intuition is put to use by Kant – it serves to reinforce the 
distinction between the transcendental realist paradigm (God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge are on a 
spectrum), to the transcendental idealist defense of empirical realism, which effectively removes the standard 
of God’s knowing from the criteria for epistemic determinacy. It might be possible to think the possibility of 
(sense 1) access to objects independently of the conditions of our sensibility or (sense 2) an intellect that 
achieves this access, not in independence from the conditions of our sensibility, but via creation of those objects. 
But these possibilities cannot be used as a canon to judge knowledge as it must be for creatures constituted as 
we are. This is I think the source of the Kantian frustration with Hegel’s phenomenalist subjectivist charge – the 
whole point of the Kantian enterprise is to release empirical knowledge from the standard of the “really real.” 
Intellectual intuition serves to eliminate of things-in-themselves from the criteria for empirical knowing. 
 107 
reason itself…” (KrV Axx).195 The same point is repeated in the Prolegomena’s characterisation of the 
first Critique, in which the reader is said to be required “to think himself little by little into a system 
that takes no foundation as given except reason itself and that therefore tries to develop cognition out 
of its original seeds without relying on any fact whatsoever” (4:274). In the above however we have 
reason coming up against the not merely unexplained but ostensibly inexplicable fact of its own 
categorial constitution, and the constitution of a sensibility it does not ground but cannot do without.  
Now, what makes Intellectual Intuition interesting for post-Kantian idealism is that it 
ambiguously supports two opposed interpretations of the Critical Philosophy, which Paul Redding has 
helpfully called “weak” and “strong” versions of Transcendental Idealism or “TI.” Weak TI characterises 
Kant’s project as attempting to fix the limits of our knowledge at sensibility in order to guard thought 
against “metaphysical” extravagance. Hegel refers to this in the Preface to the first edition of the Logic 
as the “exoteric” doctrine of Kantianism, weaponised by the “scientific camp” in their attempt to 
consign rationalist metaphysics to history (7/21.5). On the other hand, Kant’s works also lend 
themselves to interpretation as themselves part of a project of “Strong TI.” As quoted above, Kant 
sometimes claims that reason relies on no given fact but itself in generating a systematic account of 
its content. Reason is self-determining such that its limitations are “its” in the sense of its own, 
generated out of its own power (the same would go for genitive in the title, Critique of Pure Reason, 
such that reason is understood as both the agent and patient of its own activity). On Redding’s account, 
Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel are post-Kantians – not anti-Kantians – because they critique “weak TI” in 
the name of a “strong TI” also detectable in Kant’s text. Post-Kantian idealists see the explanatory 
deficit above as Kant’s failure to achieve the goal he himself articulated: a system of reason “brought 
to light by reason itself.” 196  (Interestingly, this account of a tension between strong and weak TI clearly 
accords with Hegel’s Vorbegriff account above. There we saw that Kantianism for Hegel is caught 
between empiricism – for which independently determinate objects are given to our thought – and an 
idealist account of objectivity, in which conceptuality conditions determinacy as such. The latter 
approaches Kantianism in terms of its relation to empiricism; the former in terms of its relation to 
metaphysics). 
To link Redding’s typology up with our discussion of Int Int above, for strong TI there would be 
no distinction between thinking and knowing when reason thinks itself: transcendental philosophy for 
Kant cannot itself be understood in terms of the distinction between thinking and knowing because it 
is within transcendental philosophical activity that that distinction is made. Intellectual intuition is on 
the fault-line between “weak” and “strong” TI: it presents the logical possibility of determination 
independently of the given structure of sensible intuition while at the same time reinforcing our 
limitation to those forms by denying that possibility any actualisation in us. Int Int in Kant thus holds 
out the promise of reason’s self-grounding account of its own constitution, provided a plausible claim 
can be made against Kant for our possessing a non-discursive cognitive faculty.  
To make this case, Fichte and Hegel unequivocally drop sense 2 – our intellectual intuition does 
 
195 This is generally approached in terms of the seeming arbitrariness of the “thread” [Leitfaden] for the discovery 
of the a priori categories for objectivity in the Metaphysical Deduction, i.e. Kant’s finding the categories already 
substantially formed “in the labors of the logicians.” For a brief rundown of the critique of the metaphysical 
deduction as uncritically and unsystematically borrowing from Aristotelian logic in Hegel, Hermann Cohen, 
Martin Heidegger, and Gottlob Frege, see Longuenesse, Kant on the Human Standpoint, 107-116.  
196 To elaborate on Redding’s distinction, it is possible to suggest that the “pessimistic” desiderata of weak TI is 
dependent on strong TI, i.e. from a critique whose ground is reason’s own self-determination of its limits. It is 
as a result of reason’s self-legislative power that it comes to know itself to be limited – for epistemic purposes 
– to appearances alone. 
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not create objects in the thinking of them (though Schelling as we will see does blur the line by 
sometimes presenting artistic production as the paradigm of Int Int). Sense 1 is taken up in a complex 
way. I claim that it is deflated by being rendered reflexive. In Fichte, Int Int as we possess it is not a 
faculty that would determine positive noumena without reference to sensibility. Rather, our Int Int 
would determine what it means to be determinate in general but without Kant’s constitutive reference 
to sensibility.  So rather than a divine way of knowing individual objects, Int Int post-Kant is the faculty 
for specifically philosophical cognition, i.e. the faculty that systematically derives the meaning and 
structure of objectivity.   
I say constitutive reference above to make space for an important wrinkle already flagged in 
Chapter 3 above. Not starting one’s account of synthetic determination from the givenness of the 
forms of intuition does not preclude those forms being considered. Rather, it opens the possibility that 
those forms themselves be rationally grounded, i.e. that the forms of intuition can themselves be 
deduced in their necessity. When asked “why we have these forms of intuition and not others,” Hegel’s 
commitment to strong TI means that an answer other than our contingent cognitive makeup should 
be offered. His answer, as we will see when we turn to Hegel’s derivation of the categories of quality, 
is that the thought of being taken in its immediacy necessarily proves to be qualitatively determinate, 
necessarily organises immediacy and singularity via the structure of “outside-one-another-being” that 
for Kant characterises intuitional representation. At this point however, we are seeking to understand 
how Hegel draws on the post-Kantian doctrines of Int Int to formulate the point of departure that 
would enable such a derivation. And here Fichte is indispensable. 
 
4.2. … in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre 
Hegel formulates his debt to Fichte in this way: “It remains the Fichtean philosophy’s profound 
contribution [tiefe Verdienst] to have reminded us that the thought-determinations 
[Denkbestimmungen] must be exhibited in their necessity and that it is essential that they be derived 
[abgeleitet]” (EL §42/86).  This is a constant in Hegel’s work: the Differenzschrift opens by claiming that 
“in the principle of the deduction of the categories Kant’s philosophy is authentic idealism; and it is 
this principle that Fichte extracted in a purer, stricter form…” (DS 80). When unpacked, Fichte’s 
contribution to or influence on Hegel’s Logic consists of three closely interrelated elements.  Firstly, 
there is Fichte’s critical claim against Kant. Fichte claims that Kant “by no means proved the categories 
he set up to be conditions of self-consciousness, but merely said that they were so: that still less did 
he derive space and time as conditions thereof…”197 Kant in the Metaphysical Deduction as we have 
seen does “prove” the categories by deriving each from a logical form of judgment, and in the 
Transcendental Deduction does demonstrate them to be functions of the unity of self-consciousness. 
But for Fichte, as for Hegel, a successful category derivation must be unitary, by which I mean begun 
from and grounded by a single rationally legitimate principle. As Hegel says in the same section of the 
Encyclopedia Logic, Kant has gathered the logical forms of judgment “merely empirically,” that is, as 
they are found in an extant philosophical tradition, but the “thought-determinations” should in fact 
“be derived from thinking itself.”  
This is the second point. The post-Kantian program for a unitary derivation shifts 
methodological emphasis to the problem of foundations or, in Hegel’s language, “beginning,” i.e. the 
 
197 J. G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge. Edited and translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 51/I,478. This text will be cited parenthetically in the remainder of this 
Chapter.  
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principle from which the derivation is to proceed.198 Hegel’s opening line in the Introduction to the 
Seinslogik – entitled “With What Must the Beginning of Science Be Made” – notes philosophy’s “new 
awareness of the difficulty of finding a beginning” (SL 45/21.53). Di Giovanni’s translation footnotes 
this as an “allusion” to the first part of Fichte’s 1794/5 Wissenschaftslehre (SL 45/21.53 n1). Hegel is 
more explicit later in the Seinslogik Intro: Fichte’s position is that “all that follows from the first truth 
must be deduced from it, and the need that this first truth should be… something of which one is 
immediately certain [ein unmittelbare Gewisses]” (SL 53/21.62). Hegel agrees with this program, but 
argues as we will see that there is a more immediate and more certain – because more abstract – point 
of departure than Fichte’s.  
Thirdly, Hegel follows Fichte in his commitment to the demonstrability and replicability – the 
exoteric and democratic status – of this derivation. The only authority recognised by Strong TI is 
reason, such that each agent must rationally verify philosophical belief for themselves. This political 
commitment is methodologically legible in Fichte’s claims to have derived the categories “gradually 
before the eyes of the reader.”199  
Taking these three elements together, we might say that Hegel follows Fichte in seeking a 
replicable unitary category derivation.   
Stephen Houlgate has noted the influence of Fichte’s philosophical program on Hegel’s Logic. 
Quoting Fichte’s line above, Houlgate claims that Hegel similarly seeks to reconstruct “for the reader 
the logical genesis of the categories and laws of thought from the activity of thought itself.”200 While 
Houlgate’s brief account of the Fichte-Hegel relation in the Opening orients my approach, his account 
in its brevity does not consider the way in which Fichte’s program for a unitary derivation is linked to 
a critical appropriation of Kant’s doctrine(s) of Intellectual Intuition. Fichte deploys Int Int in order to 
frame and formulate his attempts at a replicable unitary category deduction. This facet of Fichte’s 
program, I suggest, is crucial to the understanding of Hegel’s Logic presented here, i.e. as rejecting 
Kant’s discursivity thesis in order to derive the necessity of the togetherness of the logical components 
of the concept/intuition distinction from the immediacy of thought.   
Fichte’s most extended reflections on his use of the term “Intellectual Intuition” come in the 
second of two “Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre,” published in 1797 in the Philosophisches 
Journal. Fichte there claims that “Intellectual intuition is the only firm standpoint for all philosophy” 
(41/I,466). He also explicitly connects his post-Kantian program for a unitary derivation with our 
capacity for a modified form of Int Int: 
 
Philosophy, accordingly, would be the cognition of reason itself by means of reason itself – 
through intuition. The first point was Kant’s important discovery, even though he failed to carry 
it through to completion. The second point [“through intuition”], which expresses the 
condition for carrying out such a project, was added by the Wissenschaftslehre, which, for just 
this reason, is a completely new science.201 
 
198 Reinhold’s “elementary philosophy” is the first post-Kantian attempt to offer a “first principle” that would 
ground and unify Kant’s philosophy. For a brief account of Reinhold’s contribution and relation to Fichte, see 
Tom Rockmore, Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel’s Thought (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), 25-36. Rockmore, however, bizarrely attributes to Fichte the “audacious and decisive 
step” of constructing a “system without any foundation whatsoever… it rests on first principles whose truth is 
not and cannot be known,” 30-31. 
199 Fichte, Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale, 25.  
200  The Opening, 23-24.  
201 Fichte, Introductions, 193. Brackets mine.  
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Given the tension addressed above between strong and weak versions of TI, it is debateable whether 
Kant himself ever assumes the burden of demonstrating that the conditions of experience are fully 
rationally answerable. Nonetheless, Fichte reads Kant as committed to but failing to achieve the 
program of strong TI, giving rise to Fichte’s own attempted completion of Kantian idealism. For Fichte 
the availability of rational cognition “through intuition” is the unacknowledged condition of Kant’s 
idealism understood as committed to strong TI. It follows that for Fichte the completion of this idealism 
is dependent on its full reconstruction from intellectual intuition explicitly acknowledged as its 
condition. In the body of the 1796/99 version of the Wissenschaftslehre (the Wissenschaftslehre Novo 
Methodo) Fichte claims that “Indeed [Kant’s] entire philosophy is a product of this intuition; for he 
maintains that necessary representations are products of the acting of a rational being and are not 
passively received… such an intuition is certainly intellectual.” 202  The suggestion here is that the 
spontaneity by which Kant distinguishes our understanding means that we have immediate but non-
sensuous intuitive access to the categories (the “necessary representations”) that constitute it.  
But how exactly would such a non-sensuous immediacy work? And how does Fichte’s sense 
of Int Int relate to Kant’s? Fichte’s attempt in the 1790s to re-ground and so complete the Critical 
philosophy is constantly evolving, and is not always clear or even self-consistent.203 Fichte’s publication 
history and various versions of the Wissenschaftslehre are a research project in themselves. 204  
Regarding Int Int specifically, Daniel Breazeale has argued in a number of papers that (a) the term 
“Intellectual Intuition” [intellektuelle Anschauung], although present from Fichte’s Zurich lectures in 
1794, is increasingly emphasised in Fichte’s work after the first and still most widely read presentation 
of his philosophy, the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794/5; and that (b) Fichte ambiguously uses the term in 
 
202 J.G. Fichte, Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) nova method 1796/99, ed. and 
trans. Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 115.  
203 Christian Kolz’s commentary describes the 1794/5 WL as  possessing the “characteristics of a work in progress: 
some unresolved ambiguity in its central terms, gaps in the argumentation and a continuous rethinking of the 
systematic conception that is being developed…” “Fichte’s Explanation of the Dynamic Structure of 
Consciousness in the 1794-5 Wissenschaftslehre,” The Cambridge Companion to Fichte (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 65-92, 67. That David Wood and Karen de Boer have convened a workshop at the 
University of Leuven for 27-28 April 2018 on “The Enigma of Fichte’s First Principle(s)” also indicates the difficulty 
of understanding Fichte’s attempted transformation of the Critical Philosophy. Pippin emphasises the complexity 
of the Kant-Fichte-Hegel relation in Hegel’s Idealism, 42-3. 
204  The texts that concern us primarily in the below are the 1794/5 Wissenschaftslehre, the two 1797 
“Introductions” to the WL, and Fichte’s first abortive re-writing of the WL, the 1796/9 WL (nova methodo). The 
1797 introductions were together intended to redress criticisms of the 1794/5 version, which was originally only 
intended as lecture notes for Fichte’s students, and whose actual title is Foundation of the Entire 
Wissenschaftslehre. In the first introduction Fichte addresses the general public; in the second professional 
philosophers already engaged with Kant and Reinhold. The two introductions were also to constitute the first 
part of the written serialisation of the completely revised version of Fichte’s theoretical philosophy given in the 
lectures of 1796-99, the WL Nova Methodo. The first chapter of the 1796/99 system appeared, following the two 
introductions, in the Philosophical Journal in 1798. Its full publication was abandoned by 1800, in part owing to 
the polemical aftermath of the atheism controversy of 1799, and replaced by a new attempt at a systematic 
exposition. For a brief account of Fichte’s revisions of and the reception to his system in 1790s, see the 
translator’s introduction to J.G. Fichte, Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) nova 
methodo 1796/99, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 1-54. Here I am only 
interested in Fichte’s appropriation of intellectual intuition, not a full reconstruction of the differences and 
similarities between the 1794/5 and 1796/9 (and 1801/2 and 1804/5 etc.) systems.  
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two senses, not equivalent to any of the three Kantian senses so far discussed. 205 What is of interest 
here is that Fichte’s ambiguous use of the term marks an unresolved tension in Fichte’s relation to the 
Kantian discursivity thesis and to Kantian transcendental argument. The first sense of Int Int that 
Breazeale identifies is used as a synonym for sustained non-empirical introspection, and is consistent 
with the discursivity thesis and Kant’s transcendental mode of argument. In its second sense however, 
it contests Kant on both points: thinking not “only thinks” but possesses a moment of immediacy, and 
Fichte suggests that such immediacy constitutes the foundation of and method for a unitary category 
derivation. “For the true nature of things, one must have recourse to intuition” (36/I,461). It is this 
Fichtean usage of Int Int, I suggest, that stands behind the Hegelian debts to Fichte outlined above.  
 
Fichte’s Sense 1 
Intellectual intuition in its first sense is linked to Fichte’s methodological practice understood as 
attentiveness to the contents of global abstraction, that is, attentiveness to the contents that remain 
for thinking after all empirical content has been bracketed. Speaking on Fichte’s methodology 
generally, Breazeale says: “the philosopher must elevate himself, by means of a freely undertaken act 
of global “abstraction,” from the standpoint and concerns of ordinary life and then carefully “attend” 
[aufmerken] to what remains after he has abstracted from everything from which he is able to 
abstract...”206 The first pages of the 1794/5 WL puts global abstraction front and centre. Fichte’s goal 
as it is presented in the 1794/5 text is to “discover the primordial, absolutely unconditioned first 
principle of all human knowledge” (93/I, 91), the “grounding principle” [Grundsatz] from which the 
forms of our cognitive activity can be derived. This unconditioned first principle is glossed as “that Act 
[Tathandlung] which does not and cannot appear among the empirical states of our consciousness, 
but rather lies at the basis of all consciousness and alone makes it possible” (Ibid).  We will consider 
this Act in a little detail shortly. But Fichte’s concern at the beginning of the WL is methodological. He 
is worried, not about the universality of his Grundsatz, but that his readers will fail to replicate Fichte’s 
thinking and so validate this universality for themselves: “In describing this Act, there is less risk that 
anyone will perhaps thereby fail to think what he should—the nature of our mind has already taken 
care of that—than that he will thereby think what he should not” (Ibid). The unconditioned ground of 
knowledge is always already with us. At issue is a replicable methodology for bringing it into view. In 
turn, “This makes it necessary to reflect on what one might at first sight take it to be, and to abstract 
from everything that does not really belong to it” (Ibid). Fichte exhorts his reader to abstract from all 
empirical thought contents and to attend to what remains over: “Let any fact of empirical 
consciousness be proposed; and let one empirical feature after another be detached from it, until all 
 
205 The most important paper by Breazeale for the following argument is “The ‘Synthetic-Genetic Method’ of 
Transcendental Philosophy: Kantian Questions/Fichtean Answers,” The Transcendental Turn, ed, Sebastian 
Gardner and Matthew Grist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 74-95. This is a reprint of one of Breazeale’s 
Fichte Studien pieces, collected as “Doing Philosophy: Fichte v. Kant on Transcendental Method,” in Fichte, 
German Idealism, and Early Romanticism, ed. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 
42-62. The subject is also treated at length in the “Intellectual Intuition” chapter of Breazeale, Thinking Through 
Through the Wissenschaftslehre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 198-229. A summary of Fichte’s 
ambiguous usage of Int Int is provided in Breazeale, “The Wissenschaftslehre of 1796-9 (nova methodo)” 
Cambridge Companion to Fichte, ed. David James and Gunter Zöller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 93-138. A much earlier version of this material can be found in Breazeale, “Fichte’s Nova Methodo 
Phenomenologica: On the Methodological Role of ‘Intellectual Intuition’ in the Later Jena Wissenschaftslehre,” 
Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (1998), 587-616.  
206  “Kantian Questions/Fichtean Answers,” 49. Breazeale makes the same point in “The Wissenschaftslehre of 
1796-9 (nova methodo),” 98-99.  
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that remains is what cannot any longer be dismissed, and from which nothing further can be 
detached.” (94/I, 92).  
Breazeale in his Cambridge Companion piece identifies Fichte’s first sense of intellectual 
intuition with this abstraction and attention to its contents.207 Intellectual Intuition in this sense names 
a “reflective self-awareness,” an “introspection” distinguished from ordinary empirical introspection 
by the holding at bay of any and all contingent contents.208 In Thinking Through, Breazeale suggests 
that intellectual intuition in this sense is “simply a synonym” for other prominent Fichtean 
methodological exhortations, “including ‘Observation’ [Zuschauen, Zusehen, Beobachtung], 
‘attentiveness’ [Aufmerksamkeit], and ‘reflection’ [Reflexion].”209 At this innocuous or superficial level 
of analysis, intellectual intuition as a non-empirically-contaminated “awareness” is consonant with the 
broadly Kantian understanding of transcendental argument as it practiced in the first WL, and which I 
will work through briefly in a moment. But this very language of “observation,” when further 
developed by Fichte in the second 1797 Introduction, leads to a conception of categorial derivation 
not entirely consonant with the 1794/5 WL’s manner of proceeding. Therefore, pace Breazeale, I do 
not think that the two senses of the term can be rigorously distinguished: the language of observation, 
attentiveness, and awareness, there from the get-go in Fichte’s work, has an intuitionist sense that 
Fichte increasingly exploits or extends in the latter half of the 1790s. To demonstrate this however we 
need to consider the results of global abstraction in the 1794/5 WL and compare that with the 
comments on Intellectual Intuition from the 1797 Introductions.  
In the 1794/5 WL global abstraction does not itself immediately uncover the putatively 
unconditional “Act” but rather leaves us with some transcendental arguments to make. The result of 
abstracting from all empirical thought contents is their minimal form, i.e. the law of identity (A = A). 
As the abstract form of any contentful proposition, Fichte suggests that the law of identity is universal 
for empirical or “ordinary” consciousness: it is “absolutely certain,” or “given with certainty in 
empirical consciousness” (99/I,98).210 Fichte then seeks to show that the “absolute certainty” of the 
law of identity is not absolute but is demonstrably conditioned by the “Act” of consciousness. As Fichte 
puts it: “reflection must confirm that this Act is granted as such along with the proposition [i.e. A = A].” 
That is, if the proposition is admitted, its transcendental condition of possibility must be too. Fichte’s 
argument, in brief, is as follows. The claim that A = A is dependent upon both logical moments (the A 
 
207 CC 106.  
208 Ibid.  
209 Breazeale, Thinking Through, 200. One might at this point object that such words do not delimit a singular, 
Fichtean (or even generally transcendental) argumentative strategy, but rather emphasise the state of mind 
required for philosophical activity in general. In my view, the singularity of Fichte’s emphasis on the mental 
attitude of his listeners and readers is explicable only by the reference to the moral and political consequences 
Fichte attaches to replicability.  
210 There is perhaps an ambiguity already here. Fichte stresses the rigour and discipline of abstraction from all 
empirical contents but then treats the law of identity that follows that abstraction as merely an empirical 
universality, something “tacitly assumed to be familiar and established” (93/I,92), merely found to be “accepted 
by everyone as perfectly certain and established” (102/I,101). This sceptical take on logical form clearly dovetails 
with Fichte (and subsequently, Hegel’s) characterisation of the Critique’s forms of judgment as merely “gathered 
up.” In other words, Fichte ambiguously considers the law of identity as a kind of maximally abstract, non-
empirical point of departure and as an ultimately merely historical propaedeutic that will in turn require 
grounding by the very principle it serves heuristically to introduce (99/I,99). This tension helps to explain the 
shift to immediate intuitional access to self-activity from 1796 onwards. In this vein, Breazeale argues that the 
1794/5 WL’s “misleading talk about ‘single first principles’ and its appeal to logical propositions, such as that of 
identity,” is replaced in the 1796/9 version of a summons or challenge to abstract and so reach immediate 
awareness of the self. Breazeale, “Kantian Questions/Fichtean Answers,” 81.  
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as subject and the A as predicate) being held together or combined. In Fichte’s words, in the claim that 
A = A “it is the necessary connection between the two that is posited absolutely, and without any other 
ground. To this necessary connection I give the preliminary designation X.” We saw above that the 
connecting of two discrete intuitions in Kant’s A Deduction constitutes a minimal understanding of 
conceptual activity (begreifen as “grasping”), and that the ultimate condition of such a unifying activity 
is there shown to be the transcendental unity of consciousness. Fichte’s WL begins with a modified 
form of the same argument: the “truth” of the proposition A = A is X, but this X simply marks the 
uniform presence of consciousness as condition for any connection whatsoever. The unity of 
consciousness with itself (I = I) is thus presented as the condition of the connection (X) that constitutes 
any particular propositional claim.  
Most importantly, by comparing the truth criteria of the propositions A = A and I = I, Fichte 
demonstrates that the status of the I’s activity as necessary condition is self-grounding.  As Eckart 
Förster neatly puts it: “In the case of the proposition A = A, whether something actual corresponds to 
the predicate A depends on conditions which are not given with the act of judgment itself; that is the 
reason why we were able to abstract from its existence. In the case of the proposition I = I, by contrast, 
it is impossible for us to abstract from existence.”211 In other words, the judgment A = A is an act that 
does not of itself produce any corresponding existence (Fichte patently does not endorse the second 
sense of Int Int, creation of the objects of cognition). It is because no content is given by the act of 
judgment – any content it has is contingent – that we could begin the WL by abstracting from all such 
content and consider only its form. In the case of I = I, however, the activity of identifying oneself with 
oneself just is what the I is. Unlike the content of a judgment, the self is a result of its activity, it is its 
own Act.  “The self’s own positing of itself is thus its own pure activity” (97/I,96).  
The above Fichtean argument preserves the basic Kantian argumentative strategy outlined in 
Chapter 2, i.e. moving from certain indubitable facts of experience to their non-experiential conditions. 
Interestingly however – and importantly in the comparison with the Logic – Fichte’s initial argument 
for self-positing subjectivity contains modified forms of both Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and 
Metaphysical Deduction. Firstly, the law of identity plays the role of “indubitable certainty” re: the 
“compared and connected” contents of empirical cognition in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. The 
Transcendental Deduction discerns the transcendental subject not immediately, through a direct 
awareness of its grounding unity, but by working backwards from its results, i.e. through a regressive 
reconstruction of the conditions for the kind of experience that we do in fact have (i.e. one in which 
discrete spatio-temporal objects are represented in thinkable relation). That transcendental 
subjectivity must be operative as ultimate condition of experience is something we learn by thinking 
through the conditions under which singular immediate appearances can become objects of thought 
for us. 212 As such, the Kantian would find a significant lacuna in Fichte’s beginning and proceeding 
 
211 Twenty-Five Years, 183. 
212  Stephen Houlgate, “Is Hegel’s Phenemenology of Spirit an Essay in Transcendental Argument?” in The 
Transcendental Turn, edited by Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
177. Houlgate’s argument from which I draw the cited line supports my reading: “Transcendental reflection, for 
Kant, thus does not involve any immediate introspection; it entails, rather, working out rationally what the 
conditions of experience must be… The analytical unity of apperception is the direct consciousness of myself as 
an ‘I’ that is expressed in the judgment ‘I think.’ As we know, Kant states that this judgment must be able to 
accompany all our representations but does not actually have to accompany them (B131). This means that, for 
Kant, I can experience objects without always being reflectively aware that I am experiencing them. The 
transcendental condition of my being able to experience such objects, however, transcendental apperception or 
the synthetic unity of apperception. This is a form of self-consciousness, or self-thinking, that does not involve 
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solely from the minimal “fact” that A = A.  In the Transcendental Deduction, transcendental reflection 
proceeds not merely from the “fact” of formal logical certainty alone (A = A) but by reflection on the 
forms of intuition and the logical forms of our understanding. It is significant that the forms of intuition 
play no part in Fichte’s initial proof of transcendental subjectivity. It is rather that the necessity of our 
receptivity is derived as a further condition of the unity of that subjectivity.  
This connects to my second comparative point. Insofar as it is a minimal logical certainty, A = 
A plays the role that categorical judgement (S is P) plays in Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction as logical 
correlate of the category of reality. Establishing that the supposed “certainty” A = A is dependent on 
the absolute activity of the I does not render that proposition irrelevant. It is instead at the end of Part 
I of the WL grounded in the I as both a logical form and a category. To ground the logical law with which 
we began, we abstract the “specific content” of the I = I and “thus obtain ‘A = A’ as the basic proposition 
of logic…” (99/I,99). If we then make a “further abstraction from judgment, as a specific activity, and 
having regard only to the general mode of action of the human mind that this presents, we obtain the 
category of reality.” (100/I,99). Although Fichte is very brief on this point, in my view at stake here is 
Fichte’s alternate formulation of Kant’s definition of a category at B128. The category of reality for 
Fichte would be the determining of an undetermined object (a something) with regard to the 
categorical function of judgment, i.e. that something is determined as possessing its own reality (it is 
what it is). This I take to be the sense of the line: “Whatever is posited in virtue of the simple positing 
of something (an item posited in the self) is the reality, or essence, of that thing.” (100/I,99). So Fichte 
thinks that from this reconstruction of this primordial Act of self-identity as condition of the law of 
identity, it is possible to reconstruct the necessity of the categories – first and foremost those of quality 
(For Kant: reality, negation, and limitation).  
Fichte’s derivation of negation indicates a general structural similarity between Fichte’s WL (in 
both 1794/5 and 1796/9 versions) and the Logic as unitary category derivations. Fichte’s WL does not 
take itself to require an independent argument for the forms of our receptivity; rather, this receptivity 
is entailed by the necessity of the categories of negation and limitation as functions of self-unity. In 
other words, that empirical consciousness is receptive to an object domain is rather derived from the 
self-positing I. In the language of the 1794/5 WL, the self and that which opposes or negates it (the 
not-self) must be mutually limiting (122/I, 126) if “the unity of consciousness is not to be abolished” 
(123/I, 127) – and it is from this relationship of opposition (entailing negation and limitation) that the 
receptivity of the self to a distinct object domain is argued for.  
Fichte’s derivation of the category of negation begins from the indubitability of the proposition 
that “¬A is not equal to A” (the “principle of opposition”). Fichte claims that logical opposition cannot 
be derived from the principle of identity, which at most can provide that “¬A = ¬A.” Given the logical 
independence of the forms of identity and opposition, Fichte concludes that “there is an opposition 
included among the acts of the self; and this opposition is, as to it mere form, an absolutely possible 
and unconditional act based on no higher ground.” Negation is nonetheless demonstrably an act of 
the self insofar as it expresses or is grounded in the same self-identity that conditioned the principle 
of identity: In the same way that positing A = A is dependent upon the identity of the self, 
“counterpositing [opposition] is possible only through the identity of the self” (103/I,103). That is, 
there cannot be two selves, one which posits that A and another which counterposits the ¬A, lest the 
 
the direct consciousness of myself as an ‘I’… Since such apperception is the transcendental condition of 
experience, it is not a self-consciousness of which I can ever be explicitly aware in my ordinary experience (in the 
way I can be conscious of myself as an ‘I’).”. 
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counterpositing be disconnected from positing. Were it so disconnected, it would itself be merely 
another positing.  As such, “opposition is possible on the assumption of a unity of the self that posits 
and the self that opposes” (104/I,103).  Again, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction argument for 
conceptuality as the grasping together of disparate terms in one experience is Fichte’s central 
argumentative lever.   
But although unconditioned as to form, the principle of opposition is “conditioned as to 
content.” The minimal content of that which is formally designated ¬A is a “not-I” opposed to and so 
conditioned by the content of the I. That is, the unconditioned act that gives rise to opposition licenses 
the formal claim that “I know of ¬A that it is the opposite of some A.” But in terms of content, “what 
that thing may or may not be, of which I know can be known to me only on the assumption that I am 
acquainted with A.” Fichte’s argument is then that the only content available at this point in the WL is 
the originary Act of the self. “Nothing is posited to begin with, except the self; and this alone is asserted 
absolutely (§1). Hence there can be an absolute opposition only to the self. But that which is opposed 
to the self = the not-self.”  It follows for Fichte that, “as surely as the absolute certainty of the 
proposition ‘¬A is not equal to A’ is unconditionally admitted among the facts of empirical 
consciousness, so surely is a not-self opposed absolutely to the self” (104/I,104). Following the pattern 
established in §1 of the WL, Fichte claims that if we abstract from the act of judgment at stake, “and 
look merely to the form of the inference from counterposition to nonexistence, we obtain the category 
of negation” (105/I,105).  
Most crucially, because the formal connection of posited and counterposited is conditioned 
by the unity of self-consciousness, the corollary contentful claim for the necessary existence of a not-
self is itself grounded in the activity of the self that opposes it. Fichte takes it that what has been 
established here is the necessity of a domain of objects which are to be – in an as yet undetermined 
way – represented by the self.  
 
“If I am to present anything at all, I must oppose it to the presenting self. Now within the object 
of presentation there can and must be an X of some sort, whereby it discloses itself as 
something to be presented, and not as that which presents. But that everything, wherein this 
X may be, is not that which presents, but an item to be presented, is something that no object 
can teach me; for merely in order to set up something as an object, I have to know this already; 
hence it must lie initially in myself, the presenter, in advance of any possible experience.” 
(105/I,104-5).  
 
That we have a relationship to objects distinguishable from ourselves is not generated in empirical 
experience; rather, the origin of such representations is the self logically prior to the empirical 
experience it makes possible. Here we have the clear beginnings of a derivation of the receptivity 
component of our cognition and its a priori status. This will be drawn out in parts II and III of the WL, 
which I leave aside in this project. What is of interest for this project is that, in Fichte, the derivation 
of negation also constitutes a derivation of what Hegel calls the “opposition of finite consciousness,” 
which – at least on Hegel’s reading covered in 3.2 above – has simply been assumed in Kant’s beginning 
from the (empiricist) presupposition that the subject is receptive to an independently constituted 
domain of objects set over against the subject, however much the Aesthetic and the Analytic work to 
undo that presupposition by articulating the non-empirical conditions of objectivity. Fichte seeks to 
begin instead from the Transcendental Deduction’s unity of apperception, deriving the necessity of 
receptivity from it. But as we will see in the Chapter 5, from Hegel’s perspective, Fichte’s explanation 
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for the fact of receptivity also only presupposes it, insofar as the WL assumes the content of formal 
identity to be the I, of which the not-I is the logical corollary. Fichte’s second sense of Int Int, however, 
indicates for Hegel the possibility of a model of category derivation that does not tacitly presuppose 
the externality of thinking and its objects. 
 
Fichte’s Sense 2 
So far we have Breazeale’s claim that Int Int is used by Fichte to name the abstraction and attention by 
means of which the self-posting I is reconstructed as the condition of empirical consciousness, as well 
as a brief account of the opening moves in this reconstruction. In the 1797 Introductions, however, 
“Intellectual Intuition” is also used by Fichte as a synonym for the Act of pure self-consciousness itself. 
Fichte defines Intellectual intuition as the immediate awareness of the activity of the self: “The 
intuiting of himself that is required of the philosopher, in performing the act whereby the self arises 
for him, I refer to as intellectual intuition” (38/I,463). Given the transcendental status of self-active 
subjectivity in 1794/5 WL, Fichte is now suggesting a non-sensuous (“intellectual”) but nonetheless 
immediate (by Kantian definition intuitional) representation of transcendental self-consciousness as 
ultimate condition for cognition. The suggestion is that global abstraction provides not formal certainty 
for empirical consciousness but immediate access to its ground. This immediacy is emphasised by 
Fichte:  
 
“We cannot prove from concepts that this power of intellectual intuition exists, nor evolve 
from them what it may be. Everyone must discover it immediately in himself, or he will never 
make its acquaintance. The demand to have it proved for one by reasoning is vastly more 
extraordinary than would be the demand of a person to have it explained to him what colours 
are, without his needing to see.” (38/I,463). 
  
But as we have just seen, the strategy of the 1794/5 WL is to have the Act proved by (transcendental) 
reasoning! Just before this passage, Fichte in fact recapitulates the Kantian transcendental strategy as 
demonstrating the necessity of thinking the synthetic unity of self-consciousness “as preceding and 
conditioning all acts of consciousness.” In 1797 the earlier strategy is still presented as possessing 
limited validity, a kind of peace offering to the reader who sticks to the Kantian ban on intellectual 
intuition: “But if it has to be admitted that there is not immediate isolated consciousness of intellectual 
intuition” we can nonetheless present it “by the same process” that leads to an isolated presentation 
of sensory intuition, namely, an “inference from the obvious facts of consciousness.” (39/I,464-5).  
Fichte nonetheless then goes on to suggest that Int Int in its second sense is ultimately required for a 
systematic Kantianism: “transcendental idealism, if it is proceed systematically, cannot possibly 
proceed in any other way than it does in the Science of Knowledge” (38/I,463), which is a little later is 
defined in this way: “…the Science of Knowledge sets out from an intellectual intuition, that of the 
absolute self-activity of the self” (41).  
This new usage of Int Int as immediate introspective access to one’s own self-positing Act puts 
Fichte into contradiction with Kant’s own account of pure apperception. For Kant, our immediate 
introspective self-awareness is only ever of empirical and not transcendental self-consciousness 
because we “intuit ourselves only as internally affected” (B153) by representations organised in the 
temporal form of inner sense. We are “given” to ourselves conditioned by the temporal form of 
sensibility, and it follows that we intuit ourselves not as we are but as we appear. Even though, as I 
have mentioned, the forms of our intuition play no role in Fichte’s proof of transcendental subjectivity, 
 117 
Fichte also draws the empirical/transcendental distinction at the start of the 1794/5 WL: The self-
positing “Act” “does not and cannot appear among the empirical states of our consciousness, but 
rather lies at the basis of all consciousness and alone makes it possible” (93/I, 91). This meant that, 
like Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Fichte in the 94/95 WL had to deduce this transcendental 
condition by reflecting on the necessary conditions of certain indubitable facts – though as I’ve 
mentioned above, the candidate facts for Kant and Fichte differ. 
Despite Fichte’s new claim for the immediate intuitive availability of transcendental 
subjectivity, Fichte does not step back from the identification of the self-positing I with Kantian 
apperception, but rather reinforces it. Fichte begins this explicit identification by recounting what he 
takes to be Int Int in Kant:  
 
In the Kantian terminology, all intuition is directed to existence of some kind (a posited or 
permanent); intellectual intuition would thus be the immediate consciousness of a non-
sensuous entity; the immediate consciousness of the thing-in-itself, and that by way of pure 
thought; hence a creation of the thing-in-itself by means of the concept (much as those who 
prove the existence of God from the mere concept are obliged to regard God’s existence as a 
mere consequence of their thinking) (45/I,472-73).  
Unsurprisingly given their textual and logical proximity in Kant, Fichte has run together Gram’s first 
two senses of intellectual intuition – knowledge of things-in-themselves (i.e. an overleaping of the 
conditions of sensibility) and creation of the thing-in-itself. Fichte goes on: 
The intellectual intuition alluded to in the Science of Knowledge refers, not to existence at all, 
but rather to action, and simply finds no mention in Kant (unless, perhaps, under the title of 
pure apperception) (46/I,472). 
Fichte’s self-presentation here seems to support Gram’s claim that “intellectual intuition exists for 
Fichte, but his notion of it has nothing to do with what Kant claims does not exist.”213 However, Gram 
and Fichte are wrong to suggest that there is no mention of intellectual intuition vis-à-vis apperception 
in Kant. Kant uses the logical possibility of an intellectual intuition to motivate the prohibition on any 
immediate awareness of transcendental subjectivity. 214   Kant acknowledges that an immediate 
awareness of the activity of transcendental subjectivity would be possible if the representations 
synthesised were not given appearances, but generated by the subject itself: 
 
Everything that is represented though a sense is to that extent always appearance, and an 
inner sense must therefore either not be admitted at all or else the subject, which the object 
of this sense, can only be represented by its means as appearance, not as it would judge of 
itself if its intuition were mere self-activity, i.e., intellectual… Consciousness of itself 
(apperception) is the simple representation of the I, and if all of the manifold in the subject 
were self-actively through that alone, then the inner intuition would be intellectual (B68).  
 
As Estes helpfully comments, if the manifold were “self-actively” given, “we would not need to 
presuppose a relation to something external in accounting for experience if we could connect a 
 
213 Gram 296. 
214 As I suggested in introduction, there is thus a further fourth Kantian sense over and above Gram’s three, 
which Estes helpfully points out. Estes, “Revisiting,” 170.  
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determination of our existence with consciousness of the self through an intellectual intuition…”215 
That is, we would not need reference to inner sense as a form of sensible intuition to account for 
experience if the I can be shown to give rise of itself spontaneously to a manifold of material for 
synthesis. In the quote from Kant above, the auto-production of representations in the subject “self-
actively” suggests intellectual intuition in its second sense as creation, though this time creation of a 
manifold of representations, not of objects as they are in themselves. The suggestion nonetheless is 
that these self-actively produced representations would be immediately related to particular objects, 
such that we would not need sensible intuition in distinction from our merely discursive understanding 
for empirical cognition.  
From Fichte’s perspective, however, this self-active production of contents does happen at the 
transcendental level, i.e. the understanding self-actively produces the categories as transcendental 
conditions of possibility of empirical knowledge. Fichte can point to Kantian authority here: the “self-
active” production or positing of necessary and therefore a priori representations is already admitted 
by Kant in the spontaneity that Kant associates with our faculty of understanding – we are in Kant 
spontaneously in possession of the a priori categories. So for Fichte we do have intellectual intuition 
of the kind described by Kant above, but the “self-active” or spontaneous representations given 
through the I are not representations of particular empirical objects but of those necessary for our 
experience of objectivity in general, i.e. the categories. This is the deflated and reflexive account of 
Intellectual Intuitions as immediate knowledge of objects I flagged in 4.1 above. This thought in Fichte 
is present as early as the 1793/4 “Personal Meditations,” in which he claims: “The forms of the faculty 
of representation, which are precisely what we are here discussing, will be intuited purely 
intellectually.”216 It however is not until the 1797 Introductions that the self-activity of the I is explicitly 
theorised as generating to the categories.  
The net result of this second usage of Int Int is that Fichte – in the WL Nova Methodo at least 
– is committed not to the transcendental argument as we have seen it operating in Kant, but to what 
Breazeale has called the “descriptive” or “genetic-phenomenological” method.217 Rather than start 
with certain characterisations of our experience indubitable in their generality and then account for 
their non-empirical conditions, the philosopher is to observe the “self-activity” to which she has 
immediate intuitive access and then report those observations. As Fichte puts it in 1797: “In the 
Science of Knowledge there are two very different sequences of mental acts: that of the self, which 
the philosopher observes, and that of the philosopher’s observations.” (30/I,454).  
Breazeale’s term for this method has two elements: “genetic” and “phenomenological.” 
Firstly, Fichte’s method is “genetic” in that the philosopher’s observations will provide an account of 
the isolatable acts of foundational subjectivity – the categories – in their “necessary, sequentially 
ordered relation to one another.” 218 That is, this method is to provide an in-principle exhaustive set of 
categories linked by their sequential derivation from the immediate intuition of self-activity, i.e. the 
program of a unitary replicable category derivation with which I began this section. The “replicability” 
component of this Fichtean-Hegelian program is in my view secured by the “phenomenological” aspect 
of Breazeale’s definition. For Breazeale, the method is phenomenological in that “it does not fabricate 
its objects of reflection (the necessary acts of the I), but instead discovers and observes them…”219 
 
215 Estes, “Revisiting,” 170.  
216 Qtd in Breazeale, Thinking Through, 198.  
217 Breazeale, “Kantian Questions/Fichtean Answers,” 79, 87. 
218 Ibid.  
219 Breazeale, “Kantian Questions/Fichtean Answers,” 81-82. 
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Discovery suggests that that which is to be discovered is already present, but “covered” over in some 
way.  Intellectual intuition is that which brings the activity that conditions empirical experience itself 
into view. But that that activity must be always already operative in empirical experience does not 
make Fichte’s novel method “analytic” in the standard sense – unpacking what is already contained in 
a concept. Each act of the self “emerges” in our inner intuition in its genetic relation to other such 
isolable acts, but is not logically “contained in” or reducible to any other such act. Of course, it is just 
this logical irreducibility that secures each category as a category, a discrete conceptual form.   
“Emergence” is admittedly a vague or inadequate conceptualisation of category derivation as 
it is presented in Fichte’s 1797 Introduction. Visual phenomena could be said to “emerge” – as a car 
comes into view around a corner – but to carry this language over from sensible to intellectual intuition 
risks blurring their difference. Firstly, to take up the Kantian position, sensible phenomena do not carry 
the kind of necessity (as condition of possibility of experience in general) that characterises pure 
concepts of the understanding. That there is causal necessity in empirical experience is 
transcendentally dependent on the necessity of the category of cause as condition of possibility. 
Secondly, we have seen in Chapter 3 that Hegel formulates the logical structure of sensible intuition in 
Kant as external relation between singulars or “outside-one-another-being.” Representations 
produced in intellectual intuition could not be the ground of the categories – understood as forms of 
necessary connection – if they were limited to that form of relation alone. Representations in Int Int 
in so far as they are intellectual possess the form of relation lacking in Kant’s account of sensible 
intuitional representations (Recall that in Kant: connection or synthesis is a function of the 
understanding alone). As such, Intellectual Intuition in Fichte’s second sense can be understood as the 
immediacy of thinking: it is the immediate apprehension that we as thinking or rational beings possess 
a self-relation or unity. In Fichte’s 1797 Introduction, by observing the acts by which this self-relation 
is produced and maintained, we discover that such unity generates and so grounds all forms of 
connection (the categories) in our experience.  
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Chapter 5. Absolute Beginning 
In this chapter I provide an account of the Logic’s version of the post-Kantian Grundsatz, namely, 
“immediacy itself” or “pure being.” Hegel justifies his version of the Grundsatz in the Logic’s General 
Introduction, and again in a more concerted and concentrated way in the Seinslogik Introduction, 
“With What Must the Beginning of Science Be Made?” Of direct relevance to the Logic’s two 
introductory essays is the following passage from Fichte’s first 1797 Introduction, in which he reflects 
on the implications on the “genetic-phenomenological” model of derivation for philosophy as such:  
 
 The system-makers I have in mind proceed from some concept or other; without caring in the 
least where they got it from, or whence they have concocted it, they analyse or combine it 
with others to whose origin they are equally indifferent, and in reasonings such as these their 
philosophy itself is comprised. It consists, in consequence, of their own thoughts. The Science 
of Knowledge is a very different matter. Its chosen topic of consideration is not a lifeless 
concept, passively exposed to its inquiry merely, but a living and active thing which engenders 
insights from and through itself, and which the philosopher merely contemplates… he would 
be operating directly counter to his own aim if he did not leave it to itself, and sought to 
intervene in the development of the phenomenon (30/I,454). 
Here the rhetorical parallels with Hegel are significant. Hegel’s Phenomenology requires of the reader 
“simply to look on” [reine Zusehen] (PhS §85/54). “Scientific cognition… demands surrender to the life 
of the object, or, what amounts to the same thing, confronting and expressing its inner necessity” (PhS 
§53/32). The Logic’s Introductions similarly suggest this “surrender” and “observation,” claiming that 
the Logic remains “immanent” insofar as “setting aside every reflection” we are “simply to take up, 
what is there before us” [… Beiseitsetzung aller Reflexionen, aller Meinungen, die man sonst hat, nur 
aufzuhehmen, was vorhanden ist] (47/21.55).  And, as in Fichte’s paragraph above, what is there 
before us is characterised by activity, requiring in turn a contemplative passivity. The reader of the 
Logic must “stand back from its content, allowing it to have free play and not determining it further” 
(50/21.59). 220  Hegel’s own justification for a derivation grounded in immediate awareness of 
spontaneous conceptual self-development is the subject of this chapter.  
Hegel’s arguments on this point can be introduced through the problematic of indifference. 
Note that in the above quoted paragraph Fichte takes previous philosophies to be “equally indifferent” 
to their point of departure. It is interesting that Kant, Fichte and Hegel all characterise prior 
philosophical positions in terms of indifference [Gleichgültigkeit], though the term carries subtly 
different senses for each thinker. In the quote above, Fichte uses “indifference” to mark the difference 
between prior, allegedly non-systematic philosophy and his own. All philosophies prior to the Fichtean 
are “in vain” because of their indifference to the kind of material with which philosophy is licensed to 
work. For Fichte, prior philosophers are “equally indifferent” to the origin of both their first principle 
– they begin, in Fichte’s words, from “some concept or other” – as well as to the concepts with which 
that principle is “combined.”  Indifference in this sense recalls our discussion of Humean indifference 
in section 3.2, i.e. indifference in the sense that any combination or connection of individual terms is 
equally licensed, given that relations are understood to be external to those terms themselves. Lacking 
a subject matter that generates its content and the connection of those contents from within its own 
 
220 For a full treatment of the “passivity,” “openness” or “letting be” required of the Logic’s reader, see Houlgate, 
The Opening, 60-66.  
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“self-activity,” philosophical coherence is dependent on the decisions of the philosopher. In other 
words, lacking a grounding principle immanent to philosophical thought, philosophy is not genuinely 
systematic. That is, it cannot claim to fulfil what Fichte takes to be the genuine Kantian program 
(“Strong TI”), i.e. the articulation of a complete itinerary of necessary and universal representations, 
but is instead ultimately “subjective,” in the sense in which Kant opposes subjectivity to the 
universality and necessity characteristic of objectivity.  
Fichte goes so far as to suggests that previous philosophies have been indifferent to the 
problem of indifference: the difference between arbitrarily selected subject matters and Fichte’s self-
active subject matter had yet to be determined. The latter should remind us of Kant’s own self-
presentation covered in 1.2 above: Kant suggests that the discrimination of distinct sensible and 
conceptual forms in transcendental idealism determines all previous philosophies as transcendental 
realisms; Fichte suggests that his identification of a “self-active” ground of philosophical thinking 
relegates all previous, would-be “systematic” philosophies to equally-valid connections between 
indifferent thought contents. Fichte’s suggestion is, in its scope, impossible to validate or discredit 
here.   
In any case, Hegel follows Fichte in making the history of philosophy turn on the question of 
philosophically legitimate first principles. In the Seinslogik Introduction, Hegel opens by claiming that 
philosophical beginning presents a dilemma not encountered in non-philosophical domains. The latter 
can legitimately begin with a set of objects falling under the historically determined purview of that 
domain, which Hegel also understands is subject to revision as new cases stretch or undermine 
previous domain classifications. 221  In contrast, philosophy understood in the strong TI sense as 
reason’s self-legitimation cannot begin from anything merely historically given. But, like Fichte, Hegel 
notes that philosophy in its history has in fact begun arbitrarily – again, in Fichte’s words, from “some 
concept or other.” Hegel offers examples: philosophy begins either with a principle intended to explain 
all things (an “objective” principle like Thales “water” or Leibniz’s monad) or, for the moderns, with an 
account of our cognition as “subjective” criterion for truth. In both Ancient “objective” and modern 
“subjective” approaches, the beginning is considered only an “accidental way [zufälligen Art und 
Weise] of introducing the exposition,” “a matter of indifference [gleichgültig].” In modernity, however, 
the beginning is at least problematised: the moderns possess “a new awareness of the difficulty of 
finding a beginning” (SL 23/21.27). Again, Di Giovanni’s translation justifiably footnotes Part I of 
Fichte’s 1794/5 Wissenschaftslehre as Hegel’s tacit reference here – what is not footnoted is that 
Fichte’s shifting sense of Intellectual Intuition, and his movement from transcendental to genetic 
philosophical methods, further proves the difficulty of beginning.  
But while Hegel follows Fichte in characterising previous philosophies as indifferent to the 
question of beginning, both the Logic’s general Introduction and the Seinslogik Introduction transition 
to a critique of Fichte’s Grundsatz, characterised as it is in both the 1794/5 and 1796/9 WLs in terms 
of self-consciousness. As such, Hegel’s account of philosophical beginning is constituted by an 
argument with and against Fichte’s account of abstraction and immediacy. Hegel follows Schelling in 
arguing that Fichte’s first principle does not explain but rather uncritically presupposes the opposition 
of consciousness and empirical object. Fichte misrecognises the result of global abstraction by figuring 
immediacy in terms of self-consciousness. Nonetheless, Fichte’s placing non-sensible immediacy at 
 
221 “Any definition with which a science makes an absolute beginning can contain nothing else than the precise 
and correct expression of what is represented in one’s mind as the traditionally accepted subject matter and 
purpose of this science… Further still, definition is always a matter of argumentation as to what is to be included 
in it or excluded from it…” (SL 28/21.33). 
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the ground of the 1796/9 WL’s genetic derivation is legible in Hegel’s point of departure in the Logic. 
Hegel begins with the thought of immediacy itself, abstracted from any reference to empirical 
cognition whatsoever, such that categories or “thought-determinations” are understood as that which 
is necessitated by thought’s own immediacy, the “pure being” that is immediately or directly present 
to thought. In Hegel, as in Fichte, mediation is genetically derived from immediacy; they disagree on 
how – and how abstractly – that immediacy is to be conceived, which has implications for the 
ontological status and logical structure of the categories derived from it.  
To substantiate these arguments, 5.1 considers Hegel’s critique of the Fichtean I in the Logic’s 
Introduction and the Seinslogik Introduction. As Hegel here is indebted to the critique of Fichte 
developed by Schelling in the latter half of the 1790s and early 1800s, I then consider and distinguish 
Schelling’s point of departure in his Jena “Identity Philosophy” from the beginning of Hegel’s Logic. 
This reading of Schelling also enables me to introduce the singularity component of intellectual 
intuition, important to my reading of the Logic’s opening categories in Chapter 6. In 5.2 I consider 
Hegel’s own argument for beginning with “immediacy itself” and its equivalent, “pure being.”  
 
5.1. The Limits of Abstraction 
The question of the limits of abstraction is a crucial one for distinguishing the major figures of German 
idealism. For Kant, a deduction of the objective purport of the categories must abstract from empirical 
intuition, but cannot abstract from the forms of intuition: 
 
Since the categories arise independently from sensibility merely in the understanding, I must 
abstract from the way in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, in order to 
attend only to the unity that is added to the intuition by means of the category (B144).  
 
That the transcendental status of Kant’s deduction would be vitiated by reference to the matter 
organised by the forms of our sensibility should be clear from Chapter 2 above. Kant goes on, however, 
to mark the point at which, for him, our abstractive power reaches a limit:  
 
In the above proof, however, I still could not abstract from one point, namely, from the fact 
that the manifold for intuition must already be given prior to the synthesis of understanding 
and independently from it; how, however, is here left undetermined (B145).  
 
We cannot abstract from the “fact” that the matter for cognition is given in the form of intuition, such 
that the account of categorial function must have reference to that a priori intuitional form. The next 
paragraph of the B Deduction introduces the material covered in 4.1 above, i.e. the possibility of a 
divine understanding whose thinkability reinforces the constitution of our “peculiar” understanding, 
for which no “further ground may be offered” (B146). Fichte effectively pushes the limit of abstraction 
one step further back than Kant: there is a content given to us in intellectual intuition – the I – from 
which the opposition that characterises finite empirical consciousness can itself be derived, although 
Fichte shifts his position, as we have seen, as to whether that content is immediately given, or must 
be retrieved from elementary logical form via transcendental argument. In both cases, however, self-
consciousness alone is taken to be that from which derivation is to work. In the 1794/5 WL, Fichte 
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explicitly claims that “from your self-consciousness you can never abstract” (98/I,97).222 In the later 
1790s,  thought is minimally the immediate apprehension of the I’s self-posited identity, not of the 
sensible manifold.  
Hegel agrees that philosophy begins with a global abstraction. The beginning must be “entirely 
abstract, entirely general” (SL 51/21.60). For Hegel, however, Fichte in maintaining a reference to the 
subject does not abstract far enough – or more accurately, Fichte misunderstands the results of that 
abstraction. Hegel argues in the Logic’s Introduction that Fichte has misrepresented the specifically 
logical content of the self-positing I, simply by continuing to refer to it in terms of consciousness: 
 
If other Kantians [i.e. Fichte] have expanded on the determining of the intended object by the 
‘I’ by saying that the objectifying of the ‘I’ is to be regarded as an original and necessary deed 
of consciousness [Tun des Bewusstseins] … then this objectifying deed, liberated from the 
opposition of consciousness, is closer to what may be taken simply as thinking as such [Denken 
als solches]. But this deed should no longer be called consciousness; for consciousness holds 
within itself the opposition of the ‘I’ and its intended object which is not to be found in the 
original deed. The name ‘consciousness’ gives it more of a semblance of subjectivity than does 
the term ‘thought,’ which here, however, should be taken in the absolute sense of infinite 
[unendliches] thought, not as encumbered by the finitude [Endlichkeit] of consciousness; in 
short, thought as such (SL 41/21-47-8; brackets mine). 
 
Now, on our reconstructions of Fichte’s 1794/5 WL in 4.2 above, Hegel’s characterisation of the 
structure of the Fichtean I is, despite its brevity, broadly accurate. The logical form of opposition and 
corollary category of negation have their ground in an act of the self-identical I; the minimal content 
of that opposition – the opposition between an empirical self and not-self – is conditioned by that self-
posited identity. In other words, the self-positing I is the condition of both formal opposition and the 
minimal content of opposition, not one term of an opposition conditioned by self-positing. Hegel’s 
critical point is that, given this structure, continuing to refer to the self-positing Act as a form of 
“consciousness” blurs conditioned and condition. Equally importantly, it forces Fichte to presuppose 
the minimal content of opposition as the opposition between empirical consciousness and sensibly 
given objectivity; for Hegel, as we will see in the next chapter, opposition can be thought as a logical 
structure in abstraction from human mindedness and empirical object individuation.223  With that said, 
Hegel’s proposed alternative, “thought,” seemingly also carries with it the connotations of the thinking 
subject. The final sentence of the paragraph quoted above attempts to block such a reading. Hegel’s 
formulation “Infinite thought” might strike one as forbidding or profound, but “infinite” in the context 
of the Logic should be understood here simply as that which is not finite, not endlich. That is, “infinite 
thought” means thought not presupposed to be limited by an object domain beyond or outside it, at 
 
222 This is not to say that Fichte’s account of self-consciousness is not influential on Hegel’s account of the same. 
Hegel’s language in the Phenomenology, in which self-consciousness is constitutively “for-itself” [fuer sich] has 
an obvious Fichtean pedigree: “what does not exist for itself is not a self” (98/I,97). It is just that Hegel thinks 
embodied human self-consciousness as too concrete and complex a candidate for presuppositionless 
philosophical beginning.  
223 Per the Philosophy of Spirit, a concrete account of the structure of human consciousness can only be provided 
in the context of human embodied experience. Fichte arguably has a similar understanding, insofar as Part III of 
the 1794/5 Wissenschaftslehre genetically tracks the generation of objective thought from our most immediate 
embodied encounters with the world. Nonetheless, logical opposition in Part I of WL already has for its content 
the opposition between empirical I and not-I.  
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which thought has its end or limit.224  
 Hegel makes the case for the ambiguity of Fichte’s first principle as early as 1801. In the 
Differenzschrift Hegel claims that, on the one hand, Fichte’s WL has “made philosophy possible” in 
establishing the “pure concept of Reason” as Grundsatz for a “stricter, purer deduction.” This positive 
limb remains in the Encyclopedia Logic account of Fichte’s “profound contribution,” used to motivate 
Fichte’s importance to this research project in Chapter 4.1. But “On the other hand, it has equated 
Reason with pure consciousness and raised Reason as apprehended in a finite shape to the status of 
principle” (DS 82). For both the early and the mature Hegel, the Fichtean I is ambiguously both the 
ground of opposition and a term already determined by opposition.  
The Fichtean can of course respond to Hegel’s critique above that the pure subjectivity that 
constitutes the WL’s ground is, in the immediacy of its self-relation, not opposed to anything but 
immediately identical to itself. As such, the above Hegelian line of attack could be seen to confuse the 
empirical I – limited as it is by the domain of the not-I – and the pure I whose unity is the ultimate 
condition of the experience of any opposition whatsoever. Hegel’s Differenzschrift critique tacitly 
accounts for this Fichtean rejoinder, however. Fichte presents the Tathandlung as a unified ground of 
both subjectivity and objectivity; on closer inspection, however, Fichte’s Grundsatz is merely a 
“subjective Subject-Object,” the unity of subjectivity and objectivity treated from one of its sides. This 
critique and its language however is only fully intelligible with a reading of Schelling’s Identity 
Philosophy, and its presentation of the Grundsatz as “subject-object identity,” understood as 
“indifferenz” of subject and object.  
 
Schelling’s Indifferenz 
In the following I focus only on one key work of the 1801-1806 “Identitätsphilosophie” period, 
Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801).225 Importantly this text is contemporaneous with 
 
224 While the thought-determination of infinity is genetically derived only in the second chapter (“Existence”) of 
the Seinslogik, “infinite thought” can be introduced here in terms of immediacy: the content of such thought is 
not mediated by an other outside of it but is itself through itself alone. Infinite thought is thus immediately also 
totality, linking up with Kant’s third sense of Intellectual Intuition. This totality component of “infinite thought” 
in Hegel’s sense is traceable directly to Schelling’s “Identity Philosophy” account of the Grundsatz, which we turn 
to shortly.  
225  Key texts in the “Identity philosophy” period are Presentation of My System of Philosophy, Further 
Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1802), Bruno (1802), and the unpublished 1804 The System of the 
Whole of Philosophy and of Naturphilosophie in Particular (or Würzburg system). For an introductory overview 
of this period put in terms of a “Moving Beyond the I: The Break with Fichte” see Andrew Bowie, Schelling and 
Modern European Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1993), 55-67. This periodisation of Schelling’s work, in which 
“Identity philosophy” follows on from the “Naturphilosophie” of 1796-1799 is however problematic, as Bowie 
notes in introduction. Michael Vater points out that Schelling only uses the term “Identitätsphilosophie” once, 
in the “extra-systematic context” of the Presentation’s Preface, and that later Schelling considers the work from 
1800-1806 as part of the broader project of Naturphilosophie. Vater, “‘In and of Itself Nothing Is Finite’: 
Schelling’s Nature (or So-called Identity) Philosophy” in Kant, Fichte and the Legacy of Transcendental Idealism, 
edited by Halla Kim and Steven Hoeltzel, Lanham: Lexington, 2015, 191-212, 196.  I might also add that Bowie’s 
way of figuring the Identity philosophy as the moment of Schelling’s “break with Fichte” is slightly misleading. 
While Schelling and Fichte break off contact in 1802, philosophically Schelling is never simply Fichtean. Dalia 
Nassar has demonstrated that Schelling’s first published work, Vom Ich (1795), although seemingly 
straightforwardly Fichtean, in fact is already non- or anti-Fichtean, insofar as it conceives the Tathandlung in a 
non-subjective and quasi-Spinozist manner. Dalia Nassar, The Romantic Absolute: Being and Knowing in Early 
German Romantic Philosophy, 1795-1804 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 161-186. Steven Hoeltzel, 
while choosing not to investigate Schelling’s Spinozism, nonetheless similarly detects in Schelling’s earliest work 
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Hegel’s critique of Fichte in the Differenzschrift mentioned above, and we will see in what follows that 
Hegel and Schelling’s pieces from this period share formulae.226 The body of Schelling’s Presentation 
begins this way:  
 
§1. DEFINITION. I call reason absolute reason, or reason insofar as it is conceived as the total 
indifference [Indifferenz] of the subjective and the objective.227  
 
Absolute reason stands “indifferently over against” the “extremes” of subjectivity and objectivity 
(§1/146). In Part II of the Further Presentations from the System of Philosophy (1802), the standpoint 
which grasps the Absolute as the indifference of subject and object is explicitly referred to as “rational 
or Intellectual Intuition.”228 Like Fichte, Schelling takes the beginning of philosophy to begin with an 
immediate and indubitable cognition as Grundsatz securing the certainty of those categories derived 
from it. I cannot in this dissertation undertake a comprehensive account of Schelling’s changing usages 
of term “Intellectual Intuition” throughout his Jena work as a whole. 229  I am concerned only to 
establish: (1) the way in which Schelling’s text articulates an alternative to Fichte’s understanding of 
the Grundsatz as self-consciousness, in order to indicate the way in which this alternative is taken up, 
with further alterations, in Hegel’s Logic; and (2) the relation between Schelling’s characterisation of 
the Absolute as “Indifferent” and the other appearances of that term in this dissertation. These two 
points are intertwined.  
Paul Redding has noted that “Schelling’s ‘Indifferenz’ is a neologism meant to convey the idea 
of the non-difference (coincidence) of opposites. It should not be confused with what is conveyed by 
the English ‘indifference’ which is standardly translated by ‘Gleichgültigkeit’ (‘like-valid-ness’).”230  We 
 
a non-Fichtean treatment of the I: Schelling is not concerned, as Fichte is, with “charting the further specific 
determination that the I must undergo if experience is to occur” but rather with “deducing from the I’s absolute 
unconditionality additional abstract predicates” that will eventually detach Schelling’s Absolute from its 
purported explicandum. “Idealism and the Ground of Explanation: Fichte and Schelling, 1794-1797” in New 
Essays on Fichte’s Later Jena Wissenschaftslehre, ed. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2002), 261-278. 
226  Though I will also leave aside any definitive consideration of how “Schellingean” Hegel’s thinking in general 
in this period can be taken to be. The fairest account of Schelling and Hegel’s philosophical relation in Jena (to 
my mind and knowledge) is Michael Vater’s translator’s introduction to Schelling’s 1802 Bruno. Vater rejects 
accounts of the Jena Hegel as Schelling’s “henchman,” instead tracking shared vocabularies and mutual influence 
to establish Hegel as a “co-laborer not a follower.” F. W. J. Schelling, Bruno, or On the Natural and Divine Principle 
of Things, ed. and trans. Michael Vater (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 81-97.  
227 F. W. J. Schelling, “Presentation of My System of Philosophy,” in The Philosophical Rupture Between Fichte and 
Schelling: Selected Texts and Correspondence 1800-1802, ed. and trans. Michael G. Vater and David W. Wood 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), 145. I reference this text in parenthesis for the remainder of 
this chapter.  
228  F. W. J. Schelling, “Further Presentations from the System of Philosophy,” in The Philosophical Rupture 
Between Fichte and Schelling: Selected Texts and Correspondence, 1800-1802, ed. and trans. Michael G. Vater 
and David W. Wood (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), 206. 
229 Dalia Nassar’s working through of Schelling’s Jena writings in the third part of The Romantic Absolute tracks 
Schelling’s movement in the 1790s from a Spinozist to a Fichtean conception of Int Int. The primary interpretive 
complication is that the latter conception is used in Schelling’s Naturphilosophie for distinctly anti-Fichtean 
purposes. For Schelling, the productivity that Fichte identifies in self-intuition – the spontaneous self-positing or 
auto-production of the I – is in fact only an instance of nature’s self-productivity, with the I nothing more than 
the “highest potency” of nature’s self-activity. The Romantic Absolute, 198. Nassar does not however link 
Intellectual Intuition in Schelling to Kant’s multiple senses of the term. 
230 Redding, Hegel’s Hermeneutics, 58 n18.  
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saw however that in the Critique’s Introduction, Kant used the Latinate “Indifference” and the German 
“Gleichgültigkeit” synonymously, and that indifference in the sense of a claim for non-difference  and 
indifference in the sense of equal-validity were argumentatively linked: all metaphysics are determined 
by the same concept (“usefulness”) supplied by the indifferentist’s extra-philosophical criterion; they 
thus carry equal validity, i.e. no validity at all. In my view, a similar linkage is detectable in Schelling’s 
definition of the Absolute, as it will be at the very opening of Hegel’s Doctrine of Being. 
Firstly, absolute reason is indifferent to either subjectivity and objectivity because absolute 
reason lacks the negation required for contrastive determination, i.e. as subjective not objective or 
vice-versa. Understanding Schelling’s argument here requires an understanding of his account of 
global abstraction. Schelling makes it clear in §1 of Presentation of My System of Philosophy that he 
understands “Indifferenz” to result from abstraction, not only from all empirically-given objects of 
thought in the manner of Fichte, but also from the subject that “does the thinking.” Schelling says the 
standpoint of absolute reason is “foreign to everyone; to conceive it as absolute, and thus to come to 
the standpoint I require, one must abstract from what does the thinking” (§1/146).  An abstraction 
that abstracts from the agent of that abstraction may sound self-contradictory, and Fichte patently 
does not entertain its possibility. But if we keep in mind Hegel’s critique of Fichte above, the motivation 
for Schelling’s line of thinking is at least comprehensible: the unconditioned first principle is to be 
conceived as neither subject nor object in order to block presupposing the subject-object opposition 
in the way that Fichte is taken to. In line with Hegel’s critique of Fichte in the Differenzschrift, 
Schelling’s tacit argument against Fichte is that if the Grundsatz is taken to be subjectivity, then the 
opposition between subject and object is not explained from that Grundsatz but merely presupposed. 
Schelling takes himself to set aside this presupposition insofar as the principle of identity A = A is not 
reducible to the self-identical subjective pole (I = I) of subject-object dualism, but structures being in 
general, which contains both subject and object as only quantitatively different forms of being. I shall 
unpack this position now.  
The first thing to note is that if Schelling’s “abstracting from what does the thinking” means 
only to abstract from contingent thought-contents, then global abstraction in Schelling’s sense does 
not distinguish itself from its Fichtean counterpart. In stripping thought of contingent content, both 
Schelling and the 1794/5 WL arrive at the principle of identity or A = A as that which is necessary for 
thought. In §6 of My System, Schelling explicitly references “Wissenschaftslehre §1,” namely Fichte’s 
1794/5 argument that the proposition A = A in its abstraction from any particular content posits only 
the X of “necessary connection.” Schelling’s version runs similarly, only replacing “identity” for 
“connection.”  Because the proposition A = A abstracts from the “being of A,” the content of that 
proposition is not the self-identical existence of any particular A but rather “the unique being posited 
through this proposition is that of identity itself.” The differences between Schelling and the first WL 
emerge only after this point: for Schelling, I = I is not “given along with” A = A, it is rather that identity 
in its thinkability “stands in being.” Our abstraction from empirical particulars terminates at identity 
as the “sole unconditioned cognition,” which for Schelling cannot be held to be equivalent to or 
grounded in the self-identity of the I without surreptitiously re-introducing opposition. As Schelling 
says, “the sole remaining thing, from which abstraction cannot be made, which is therefore really 
posited in this proposition, is absolute identity itself.” (§6/147). For Fichte self-identity is “posited” in 
the maximally abstract proposition A = A; for Schelling what is really posited in the proposition is 
absolute identity itself, that is, identity as the law of being in general. 
Schelling then argues that, once absolute identity is admitted as sole unconditioned cognition, 
subject and object must be in truth indifferent insofar as the determination of any difference by 
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negation is alien to absolute identity. Schelling repeatedly insists that the only content of absolute 
reason is identity, and that opposition belongs only to the standpoint of ordinary consciousness and 
“appearance.” Everything “in reason” is determined through the law of identity, and as a result “by all 
other laws, accordingly, if there are such, nothing is determined as it is in reason or in itself, but only 
as it is for reflection or in appearance” (§6/147).  Redding accordingly notes that subject/object 
difference for Schelling is “really the result of a kind of perspectival illusion: it is only when thought 
from the point of view of a limited, finite consciousness that such differences become 
unbridgeable.”231  
But bound up with indifference in the above sense is the claim that the absolute is with equal-
validity subject as much as object. That is, there is a quantitative equivalence of subject and object in 
the absolute; “outside” the absolute, that is, from the perspective of individuals, a quantitative 
difference between predominantly subjective domains and predominantly objective domains opens 
up. As Schelling puts it in the Explanation of §23, when viewed from the standpoint of the absolute, 
there is “no opposition between subject and object (since what is posited in the one position and in 
the other is the very same identity; subject and object are thus in essence one).” (§23/151-2). But to 
individual perspectives, this absolute identity is also presented as a coexistence in which subject and 
object “subsist together in such a way that they can be alternately posited as predominant” (§23/151-
2). From one individual thing to the next, subject and object can increase and decrease their respective 
proportions without introducing a qualitative difference into absolute identity. As Michael Vater puts 
it: “If the absolute is the primal indifference of subjectivity and objectivity, every finite instance of it is 
a distortion of identity by difference, or an inflection of indifference toward relatively greater 
subjectivity or objectivity.”232  
The key steps of this argument are contained in §22-23 of the Presentation. If the “essence of 
absolute reason” is, per §6, “identity itself,” the “form” of absolute reason is identity between subject 
and object. “This is so because absolute identity’s form of being is the same as the form of the 
proposition A = A” (§22/151). What is posited in this form is the identity of subject and predicate, 
which Schelling takes to be equivalent to the identity of subject and object (§22/151). Schelling takes 
himself to have derived from the form of the principle of identity two elements within that identity, 
designated as subject and predicate or subject and object. This will be designated in the Explanation 
of §23 in the formula “A = B,” where A is subject and “B is adopted as a designation for objectivity” 
(152).  The body of §23 claims that “between subject and predicate, none other than quantitative 
difference is possible.” The reasons for the exclusion of qualitative difference we have already seen – 
the Absolute in essence, and now in form, is entirely determined by the principle of identity, such that 
no contrastive relation of opposition is logically possible within it. With the derivation of subject and 
object from the principle of identity, “difference commences” (§23/152), but this difference can only 
be thought as quantitative.  
Schelling makes this point in a number of ways before claiming that: 
 
Expressed in the clearest way possible, our assertion is this, that if we could view everything 
that is in the totality, we would perceive in the whole a perfect quantitative balance of 
subjectivity and objectivity, hence nothing else than a pure identity in which nothing is 
distinguishable, however much in the perspective of the individual a preponderance might 
 
231 Ibid.  
232 Vater, “Finite” 197 
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occur on one side or the other… (§30/153). 
 
I will treat Hegel’s famous criticism of this position as lacking explanatory force in the next section. 
What interests us here is the explanatory force that Schelling takes quantitative difference to have. 
This is most clearly presented in the “constructed line” of §46. Schelling offers a diagram: at the 
midpoint of a horizontal line stands the principle of identity through which the Absolute is thought (A 
= A); at one pole stands the formula for the predominance of subjectivity (+A = B); at the other stands 
the formula for the predominance of objectivity (A = +B). Redding in his discussion of Schelling’s 
constructed line makes two points here. Firstly, the line does not present a dichotomy of subject and 
object, because both poles are constituted by “subject-objects.” Redding also shows that the +A = B 
pole corresponds to the  “subjective Subject-Object” of the Differenzschrift and the A = +B pole to the 
“objective Subject-Object.” 233 Secondly, Schelling’s diagram is an attempt to account for the seemingly 
opposed domains of natural science and transcendental philosophy. Both participate in the unity of 
subject and object, but in the object of natural science objectivity predominates over subjectivity, and 
vice-versa for critical philosophy. The constructed line thus presents the logical structure of Schelling’s 
famous formulation from the 1797 Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature: “Nature should be Mind made 
visible, Mind the invisible Nature.”234 The natural domain as predominance of objectivity and the 
mindedness as predominance of subjectivity take place as quantitative differences that emerge from 
perspectives on the Absolute as indifference of subject and object.  
So indifference as non-difference and equal-validity come together in Schelling’s identity 
philosophy insofar as the non-difference of subject and object in the absolute is at the same time a 
quantitative equilibrium between subject and object: the absolute is subject as much as object. This 
equilibrium licenses quantitative difference between subject and object, with either predominance 
equally grounded in absolute identity.  
Schelling makes the extent of his re-formulation of the Kantian problematic clear in the 
following passage from the 1795 Lectures on Dogmatism and Criticism: 
  
How did we ever come to judge synthetically? This is what Kant asked at the very beginning of 
his work, and this question lies at the base of his entire philosophy as a problem concerning 
the essential and common point of all philosophy. For expressed differently, the question is 
this: How do I ever come to egress from the absolute, and to progress toward an opposite?  
Synthesis comes about only through the manifold's opposition to the original unity. 
For without opposition no synthesis is necessary; where there is no manifold there is absolute 
unity [Einheit schlechthin]. On the other hand, if the manifold were original, then again there 
would be no synthesis.235  
 
In my view, this question – how we come to “egress” from the Absolute and progress to opposition – 
is the early Schelling’s way of putting the Hegelian question with which we started, i.e. how does 
 
233 Redding, Hegel’s Hermeneutics, 58n17. The influence goes both ways, however: Schelling in the 1802 Further 
Presentations uses Hegel’s “subjective Subject-Object formula” in stating his critique of the Fichtean I as over-
determining the Absolute, Further Presentations, 212.  
234 Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature: as Introduction to the Study of this Science, translated by E. E. Harris and P. 
Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 42.  
235 F. W. J. Schelling, The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four Early Essays, trans. Fritz Marti (Cranbury, 
New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1980), 164. 
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indeterminacy come to determinacy? Both frame their questions as re-formulations of the Kantian 
program: we know that Hegel quickly follows his question with a remark about Kant’s provided 
solution (“in his way”); Schelling here explicitly takes the problem of egress to be a different expression 
of the Kantian question regarding a priori synthetic judgments.  
Schelling’s account of the relation between the constituents of Kant’s TD is, at a high level of 
generality, correct. Kant’s TD begins from the “fact” we began Chapter 5.1 with, namely that, for 
creatures like us, the sensible manifold is given and must be synthesised through the categories as 
functions of the unity of apperception. In the A Deduction we saw that this synthesis minimally means 
the holding together of discrete temporal intuitions in one consciousness; the B Deduction puts this 
same thought in the claim the unity of apperception is original insofar as any act of synthesis 
presupposes that unity. So Schelling is right that, on Kant’s view, (1) there is no synthesis without a 
given manifold to synthesise (obviously), (2) that such synthesis is dependent on an original unity, and 
(3) that, conversely, if the manifold were instead original, we would lack the condition of its synthesis. 
(This third point is really just an extremely condensed argument against empiricism: we cannot account 
for experience with recourse to manifold sensory “ideas” alone, there must be a non-empirical ground 
of their connection).  
What is however new in Schelling’s re-writing of the Kantian question is its ontological 
generalisation of the Kantian problematic, and, as a corollary of this generalisation, its thinking of 
determination in terms of logical opposition rather than as the synthesis of the sensible manifold. The 
question of the non-empirical conditions of “compared and connected representations” becomes in 
Schelling the ontological question of “egress” from absolute unity. As Dalia Nassar has convincingly 
demonstrated, the central  question for Schelling is how or why the One comes to be Many such that 
finite knowers experience a Many susceptible to comparison and connection by our subjective unity.236 
The Kantian philosophy, however, “could only presuppose the original synthesis as a fact within the 
cognitive faculty.”237 This reading of Kant as reducing an ontological problem to a cognitive one is 
consonant with Hegel’s claim in Faith and Knowledge discussed in 3.1 above: Kant’s cognitive model 
of determination contains the principle of idealism – determination as the synthesis of opposites – but 
is unable to generalise that principle’s function. It has rightly been suggested that Hegel’s “Absolute 
Idealism” is impossible without Schelling’s contribution. 238  In any case, once determination is 
ontologically generalised, the logical form of determination – the way in which terms are related and 
distinguished in contrastive relations – again takes precedence over what now appears as the local 
problem of the determination of the sensible manifold. Similarly, from this post-Kantian perspective, 
the logical relation of a manifold of discrete “ones” to one another is in need of systematic treatment 
 
236 Nassar, The Romantic Absolute, 2-5.  
237 Schelling, The Unconditional in Human Knowledge, 164. 
238 In particular, see Beiser’s introductory comments regarding the “troublesome Hegelian legacy” in The Struggle 
Against Subjectivity, namely that Hegel’s debt to the Jena Romantics and to Schelling is not adequately expressed 
in Hegel’s history of philosophy. The value of Hegel for Beiser lies in his systematisation of Schelling’s post-
Kantianism. In my view, however, Beiser’s suggestion that Schelling and Hegel agree that Nature and Spirit are 
grounded in the Absolute and only disagree in their respective emphases (with Schelling prioritising Nature and 
Hegel Spirit), does not tackle the very real differences in their respective conceptions of the relation between 
the philosophical Grundsatz and the determinations grounded in it. Beiser, The Struggle Against Subjectivity, 10-
11.  Nassar, who indicates her agreement with Beiser on this point in introduction, similarly suggests that it is 
Schelling’s break with Fichte that replaces Critical with Absolute Idealism, constituting “nothing less than a 
fundamental restructuring of the meaning and methodology of idealism.” The Romantic Absolute, 187. I agree, 
but again, the claim that being is in itself organised by conceptual forms in principle derivable in a priori thought 
can be worked out in starkly different ways.  
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before an account of the sensory manifold given to our cognition.  
In this way, the mature Hegelian and early Schellingean reformulations of the Kantian question 
map onto one another. We have seen that by 1801 Schelling thinks the Absolute as indeterminate in 
the sense of “indifferent” to its determination as either subjective or objective; we also know that 
qualitative determination minimally involves opposition and the corollary category of negation (“this 
not that”). As such, we could ask the Hegelian question with which we started with its Schellingean 
equivalents in brackets – how does pure (Absolute) immediate indeterminacy (understood as 
indifference) come to determinacy (understood as opposition)?  
However, the early Schelling and Hegel’s Logic answer this shared question very differently. By 
the time of the Presentation, Schelling’s answer is that any such egress from Absolute indifference and 
progress toward opposition is illusory: I do not in fact egress from the Absolute, even though it appears 
that I have. The locus classicus for the Hegelian criticism of Schelling on this point is the 
Phenomenology’s “night in which all cows are black,” a line that famously terminates Schelling and 
Hegel’s philosophical alliance.239 We are however in a position to put this Hegelian criticism more 
closely to Schelling’s 1801 text. Although perspectival, quantitative difference does have a ground in 
the Absolute; it is licensed by the form of the principle of identity. Schelling does not say so, but 
qualitative difference must be perspectival also, though without a ground in the Absolute. Schelling’s 
account of the Absolute in terms of indifference renders derivation of qualitative determination 
impossible. Undoubtedly rational beings possess qualitative discriminatory capacity and the 
conceptual category of negation; Schelling must acknowledge the fact of that possession but cannot 
explain that possession nor legitimate its use. As such, the Presentation jeopardises the Strong TI 
program as we have formulated it. As Vater puts it: “there is simply no explaining” how “reflection see 
things differently than reason—evidently this is the price one has to pay for being a systematic 
Monist.”240 I also note that this argument against Schelling’s Identity Philosophy can and has been 
made without mentioning Hegel.241 
There are Schellingean rejoinders of course. But embedding here a consideration of the 
legitimacy or otherwise of Hegel’s critique of Schelling’s early conception of the Absolute – which 
would have to take into account Schelling’s reformulation of the Grundsatz in the 1804 Wurzburg 
system, Schelling’s own post-1806 development, and Schelling’s counter-critique of Hegel in On the 
History of Modern of Philosophy (1833-4) – would distend this chapter beyond recognition.242  
 
239 Hegel’s 1804-5 lectures on “Logic and Metaphysics” work from Schelling’s indifferent Grundsatz, but by 1807 
Hegel has clearly abandoned the attempt. See Vater’s Introduction to Schelling’s Bruno, 84.  
240 Vater’s full quote runs: “There is simply no explaining how quantitative indifference appears as quantitative 
difference, or how reflection see things differently than reason—evidently this is the price one has to pay for 
being a systematic monist.” While I agree that Schelling has a problem with the latter explanatory deficit, I do 
think that Schelling at least attempts a derivation of quantitative difference. Vater, “In-itself Nothing is Finite,” 
197. 
241 Stephen Hoeltzel compares Fichte’s and Schelling’s respective Jena conceptions of the Absolute, concluding 
that Schelling “seems to conceive idealism’s ultimate explanatory ground quite differently [from Fichte] in these 
early texts: as a necessary condition of our experience, but one whose existence or occurrence is not sufficient 
to entail the determinate mediations and limitations upon which our experience also depends.” “Idealism and 
the Ground of Explanation,” 273. It is also to Hoeltzel that I owe the suggestion of Schelling’s “detachment” of 
the Absolute from determinacy, 272.  
242 The final chapter of Andrew Bowie’s Schelling mounts a defence of Schelling’s mature Hegel critique, framing 
the issue as a kind of generalised ad hominem: “the basic issue is whether the aim of German Idealism, the 
grounding of reason by itself, may not be a form of philosophical narcissism.” Bowie, Schelling, 128. This in my 
view is better formulated in Houlgate’s terms as a debate between Hegel’s commitment to presuppositionless 
thinking and the “quasi-transcendental” tradition inaugurated by the later Schelling and continued in Heidegger 
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5.2 Immediacy Itself 
In what follows I provide an account of the Logic’s version of the post-Kantian Grundsatz, namely, 
“immediacy itself” or “pure being.” Hegel sets out his debt to and departure from Fichte in this passage 
from the Seinslogik intro: 
The beginning must then be absolute, or, what means the same here, must be an abstract 
beginning; and so there is nothing that it may presuppose [nichts voraussetzen], must not be 
mediated by anything or have a ground, ought to be rather itself the ground of the entire 
science [er soll vielmehr selbst Grund der ganzen Wissenschaft sein]. It must therefore be 
simply an immediacy [schlechthin ein Unmittelbares], or rather only immediacy itself [nur das 
Unmittelbare selbst] (48/21.56). 
Like Fichte, Hegel accepts that we must begin from an indubitable point, whose certainty is to ground 
the “entire science.” And, like Fichte, that point of departure is characterised in terms of immediacy. 
Per the Schellingean critique above, however, it is not the immediate self-relation or coincidence of 
self-consciousness’s poles (I = I), but rather “immediacy itself.” By formulating that beginning as 
“immediacy itself” [das Unmittelbare selbst], Hegel is here participating in and critically extending the 
Kantian and post-Kantian doctrines of Int Int. Hegel makes this participation clear in his clarification of 
the logical beginning in the Logic’s final chapter: “Because it is the beginning, its content is an 
immediate… But first of all it is not an immediate of sense-intuition or of representation, but of thought, 
which because of its immediacy can also be called a supersensuous, inner intuiting [innerliches 
Anschauen]” (738/12.239). This line constitutes a direct contestation of Kantian discursivity: thought 
for Hegel shares with sensible intuition the logical determination of immediacy; thought in its 
immediacy can thus legitimately be called a non-sensible kind of intuiting.  
Taking Hegel’s comments at face value enables a schematic account of the Kant-Fichte-Hegel 
relation vis-à-vis immediacy as follows: (1) Kantian immediacy is always sensible immediacy, i.e. 
immediacy as it appears to and for our sensibly-conditioned empirical consciousness; (2) Fichte’s 
makes the non-sensible immediacy of self-consciousness in its certainty the foundation of category 
derivation;  (3) the Logic begins from what he calls “immediacy itself,” i.e. the thought of immediacy 
abstracted from the reference to (Fichtean) self-consciousness and (Kantian) sensible givenness 
altogether.  
 Hegel’s programmatic statement of the Logic’s beginning, however, leaves us with two 
questions: (1) what is “immediacy itself”? What is its content? And (2) given that the Logic does not 
begin with the “immediacy itself” announced in the Seinslogik introduction, but rather the thought of 
“pure being,” what is the relation between these two terms? Answering these questions requires some 
unpacking.   
Houlgate’s work in The Opening of Hegel’s Logic is the central interlocutor in what follows. 
Houlgate’s approach emphasises the “nichts voraussetzen” of the quote above, framing Hegel’s 
version of global abstraction as the setting aside of presuppositions.  As Houlgate puts it: “Anyone can 
embark on the study of ontological logic, therefore, provided he or she is willing to suspend all 
 
and Derrida. The latter tradition holds that no self-consistent conceptual grasp of the ground of difference is 
possible. Bowie’s book certainly draws connections between Schelling, Derrida, and Heidegger, particularly 
pages 60-75. Deciding whether the quasi-transcendental stance is a self-consistent alternative to Hegelian 
thought is however a book length project in itself. 
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assumptions about thought and being, start from scratch....” 243  The felt need to suspend one’s 
assumptions for Houlgate is a mark of modernity: modern freedom entails self-criticism in the sense 
that we can take no epistemic, ontological, or practical commitment on authority, but rather must 
rationally legitimate them. This sense of modernity is detectable in Kant’s sapere aude, and Fichte’s 
Strong TI interpretation of Kantianism. Most importantly for Houlgate, the setting aside of 
presuppositions that opens the Logic also sets aside the historically conditioned motivation for 
presuppositionless philosophy. In Houlgate’s words, the enabling historical conditions of ontological 
logic are not “founding” ones, in the sense that they do “not determine in advance the course that 
philosophy will take.”244 That is, the historical conditions that lead modern philosophy to demand a 
radically self-critical, and so presuppositionless, account of the necessary categories of thought do not 
themselves “contaminate” – illicitly supply a content or purpose to – the abstractive act and immanent 
deduction they motivate. In other words, the program of Strong TI is motivated by empirical conditions 
but not relativised to them.  
Alongside the quote from the Seinslogik Introduction provided above, EL §78 provides the 
clearest textual warrant for Houlgate’s reading of the Logic in terms of presuppositionlessness. That 
section begins by setting out the Kantian opposition between “immediacy of content” (read: 
intuitionally-given content) and “mediation,” but then characterising their opposition as an illegitimate 
presupposition: 
 
The opposition between a self-standing [selbständig, independent] immediacy of content or 
knowing and a mediation that is equally self-standing but incompatible with the former must 
be set aside, for one thing because it is a mere presupposition [Vorussetzung] and an arbitrary 
assurance. Similarly, all other presuppositions or prejudices [Vorurteile] must be surrendered 
[aufzugeben] at the entry to science… (EL §78/125). 
 
In taking up the Logic, we surrender all presuppositions. But of these, it is indicative that Hegel singles 
out the Kantian – or “Kantian” – assumption that we bring conceptual mediation to bear on self-
standingly intelligible immediacy. Again, referring back to our introductory discussion of Conant, it 
matters little whether this critique of Kantian cognitive two-stageism is fair to Kant’s text or intentions: 
on Conant’s reading of Kant, the Analytic has as its goal the dialectical undermining of any account of 
cognitive faculties as “self-standing” or independent; on my reading of Hegel, the Logic advances an 
explicitly dialectical account of the logical components of concept/intuition from the start. This line of 
reading is supported in the quote above: the presuppositionlessness emphasised by Houlgate has as 
its explicit target a setting aside of one assumption in particular, namely, that mediation and immediacy 
are logically independent.  
Now, this explicit targeting of one assumption does not necessarily vitiate the 
presuppositionlessness of Hegel’s method or Houlgate’s presentation of it. From Houlgate’s 
perspective, that some presuppositions are more prominent or more entrenched than others is 
ultimately of no account. Once identified and abstracted from, even the most historically dominant set 
of presuppositions do not contaminate presuppositionless thinking by tacitly supplying it with a 
predetermined end (in this case, the Logic would be aiming to disprove the “opposition of finite 
consciousness” by demonstrating the togetherness of mediation and immediacy). But it does at least 
 
243 The Opening, 144.  
244 The Opening, 60-61.  
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raise a legitimate suspicion. 245  
Hegel makes it clear in the addition to EL §78 that this surrendering of presuppositions is 
achieved via global abstraction. Hegel emphasises “…the resolve [Entschluss] to engage in pure 
thinking and through the freedom that abstracts from everything and grasps its pure abstraction, the 
simplicity of thinking” (EL §78a). Like Fichte, Hegel understands our practical and intersubjective 
capacities to be engaged in abstraction: we “resolve” to globally abstract, in response to the modern 
“demand” that we submit all commitments to critical scrutiny. 246   In Hegel’s global abstraction 
however we leave aside the Kantian limit – namely that thought is dependent on intuitional 
representation for singular, immediacy and actuality – as well as the Fichtean limit, that the I is the 
immediate and irreducible content of thought. We also leave aside the claim for any formally 
expressed structure of identity (Fichte’s I = I as much as Schelling’s A = A) to possess immediate 
certainty. Hegel is confident that the resolve to think abstractly will issue in the immediate awareness 
that thought simply is, equivalent to the thought of “pure being.”247 In what follows I want to work out 
the sense of these terms and their equivalence.  
At the start of Chapter 5 we saw the Seinslogik Introduction tacitly reference Fichte in claiming 
for modernity “a new awareness of the difficulty of finding a beginning” (SL 45). In response to this 
“modern perplexity about a beginning,” the Seinslogik Intro then repeats a version of Kant’s 
Kampfplatz, centred on opposing dogmatic and sceptical versions of philosophical beginning, and 
adding “intellectual intuition” as a further, but equally flawed, option: 
 
But the modern perplexity about a beginning proceeds from a further need which escapes 
those who are busy demonstrating their principle dogmatically or sceptically looking for a 
subjective criterion against dogmatic philosophizing, and [the perplexity] is outright denied by 
 
245  Houlgate would likely add a cautionary note that Hegel is not entitled outside of the Logic’s category 
derivation to commit to the togetherness of conceptual and intuitional representation. The relation between 
immediacy and mediation – whatever it proves to be – must be genetically derived from the immediacy of the 
Grundsatz alone. Although I will not develop the counter-argument here, it would be at least possible to suggest 
that Hegel’s singling out of what he takes to be the historically material presupposition (“the opposition of finite 
consciousness” present in empiricism as much as Kantianism) provides the Logic with a certain agenda. That the 
Logic has an agenda is implicit in those interpretations that take the dialectical progression of the Logic to be 
driven by its own failure to articulate a satisfactory account of determination. Rocio Zambrana, for example, 
takes the first two books of the Logic to constitute critiques of realism and dualism, respectively, as failing to 
adequately account for determination. Hegel’s Theory of Intelligibility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2015), 8-9. An extreme version of this view is presented by Adrian Johnston, who suggests that “The Logic in its 
full sweep is composed of a series of (spectacular) failed attempts to begin with thinking alone,” and that the 
demand for determinacy necessitates the shift to a consideration of material nature in the Philosophy of Nature. 
Where to Start? Robert Pippin, Slavoj Žižek, and the True Beginning(s) of Hegel’s System,” Crisis & Critique 3 
(2014): 405.  
246  However, that freely willing is an enabling condition of global abstraction and so systematic philosophy does 
not in Hegel legitimate a claim for the philosophical beginning as already containing the unity of theoretical and 
practical reason, as it does in Fichte. Pure being will prove to include determinations with a “practical” valence 
(most notable practical cognition or the “Idea of the Good” that follows theoretical cognition or “Idea of the 
True” in the penultimate chapter of the Begriffslogik), but cannot legitimately be taken to unify the limbs of the 
Kantian architectonic from the start.   
247 That global abstraction leaves the I behind can also be taken as a critical appropriation of Descartes second 
meditation, namely, that in doubting everything one is left with the irreducible certainty that there is an I that 
doubts. As Nathan Brown has shown, Hegel replaces the Cartesian cogito with the more minimal “thought is, 
thought exists.” “Hegel’s Cogito: On the Genetic Epistemology of Critical Metaphysics.” Parrhesia 20 (2014): 49-
61. Houlgate makes a similar claim in The Opening, 129.   
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those who begin, like a shot from a pistol, from their inner revelation, from faith, intellectual 
intuition, etc. and would be exempt from method and logic (45/21.53).   
The dogmatist persists in the classical metaphysical assertion of an objective principle; the skeptic 
prioritises subjective conditions for justified belief in order to undermine any such principle; and 
intellectual intuition – at least as Hegel presents it here – seeks to avoid the dispute altogether. The 
“shot from a pistol” line is borrowed from the Preface to the Phenomenology (§27/16) and its polemic 
against the “empty” Schellingean Absolute briefly covered in 5.1 above. This dismissal is prima facie 
good evidence for the Westphal-Pippin line I raised at the start of Chapter 4, namely, that the mature 
Hegel has abandoned intellectual intuition altogether. While Hegel dismisses the term, the starting 
point of the Logic nonetheless continues to think – in line with the Schellingean critique of Fichte – the 
necessity of beginning from an immediately certain point that is neither subjective nor objective. This 
continued need to think from a unitary point from which subjectivity and objectivity (and indeed 
opposition in general) can be derived is suggested in the following passage. After setting out his 
account of the philosophical battlefield, Hegel adds his own position, the “further need” of the age 
not captured in dogmatism, scepticism or the immediacy of faith: 
 
If earlier abstract thought is at first interested only in the principle as content, but is driven as 
philosophical culture advances to the other side to pay attention to the cognitive process, then 
the subjective activity has been grasped as an essential moment of objective truth, and with 
this there comes the need to unite the method with the content, the form with the principle. 
Thus the principle ought to be also the beginning, and that which has priority for thinking ought 
to be also the first in the process of thinking (46/21.53-54).   
Against dogmatism’s ultimately arbitrary positing of an objective explainer (say, the Leibnizian God as 
harmonising intrinsic properties) and the relativisation of truth to subjectivity in modernity, some 
approach that takes account of both the objective and subjective – without being reducible to either 
pole – is required. So while Schelling’s 1801 characterisation of the Absolute as the indifference of 
subject and object has been dismissed both here and in the Phenomenology, the need for a unitary 
point of departure remains. Hegel’s next move in the Seinslogik introduction is indicative. The poles of 
the required unity that would begin the Logic are not subject and object, but the logical poles of 
mediation and immediacy. The ancient/modern : principle/criterion : dogmatist/sceptic : 
objective/subjective proportion set up in the first page of the Seinslogik Intro is collected in the 
distinction between “mediated” and “immediate” beginnings: 
 
 “Here we have only to consider how the logical beginning appears. The two sides from which 
it can be taken have already been named, namely either by way of mediation as result, or 
immediately as beginning proper [als eigentlicher Anfang]…” (46/21.54) 
In this quote Hegel takes up philosophy’s problem of beginning – its history of beginnings – at its most 
abstract. Note that Hegel says that beginning “immediately” would be “beginning proper.” This 
identification of beginning or the start [der Anfang] with immediacy is important. The beginning 
cannot be something “mediated,” because that would not really be a beginning. A concrete beginning 
(from a “principle,” in the manner of the Ancients) presupposes “within itself a process of mediation 
and the transition from a first to an other… But the beginning ought not itself to be already a first and 
an other, for anything which is in itself a first and another implies this advance has already been made” 
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(52). For example, if one were to begin from the Neoplatonic “One,” one has already assumed the 
“Many” that gives the concept of Oneness its determinacy. In other words, a mediated beginning 
would presuppose not only a determinacy, but the structure of determinacy in general. Hegel notes, 
throwing forward to the derivation of determinacy in the Logic’s second chapter, that “a determinate 
something has the character of an other with respect to a first” (50).  
This helps to clarify Hegel’s sense of determinacy as the mediation of otherness or synthesis 
of opposed contents: to be determinate is to have relation to an other, to be thought “with respect to” 
that other. The Logic will demonstrate that they are many different ways of being mediated by one’s 
other, many different forms of determination (many “thought-determinations”). To take only the first 
of the Seinslogik’s categories, one can vanish immediately into one’s other (the category of 
“becoming”), be limited by it (the category of “something”), have one’s other “within” oneself 
(“finitude”), be a moment of that other (“true infinity”), relate to oneself as indifferently as one does 
to another (“being-for-one”), and so on through the logical progression. We will cover the first two of 
these categories in the next chapter, as they provide a minimal account of qualitative determination, 
which Hegel refers to as “determinateness as such” [Bestimmtheit als solches] (56/21.66). What is at 
issue here is simply that the beginning as immediacy itself must be radically indeterminate, in the 
sense of lacking any connection to any other at all.  
Hegel treats two possible objections to the above line of thought. Firstly, one might take 
beginning with “beginning” to satisfy the self-critical demand. But Hegel shows that it has the same 
structure as mediated beginning above: the concept of a beginning is of “a nothing from which 
something is to proceed” (52/21.62). In other words, the beginning understood as beginning is already 
implicitly mediated by the thought of an end. The second objection follows on Hegel’s answer to the 
first: it certainly appears that immediacy is determined via its oppositional pair; negation is even legible 
in the word itself (im-mediacy). This second objection is the crucial motivator for Hegel presenting 
“pure being” as equivalent to immediacy itself. Taken as im-mediacy, “simple immediacy is itself an 
expression of reflection; it refers to the distinction from what is mediated. The true expression of this 
simple immediacy is therefore pure being.” (47/21.55). He then glosses pure being as meaning 
“nothing but being in general; being, and nothing else, without further determination and filling.” In 
what sense, however, is “pure being” the “true expression” of “simple immediacy”? Hegel connects 
the two formulations in the remainder of the passage on “absolute beginning” with which we began 
this section. After claiming, the need for an absolute (that is, abstract) beginning, Hegel claims:  
 
[The logical beginning] must therefore be simply an immediacy [schlechthin ein 
Unmittelbares], or rather only immediacy itself [nur das Unmittelbare selbst]. Just as it cannot 
have any determination with respect to another, so too it cannot have any within; it cannot 
have any content, for any content would entail distinction and the reference of distinct 
moments to each other, and hence a mediation. The beginning is therefore pure being (SL 
48/21.56). 
This quote introduces emptiness or indeterminacy of content as that element or aspect of simple 
immediacy which “pure being” expresses. As we saw above, immediacy as im-mediacy is not mediate, 
with mediation understood here in its most general (Hegelian) form as relation to another. The 
problem Hegel identifies with immediacy is that this not in fact is reference to another, the other to 
which immediacy is opposed. Immediacy is, therefore, a contradictory structure: formally, it is 
determined through opposition to another, but its content is the absence of opposition and otherness.  
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Its content, in other words, is the indeterminacy that obtains in the absence of mediation. To truly 
begin, then, we must abstract content from form: set aside the form of determination – a form that 
we at this point can only presuppose – and think the indeterminate content of immediacy. That is, we 
must think “immediacy itself,” not the immediacy that is “for another” – in this case, “for” the 
mediation that opposes it. The difficulty here is the reflexivity in play: the other to which immediacy 
has reference is the concept of reference to another in general, mediation. Global abstraction thus 
taken to a new extreme in Hegel: to begin in philosophy, we must abstract not only from contingent 
contents, but from any determinate content all together, insofar as determination assumes a 
determining relation between first and second terms. Contrast the Fichtean and Schellingean 
Grundsätze in which the determining relation between first and second terms is collapsed in self-
relation (I = I and A = A). In both cases, that form brought with it a content: “I am” or “absolute identity.” 
What we have in Hegel is an abstraction that terminates in thinking of no relation, and therefore no 
content, whatsoever. As such, it is the sheer indeterminacy of “pure being” – its emptiness or lack of 
“filling” – that makes it the “true expression” of “immediacy itself.” being marks the beginning because 
we have abstracted from everything and are left with the immediate certainty that there is; but, in 
abstracting from everything, there is no “filling” to think in it.  In Hegel global abstraction leaves us 
with pure being as indeterminate immediacy as the ground of category derivation. It seems impossible 
that such an indeterminate immediate could ground any account of determination, and Hegel 
recognises this:  
 
Totally for itself, being is thus the indeterminate, and has therefore no connecting reference 
[keine Beziehung] to any other; consequently it seems that from this beginning no further 
forward move is possible – that is, from that beginning itself – and that any advance can only 
occur by adding something foreign to it from outside (70/21.81).   
 
It is in this quote that the uniqueness of Hegel’s formulation of the Grundsatz of a post-Kantian unitary 
category derivation is expressed. In Schelling’s Identity Philosophy, the Grundsatz was defined through 
reference to the logical form of categorical judgment, but any “advance” to determinate difference 
could only be understood as stepping outside the standpoint of “Absolute” philosophical cognition, as 
“adding something foreign to it” – without having the resources to explain how such an “egress” is 
possible. Hegel jettisons any constitutive reference to logical forms of judgments, but in so doing gives 
philosophy the chance of genuinely deriving the minimal structures of determinacy. Hegel risks all 
determinacy in order to win it back, but in the form of a system. It is to that system’s first moments 
we now turn.248  
 
248 I have in the above left aside a crucial complication. That is, that Hegel offers two points of entry into the 
Logic: (1) the “resolve” to globally abstract covered above; and (2) taking up the results of the Phenomenology. 
William Maker identifies these two distinct pathways in Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994). For Maker, the difficulty is reconciling these paths: the Logic 
“begins without presuppositions while the Phenomenology is nonetheless the presupposition for the Logic,” 
Philosophy Without Foundations, 72. Maker’s solution is to present the “Absolute Knowledge” that concludes 
the Logic not as determinate claim about a certain structure of self-consciousness, but entirely negatively. 
Maker’s solution is broadly taken up by Houlgate: Hegel’s philosophy “begins from self-critical openness to being 
rather than from the assumption of absolute closure.  Indeed, in my view, Hegelian “absolute knowing” [the final 
chapter of the Phenomenology] is precisely such openness to what being shows itself to be,” The Opening, 58. 
In my view, this tends to make the Phenomenology only necessary for those unable to immediately drop the 
crucial “Kantian” presupposition of an opposition between self-standing thought and self-standing being via 
abstraction (see my discussion of EL §78 above), but require the untenability of that opposition to be 
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demonstrated. In my view, it may be possible to build some content into the Phenomenology’s result without 
abrogating the Logic’s presuppositionlessness by casting the Phenomenology as staging the transition from 
sensible to intellectual intuition, from sensuous immediacy to the immediacy of thought. The result of the 
Phenomenology would then be that sensuous immediacy understood as the other of thought must shed its 
externality to thought (its sensuousness) but preserve its immediacy as specifically logical immediacy. This view 
accords with Dean Moyar’s account of the Phenomenology as aiming to “reduce the separation or opposition in 
all shapes of consciousness to a basic internal difference,” as well as Moyar’s foregrounding of Hegel’s 
presentation of Absolute Knowledge in PhS §801 as “intuition which has been conceptually grasped and is itself 
intuition which is comprehending [und ist begriffnes und begreifendes Anschauen].” Moyar, “Absolute 
Knowledge and the Ethical Conclusion to the Phenomenology” in The Oxford Handbook of Hegel, ed. Dean Moyar 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 168, 192. Nonetheless, determining whether building intellectual 
intuition into the result of the Phenomenology abrogates the Logic’s claim to presuppositionlessness requires 
further treatment.  
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Chapter 6. Being and Existence 
In this final Chapter I reconstruct Hegel’s deduction of a novel, post-Kantian account of qualitative 
determination. This proceeds in two steps, corresponding to the first and second chapters of the 
Doctrine of Being (entitled “Being” and “Existence” respectively). The “Being” chapter genetically 
derives the mediation of opposed terms (“being” and “nothing”) from the Hegelian Grundsatz or 
“absolute beginning,” namely indeterminate “immediacy itself.” The relation between being and 
nothing is an “immediate” difference in the sense that the difference between the terms “vanishes” 
at the same moment it appears. In other words, the Logic’s initial opposed terms are indifferent in a 
sense related to that developed in the preceding chapters of this thesis. At the beginning of Hegelian 
philosophy, we lack – because we have abstracted from – the conceptual resources to determine the 
difference between being and nothing: pure being is not pure nothing but is conceptually 
indistinguishable from it. The Logic demonstrates that an immediate description of being is equally 
valid as a description of nothing. But although we cannot say in what the difference consists, we 
nonetheless intuit that difference, and that intuition can be rendered conceptual (can be made explicit 
or posited). It will be shown that being and nothing are for intellectual intuition what Kant’s 
“incongruous counterparts” are for sensuous intuition: a difference that is only immediately (i.e. 
intuitively) discriminable, but not conceptually determinable. The Logic then genetically derives the 
resources for the determination of being-nothing difference from the intuitable oscillation or equal-
validity of being and nothing themselves.  As we will see, the thought-determination or category of 
“becoming” that distinguishes being and nothing arises simply by thinking through their indifferent 
relationality as it is immediately intuited in thought. Nonetheless, becoming is, owing to its origin in 
indeterminate immediacy, only the most immediate form of mediation. The “Existence” chapter takes 
up the category of becoming to derive determinate difference in its minimal form, namely, that 
operative between the categories of “something” and “other.”  
This is admittedly a rapid summary, but the proceeding chapters have I hope rendered its key 
terms intelligible by tracing their genesis in Kant’s logical definitions of conceptual and intuitional 
representation and their reception in German idealism. Because Hegel’s account of immediacy and 
mediation has a Kantian pedigree, one’s interpretation of the Kantian concept/intuition distinction will 
determine how one frames Hegel’s alternative model of qualitative determination in the Doctrine of 
Being. If one takes Hegel’s perspective, Kant’s ostensible commitment to the thoroughgoing 
“togetherness” of concepts and intuitions is not borne out by the Critique’s Logic. As we have seen in 
Chapter 3, Hegel suggests that Kant does not follow through on his commitment to togetherness, 
insofar as the indifference between intuitional representations must be supplemented by a self-
standingly intelligible (i.e. equally indifferent) conceptual form. That is, the relation between concepts 
and intuitions is treated one-sidedly, in terms of the relationality proper to intuitional form. In contrast, 
the Logic shows that indifference is itself a moment of determination, i.e. indifference does not require 
mediation by an external, independent, and separable form but rather is necessarily together with it.  
One need not buy in to Hegel’s reading of Kant, however. Even if Hegel’s critique of Kant’s 
presentation of the concept/intuition misses the mark, and Kant does in fact adequately advance 
concept/intuition togetherness, the opening chapters of the Logic can nonetheless stand as an 
ontological generalisation of the togetherness principle. In other words, a reading of Kant that resists 
the imputation of “layer-cake” dualism to Kant’s cognitive model would position the comparison 
differently. Rather than correct Kant’s failure to adequately present concept/intuition togetherness, 
Hegel’s derivation of qualitative determination logically demonstrates the togetherness immediate 
singularity and mediation in general. That is, it vindicates Kant’s togetherness principle without 
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reference to sensibly-conditioned cognitive capacities, but rather as a necessary condition of 
determinate being as much as of determinate thought.    
 A final note. The Logic’s first chapter is its most well-known and most commented on, and the 
following draws particularly on Houlgate, Winfield, and Burbidge. The novelty or contribution in what 
follows is twofold. Firstly, the demonstration of “pure being” as an intellectual intuition, prepared by 
the work on post-Kantian idealism above, enables me to draw the comparison between being and 
nothing and Kant’s Incongruous Counterparts. It is thus able to argue that the “Being” chapter stages 
not only the inseparability of being and nothing but also the inseparability of the logical components 
of concepts and intuitions. Secondly, an understanding of immediate difference between being and 
nothing as indifference connects the Logic’s first dialectic to Kant’s critique of rationalist indifference 
(1.2 above); to the A Deduction’s account of discrete intuitions and their apprehensive synthesis (2.2); 
to Hegel’s understanding of Kantian intuitional form as indifferent externality and concomitant critique 
of the concept/intuition distinction as itself characterised by externality (3.2); forward to Hegel’s 
account of quality as the determination that conditions the appearance of indifferent individuals (6.2); 
and to the form of quantity (see my concluding essay below).   
6.1. Being, Nothing, Indifference 
Pure being is described in the first chapter of the Seinslogik in one dense paragraph. The first three 
sentences are: 
Being, pure being – without further determination [ohne alle weitere Bestimmung]. In its 
indeterminate immediacy [unbestimmten Unmittelbarkeit] it is equal only to itself and also 
not unequal with respect to another [ist es nur sich selbst gleich und auch nicht ungleich gegen 
Anderes]; it has no difference [Verschiedenheit] within it, nor any outwardly. If any 
determination or content were posited in it as distinct, or it were posited by this determination 
as distinct from another, it would thereby fail to hold fast to its purity (59/21.68-69).  
This first sentence, as Houlgate has suggested, is not a “definition,” but an “injunction.”249 A definition 
would be a determination in the rationalist sense covered in 1.1 above, namely, predicating a concept 
of the subject (in this case, “being”) and excluding its opposite. That understanding of the sense of 
Hegel’s opening description would determine being in the judgment, “being is indeterminate 
immediacy (and not a mediated determination).” As I covered in detail in my reading of the Seinslogik 
Introduction in Chapter 5.2, at the Logic’s beginning we are to think the indeterminacy that results 
from our decision or resolve [Entschluss] to abstract from all determinate content, and also crucially 
from the form of determinacy itself. We are rather called on to attend to the thought of “being, pure 
being – without further determination,” that is, without supplying a non-contradictory predicate 
concept, without determining it by opposing it to another content as its negation. We are asked, in 
other words, to abstract the immediate being of thought from relation or reference to another, to think 
the content of immediate being (“immediacy itself”) not the “im-mediacy” in which the relation of 
opposition between immediacy and mediation is legible. This means that we are not entitled to claim 
that determination takes the form of predication in judgment (rationalism), synthesis and subsumption 
of empirical intuitions (Kant), nor, with Spinoza, that omnis determinatio est negatio. Any 
determination of pure being, along with any determination of what it means to be determinate, would 
fail to “hold fast” or sustain the global abstraction that institutes presuppositionless logic. In the 
 
249 The Opening, 82. Houlgate uses this language of “injunction” only once, and does not elaborate its relation 
to the Hegelian Entschluss as I do in the following. 
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Seinslogik Introduction we had an argument for the necessity of the abstraction from all reference to 
another on the basis of the logical definition of beginning; here the simple injunction to “hold fast” or 
sustain this abstraction assumes the reader’s acceptance of the necessity of such a beginning. I should 
also note here that sustained abstraction constituted Fichte’s first, “methodological” sense of 
Intellectual Intuition (see 4.1), and more substantial senses of Int Int will surface in the thought of pure 
being shortly.  
What interests me here, however, are the second and third lines, in which the “indeterminate 
immediacy” first presented in the Seinslogik Introduction in terms of lacking reference to another is 
reformulated in terms of self-equality and equality to any other: indeterminate immediacy is “equal 
only to itself and not unequal with respect to another.” This formula marks the presence of indifference 
[Gleichgültigkeit] in Hegel’s Grundsatz. In thinking pure being we have abstracted from any reference 
to that which such being may be opposed or contrasted to; this has as its corollary the loss of any 
ground of difference between the thought of pure being and that which opposes it. On the one hand, 
as abstracted from all relation, pure being can legitimately only be said to be self-identical, “equal only 
to itself.” On the other hand, there is no content in the thought of pure being by which it could be 
distinguished from another; it can therefore also be legitimately said to be “not unequal [i.e. equal] 
against another [gegen Anderes].” Bringing these poles together, we might say that, in having no 
relation to its other, pure being is indistinguishable from or indifferent to that other. Or, to use the 
German word, it is with “equal-validity” [Gleichgültigkeit] self-identical as much as it is identical with 
its other. We are equally licensed to make either claim. This indifference is borne out in the immediate 
emergence of being’s other in the very description of being itself. The remainder of the first paragraph 
of the Doctrine of Being reads: 
 
[Being, pure being] is pure indeterminateness and emptiness [reine Unbestimmtheit und 
Leere].  – There is nothing [nichts] to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting 
[Anschauen]; or, it is only this pure empty intuition itself [oder es ist nur dies reine, leere 
Anschauen selbst]. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only this empty 
thinking [ode es ist nur dies reine, leere Anschauen selbst]. Being, the indeterminate 
immediate, is in fact [in der Tat] nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing (59/21.69). 
 
So, by the time we finish the Logic’s first paragraph, Hegel makes it explicit that in describing being as 
it appears in its immediacy for thought, he is also describing what being is not, namely nothing. That 
is, the opposite of being has immediately emerged because the one description is indifferently either 
being or nothing; the same description holds as much as for being as it does for nothing. This 
indifference is reinforced in the treatment of nothing in the Logic’s following paragraph, in which 
nothing is described in (almost) exactly the same terms as being, leading Hegel to conclude that 
“Nothing is therefore the same determination or rather absence of determination 
[Bestimmungslösigkeit], and thus altogether the same as what being is [und damit überhaupt dasselbe, 
was das reine Sein ist].” Nonetheless, there is a difference between them – nothing is not being, and 
vice-versa: “it makes a difference whether something or nothing is being intuited or thought.” Now, 
this structure of immediate difference between being and nothing will be articulated in the Logic’s first 
“thought-determination” (“becoming”), but I want to hold off on that for a moment to better secure 
the comparison with Kant.  
I said above that nothing repeats being almost exactly. Now, in the paragraph on pure being, 
Hegel may appear to be vacillating in first questioning whether “intuiting” is relevant to or valid in an 
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ontological logic that has abstracted from all sensible epistemic conditions, but then nonetheless 
characterising the thought of being in its immediacy as pure “intuition itself” [Anschauen selbst]. This 
vacillation is absent in the symmetrical description of nothing. Hegel in describing nothing importantly 
shores up the identification of thinking and intuiting: “[Nothing] is the empty thinking and intuiting 
itself [ist es das leere Anschauen und Denken selbst], like pure being.” The explicit identification of 
thinking and intuiting here serves to collect the trajectory traced through German Idealism in Chapters 
4 and 5 above, namely Hegel’s critical appropriation of the Kantian and post-Kantian doctrines of 
Intellectual Intuition. Already the first two paragraphs of the Logic’s derivation has made clear that the 
immediate thought of pure being, in its equivalence to nothing, is an Intellectual Intuition insofar as it 
possesses the logical components of both pure concepts and pure intuitions. That the thought of being 
is (1) pure in the Kantian sense is secured by abstraction from empirically-conditioned sensibility. Like 
pure intuition it is (2) immediate; (3) singular; but nonetheless, like Kantian intellectual 
representations, it is (4) general and (5) mediated – or rather contains within its singular immediacy 
the grounds for the derivation of mediation in general.  
The first two points have been substantiated in Chapter 5 above, so I treat them summarily 
here. (1) By definition, being as it is immediately intuited in thought is pure in the Kantian sense of 
“non-empirical” or “a priori.” It is not conditioned by any sensibly given content. Most importantly, 
however, global abstraction for Hegel takes us past the Kantian limit of abstraction, namely, the pure 
forms of intuition, space and time. Global abstraction has bracketed sensible intuition from Hegel’s 
alternative category derivation in both its content or matter (“sensation”) and the form in which that 
content is organised (space and time). In other words, what has been abstracted from is the “outside-
one-another-being” that characterises the “placing and ordering” of the matter of sensation in the 
forms of pure intuition (see Chapter 2.1). At the same time, however, the result of that abstraction – 
that thought is – shares with sensible intuition the logical characteristics of immediacy and singularity.  
(2) As we have seen in detail in 5.2, the thought of pure being is equivalent to “immediacy 
itself.” For Hegel, thought immediately apprehends its own being, i.e. that there is thought. This 
constitutes a form of the Fichtean challenge to Kant’s discursivity thesis, which holds that thought is 
dependent on sensible intuition to supply the immediacy that constitutes a necessary component of 
determinate thought. While thought cannot determine empirical objects without sensible intuition – 
it is not a “divine” intellect in that sense – it can nonetheless derive the categories that condition any 
objective determination beginning from reference to itself alone, i.e. without Kant’s constitutive 
reference to the possibility of geometry (for intuitional form) or to the logical forms of judgment (for 
concepts). As we saw in Chapter 4, Fichte takes this to follow from Kant’s commitment to rational self-
determination or “strong TI,” even if Kant does not consistently fulfil that commitment.  
(3) Singularity. The immediacy of pure being is “singular” in the Kantian sense reserved for the 
pure forms of intuition. As we saw in 2.1, Kant repeatedly distinguishes the singularity of the pure 
forms of intuition (space and time) from the generality of pure concepts (the categories): “…one can 
only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of 
one and the same unique space.” (A24-25/B39). The same argument is repeated for time (A31-
32/B47). As we saw in 5.1, Schelling’s Int Int of “absolute reason” is singular in the sense that all 
particulars are understood as within it, as limitations of the one “unique being.”  Although Hegel will, 
unlike Schelling, derive the form of qualitative difference from our immediate intuitive apprehension 
of being, that pure being is like Schelling’s absolute reason not a general concept under which 
particulars can be subsumed. The only other term that has emerged in the Logic so far is “nothing,” 
but this cannot be said to be subsumed under being because it is “altogether the same as what pure 
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being is.” Recall that concepts are defined by Kant as partial representations of objects (A32/B48). 
Kant holds that conceptual subsumption works by picking out a “mark” common to two or more 
particulars; at the same time, however, it leaves aside other discernible features of those particulars 
by which they may be distinguished. In other words, when brought together or subsumed under a 
common mark, two objects are identified; another concept, however, can pick out a feature that 
distinguishes one object from another. Here however, being and nothing in their immediate 
representation have no qualities unaccounted for; in thinking one we think all of the other. The spatial 
analogy, rather than the model of judgment, better captures their relationship. The logic of “absolute 
beginning” dictates that we abstract from all relations; once we so abstract, there is no “other” space 
“outside” of the logical beginning to be thought. As such, the thought of nothing has emerged within 
the one “space” of thought occupied by being.  
I say spatial analogy above because the intellectual intuition of pure being is not spatial in the 
sense of Kantian sensible intuition. To see this, consider again the immediacy of the being-nothing 
relation. In thinking being we think all of nothing, and we think that all immediately, here in the sense 
of simultaneity. There is not being and then nothing, but rather one description that is equally valid 
for both. As such, the Logic’s opening thought is not a successive intuition in the manner of Kant’s 
sensible intuition of time, the form of “inner sense.” Kant says in the Transcendental Aesthetic that 
“Only in time can two contradictorily opposed predicates meet in one and the same object, namely, 
one after the other [nacheinander]” (A32/B49). Here we have an opposition that meets in one and the 
same “object” of thought (thought’s object here can be taken to be thought’s own immediacy) at one 
and the same moment: pure being coincides immediately with what it is not, with the nothing that 
opposes it. This is another way of putting the point put above in (1), that Hegel has abstracted from 
the “neben und nacheinander” (i.e. spatiotemporal) structure of Kantian sensible intuition, but 
retained the logical components of singularity and immediacy. There is no other to pure being except 
that which emerges immediately within it. 
Hegel suggests this analogy in his reflections on the logical beginning in the Logic’s final 
chapter. I have already quoted the retrospective claim there that the logical beginning “is not an 
immediate of sense-intuition… but of thought, which because of its immediacy can also be called a 
supersensuous, inner intuition.” Hegel goes on: The immediate of sense-intuition is a manifold and a 
singular. Cognition, on the contrary, is a thinking that conceptualizes [begreifendes Denken]; its 
beginning, therefore, is also only in the element of thought, a simple and a universal [ein Einfaches und 
Allgemeines” (739/12.239).  The contrast is between the manifold character of spatio-temporally 
individuated objects (“next to and after one another”), and an immediate representation that is 
simple, i.e. not complex, not constituted as an aggregate of discretely analysable parts. Like the spatio-
temporal field for sensible intuition, the universal that begins the Logic is immediately given for 
intellectual intuition. 
(4) That the logical beginning is described as a universal opens on to the generality component 
of pure being as intellectual intuition. As we saw, Hegel is explicit in his claim that being and nothing 
are as much intuited as they are thought. In terms of Kant’s logical definitions, an intuition that is also 
or equally thought would be a singular immediate apprehension that is also general and mediate. This 
“also” seems to predicate opposed concepts of one object, issuing in contradiction. But again, it is 
crucial here to recognise that the legitimacy of this form – and the illegitimacy of contradiction – has 
been suspended. It follows from this suspension that the generality and mediation components of 
conceptuality do not, for Hegel, immediately mean or entail the form of predication as they do in Kant: 
generality does not at the beginning mean a more general representation under which to subsume a 
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more particular representation in judgment; nor does mediation immediately mean access to the 
particular through another representation. The generality and mediation components of the Logic’s 
intellectual intuition of pure being are thought otherwise.  
The generality component follows from the above discussion of singularity. In pure being we 
are dealing with the intellectual equivalent or analogy of the singularity of the spatio-temporal field 
itself, not the representation of a singular object relationally individuated space and time. The 
equivalent for a specifically intellectual intuition is the immediate apprehension of the totality as a 
universal singular, the one unique “space” of conceptual determinations in which all universal and 
necessary determinations of objects in general – the Hegelian equivalent to Kantian categories – 
participate as logical moments. In 4.1 we saw that Fichte, in arguing contra Kant that we do have a 
capacity of intellectual intuition, also deflated the Kantian characterisation of its powers. Rather than 
cognise (sense 1) or create (sense 2) real objects, our intellectual intuition spontaneously produces 
only the maximally general a priori conceptual framework for object individuation, i.e. the categories. 
Hegel’s unitary deduction from the thought/intuition of pure being clearly follows this model. 
(5) The first step in the derivation of categories as universal and necessary object 
determinations would be the derivation of a first (or immediate) form of mediation from the 
immediately certain Grundsatz. Like Fichte, Hegel takes immediacy to generate of itself the structures 
that condition our determinate experience, which can be characterised as a mediated one (Kant’s 
“whole of compared and connected representations”). But unlike Fichte (and Schelling following him), 
Hegel does not figure the Grundsatz as in its form already possessing mediation or relation between 
identical terms (Fichte’s I = I; Schelling’s A = A). The Logic’s Grundsatz is empty of form and of content, 
but generates of itself the necessity of relation to an other, i.e. the necessity of mediation. Mediation 
for Hegel is generated as between immediately different terms, with this immediate difference 
articulated in the thought-determination of “becoming.” Becoming, as we will see, is the minimal 
structure of relational determination, enabling us to distinguish being from nothing only by thinking 
them together. 
The remainder of 6.1 considers “becoming” from two Kantian angles. Firstly, it is shown that 
the indifference of being and nothing enables Hegel to treat both limbs of Kant’s togetherness 
principle (empty concepts and blind intuitions) together at the same time insofar as this indifference 
corresponds to that treated at the start of Kant’s A Deduction. That is, Hegel’s Logic begins from the 
moment in Kant in which immediate singulars are rendered cognitively discriminable through 
synthesis. Secondly, I elucidate the category of becoming as the relational determination of being and 
nothing by comparison to Kant’s Prolegomena account of “incongruent counterparts.” 
 
The Emptiness and Blindness of Being 
The thought-determination of becoming can be heuristically introduced as a solution to the problem 
that the indifference of being and nothing presents. The problem we have after the “Being” and 
“Nothing” paragraphs of the Logic is the following. How do we name or mark the difference between 
being and nothing, given their content – the “empty intuiting” and “empty thinking” of sheer 
indeterminacy – immediately holds of both? Here again I differentiate my commentary via detour 
through Kant. At the end of the second paragraph of the Logic, we are at a point very similar to (1) the 
indifferent indeterminacy of thought that Kant diagnoses in the rationalist tradition; and (2) the 
indifferent indeterminacy of sensible intuitions that begins Kant’s A Deduction. That Hegel takes pure 
being to be both thought and intuition enables him to treat both the emptiness and blindness limbs of 
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the togetherness principle simultaneously, within a unitary deduction. That is, he can simultaneously 
treat: (1) the problem of “empty” thought, i.e. thought that is about nothing when it takes itself to be 
about something; as well as (2) “blind” intuiting, i.e. an intuition that is indeterminate because not 
brought into connection with another. 
(1) Kant as we have seen in 1.2 demonstrates that rationalism may always be thinking or 
judging of nothing when it takes itself to be judging of something. Rationalist indeterminacy could 
therefore be understood as indifference, i.e. the equal-validity of judgments about some empirically 
real thing and no empirically real thing under rationalist criteria for determinacy. Note the 
correspondence with the Logic’s opening moves: abstract thought finds itself judging of nothing (what 
is not) when it took itself to be judging of being (what is), and vice-versa. In both Kant and Hegel, pure 
thought is indeterminate because it is indifferent to the existence of its object; and, in both thinkers, 
intuition provides resources for determining that difference. In Kant sensible intuition gives us an 
existent something about which to think; in Hegel we intellectually intuit the difference between being 
and nothing even though we have abstracted from the conceptual resources that would render that 
difference explicit. Hegel’s shift from sensible to intellectual immediacy here, however, means a shift 
in his understanding of the minimal object of thought.  
Kant thinks the minimal intentional object of judgment as something sensibly given to thought. 
Accordingly, his answer to rationalist indifference is to provide a transcendental account of the 
conditions under which something rather than nothing is so given. Kant claims that thought has 
objective validity or purport – is about an empirically real thing – only when it synthesises a manifold 
of sensible intuition. Furthermore, because this conceptual synthesis is constitutive of objectivity as 
such, Kant takes the Humean sceptical gap between sense-data and the universal and necessary 
determinations of our thinking to be closed. At the beginning of the Logic, however, we have seen 
Hegel’s claim that thought is its own intuiting: thought immediately apprehends its own being and the 
spontaneity that characterises it. Hegel thus takes the minimal object of thought not to be something, 
but rather the pure being that thought itself is. In the Remark that immediately follows the “Being,” 
“Nothing,” and “Becoming” paragraphs, Hegel explicitly draws attention to this. “It is customary to 
oppose nothing to something [Etwas]. Something is already a determinate existent [ein bestimmtes 
Seiendes] that distinguishes itself from another something; consequently, the nothing which is being 
opposed to something is also the nothing of a certain something, a determinate nothing [ein 
bestimmtes Nichts]” (SL 60/21.70). For Hegel, the Kantian “something” that requires determination by 
conceptual form is already determinate in the sense of being relationally individuated, i.e. set against 
and outside another such something via spatio-temporal form. It follows that “nothing” thought in 
relation to “something” is not a pure nothing, but determined as the absence of a relationally 
individuated thing. In Hegel’s version of strong TI, this constitutes a failure to derive determination 
from an immediately certain ground, but rather presupposes a minimal form of determination 
(relational individuation) to already be in place.  
All of this means a new, broader definition of “determination” in Hegel. In the Kantian 
framework, taking “something” as the minimal object of conceptual determination makes sense: 
although there are some usages of “determination” in the Aesthetic (see 2.1 above), Kant in general 
follows rationalism in taking “determination” to mean conceptual determination, not the relational 
individuation provided by intuitional form. Intuition, in other words, gives us real but conceptually 
undetermined “somethings” to be thought – though it emerges in the Analytic that the external 
relationality constitutive of such immediacies is not cognisable in the absence of synthetic 
apprehension. In contrast, Hegel as we have seen, suspends the presupposition that determination is 
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concept predication. This leads to a generalised understanding of determination as that which renders 
a content distinct or distinguishable from an other content. As such, “determination” for Hegel catches 
both concept predication and intuitional “placing and ordering.” This will become clearer when we 
turn to Hegel’s dialectic of something and other in 6.2., in which qualitative determination – the 
categories of reality, negation, and limit – are bound up with the form of “side-by-side” or “outside-
one-another” placement.  
 (2) In this Kant nonetheless intimates the Hegelian position. Parallel to or in close 
correspondence with Kant’s A Deduction, the “Being” chapter of the Seinslogik demonstrates that 
synthesis speciosa – conceptuality understood literally as “gripping” or “holding together” two discrete 
immediacies – is the minimally thinkable form of mediation. Were such apprehension not to take 
place, each intuition would be indifferent to one another and so indeterminate or “blind,” in the same 
way that Hegel’s being and nothing, in the absence of their mediation in becoming, remain indifferent 
to one another and so indeterminate. In other words, Hegel’s category “becoming” is the 
“apprehension” of being and nothing in Kant’s A Deduction sense. It follows that Kant’s account of 
intuitional discrimination in the synthesis of apprehension is for Hegel the most immediate form of 
determinacy taken by being in general. Recall that in introducing the synthesis of apprehension in the 
A Deduction, Kant says: 
 
If every individual representation were entirely foreign to the other, as it were isolated and 
separated from it, then there would never arise anything like cognition, which is a whole of 
compared and connected representations (A97).  
In the absence of relation between individual representations, it seems to follow that we would 
experience one isolated representation after another. But this is not the case. Rather, there would be 
no way to tell whether one representation had been replaced by another, because there would be no 
way of comparing and so telling the difference between “entirely foreign” representations. Each 
representation would so fill the “space” of thought that we would experience only an absolute unity: 
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such 
if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another; for 
as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything other than absolute 
unity (A99). 
As we saw in Chapter 2.2., the A Deduction solves this problem by showing that spontaneous 
(empirically unconditioned) syntheses of apprehension and reproduction must obtain for discrete 
spatio-temporal individuals to be grasped together and so discriminated from one another, and further 
that these syntheses are grounded on the unity of the subject (and its categories). Kant puts this in the 
form of transcendental argument. The skeptic must admit that connectedness characterises our 
experience (because its negation, a “blooming buzz” of unconnected impressions does not so 
characterise our experience). But, contra the skeptic, Kant proceeds to show that this experience of 
connectedness is dependent on certain non-empirical conceptual conditions in the immediacy of 
sensible representations themselves. Again, sensibility gives us externally relationally individuated 
singular objects; but because this relationality is external, neither the objects nor their relations are 
cognisable without synthesis apprehending and reproducing them.  
In the indeterminate immediacy of being, Hegel has diagnosed a similar problem: abstracted 
from all relationality (“entirely foreign” to any other), our representation collapses into an 
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indeterminate unity or self-equality that cannot be told apart from its other.  The correspondence of 
the starting point of the Logic and the A Deduction can be confirmed definitionally, so to speak, simply 
by considering the logical description of pure being unpacked in detail above: an indeterminate 
immediate but non-sensible content for thought. In Kant’s cognitive model, this logical content – an 
indeterminate (conceptually undetermined) immediate non-sensible content – describes the pure 
intuition (the form of spatio-temporal organisation) from which the A Deduction begins. That is, the 
indeterminate immediate with which we start the Logic has the very same logical features of 
unsynthesised pure intuition with which we begin the Transcendental Analytic.  
Hegel however solves this problem differently. In short, as committed to the unitary derivation 
of post-Kantian idealism, Hegel does not have the Aesthetic and Metaphysical Deduction behind him, 
i.e. an independently ascertained content with which to approach the problem of synthesis. Spatio-
temporal organisation (outside-one-another-being) as much as logical form must be proved within the 
one deduction. As such, the difference between Kant and Hegel on this point can be approached 
methodologically, in terms of the difference between transcendental argument and genetic derivation. 
Hegel does not seek to secure the relation between indubitable facts of sensibly-conditioned 
experience and a universal propositional form, but rather to show that there is a continuity between 
immediate certainty and the forms of determination. There is a family resemblance in these 
approaches: both move from an indubitability of some kind towards the (not immediately apparent) 
structure upon which that indubitability is dependent. The difference that the genetic approach makes 
is the relation of its components to a single ground. In Kant, regardless of one’s interpretation of the 
togetherness principle, the conceptual structure that determines immediacy is independently derived 
from the logical forms of judgment in the Metaphysical Deduction. Similarly, the pure forms of intuition 
on which concepts are shown in the Transcendental Deduction to necessarily operate are established 
by an independent transcendental argument from the indubitability of geometry.  
Now, it is possible to argue with Conant that Kant holds that concept/intuition separability is 
never actual, but only the result of abstractive work. Hegel says something similar about being and 
nothing, namely that being and nothing taken as separate contents would be “only the empty figments 
of thought [leere Gedankendinge]” while the “truth” is the “unity of being and nothing in every actual 
thing or thought,” “the inseparability of the two which is everywhere before us” (61-62/21.71-72).  But 
at best Conant can argue that Kant advances the togetherness principle from the mistaken assumption 
of their separateness, and that their inseparability is proved negatively from the breakdown of that 
assumption. In Hegel, that breakdown occurs immediately. Rather than an independent section that 
seems to give us discriminable items in intuition and then an Analytic that reverses this tendency, Hegel 
sustains separateness for one paragraph – being, pure being – that is undone in the next – nothing, 
pure nothing. Or more deeply: that one is actually equally reading about nothing when one took 
oneself to be reading about being – and vice-versa – means that the transition has in fact always 
already occurred, so to speak. We were never reading and thinking only of being, but in fact being and 
nothing together at the same time. This “at-the-same-timeness” is important in the determination of 
becoming: Hegel says in the second line of the “Becoming” paragraph that “the truth is neither being 
nor nothing, but rather that being has passed over into nothing and nothing into being – ‘has passed 
over,’ not passes over [nicht übergeht, sondern übergegangen ist].”  That is: their togetherness is 
always already actual: one cannot think one without the other, even if one wants to, because in 
thinking one has already thought the other.   
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Being and Nothing as Incongruent Counterparts 
Recall that Hegel says of pure being that “there is nothing to be intuited in it.” This on first glance is 
another assertion of the indeterminate emptiness of pure being. On second reading, however, the 
sentence also claims that, in being, there is the thought content “nothing” there to be intuited. That 
is, we can intuit nothing in being, and being in nothing. This intuition of “being in nothing” and “nothing 
in being” is not a sensible intuition, but rather a thought that shares the immediacy and singularity 
logically characteristic of sensible intuition. In discovering nothing in being and vice-versa, we 
immediately intuit a difference between being and nothing in the one rational “space,” but do not yet 
have the rationally legitimate (i.e. derived) resources to determine that difference, to say in what their 
difference consists. In other words, thought for Hegel possesses an intuitional (immediate) power of 
discrimination between conceptually indiscriminable terms. Insofar as this difference is intuited and 
not conceived, in the same moment a difference between being and nothing is intuited, so too is the 
difference between conceptual and intuitional representation. But, as we will see, the immediate 
difference between being and nothing is conceptually articulable only through an articulation of their 
necessary togetherness. As such, in so demonstrating the togetherness of being and nothing, Hegel is 
also demonstrating the togetherness of the logical components of conceptual and intuitional 
representation: the immediate difference we intuit is articulable only by the mediation or synthesis 
logically characteristic for Kant of conceptuality.    
Now, in trying to tell the difference between being and nothing in intellectual intuition, we are 
in analogous position to that which Kant describes when trying to tell the difference between 
“incongruent counterparts” as they are represented in sensible intuition. Kant introduces his point by 
noting that, “if two things are fully the same (in all determinations belonging to magnitude and 
quality)… it should indeed then follow that one… can be put in the place of the other, without this 
exchange causing the least recognizable difference.” But this is not the case with incongruent 
counterparts, of which the paradigm example – used in both the Prologemena and the “Orientation” 
paper – is right and left hands:  
 
What indeed can be more similar to, and in all parts more equal to, my hand or my ear than 
its image in the mirror? And yet I cannot put such a hand as is seen in the mirror in the place 
of its original; for if the one was a right hand, then the other in the mirror is a left, and the 
image of the right ear is a left one, which can never take the place of the former. Now there 
are no inner differences here that any understanding could merely think; and yet the 
differences are inner as far as the senses teach, for the left hand cannot, after all, be enclosed 
within the same boundaries as the right (they cannot be made congruent), despite all 
reciprocal equality and similarity; one hand’s glove cannot be used on the other. What then is 
the solution? (37-38/4:286).  
 
Kant’s solution to the lack of an available conceptual determination is to argue as follows. Given that 
the difference between left and right is discriminable in our experience but not reducible to conceptual 
discrimination, it is explained by its being conditioned by a distinctly non-conceptual form of our 
cognition. As he puts it: “We can therefore make the difference between similar and equal but 
nonetheless incongruent things (e.g., oppositely spiralled snails) intelligible through no concept alone, 
but only through the relation to right-hand and left-hand, which refers immediately to intuition” 
(38/4:287).  
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Like left and right hands or oppositely spiralled snails that are “in all determinations” “fully the 
same,” we have seen Hegel describe being and nothing as “altogether the same [überhaupt 
dasselbe].” That is, our discursive description of the intellectual intuitions of being and nothing are 
identical: we can find no “mark” or predicate in one lacking in the other. There is however a difference 
between them, and this difference “refers immediately to intuition” for its justification. The difference, 
however, between Kant’s sensible (left and right) and Hegel’s non-sensible (being and nothing) 
incongruous counterparts is twofold. Firstly, being and nothing are the same “in all determinations” 
insofar as neither has any determination whatsoever: we find no mark in one not in the other because 
there are no marks in either. In other words, we do not determine (predicate concepts of) being and 
nothing, but rather observe in our inner intuiting the indeterminacy that they are. Another way to put 
this is to say that, in Kant’s account of sensible counterparts, conceptual determination has been 
exhausted, and no difference has been found: right and left hands have identical predicates (both are 
“bodies,” are “organic,” have an opposable thumb, and so on). In Hegel’s non-sensible counterparts, 
conceptual determination has been suspended: we immediately have identical descriptions of what 
thought apprehends in its own being, namely, sheer indeterminacy.  
The second difference follows from the logic of singularity as it characterises specifically 
intellectual intuition. In Kant’s account, the relational individuation of spatio-temporal particulars is 
the reason why we can intuitionally discriminate left and right hands: the left cannot occupy the same 
space as the right; it is determined as what it is (a left) because of its spatial-temporal relation to its 
counterpart (the right). That is, they are distinguished not through conceptual determination but 
through the part/whole relations characteristic of intuitional representation: left and right hands are 
different because they cannot take up the same part within the immediately given whole of space:  
 
“Now, space is the form of outer intuition of this sensibility, and the inner determination of 
any space is possible only through the determination of the outer relation to the whole space 
of which the space is a part (the relation to outer sense); that is, the part is possible only 
through the whole, which never occurs with things in themselves as objects of the 
understanding alone, but does occur with mere appearances” (38/4:287). 
 
So for Kant, left and right cannot occupy the same place – that they cannot replace each other – and 
are distinguishable on this basis alone. They exist, in other words, outside one another, in the 
relationality characteristic of intuition. In contrast, incongruent counterparts in intellectual intuition 
are characterised by replaceability. This is traceable to the take up of the singularity component of 
intuition into pure being. We saw above that the singularity of pure being and pure nothing is not the 
singularity of the manifold – singular immediacies relationally individuated by spatio-temporal form – 
but rather the singularity of the spatio-temporal field itself. Thought is immediately one, not one 
against or in relation to another, such that thought would be a delimited part of the space to be 
thought; in its immediacy, it is the totality of that space. As such, the thought of nothing in its identity 
to the thought of being takes the place of being, the only “place” that there is to think. It replaces 
being. As I put it earlier, nothing emerges within the space of being, and as such cannot be understood 
as a particular to be subsumed under it. But, at the same time, nothing cannot be distinguished from 
being in the way that Kant takes left and right hands to be distinguished, as incapable of occupying the 
same part of the whole. Both occupy the same whole.  
Hegel suggests this link between singularity and replaceability via a quirk of grammar in the 
first line of the paragraph on becoming: “Pure being and pure nothing are therefore the same [Das 
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reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist also dasselbe].” A literal translation would read “being and nothing 
is [ist] the same.” They are not two that are [sind] the same, as two discrete, pre-determined identities 
brought together in a comparative relation. Both completely exhaust the singular “space” in which 
each is immediately apprehended.  
Nonetheless, in this replacement, a difference is intuitable: 
But the truth is just as much that they are not without distinction; it is rather that they are not 
the same [sie nicht dasselbe], that they are absolutely distinct [absolut unterschieden] yet 
equally unseparated and inseparable [ungetrennt und untrennbar], and that each immediately 
vanishes into its opposite [jedes in seinem Gegenteil verschwindet]. There truth is therefore 
this movement [Bewegung] of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming 
[das Werden], a movement in which the two are distinguished, but by a distinction which has 
just as immediately dissolved itself (60/21.69-70).  
In our “inner intuiting,” being and nothing “vanish” into one another. The moment we think one, we 
think the other; the one disappears as the other appears, and vice-versa. The immediate difference 
between the two is articulated by naming a non-sensuous movement: not that of one body moving so 
as to occupy a different part of space, displacing other bodies there, but between two identical 
indeterminacies in the one inner “space” of thought.  
The problem we had after the Logic’s first two paragraphs was that of indifference: we were 
not able to distinguish being from its other, nor vice-versa; we were not able to say what being is 
without saying what nothing is, nor able to define a nothing which would not already be being. 
Becoming articulates the equal-validity of being and nothing in order to determine their immediate 
difference: the solution to the indifference of being and nothing is to say the two terms together, 
defining each as its transition into the other. Being is the movement or transition into nothing; nothing 
is its transition to being. As Hegel puts it, the “challenge” of indeterminate immediacy is to “state what, 
then, is being, and what is nothing.” However, “the two are equally only a transition of the one into 
the other…” (68/21.80). Note that this “equal” transition nonetheless expresses the moment of 
difference that is immediately intuited in thought: both are transitions, but different directions within 
that transition. The transition of being to nothing is expressible as ceasing-to-be [Vergehen]; from 
nothing to being as coming-to-be [Enstehen] (80/21.93). It has proved impossible to think being 
independently of nothing and a nothing independently of being, as if being could be distinguished as 
an “over here” from nothing “over there.” The two rather take each other’s place in the only place 
there is. As such, to think the difference of each term we have to approach their relation from two 
different directions, with the difference between them consisting in this bi-directionality alone. In 
other words, the difference between being and nothing cannot be understood as “being/nothing” but 
rather only as “coming-to-be/ceasing-to-be,” with the latter opposition unpacked as “being becoming 
nothing / nothing becoming being.” Notice that, in this formula, being is present on both sides of the 
opposition, as is nothing. Rather than simply being not what their opposite is, being and nothing are 
logical moments of their opposites. Hegel puts this as follows:    
 
Grasped as thus distinguished, each is in their distinguishedness [Unterschiedenheit] a unity 
with the other […ist jedes in derselben als Einheit mit dem anderen]. Becoming thus contains 
being and nothing as two such unities, each of which is itself unity of being and nothing; the 
one is being as immediate and as reference [Beziehung] to nothing; the other is nothing as 
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immediate and as reference to being; in these unities the determinations are of unequal value 
[die Bestimmungen sind in ungleichem Werte in diesen Einheiten]. (80/21.93).  
 
In distinguishing between two forms of the unity of being and nothing (coming-to-be/ceasing-to-be), 
the determination of becoming breaks the indifference that characterised being and nothing in their 
immediacy. In other words, the immediate difference of being and nothing – their indifference – is 
now determined in the Hegelian sense: one can be distinguished from its other, and vice-versa.  
Crucially, this determination is achieved through a presentation of the relation or connection 
[Beziehung] between being and nothing. In other words, in becoming being and nothing are 
relationally determined, determined as distinct by being brought into relation. What has occurred in 
the determination of becoming, then, is a first articulation of mediation: being is what it is, is 
distinguishable from nothing, only through its relation to nothing, and vice-versa. Or, to use the 
Kantian language, becoming is a category in the sense that it is a rule of synthesis that enables being 
and nothing to be thought together and so distinguished from one another – rather than simply 
interminably replacing one another. Becoming is however only the first or immediate form of 
mediation, from which qualitative determination (“determinateness as such”) is derived in the 
following chapter, “Existence.”  
To summarise the above trajectory as simply as possible, Hegel can be seen to be conducting 
a thought experiment in which we attempt to hold the minimally thinkable thought-content – that 
thought is – in abstraction from its other or any otherness, that is, we attempt to vitiate a generalised 
form of the togetherness principle. Abstracting from contingent content and from all relation to 
otherness, however, renders the being of thought (that thought is) completely indeterminate. For 
Hegel, the experiment demonstrates that thinking this indeterminate content proves to be 
immediately a thinking of its other (thought is not, is nothing). That Hegel takes this experiment to be 
a proof of the togetherness principle’s logical content is clear from the following equivalence: “the 
same must be said of being and nothing as was said above of immediacy and mediation (which contain 
a reference to each other and hence negation), that nowhere on heaven or on earth is there anything 
which does not contain both being and nothing in itself.” (61/21.171).  That is, Hegel has generalised 
the togetherness principle in two related ways. Firstly, as the logical relation between being and 
nothing is primary and paradigmatic, mediation is minimally understood as relational determination, 
in which something is what it is – is determinate in the sense of distinguishable from its other – only 
by thinking it in relation to its other; secondly, this logical relation is held to be true of being in general, 
insofar as the thought in which this structure demonstrably is or has being. That is, the togetherness 
principle in Hegel is logicised – reformulated as holding of opposed contents in general – and onto-
logicised, holding true for being in general.   
6.2. Determinateness and Determination 
The “Existence” chapter derives a minimal form of qualitative “determinateness” or “determinacy as 
such” [Bestimmtheit als solche] and further the category of “determination” [Bestimmung]. Put as 
simply as possible, “determinateness” is the moment of negation that renders pure being a stable 
“existent” [Dasein], while “determination” develops negation in such a way to as to inter-articulate the 
contrastive relation between such existents (having this quality not that quality) and the self-relation 
or self-identity of individual existents that emerges through this contrast. As we will see, this inter-
articulation is developed through the indifference that emerges between a self-relating “something” 
and an “other” such something: Hegel treats the relation between something and other in terms of 
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the indifferent “outside-one-another-being” that he takes to logically characterise Kantian intuitional 
form. Determination for Hegel therefore contains a logical moment of indifference between 
somethings, just as in Kant’s cognitive model determination takes up the singular immediacies 
(indeterminate “somethings”) given in sensible intuition. In Hegel’s case, however, the relation of 
indifference between something and other is shown in intellectual intuition to logically entail of itself 
the determination – the qualitative distinguishability – of its terms, without reference to 
independently articulable conceptual form. 
It is in the Existence chapter that we start to see the results of Hegel’s ontological 
generalisation of togetherness emerge as a substantive alternative to Kant’s cognitive model. In its 
account of determinacy and determination, the Logic’s second chapter derives Kant’s categories of 
quality (reality, negation, and limit). These categories are not forms of judgment but rather the logical 
structure of determinacy and determination as forms of relational individuation. These relational 
forms, as noted in Chapter 3.2, come in Hegel’s Realphilosophie to characterise spatiotemporal nature 
and its intuition in minded [geistige] animals. In other words, the outside-one-another-being of 
intuitional givenness that for Kant requires mediation by the categories of quality is for Hegel logically 
itself a qualitative determination, one manifest or actualised in both natural and spiritual domains. 
The side-by-side or external relation that determines something as not another such something, and 
that in turn gives that something a qualitative determination “for itself” as an individual, is for Hegel a 
mediating structure that conditions immediate somethings in general, regardless of the ontological 
domain of their appearance. 
That determination for Hegel emerges from the derivation of “something” – a self-relating 
existent – is important in the comparison with Kant. As we saw in Chapter 2, and again discussed in 
6.1 above, in Kant’s account a relationally individuated spatio-temporal singular immediacy, when 
taken as the subject of a judgment, is a “something” [Etwas]. The categorial forms determine this 
something as determinate with regard to one of the logical functions of judgment. In Hegel’s 
alternative, the mediation that determines the quality of a something is conceptually articulable – 
reality, negation, and limit are constitutive – but these concepts cannot be understood as predicates 
of possible judgment subsuming an intuitionally-given “something” itself distinct from that conceptual 
operation. Rather, that something is already the result of the categories mediating work, logically prior 
to the forms of judgment. Perhaps a better way to put this is to say that for Hegel “something” already 
is a qualitative determination: to be something means to possess a quality; a something does not 
require qualitative determination to be brought to it. When in intellectual intuition we think reality, 
negation, and limit, we are thinking a structure that determines qualitative “something-ness” in 
general. 
To reconstruct Hegel’s derivation or proof of determination understood in the above way we 
must begin by recalling that for Hegel beginning is logically immediate. “Being” as the “absolute 
beginning” began with “immediacy itself” and generated the thought-determination of becoming as 
immediate mediation. “Existence” insofar as it begins must also begin with an immediacy, and the only 
immediacy legitimately available to it is that which has been genetically derived from immediacy itself. 
As such, Existence begins from becoming taken in its immediacy, i.e. the immediacy of immediate 
mediation; its ground is the “first truth” (62/21.72) named in the category of becoming, that is, that 
being is distinguishable from nothing only by reference to it, and vice-versa. In other words, the 
Existence chapter takes the identity-and-difference of being and nothing as articulated in the 
mediating structure of becoming as its beginning. What this means is that “Existence” plays out the 
relation between immediacy and mediation articulated in “Being” at one remove; it concerns the 
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relation not between sheer immediacy and mediation but between minimally mediated immediacy 
and further mediation. 
 “Existence” is split into three sections: “A. Existence as such,” “B. Finitude,” and “C. Infinity.” I 
will only take us as far as the definition of “determination” as it is provided in B, as that provides us 
with enough resources to justify the comparison of Kant’s cognitive model of determination with 
Hegel’s ontological alternative as sketched above.  
 
A. Existence as such  
Section A is in turn divided into three sub-sections: a. Existence in general; b. Quality; and c. 
Something. While brief – and difficult on account of their brevity – these sub-sections are absolutely 
crucial. Sub-section a. points back to the Being chapter in order to characterise becoming’s immediacy 
as its own point of departure. In doing so, it very quickly derives a definition of “determinateness” or 
“determinacy as such” [Bestimmtheit als solches]: the dialectic of being has shown that nothing must 
be thought with being in order to think being with any determinacy; it follows for Hegel that 
determinateness as such is the moment of non-being [Nichtsein] in any determinate being [bestimmtes 
Sein]. To this determinate being Hegel gives the name “existence” [Dasein]. Sub-section b. draws from 
this understanding of determinateness the first form of qualitative determinateness as contrastive 
relation: having the quality of “reality” because not having the quality of “negation.” Thirdly, in c. Hegel 
argues that an understanding of existent beings in contrastive relations logically entails a form of self-
relation. Existents are not simply not their opposite or negation, but rather a self-relating “something” 
through that negation.  
While contrastive relation and self-relation are announced in section A, they will be expanded 
and then thought together – as the determinate relational contrast between self-relating singulars – 
in the dialectic of “something” and “other” in the following section, “B. Finitude.” In Section B their 
unity is expressed under the category of “determination” [Bestimmung]. Determination for Hegel, 
then, is the form that inter-articulates other-relatedness and self-relatedness as constitutive of 
qualitatively determinate existents.    
 Hegel begins section A by defining “existence” as “determinate being [bestimmtes Sein]” 
(83/21.96). Put as simply as possible, existence is the indeterminate being with which the Logic began 
but rendered determinate through the necessary reference to nothing that the category of becoming 
articulates. Hegel puts existence’s relation to becoming in this way: 
 
“Existence [Dasein] proceeds from becoming. It is the simple oneness of being and nothing. 
On account of this simplicity, it has the form of an immediate. Its mediation, the becoming, 
lies behind it; it has sublated itself, and existence therefore appears as a first from which the 
forward move is made. It is at first in the one-sided determination of being; the other 
determination which it contains, nothing, will likewise come up in it, in contrast to the first” 
(83/21.97).  
 
Existence’s genesis in becoming requires some unpacking. We need to understand how becoming has 
“sublated itself” [sich aufgehoben]. Hegel describes this sublation as becoming’s necessary “collapse” 
into Dasein’s “quiescent unity” in the final body paragraph of “Being,” “3. Sublation of Becoming.” This 
dense derivation is challenging. On first pass, Hegel at the end of the Being chapter seems to force 
becoming – a ontological category he explicitly takes to be equivalent to Heraclitean flux (60/21.70) – 
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into the consideration of stable (or relatively stable) objects that the Existence chapter will, in its 
second section, set “side-by-side.” Houlgate’s Opening does, however, mount a convincing defence, 
which I will rehearse briefly here. Becoming we saw above is constituted by the “vanishing” of being 
into nothing and vice-versa: being just is its vanishing into nothing; nothing is its vanishing into being; 
becoming articulates what being and nothing are by saying them together, that is, by articulating their 
relation to one another. But once becoming so results, vanishing turns out to entail the vanishing of 
vanishing itself. Vanishing was dependent upon the immediate difference between being and nothing, 
but becoming articulates their difference and identity, saying both at once. In Houlgate’s words:   
 
Being and nothing start out by vanishing, but precisely by virtue of vanishing into one another 
they show themselves to be indistinguishable and so no longer to be purely other than one 
another at all. This means that there can no longer be any vanishing or transition of one into 
the other. That in turn means that there can no longer be any becoming.250 
 
Though Houlgate does not put it like this, this means that becoming, like the being and nothing that it 
articulates, vanishes the moment it appears. As soon as being and nothing are no longer absolutely 
opposed but understood as their necessary relationship to one another, the vanishing of becoming – 
the disappearance of one into its opposed term or negation – itself vanishes. What remains over, 
however, is the thought that being must be in relation to nothing in order to be the very being that it 
is. At the end of the Being chapter, Hegel refers to this “quiescent result” [ruhiges Resultat] of 
becoming as “vanishedness” [Verschwundensein]. This vanishedness, however, is not a return to 
abstract or empty nothing. This, Hegel remarks, “would be only a relapse [ein Rückfall] into one of the 
already sublated determinations and not the result of nothing and of being.” (SL 81/21.94). “And of 
being” is italicised in Hegel’s text to highlight that, were vanishedness to be taken as nothing the 
moment of being that equally constitutes becoming would be lost sight of. Put differently, in order to 
link up with the language of conceptuality as grasping [begreifen], we would lose our grip on one of 
the two moments that becoming articulates. Rather, the “quiescent result” of becoming, the name for 
the vanishing of its vanishing in its “vanishedness,” is existence [Dasein], which Hegel takes to preserve 
in an immediate representation the opposed poles that becoming had mediated, i.e. being and 
nothing. 
Hegel puts this at the end of “3. Sublation of becoming.” “Becoming, as transition into the 
unity of being and nothing, which is as existent or has the shape of the one-sided immediate unity of 
these moments, is existence” (81/21.94). Immediacy for Hegel, then, is not only present at the 
beginning of presuppositionless category derivation. We have moved past “absolute” beginning as 
sheer immediacy onto further derivations which begin with a prior mediation taken in its immediacy. 
We are thus dealing with what I might call a “derived immediacy.” As derived, derived immediacy 
contains the mediation from which it results (the mediation that “lies behind it”). But as immediate, 
derived immediacy prioritises on one term (“one side”) of that prior mediation. That is, a derived 
immediacy is immediate by prioritising one of its two moments, by taking one of its two moments first. 
In other words, it takes up both terms in their unity through one of them. The second term, however, 
is not lacking but rather implicitly present – were it lacking entirely, we would regress to the beginning 
of the preceding derivation.  
 
 
250 The Opening, 290.  
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a. Existence in general 
We are now in a position to return to Hegel’s definition of existence from the Existence chapter itself: 
“Existence [Dasein] proceeds from becoming. It is the simple oneness of being and nothing. On 
account of this simplicity, it has the form of an immediate…. It is at first in the one-sided determination 
of being; the other determination which it contains, nothing, will likewise come up in it, in contrast to 
the first” (83/21.97). Existence is, in other words, the inseparability of being and nothing posited in 
one content for thought, but with the moment of being taking priority there. It is bestimmtes Sein not 
bestimmtes Nichts. The “nichts,” however, we will see is concealed in the determinacy – the 
“bestimmtes” – that differentiates Dasein from the reines Sein with which we began.   
 Before I continue with the structure of existence, I should note the complication that emerges 
with Hegel’s choice of terminology. “Existence” translates “Dasein,” “There-being,” “being in a certain 
place” [Sein an einem gewissen Ort] (SL 83/21.97). Hegel notes at the very beginning of sub-section a. 
that “the representation of space does not belong here.” Hegel takes himself only to be making a claim 
about that which logically follows from becoming, in which no reference to sensibly intuited spatiality 
is present. Such a reference would vitiate the purity of the logical deduction. However, once the sweep 
of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction is in view, it is clear that what is at issue in 
the Existence chapter is a derivation of a logical form that will prove to organise spatial relations in the 
Philosophy of Nature (see Chapter 3.2). So Hegel’s warning against spatial representation is 
methodologically necessary, but does not tell the whole story. It rather needs to be supplemented in 
order to indicate the relation between logical existence and spatio-temporal natural existence within 
the Hegelian system: the representation of space does not belong at this stage of a presuppositionless 
category deduction; nonetheless, the forms of thought and being so deduced will – insofar as they are 
forms of being – be in play in the being of nature and its sensible intuition in minded [geistige] 
creatures. Again, the relation between “something” and other” that emerges in “B. Finitude” is 
constituted by outside-one-another-being, which we have seen for Hegel is the logical form of spatio-
temporal relation. To understand the something-other relation, however, we must return to unpacking 
the simple immediacy of being and nothing, or Dasein. 
After warning against inferring spatiality in the “da” of Dasein, Hegel reiterates the derivation 
of existence outlined above: “As it follows upon becoming, existence is in general being with a non-
being [Sein mit einem Nichtsein], so that this non-being is taken up into simple unity with being.” Hegel 
then adds the following definition, crucial in what follows: “Non-being thus taken up into being with 
the result that the concrete whole is in the form of being, of immediacy, constitutes determinateness 
as such [macht die Bestimmtheit als solche aus]” (84/21.97). The term “non-being” [Nichtsein] is new 
here, and its novelty is indicative. In defining Dasein, Hegel no longer speaks of “nothing” [Nichts] but 
rather “non-being” [Nichtsein]. This new locution follows from the unity of being and nothing that was 
articulated in becoming: nothing can no longer be understood as pure and empty nothing, but rather 
as a nothing containing a moment of being, i.e. a non-being. This moment of non-being in any being 
for Hegel just is determinateness or determinacy as such, a point that is clarified in the following sub-
section (“b. Quality”), in which Hegel claims “… to the extent that existence is existent, to that extent 
it is non-being; it is determined” (84/21.98). Existence is the unity of being and non-being, but the 
moment of non-being is the determinateness of that existence. To illustrate this we only need pay 
attention to the definition of existence as “bestimmtes Sein.” In this definition, being is explicitly 
represented (Sein is actually said); non-being however is implicitly present as that which renders that 
being determinate (the bestimmtes that qualifies being). As non-being is the moment of determinacy, 
 155 
it follows that existence can be alternatively formulated as “being-that-is-non-being,” i.e. a being that 
is determinate on account of not being.  
This formulation sounds contradictory. Or, at the very least it seems to call for another term to 
save it from contradiction: to the claim that “a determinate being is what it is on account of not being,” 
one is tempted to add, “another determinate being.” However, the contradictory formula is licensed 
by the progress of the Logic thus far. Recall that in the Being chapter, the reference or mediation to 
another was not posited in being’s indeterminate immediacy. Its immediacy rather turned out to entail 
the necessity of mediation. Existence follows from becoming as the articulation of the necessity of 
mediation. Existence is determinate being rather than the indeterminate being with which the Logic 
began because it contains the moment of non-being as a part of what it immediately is. Unlike 
immediate indeterminate being, the immediate but determinate being of existence contains a 
reference or mediation to what it is not as a part of what it immediately is.  
Secondly, one might be tempted at this point to extend Hegel’s argument here into a more 
explicit account of contrastive determinacy between particulars, i.e. to claim that an existent is what 
it is insofar as it not another such existent. Hegel will hold off on this move until after the derivation of 
something in sub-section c. For Hegel, the category of “something” as self-relating existent must be 
derived before articulating the relation between distinct somethings in section B. What we have at this 
point is not a relational contrast between particular beings, but rather – to use another phrase of 
Houlgate’s – a general “way of being.” Determinate being is a way of being distinguished from sheer 
indeterminate being by the co-presence of non-being. In other words, we have at the beginning of the 
Existence chapter only one object of thought: Dasein as the immediate unity of being and nothing.   
 
b. Quality 
What then is quality? Hegel says: “determinateness thus isolated by itself, as existent determinateness 
[seiende Bestimmtheit], is quality – something totally simple, immediate… on account of this simplicity, 
there is nothing further to say about quality as such” (85/21.98). So quality for Hegel has a kind of 
perplexing redundancy: to exist is to be determinate, and to exist determinately is to have quality. The 
overlap of existence, determinateness, and quality is also stated at the very start of the chapter: 
“Existence is determinate being; its determinateness is existent determinateness, quality” (81/21.96). 
The key here is the immediacy component: existence as an immediate unity of being and nothing is 
the immediacy of quality; quality is at first just that unity that makes existence what it is. But that is 
only quality in its immediacy, as it first appears. Hegel as a part of his opening precis goes on: “Through 
its quality, something is opposed to an other.” The quality of existence in general, Hegel suggests, 
bifurcates in such a way in order to license talk not only of stable, singular existence, but as particular 
existents in opposition to one another.  
As such, the link between the categories of “existence” and “something” is the derivation in 
sub-section b. of two distinct forms of quality. This introduces a minimal form of contrastive relation 
into existence; not yet that between particular and distinct existents, but rather between two ways of 
being determinate. These ways are “reality” and “negation.” Hegel says: “Quality, in the distinct value 
of existent, is reality; when affected by a negating, it is negation in general, still a quality but one that 
counts as lack and is further determined as limit, restriction” (85/21.99). “Further determined” here 
points forward to the account of determination proper [Bestimmung] in section B. We need only at 
this point understand the contrast between “reality” (being-that-is-not) and what it is not, i.e. 
“negation” (non-being-that-is). The difference between reality and negation is derived by 
distinguishing between existence in its immediacy, which places the emphasis on being (bestimmtes 
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Sein, being-that-is-not) and existence with the “accent” [Akzente] on its other moment, non-being 
(non-being-that-is). Again, this follows from the resources generated within the Logic so far. What is 
opposed to determinate being as the unity of being and non-being cannot be the abstract 
indeterminate nothing of the Being chapter: we have learnt in becoming that being and nothing are 
inseparable. As a result, what determinate being is not at this stage of the logical development must 
be a nothing determined by its reference to being, i.e. non-being-that-is. In other words, we are 
constrained by the results of becoming to think being and nothing together: this togetherness can be 
read in two ways, with the priority falling to either being or nothing – reality and negation (85/21.99).  
  Hegel brings all this together in introducing the third subsection: “Reality itself contains 
negation; it is existence, not indeterminate or abstract being. Negation is for its part equally existence, 
not the supposed abstract nothing but posited here as it is in itself, as existent, as belonging to 
existence” (88/21.102). We do not, then, have the immediate difference that characterised being and 
nothing. We rather, following from the determinacy introduced by becoming, have a determinate 
difference in which both terms are explicitly one side of the unity they compose. Reality is the unity of 
being and nothing in which being is taken first; negation is that unity in which nothing is taken first. 
This difference is “determinate difference” in two senses. Firstly, it is a difference between two terms 
that are themselves determinate in Hegel’s technical sense of determinateness, that is, they contain 
non-being as a moment within themselves; secondly, in contrasting with what they are not they also 
reference the moment of otherness that constitutes them as the determinate existents that they are. 
The other-relatedness – the reference to non-being – that rendered being determinate existence is 
present both in reality and negation and between them. Reality is being-that-is-not; it is opposed to 
what it is not within itself and to another term against it, i.e. negation. But the term set against reality 
contains a moment of reality itself, because negation is non-being-that-is. Negation, for its part, is 
opposed to what it is not within itself (because it also is) and to the reality against it. But the reality 
set against negation contains a moment of negation, insofar as it is being-that-is-not.  
 
 
c. Something 
The transition to something is generated by thinking through the second sense of determinate 
difference. That is, determinate difference means relating to another insofar as one contains a moment 
of that other within oneself. The thought here is quite simple. Reality is quality (existent 
determinateness) with the accent on being rather than non-being. When reality is set against negation 
– existent determinateness or quality with the accent on non-being rather than being – reality relates 
to itself insofar as negation contains a moment of being. And vice-versa: negation in relating to reality 
relates to itself insofar as reality is the existent determinateness or quality it is only through non-being. 
This moment of self-relation in other-relation does not collapse the difference between reality and 
negation as it did in the Being chapter: there we found ourselves thinking the other of being at the 
moment being itself was thought; in the Existence chapter reality can be thought without collapsing 
into negation because both are grounded in the determinateness that characterises existence. Again: 
their difference is a determinate not an immediate one. Rather than collapsing into immediate unity, 
the opposition between reality and negation means that quality comes to exhibit both determinate 
difference and self-relation. Through the distinction between reality and negation, existence relates to 
itself.  
Hegel reinforces that self-relation does not mean the cancelling or loss of qualitative 
distinction between reality and negation: “The distinction cannot be left out, for it is.” Hegel then puts 
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the emergence of self-relation in a dialectical triad, with each moment mapping on to the sub-sections 
of section A:  
 
“Therefore, what is de facto at hand is this: [a] existence in general, [b] distinction in it; and [c] 
the sublation of this distinction; the existence, not void of distinctions as at the beginning, but 
as again self-equal through the sublation of the distinction, the simplicity of existence 
mediated through this sublation. This state of sublation of the distinction is existence’s own 
determinateness; existence is thus being-in-itself [Insichsein]; it is existent [Daseiendes], 
something [Etwas]. 
Something is the first negation of negation, as simple existent self-reference [einfache 
seiende Beziehung auf sich]” (89/21.103; my brackets for a, b, and c). 
 
I want here to focus on the derivation of self-reference or “connection to oneself” [Beziehung auf sich] 
as constitutive of a qualitatively determinate individual. Self-reference is important because it 
establishes existence as a singular existent not in the sense of totality but in the logical sense of 
singular intuitions in Kant: a something that is what it is via relational determination. In keeping with 
Kant’s logical schema, however, both singularity-as-totality and singularity-as-something are 
characterised by immediacy. To work through the three moments of “Existence as such” from this 
perspective:   
a. Existence in general in its immediacy lacks the logical resources for self-relation. Existence 
in general is the mediation of becoming taken in its immediacy: being as existent 
determinateness is only quality as such, and non-being or otherness is “submerged” in the 
moment of determinacy. There is in its immediacy no other quality but stable 
determinacy: being is determined “on the whole,” as it were, as quality; that is the what 
that existence is. There is, in other words, nothing other to which existence might be 
opposed: existence in general is singularity in the sense of totality, and not in the sense of 
an existent, a something.  
b. The progressive unfolding of the moment of determinacy, however, gives rise to quality 
understood as negation, i.e. non-being as itself existent determinateness. This introduces 
opposition or mediation, but within quality itself.  Recall that reality and negation are not 
distinct existents but ways of being determinate, ways in which the one quality is. The 
immediacy of singularity-as-totality has come to be internally differentiated, and so no 
longer immediate.  
c. In the third moment, the immediacy of existence is returned to but as a self-relation that 
requires the moment of mediation be made explicit: a something is “simple existent self-
reference” “but the something is thereby equally the mediation of itself with itself.” Again, 
quality proves to be the opposition within itself of reality and negation, an opposition that 
enables existence to be understood as the relation between its own two moments, i.e. as 
self-relation. In Hegel’s language something has being-in-itself [Insichsein], a something 
that has in it a quality of its own.  It has an inside, however, and so an outside. It is one 
thing, not the entirety of the logical space. This outsideness will be worked out in section 
B. 
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In Houlgate’s understanding, this makes something the emergence of a sense of “interiority.”251 The 
interiority of “being-in-itself” is established in the “gap” between reality and its reference to itself (the 
moment of being) in negation. There is, in other words, a “space” inside the something in which 
distinct properties can inhere. In other words, with the emergence of something, existence is no longer 
the whole “space” of thought, but rather distinguishes the interiority of self-relation from what is 
outside it – though this outside remains at this point only implicit. Also, at this point, the logical 
structure of properties that inhere in something has yet to be developed from quality. At this point 
only two ways of being qualitative have been derived, as either reality or negation. The qualitative 
determinateness of the something does not yet entail property-bearing. Hegel makes this explicit: 
“Quality specifically is a property only when, in an external connection, it manifests itself as an 
immanent determination.” (88/21.102). “Determination” as I have noted above is distinct from 
“determinateness.” Both it and the “external connection” mentioned here form the subject of B. 
Finitude, to which we are underway.   
B. Finitude 
What has been derived thus far within the logical progression are the following forms of relation: 
indeterminate difference (that between being and nothing, articulated in becoming); determinate 
difference (between reality and negation as two ways of being qualitative); and the self-relation 
characteristic of a singular existent (something). Note again that we are still lacking relation between 
existents: in Hegel’s language, between “something” and “other.”  
 I said just above that quality is understood at this point as either reality or negation. However, 
this or has not yet been expressed or made explicit in the category of something. The something is 
only the self-relation of quality considered from the side of reality (accent on being) not from the side 
of negation (accent on non-being). In treating becoming in its immediacy above, it was claimed that a 
“derived immediacy” is immediate by prioritising – taking first – one side of the mediation it contains, 
namely that side equivalent to “being” and its further determinations, rather than non-being. Like 
existence in general, the immediacy of an existent is one in which the moment of being is prioritised: 
existence in its immediacy was determinate being not the being of determinateness as such (non-
being); something in its immediacy is first of all the return of determinate being to itself through its 
relation to negation, not negation’s return through reality. In a move that we should be accustomed 
to by now, the “other” to which the something is opposed is generated by focussing on the moment 
of nothing – further developed now as non-being and negation – that has been demonstrated to be 
constitutive of any determinate being: 
  
“Something is, and is therefore also an existent... One of these moments, being, is now 
existence and further an existent. The other moment is equally an existent, but determined as 
the negative of something – an other [ein Anderes].” (89-90/21.104). 
 
By taking up negation’s self-relation we derive the second of two self-relating existents: “something” 
is self-relating reality, quality as reality that comes to itself through negation; the “other” is self-relating 
negation, quality as negation that comes to itself through reality. As the “negative of something,” the 
“other” is that self-relating existent that is not something.  
 
251 This is not emphasised by Houlgate in The Opening. I rather draw it from attendance at Houlgate’s autumn 
term MA Seminar on the Logic at the University of Warwick in 2016.  
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Most important here is that the relation between something and other in its first appearance 
cannot be understood as the determinate difference characteristic of reality and negation. Reality and 
negation were two sides of determinate being. They were the singularity-as-totality of “existence in 
general” approached from either of its poles. Something and other, however, are themselves two 
distinct self-relating singulars. The emergence of existents complicates determinate difference, 
because we have to account for the moment of self-relation that characterises them.  
To put it in Houlgate’s terms, Hegel in section B has shifted from an account of being different 
to being other, with the latter entailing the former but irreducible to it. Difference as we have seen is 
a contrastive determination, in which one’s determinacy is constituted by reference to what one is 
not; otherness, however, means that what one is not sustains an independence of its own.252 As such, 
being other has two components: being other than (contrastive relation) as well as being other in itself 
(self-relation). 253  In the course of a few short and difficult passages, Hegel develops these two 
moments as “being-for-other” and “being-in-itself” respectively, which provide the logical matrix for 
the categories of determination, constitution, and limit.  
Hegel’s development again advances via indifference. That is, the relation between something 
and other in its immediacy presents a further developed form of the indeterminate difference that 
characterised being and nothing. In his opening gloss on section B as a whole, Hegel says: “Something 
and other; at first they are indifferent [gleichgültig] to one another; an other is also an immediate 
existent, a something; the negation thus falls outside both [die Negation fällt so ausser beiden]” 
(90/21.104). And again when beginning sub-section B.a: “Something and other are, first, both existents 
or something. Secondly, each is equally an other. It is indifferent [gleichgültig] which is named first…” 
(90/21.105). Hegel’s point is this: something and other as two independent spheres of self-relation are 
indifferent in that we intend their difference but cannot distinguish them. Something is not its other, 
but at this level of abstraction, something at the same time is itself other, namely, other than its 
other.254   
By way of demonstration, consider two independent self-relating existents, A and B. We can 
start from something A and determine its other as B, but at the same time, that A is the other of B 
itself understood as something: “If of two beings we call the one A and the other B, the B is the one 
which is first determined as other. But the A is just as much the other of B. Both are other in the same 
way” (91/21.105). We can put this same point in terms of the logical content of something and other 
in their immediacy. The description “self-relating existent” holds as much for one as it does the other, 
such something and other are both something and at the same time both other. Each are equally 
identical with one another, such that designating one as something and the other as “other” can only 
be arbitrary (more on arbitrariness in a moment). Hegel’s unitary derivation has arrived at an explicit 
formulation of indifference as the logical incapacity to “tell the difference” between two individuals. 
Or rather, his unitary derivation has isolated that level of abstraction at which indifference as incapacity 
to tell the difference between individuals emerges as a necessary corollary of the conception of 
individuality in play.  
Indifference understood as immediate difference was crucial to our reading of the Being 
chapter above. In treating something and other in the Existence chapter, Hegel takes the opportunity 
to rehearse the distinction between merely intending a difference and articulating or positing a 
 
252 The Opening, 322.  
253 The Opening, 326.  
254 The Opening, 324.  
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difference that we saw characterise the category of becoming. In the Being chapter, the description of 
being in intellectual intuition immediately holds for nothing and vice-versa; their difference is an 
immediate one. We intend or “mean” [meinen] to think pure being and not pure nothing or vice-versa, 
but immediately discover their indifference. In the Existence chapter, one intends [man meint] to 
establish a contrastive relation, to fix this as something in distinction from that other, and so “express 
something completely determinate” [etwas vollkommen Bestimmtes auszudrücken]. But again, this 
intention has as its result indifference: the failure to “tell the difference” between “somethings.”  
Despite this similarity between being/nothing and something/other, however, we are in the 
Existence chapter not beginning from immediacy as such but rather a derived immediacy. Rather than 
the immediate indifference of being and nothing, we have here an indifference mediated by the self-
relating determinacy that has come to characterise existence as existents. This means a kind of 
inversion in the structure of indifference: in Being we immediately think two opposed contents 
alternating in the singular “space” of pure thought; in Existence we think two singulars but with only 
one content available to think in them, with the result that we think them as identical. We have moved 
from one “space” alternating between two opposed contents to two self-enclosed “spaces” whose 
content is the same – that is, self-enclosed existence as such, without further determination. 
Hegel does not explicitly mark the novelty of something/other indifference vis-à-vis 
being/nothing. However, that we are no longer dealing with the singular space of being or of existence 
in general but rather two singulars is I think tacitly indicated by Hegel’s introduction in section B.a of 
the language of externality, i.e. “outside” [ausser] and “apart” [ausserhalb]. I want to follow this 
externality component through in detail not only because it contains the germ of Hegel’s solution to 
indifference, but also because it speaks to the Kantian account of intuitional form.  
Externality is operative in the dialectic of something and other in two related ways: the 
externality of something and other and the externality of the negation that relates them. Firstly, there 
is the externality of something and other that follows from existents understood as self-relating and 
so, as we saw in section A.c above, possessing “being-within-self” [insichsein]. Once there is a within, 
there is a without. The “without” or outside of the something is minimally determined as the site of 
the other: given that the something is its self-relation and attendant being-within-self, the other, as 
that which is not something, cannot coincide with the being-within-self of the something, but must be 
outside it. Rather than being and nothing replacing one another, we have with something and other a 
non-sensible account of the exclusion characteristic of Kant’s incongruent counterparts. With 
something and other thus determined as outside one another, Hegel also elaborates the logic of 
external relation in the following sense. The something is not the other, but there is no content in the 
something that refers or connects to the other or vice-versa. The “not” or negation that contrasts 
something and other is external to both terms – the second sense of externality in play. In the context 
of something and other, the “not” is what we might call an “external connector,” insofar as it is not 
immediately present or apparent in the self-enclosed totalities of something or other. Hegel’s way of 
putting this is to say that “the negation falls outside of both” [die Negation fällt sich ausser beiden]: 
the something is not the other, and the contrastive “not” belongs to the space between them, not to 
either term in its immediacy. The “not” that distinguishes something from other marks their externality 
to one another and is itself external to both. So we have two externalities operative: the outside-one-
another being of the two terms, and the contrastive “not” outside of them both.  
It is this second externality as a logical consequence of the something/other structure that 
introduces the possibility of merely intending a difference as discussed above.  Hegel says that the 
“privileging” of one term over the other – taking something to be something and not other – is only a 
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“subjective designation, that falls outside the something itself” [dies Unterschieden oder Herausheben 
des einen Etwas ein subjektives, ausserhalb des Etwas selbst fallendes Bezeichnen ist] (91/21.105). We 
have seen Hegel repeatedly warning the reader against the importation of “external” contents not 
licensed by the immanent derivation of the Logic itself. Hegel’s point here is subtly different: the 
“subjective designation” that “falls outside” the something is made possible by the logical structure of 
something itself, insofar as something, taken in its immediacy as an independent, self-enclosed 
singular, lacks connection to another in itself. If we conceive the something minimally, i.e. as an 
independent singular existent, then any comparative relation to another must take the form of an 
externally imposed connector.255 Hegel is not licensed to talk of abstracted properties as that “external 
connector” which would distinguish one item from another, e.g. this is hot, that is not. Again rehearsing 
the argument of the Sense-certainty chapter of the Phenomenology, he instead uses the act of giving 
something a proper name – an “individual name” [individuelle Name] of a “singular object” [eines 
einzelnen Gegenstandes]. At an extreme, this act would be insisting that This is the proper name for 
this, not that. In using this example, Hegel repeats “arbitrary” [willkürlich] and its cognates four times. 
To distinguish something in its immediacy from its other is arbitrary in the sense that it is not licensed 
by the logical structure shared by something and other, but must be supplied from without. If 
something and other do not shed their immediacy, if they are not further developed or capable or 
further development – that is, if they are not understood as more than the immediacy of self-relation 
and “being-within-self” – then arbitrariness of distinction would be generalised.  
In the Being chapter, the solution to immediate indifference was to articulate being and 
nothing together: one cannot say being without saying nothing at the same time. Here it is otherness 
that possesses in itself the resources that will enable a determinate account of the relation between 
existents.256 Above I said that something and other in their indifference are both something and both 
other. Indifference in its derived immediacy however has tacitly relied on taking something and other 
as both something, that is, as equally existent. What would open the possibility of non-arbitrary 
connection, then, is thinking through of something and other as both other, i.e. as both not another 
something. Put from the perspective of the second externality in play here, the “not” that distinguishes 
something and other must immediately appear as arbitrary (unlicensed) in the sense that self-relating 
existents appear as self-enclosed singulars, obscuring, as it were, the negation that constitutes the 
possibility of self-relation understood as the negation of the negation. But the other, however, in being 
not something, has negation explicit in it. Non-arbitrary connection between something and other 
must be developed from the side of the other insofar as its being not something contains the “not” 
required for contrastive difference.  
Hegel turns to an emphasis on the logical character of otherness in this way: 
 …even for ordinary thinking [die Vorstellung] every existence equally determines itself as an 
other existence, so that there is no existence that remains determined simply as an existence, 
none which is not outside an existence and therefore is not itself an other (91/21.105). 
Note that the generalisation of otherness reinforces the externality component: all somethings are 
others insofar as they are outside of one another. What however is logically entailed by this picture in 
which all are others? What is to be other? Hegel isolates two moments: “the other, as posited at first, 
 
255 “Another way of putting the point is to say that every something is intrinsically vulnerable to being 
externally compared with another by a third party.” Houlgate, The Opening, 325.  
256 “The other is more explicitly relational and negative since it consists precisely in not-being-something.” The 
Opening, 326. 
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though an other with reference to something [in Beziehung auf das Etwas], is other also for itself apart 
from the something [aber auch für sich ausserhalb desselben]” (91/21.106). The determination of the 
other, put more literally, is first of all to be other than or outside something. That was its immediate 
appearance, and which gave rise to the indifference detailed above. But to be other is also to itself be 
this otherness or outsideness itself, “the other by its own determination” (91/21.106). Hegel 
elaborates on “otherness itself” in this way: “thus the other, taken solely as such, is not the other of 
something, but is the other within, that is, the other of itself [das Andere an ihm selbst, d.i. das Andere 
seiner selbst]” (91/21.106). It is not immediately apparent that the formulations “other within” and 
“other of itself” are equivalent. Hegel unfortunately only spends one more sentence establishing this 
move, before deriving from the latter a logical account of alteration or change: 
The other which is such for itself is the other within it, hence the other of itself and so the 
other of the other – therefore, the absolutely unequal in itself [in sich schlechthin Ungleiche], 
that which negates itself [sich Negierende], alters [Verändernde] itself (92/21.106). 
To be other is to be “other than” something, but also to have this otherness as one’s own 
determination. As we are considering something and other as both other, being “other than” as one’s 
“own determination” can only mean being other than the other that oneself is.257 Hegel’s sudden claim 
for self-difference is perhaps surprising, but is only the unpacking of the indifference which begins 
section B. We began by saying that something in its immediacy is also itself other, insofar as it is the 
other of its other. Something is in this formulation already implicitly the other of itself insofar as it is 
designated a “something” but proves to have the same determination as its other, that is, to be the 
other that opposes it. To make this self-difference explicit we had only to draw out what “otherness 
itself” entailed by taking up the something/other relation from the perspective of otherness or 
externality. 
Hegel makes two quick moves here, which result in a new understanding of the co-presence 
of other-relatedness and self-relation. Firstly, as we have seen in the quote above, Hegel has derived 
the logical necessity of change in abstraction from temporality.  To be something is to be an other and 
this further entails being the other of oneself, becoming other to what one is. Secondly, to alter – to 
become other – is only for the other to reunite with itself insofar as, at this level of abstraction, the 
other that the other becomes has no further determination than otherness itself: 
But [the other] equally remains identical with itself, for that into which it alters is the other; 
and this other has no additional determination; but that which alters itself is not determined 
in any other way than this, to be an other; in going over [geht daher] to this other, it only unites 
with itself [nur mit isch zusammen] (92/21.107). 
This move reinstalls the triadic pattern established in section A in the derivation of something. We saw 
there that reality establishes self-relation through negation; here the self-relation characteristic of 
something is preserved in its alteration. The triad specific to section B is: (1) something proves to be 
 
257 I rely again on Houlgate’s parsing: “… something and other must also be ‘other than…’ in their separate, quite 
unrelated otherness. They must be ‘other-than…’ purely within themselves. Logically, Hegel concludes, this can 
only mean that each is other than itself.” The Opening, 327. The biggest difference in our respective analyses 
here is that I characterise the shift from immediacy to mediation in this context from being both something to 
being both other in order to highlight Hegel’s generalisation of outside-one-another-being at this stage of the 
logical development.   
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the other of its other; (2) as the other of its own designation as something the something proves to be 
becoming other than itself or altering; (3) in altering it reunites with itself, insofar as it becomes only 
another other indistinguishable from it. Note that this third moment of “reuniting” is characterised by 
indifference – the other self-others into another logically indistinguishable other – except that we now 
have developed from the necessity of reference or transition between terms, not immediately 
apparent in something and other understood as independent self-relating existents.  
There is an important similarity here with becoming as the solution to being/nothing 
indifference: to say what being is, we must articulate its inseparability from nothing; to say what 
something is, we cannot simply say “something” because that will prove indistinguishable from its 
other. We instead have to think a something that is “going over” to its other, in the process of becoming 
other. Something and other are no longer self-enclosed spheres, but rather understood as transitions 
into each other. Alteration is, however, determinate in a way that becoming was not: something and 
other do not “vanish” into one another as pure being and pure nothing; something retains the self-
relation that determinate being proved to entail, even as that self-relation is now shown to entail 
other-relatedness. Hegel tries to make the co-presence of relation and self-relation clear in this 
sentence: 
The something preserves itself in its non-being; it is essentially one with it and essentially not 
one with it. It therefore stands in reference to an otherness without being just this otherness 
[Es steht also in Beziehung auf sein Anderssein; es ist nicht rein sein Anderssein] (92/21.106). 
The other stands in a necessary connection to the other it becomes; on account of its own self-relation, 
however, it is not just this otherness. An other alters into an other, but in so doing retains its singularity 
and externality to other others. Indeed, there could be no account of alteration if otherness were not 
understood to entail its own self-relation and “being-within-self” – it is by consideration of the 
independence of the other that alteration is derived.  
Hegel’s way of putting this new understanding of an existent as the co-presence of other-
relation and self-relation is in terms of being-for-other [Sein-für-Anderes] and being-in-itself 
[Ansichsein]. 258  “Being-for-other and being-in-itself constitute the two moments of something” 
(92/21.107). The former names an existent as other than itself; the latter its preservation as an 
existent, i.e. characterised by self-relation. With these formulations, the externality characteristic of 
something and other is not simply abandoned, rather externality is taken to entail relation.  
This sublation of externality is accomplished by shifting other-relatedness inside the logical 
determination of each existent. Hegel compares the something/other pair with being-for-other/being-
in-itself along an external/internal axis:  
 
“There are here two pairs of determinations: (1) something and other; (2) being-for-other and 
being-in-itself. The former contain the non-connectedness of their determinateness 
[Beziehungslosigkeit ihrer Bestimmtheit]; something and other fall apart [fallen auseinander]. 
But their truth is their connection; being-for-other and being-in-itself are therefore the same 
 
258 Not to be confused with the earlier Insichsein, which characterised the interiority or “being-within-self” of 
the something. Ansichsein, as we will see when discussing the category of determination shortly, enables an 
articulation of the quality of an existent manifest through its other-relatedness. Insichsein simply expresses a 
moment of interiority that gives rise to the other as independent and unrelated.   
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determinations posited as moments of one and the same unity… Each [existent] thus contains 
within it, at the same time, also the moment diverse from it” (92/21.107).  
Being-for-other is a necessary moment within an existent, but it appeared immediately as an other 
outside of it. In the indifference that begins section B, the necessity of standing in relation to another 
appears immediately as an external independent existence confronting the something. But this 
independent externality emerged with necessity: once the internality [insichsein] of a self-relating 
something is derived, a self-relation that is not the something necessarily emerges outside it, in line 
with the inseparability of being and nothing established as “first truth” in the Being chapter. All that 
the term “being-for-other” accomplishes is making explicit of the necessary relation between 
something and other, i.e. that to be something necessarily entails otherness, such that part of what it 
is to be something is to “refer” to that other.  As Hegel puts it, “something behaves in this way in 
relation to the other through itself; since otherness is posited in it as its own moment” [Etwas verhält 
sich so aus sich selbst zum Anderen, weil das Anderssein als sein eigenes Moment in him gesetzt ist]” 
(97/21.113). A more accurate and succinct translation of the first clause here would be: “something 
relates itself through its own self to the other.”259 This formula contains – at least for the comparative 
project of this thesis – the key result of the Logic thus far. Namely, that something is in relation with or 
connected to its other is entailed by the structure of the something itself. It is no coincidence that, 
with this result, Hegel announces his version of determination [Bestimmung]. “Determination” for 
Hegel names the quality an existent retains in-itself in the face of its other-relatedness, and that is 
expressed or exhibited in its other-relatedness. Hegel says that determination is “affirmative 
determinateness” – that is, the quality of something – “… by which a something abides in its existence 
while involved with an other that would determine it, by which it preserves itself in its self-equality, 
holding on to it in its being-for-other” (95/21.110-11). 
 
Determination and the System 
Hegel helpfully provides an example to demonstrate this definition of determination. Three levels are 
present in this example. Firstly, Hegel’s example demonstrates the difference between “simple” 
determinateness and determination. Secondly, his example plays on the bivalence, mentioned in this 
dissertation’s introduction, of Bestimmung as both determination and “vocation,” one already 
employed in Fichte’s 1799 The Vocation of Man [Die Bestimmung des Menschen]. Thirdly, in using the 
category of determination to characterise humanity as “rational” and in relation to its other – at first 
“brute animality,” but then “natural and sensuous being” in general – Hegel also tells us something 
about the relation between nature and human mindedness or “spirit” in his system.260 Obviously 
following Fichte, Hegel claims: 
  
 
259 Miller’s translation is preferable to di Giovanni’s. “Something through its own nature relates itself to the 
other.” The Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (Abingdon: Routledge, 1969), 125. 
260 In what follows I follow Terry Pinkard’s deflationary understanding of spirit as “mindedness.” For Pinkard, our 
mindedness as geistige creatures is “non-naturalness,” but this negation does not express “a metaphysical 
difference (as that, say, between spiritual and physical “stuff”) or the exercise of a special form of causality.” 
Rather our rationality emerges as a further development or “complication” of the teleological structure of animal 
life. Pinkard, Hegel’s Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
18, 30. This position I take to be already intimated by the determination of the human being as Hegel puts it at 
this early moment of the Logic: humanity relates to itself as rational through or across the animality that 
constitutes it.  
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The determination of the human being, its vocation, is rational thought [Die Bestimmung des 
Menschen ist die denkende Vernunft]: thinking in general is his simple determinateness; by it 
the human being is distinguished from the brute; he is thinking in himself, in so far as this 
thinking is distinguished also from his being-for-other, from his own natural and sensuous 
being that brings him in immediate association with the other (96/21.112). 
 
At the level of determinateness as such, the rational human is not the “brute.” The human has the 
quality of rationality, while the animal is a way of being that is not rational. This kind of relegation of 
non-human others to the simple negation of rationality is today a subject of critique, but Hegel’s 
category of determination complicates the hierarchical picture somewhat. 261  Determination 
understood as a certain configuration of being-in-itself and being-for-other allows for a more concrete 
elaboration of the relation of two qualitatively distinguished domains, i.e. the rationality of the human 
and “natural and sensuous being.” Humanity is not just one side of a difference; it is not explained 
simply through the negation that contrasts it with its other. Human rationality is also something for 
itself; it possesses a moment of self-identity through self-relation. As we saw in the derivation of the 
category of something above, the self-relation that constitutes the quality of an individual is sustained 
through the moment of otherness within: one can “connect to oneself” only insofar as one’s 
determinacy is the mediation of two distinct moments, i.e. of being and of not-being. As such, 
humanity must relate to itself as the rationality that it is through a moment of not being that rationality. 
Once we move from the indifference of self-relating somethings and others to an account of their 
necessary relation in determination, the determination of the human would mean to have a moment 
of its other within: rationality as the in-itself of the human is distinguished from natural sensuous being 
as humanity’s moment of being-for-other. In Hegel’s example above, it is through this moment of the 
other within that the human comes to exhibit the quality of thinking in its dealing with the natural 
world. Sensuous nature as our moment of being-for-other puts us into necessary relation with the 
sensuous nature “outside us.” Determination then is “vocation” in the sense that we bring thinking 
reason to nature, both epistemically and practically.262  
Determination is not simply the “not” of determinateness. Determination grasps the other as 
a moment of the quality of an existent, while still granting that otherness an existence of its own. 
Determination thus thinks two terms together, accounting for both the necessity of their relation and 
their separateness. This is not to say that an explanation of human rational thinking is provided by the 
 
261 If one finds that it does not complicate the picture enough, one can always read what follows as a merely 
formal illustration of the structure of determination.  
262 In keeping with Hegel’s appropriation of Fichte’s thought here, thinking in its relation to that which is not 
thinking is characterised by the ought. We ought to submit nature to reason: both epistemically, by making 
natural processes transparent to us, and practically, by effective control over these processes. This sense of die 
Bestimmung des Menschens as an imperious striving is put most forcefully in Fichte’s Vocation of the Scholar, 
trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). Hegel’s however predictably mounts a critical appropriation, 
shifting almost immediately to a critique of Fichte’s (and in Hegel’s view, Kant’s) one-sided emphasis on the 
ought. The ought for Hegel is reducible to two equally-valid formulae: “You can because you ought” and “You 
cannot, even though you ought” (SL 105/21.121) The ought, in other words, reduces determination to 
determinateness, to a simple opposition between rationality and the recalcitrant nature that will always oppose 
it; as a logic of mere determinateness, recognition that the opposed poles already contain a moment of their 
other is not available. This is not to say, of course, that the ought has no validity – it is characteristic of the 
practical – but Hegel’s reconciliation of the practical and epistemic stances is not fully articulated until the last 
chapter of the Logic.  
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category of determination alone – far from it – just that it provides a more adequate explanatory 
framework than determinateness.263   
In the above account, that determination grants otherness an existence of its own is not 
elucidated: what is developed in Hegel’s Bestimmung des Menschen passage is determination on the 
side of being, of humanity with the affirmative quality of rationality, not the sensuous nature 
determinate by its lack. Developing the determination of nature from its determinateness as that-
which-rationality-is-not suggests something important about the relation between indifference and 
determination as it plays out in Hegel’s distinction between the philosophies of nature and spirit. That 
is, the being-for-other of the human that relates us to natural being is being-for-other in the most 
general possible sense: nature in its immediacy as “physical” (i.e. non-organic) for Hegel just is 
generalised otherness, so our being-for-other is really being-for-otherness-in-general. Indicatively, at 
the point of generalised “outside-one-another-being” discussed above – i.e. at the moment when 
something and other are both conceived as others of each other – Hegel explicitly raises “physical 
nature” as space, time, and matter: 
Thus the other, taken solely as such, is not the other of something, but is the other within, that 
is, the other of itself. – Such an other, which is the other by its own determination, is physical 
nature; nature is the other of spirit; this, its determination, is at first a mere relativity 
expressing not a quality of nature itself but only a reference external to it… taken for itself the 
quality of nature is just this, to be the other within, that which-exists-outside-itself [Ausser-
sich-Seiende] (in the determinations of space, time, matter) (91-92/21.106).  
Although the two are not explicitly linked by Hegel, this paragraph is the other side of “the 
determination of the human being” passage discussed above, allowing us to step through the levels of 
determinateness and determination for the non-rationality opposed to humanity. At the level of simple 
determinateness – a “mere relativity” lacking the moment of self-relation – physical nature is not 
human mindedness or the “spiritual.” Once we move to the more concrete account of relation 
expressed by the being-for-other/being-in-itself distinction, however, the being-in-itself of nature, 
what it is within itself, is generalised externality, the indifference of each other to its other that begins 
Hegel’s account of space and time in the Realphilosophie. Indifference is the determination of physical 
nature in the Logic’s sense: it “abides” in its indifference in face of the other, i.e. to the thinking reason 
that characterises spirit. Indifference and externality – which will be fully developed by Hegel in the 
“Quantity” section of the Seinslogik – is the concept of physical nature, a distinct moment within the 
conceptuality articulated in the Logic as a whole (“The Concept”). When we as rational agents 
encounter physical nature, we encounter the indifference of its objects in their external relation to one 
another (and for Hegel, per 3.2 above, our mindedness does such objects the “honour” of representing 
them in the external relations proper to them). However, if indifference is the being-in-itself of nature, 
its moment of being-for-other, then, must contain a reference to it other. There must then be a 
moment within “physical nature” that is not the generalised externality of its being-within-self, but 
rather is for thinking reason.  
 
263 The next stages of the Logic’s development – the logic of infinity and its immediacy in the category of being-
for-itself that begins Chapter 3 – provides a more thoroughgoing account the self-relation characteristic of 
human mindedness. Hegel says being-for-itself intimates self-consciousness (127/21.145). Per Kreines and 
Ciavatta, a complete explanation would demand the teleological resources developed in the Logic’s third book. 
See note 136 above.  
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This might raise the spectre of the “spirit monist” reading of Hegel, an emergence story in 
which a “divine mind” inhabits and directs nature towards mindedness.264 The logical derivation of 
determination outlined above means that it need not, however. Generalised otherness, we have seen, 
contains within it a moment of relationality: individuals other to one another are individuated in and 
through their externality. Relationality can be taken, with Kant, as the distinguishing mark of our 
cognition (recall that, for Kant, conceptuality is distinguished from intuitional representation by 
synthesis, and that our consciousness is characterised as “a whole of compared and connected 
representations”). In logically demonstrating that indifference resolves itself into determination, Hegel 
demonstrates that the generalised externality of physical nature has within itself a moment of the 
relationality that characterises its other, “thinking reason.” That physical nature has as part of its own 
determination a moment of “being-for-thought” is not a “spirit monist” claim, but simply a logical one 
about the structure of indifference itself. 265  Were nature to be indifference in itself without any 
moment of the relationality characteristic of thought, it would be unthinkable.  
This point is made in a cognitive register in Kant’s argument for the impossibility of a “blooming 
buzz” of unsynthesised empirical intuitions. Indifference without synthesis issues in no determinacy. 
But insofar as synthesis is in Kant’s account dependent upon our conceptual capacities, Kant leaves 
open the possibility that natural objects really are entirely indifferent in themselves. As I noted in 2.1, 
Kant – at least on the deflationist reading – makes no substantial realist claims, and Hegel (per 3.1) 
goes too far whenever he suggests that Kant is committed to an in-itself radically indeterminate reality 
(the “formless lump” view). The Kantian cognitive framework only leaves that possibility open, as 
merely thinkable. But, as also noted in 3.1, Houlgate has argued that Hegel’s logic of determination 
nonetheless articulates a critique of Kant’s things-in-themselves not as ontologically substantial, but 
as “things of thought.” We are now in a better position to appreciate the force of this critique. In the 
“Existence” chapter, Hegel has elaborated the structure of the something as necessarily entailing 
relation to another: in order for a something to be distinguished from its other, that something must 
be understood as necessarily in relation to otherness. The determination of something, in other words, 
entails the co-presence of the logical components of being-in-itself and being-for-other. Kant suggests 
that the in-itself of something in abstraction from its being-for-other may be determinate.266 That is, 
we can think such a possibility because it satisfies the logical criterion of non-contradiction, though 
are constitutively unable to know whether or not it really obtains. Hegel in contrast argues that such 
a thought is itself incoherent: the self-relation that constitutes the logical structure of something in 
abstraction from its relation to otherness issues in the indifference of something and other; this 
indifference undermines or undoes the presumed individuality of the something that we are 
 
264 As I footnoted in introduction, Charles Taylor reads Hegel as committed to a cosmologically inflated super-
subject in Hegel (1975). Regarding emergence, Gregory Moss, for example, claims that the Logic tells the story 
of God’s awakening from his dormancy in Nature. Gregory S. Moss, “Hegel’s Free Mechanism: The Resurrection 
of the Concept,” International Philosophical Quarterly 53, no. 1 (2013): 73-85. I have some sympathy for this 
picture, but it is a picture – it belongs in Hegel’s thinking to the “picture-thinking” characteristic of religion, not 
to the rationality of the philosophical domain.  
265 One can unpack the significance of Hegel’s reference to physical nature within the Logic without immediate 
reliance on the Hegelian assertion that “nature is self-alienated spirit.” Carlson, A Commentary to Hegel’s Science 
of Logic (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 72. In principle, I think that the categories of the Logic should be 
used to explicate the logical basis for bold claims of this kind in Hegel, not such claims the Logic.  
266 Kant produces the idea of things-in-themselves by abstraction from two forms of being-for-other: being-for-
our-mindedness and being-for-other-somethings. The former is emphasised by Houlgate in The Opening, 338-
345; the latter by Franks, All or Nothing, 30-36.    
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immediately presented with. Or, to put this in Conant’s language, it turns out that we are not entitled 
to individual somethings unless the relational conditions of individuation are also committed to.  
The Logic, of course, does not stop with Hegel’s account of human rationality in terms of 
determination. Determination gives rise to the category of “Constitution” [Beschaffenheit]. 
Constitution reverses the direction of constitutive being-for-other, articulating the vulnerability of an 
existent to become other than what it is in itself through the moment of its other-relatedness. To use 
again the “thinking reason” example above, our other-relatedness connects us to the brute, but also 
entails the possibility that our reason is overrun by brutishness, that we alter into a self-relating 
something not characterised by the quality of thought, but by its other or negation. The framework of 
determination, although minimal, dovetails with common sense: in ordinary human interpersonal 
relationships, one can be oneself in one’s relation to the other, or one can have oneself altered in 
relation to the other. As such, determination and constitution can be seen as accounts of relational 
individuation that unpack and relate the content of both sides of that formulation: determination is 
the minimal logical structure of an individual in relation; constitution that of an individual in relation.  
The external opposition between something and other has developed into the opposition 
between being-in-itself and being-for-other characteristic of each something, and again into 
determination and constitution as two opposed ways in which being-in-itself and being-for-other can 
be arranged. The determination/constitution opposition will itself be taken together or mediated by 
the category of limit, which marks first the reciprocity of influence between existents, but further 
entails their necessary end or finitude. However, I will stop the logical progression here in order to 
make some broader claims about Kant and Hegel’s alternative derivations and conceptions of 
determination.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has analysed Kant and Hegel’s respective accounts of determination. I have argued that 
these accounts respond to different forms of indifferent indeterminacy. We can summarise this 
analysis in three stages: Kant’s critique of rationalist indifference, which issues in an account of 
determinacy as the togetherness of concept and intuition as distinct representational forms; Hegel’s 
critique of Kantianism as partially remaining within an empiricist epistemic frame that opposes in 
themselves indifferent sensibly-given objects to our conceptualisation of them; and Hegel’s attempt 
to ontologically generalise the togetherness principle as constitutive of determinacy in general.  
Kant diagnoses existential indifference in rationalism’s understanding of determination as 
logical predication: on the criterion of non-contradiction alone, one could always find oneself speaking 
of nothing rather than something, and unable to tell the difference. Kant develops the 
concept/intuition model of determination in order to redress this problem: the togetherness of 
concept and intuition guarantees that logical determination has objective purport, i.e. constitutes 
cognition of an empirically real object. The first limb of Kant’s togetherness principle, “thoughts 
without content are empty,” then, addresses the always possible indeterminacy of rationalist logicism 
in its failure to articulate an independent intuitional form of representation as a condition of 
determinate cognition.  
But from the Hegelian perspective, if Kant is successful against rationalist indifference, the 
concept/intuition distinction in its independent articulation of sensible and conceptual forms 
maintains another form of indifference, this time traceable to empiricism. On the conceptualist 
reading of Kant followed in this thesis, intuitions are understood to provide externally relationally 
individuated objects to cognition, but in their immediacy – that is, without conceptual mediation – 
intuitions so understood are indifferent to one another in the sense that they cannot be qualitatively 
discriminated. Hence, for Hegel, the second limb of the togetherness principle, that “intuitions without 
concepts are blind,” generalises the external relationality characteristic of intuitional form to the 
concept/intuition framework as a whole, tacitly repeating the empiricist view in which conceptual 
form must be applied or “projected” onto an independent sensible manifold in itself lacking the 
relationality that characterises our conceptual capacities.  
Hegel nonetheless takes Kant’s concept/intuition distinction to be an instance of the “idealist” 
principle in which opposed poles taken in “isolation” from one another issue in no determinacy (FK 
68/302-303). What is required for Hegel, then, is not a retreat from or abstract “overcoming” of Kant’s 
concept/intuition model, but a generalisation of that model such that determinacy in general – of 
thought as much as of being – is characterised by the togetherness of the logical components of 
concept and intuition.  
Hegel’s program begins by critically re-deploying post-Kantian doctrines of Intellectual 
Intuition in order to alter the Kantian account of categorial purport as concerning the applicability of 
concepts to sensible appearance. Kant’s discursivity thesis – that thought can only think, can only 
mediate representations given from sensibility – does not account for thought’s own immediate, 
singular being. For Hegel, insofar as thought possesses immediate being, it is able to determine the 
logical structures of determinacy as such without reference to sensible intuition, and without 
constitutive reference to the forms of judgment.  
In the first chapter of the Doctrine of Being, Hegel demonstrates the necessary togetherness 
of the logical components of concept and intuition. The thought of pure being in abstraction from all 
determinacy of itself immediately generates necessity of relation to what it is not, i.e. the necessity of 
mediation. The distinguishability of being and nothing within the singular “space” of thought is 
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dependent upon an articulation of their necessary togetherness in the category of becoming. 
Undertaken as it is at a maximally conceivable level of abstraction, Hegel takes himself to have 
demonstrated togetherness or the “inseparability of the two” with utmost generality, the “first truth” 
of the Logic’s unitary derivation as “foundation” [Grund] and “element of all that follows” (62/21.72).  
In the second chapter of the Seinslogik, Hegel takes up becoming in its immediacy in order to 
derive the logical structure of relational individuation as constitutive of qualitative determination. That 
is, the Existence chapter articulates the relational individuation characteristic of intuitional form and 
the categories of quality – in Kant separately derived in the Aesthetic and the Metaphysical Deduction 
– in one derivation. For Hegel, the categories of “reality” and “negation” that Kant derives from the 
categorical judgment and its negation in fact articulate the minimal determinacy that issues from the 
necessary togetherness or immediate mediation of being and nothing in becoming. This self-relation 
that emerges from the presence of negation in reality and vice-versa issues in the category of 
“something,” enabling Hegel to provide a logical account of the structure of the minimal object of 
thought in Kantian idealism. The “something” in Kant is individuated by its being placed and ordered 
outside of other such somethings in the forms of our sensibility, but a contribution of conceptuality is 
required in order for such somethings to be distinguished from one another. In Hegel, the necessary 
togetherness of these two moments for qualitative determination to obtain is built-in to the structure 
of something. Something in its immediacy is indifferent or indistinguishable from its others, and this 
immediate indifference is a logical corollary of the externality of their relation. That something, 
however, logically entails reference to otherness; in distinguishing something and other, we render 
explicit the form of relationality individuation determinative of something in its immediacy, rather than 
bring an independent conceptual function to relational individuation.  
 In relation to current scholarship in German Idealism, this analysis makes four contributions, 
all of which are susceptible to further treatment in independent papers. 
1. It draws attention to the centrality of Kant’s A Deduction account of the syntheses of 
apprehension and reproduction for the opening moves of Hegel’s Logic. Hegelian 
conceptuality is minimally the grasping together of discrete moments in order that they be 
distinguished. After Pippin’s Hegel’s Idealism, such a reading is not contentious, though I 
follow Houlgate in suggesting that the Logic’s post-Kantian account of synthesis is bound up 
with an ontological commitment.  
2. My account provides one line of answer to the Kantian argument that Hegel does not treat 
Kantian intuitional form, and thus undoes Kant’s critique of rationalism. Rather, Hegel is 
attentive to the specificity of intuitional form, and indeed his critique of Kant’s account of the 
concept/intuition distinction is that Kant illegitimately models the relation between concepts 
and intuitions on the external relationality specific to intuitions. Furthermore, Hegel’s 
appropriation of Fichte’s post-Kantian unitary derivation program seeks to derive and so 
rationally legitimate intuitional form as a way of being in general, not just our so-constituted 
sensibility. How this kind of conceptualism – with intuitional form “nested” as a semi-
autonomous moment with conceptuality as such – distinguishes itself from rationalism 
requires further treatment. 
3. It acknowledges the continued relevance of the post-Kantian doctrine of Intellectual Intuition 
for Hegel’s mature project, denied in Pippin, Westphal, and Longuenesse. Globally, without a 
challenge to the discursivity thesis, the Logic could neither begin nor progress, insofar as each 
category derivation begins from the previous category itself taken in its immediacy. More 
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locally, failure to read the Logic as conducted within intellectual intuition obscures the 
correspondence between Kant’s account of incongruent counterparts and Hegel’s dialectic of 
Being.  
4. It allows us to nuance James Conant’s otherwise convincing account of Kant’s first Critique as 
“dialectical.” I will spend a little time on this fourth point here, because it helps to differentiate 
the Kant and Hegel’s respective understandings of “togetherness.”  
 
Putting the Kant-Hegel comparison as broadly as possible, what is methodologically at stake 
in Kant’s and Hegel’s respective accounts of togetherness is whether one starts from two only 
seemingly independent terms, or one generates opposed terms and their necessary relation from one 
immediately given term. I agree with Conant that the desideratum of the Aesthetic and Analytic – 
when read together – is the “togetherness principle,” not a layer-cake interpretation (pushed to its 
extreme in Kantian nonconceptualism). But against Conant, I do not think there’s a way of reading 
Kant’s text that makes the question unaskable: the “layer-cake” conception is built into the Critique’s 
two-stage argument, and Kant’s “dialectical” undermining of that conception takes exegetical work to 
uncover. 
I say “dialectical” because Conant’s understanding of “dialectic” does not catch the specific 
Hegelian sense that interests us in accounting for the togetherness of mediation and immediacy as it 
emerges in the Logic from immediacy itself. Conant takes the word to mean a structure in which two 
elements have necessary reference to one another, such that taking either element in abstraction from 
that structure cannot account for that element’s conditions of possibility.  Now, dialectic does have 
this function in Hegel: “representation” in the Vorbegriff sense, insofar as it follows “the sensory” in 
presenting elements in “isolation” from one another, takes such discrete elements as primary and then 
attempts to account for the relation that in fact individuates them. We might call the corrective to this 
error a critical dialectic: showing how two things which are taken to be separate (say, concepts and 
intuitions) in fact mutually condition one another. The Phenomenology often functions this way: the 
master takes himself to be independent, but has abstracted from the relation that conditions the 
possibility of there being “masters” at all (i.e. that there are slaves constituted in a certain way, and so 
constituted because of their relation to mastery). Or, Sense-certainty takes the “This” to be to the most 
certain knowledge, but has abstracted from the relational individuation that conditions the possibility 
of there being immediate items for sense in the first place. The Phenomenology takes up dialectic in 
this way because it begins from sensuous immediacy, which is structured by externality, such that 
terms appear in their immediacy without the relation that in fact determines them. While I would 
need to elaborate this claim in a treatment of the Phenomenology, the Kantian analogue is nonetheless 
clear: intuitions in their singular immediacy appear without the relations that individuate and 
distinguish them being immediately cognised. 
Dialectic in the Logic, however, comes at necessary relations from the other direction. It is not 
critical of an opposition between two terms (truth and certainty, master and slave) that counts as given 
in a particular domain of experience. It rather seeks to prove the necessity of the relation between 
opposed terms by generating the opposition itself. Dialectic in Hegel’s Logic means that something, 
simply in being what it is, turns out to be the other of what it was immediately taken to be. So the 
Logic’s dialectical argument for the mediation-immediacy relation is not that we reconstruct their 
forms independently in abstraction from one another and then demonstrate the necessity of their 
relation. It is rather that their necessary relation is proven insofar as thinking one term genetically gives 
rise to the second. So, again, in the Logic “dialectic” means that we start with one term in its immediacy 
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and, simply by thinking that one term through, we get its negation (and then a third term as articulating 
the necessity of their relation); in Conant’s understanding it means the mutual conditioning of a given 
two.   
 I want to finish by addressing two key omissions, which I also hope to redress in further 
research. The account summarised above truncates both the Critique and the Logic, excluding or 
underplaying concepts I now see to be crucial for Kant and Hegel’s respective understandings of 
determination. Including those moments may well alter the tenor of my analysis on some points.   
Firstly, I do not treat Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic. It would be possible to treat Kant’s 
argumentative strategy there, from a Hegelian point of view, as a sustained abrogation of the 
generalised togetherness characteristic of idealism as such. As Hegel puts it in the “Quantity” chapter, 
“the Kantian antinomies contain nothing more that the wholly simple categorical assertion of each of 
the two opposed moments of a determination, each on its own, isolated from the other” (158/21.181) 
The continuity between Hegel’s thinking here and the crucial Faith and Knowledge passage addressed 
in 3.1 is obvious. 
The centrality of the Kantian dialectic was brought to my attention by two texts read after the 
central contentions and analyses of this thesis were framed and underway. Paul Franks in All or Nothing 
is able to economically present post-Kantianism’s central motivations by foregrounding Jacobi’s 
Spinozist reading of Kant’s Aesthetic, that is, in terms of the difference between Spinoza’s 
understanding of determination as limitations of a real ground of being and Kant’s account of limitation 
as individuating spatio-temporal appearance. Now, Kant’s treats the possibility of a real ground of 
being in the Transcendental Ideal section of the Transcendental Dialectic by suggesting that 
thoroughgoing determination – the complete determination of an object by selecting one from every 
pair of possible predicates – leads reason to presuppose a “sum total of reality” (totum realitatis) as a 
pool of all possible predicate pairs, further hypostatised as a being containing all affirmative 
determinations (ens realissimum, the most real being).267 It is in this context that Kant’s third sense of 
Intellectual Intuition – immediate apprehension of totality as the real ground of being, discussed in 
§§76-77 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment – must be interpreted. Most importantly for the 
Kant-Hegel comparison, this third sense directly links to the account of relational individuation in 
Hegel’s Doctrine of Being in a way that Intellectual Intuition as it is framed by Fichte does not. That is, 
Intellectual Intuition as providing an indubitably certain Grundsatz à la Fichte is important for Hegel, 
but my emphasis on it in the above is one-sided and so misleading. Hegel’s claim in the Phenomenology 
that “the whole is the true” is well known; in the case of the Logic, this claim means that on Hegel’s 
version the foundational principle of a unitary category derivation is only the “poorest” truth, i.e. truth 
in its immediacy. “Being, pure being” counts as true only when it is fully developed into a whole of 
compared and connected necessary representations, i.e. the totality of conceptual forms that 
comprise the Logic (The Concept). Comparing Kant’s understanding of the totum realitatis as a 
predicate pool presupposed by any empirical determination and Hegel’s Concept as itself a condition 
of any determinacy would I now think give a better picture of the core of the Kant-Hegel relation, 
rather than proceeding through the question of sensibility.  
 
267 This already complicated material is further complicated by its status as an autocritique: Kant deflates his pre-
Critical argument for the existence of God (The Only Possible Proof in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence 
of God, 1763) by arguing that reason is led to this idea by its attempt to provide complete determinations, but 
that such an idea constitutes only a reification of the activity of determination. See Allison, Transcendental 
Idealism, 397-400. 
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On this point, James Kreines in Reason in the World has convincingly argued against what he 
calls “epistemology-first” readings of the Kant-Hegel relation, instead suggesting that it is Hegel’s 
appropriation of the Transcendental Dialectic that constitutes the singularity of the Hegelian system. 
In Kreines’ view, Hegel’s response to Kant is not or not primarily to characterise Kant’s “Copernican” 
turn to our cognitive conditions as leaving things-in-themselves indeterminate and then either: (a) “to 
give an anti-Kantian answer to the Copernican question”; (b) “to borrow and extend Kant’s answer”; 
or (c) “to somehow combine both answers.” 268 My approach clearly attempts (c): Hegel extends 
Kantian togetherness only by shedding the Copernican frame in which our cognition is determinative, 
instead advancing a realism in which conceptuality is operative in being and in thought. From Kreines’ 
perspective, my criticisms of McDowell and Sedgwick in 3.1 would essentially amount to the claim that 
they attempt (b) without properly providing (a). Kreines’ position instead suggests that Hegel’s project 
is not best understood as an immediate contestation of the relation of the faculties of understanding 
and sensibility, but rather as a critical appropriation of Kant’s account of the faculty of reason as 
necessarily pursuing the “unconditioned” or, in Kreines’ reformulation, “completeness of 
explanation.269 This approach dovetails with that of Franks, and Franks indicatively approaches post-
Kantian idealism through a similar framework, as motivated by the challenge of negotiating 
explanatory arbitrariness, regress, and circularity (the “Agrippan Trilemma”).270 Approaching the Kant-
Hegel relation from their respective accounts of completeness of explanation and totality would better 
draw the project of the Logic as a whole into view, rather than my above focus on Hegel’s account of 
only the most immediate forms of objectivity. The shift to a vocabulary of explanation has the benefit 
of side-stepping the perhaps unresolvable – and perhaps uninteresting – question of ontological 
categorial purport. 
The idea of the whole of the Logic leads me to problems raised by my focus on only its opening 
categories. If the general lineaments of the above story were to be substantiated, at least three further 
moments of the Logic would need to be considered: the Seinslogik’s second section (“Quantity”); the 
dialectic of mechanism that references it in the second section of the Begriffslogik; and the derivation 
of the object from the syllogism in the first section of the Begriffslogik that mechanism presupposes. 
Quantitative determination for Hegel follows from the derivation of many self-relating individuals in 
the third chapter of the “Quality” section (“Being-for-self”). Quantity is a model of determination 
characterised by “continuity” and “discreteness” of self-relating ones indifferent to any qualitative 
distinction between them: each one is outside every other one (and is therefore a discrete unit); each 
one is qualitatively identical to every other (and is therefore continuous with it) (154/21.176). This 
picture of continuity and discreteness is picked up in the Begriffslogik, in which a mechanistic model 
of determination collapses into indifference insofar as every mechanical object is to be explained by 
reference to another such object, and so on. Hegel’s claim is that with the resources of mechanism 
alone we either terminate explanation arbitrarily or offer an infinitely regressive one (633/12.135). 
Hegel’s solution, which corresponds closely to the emergence of qualitative determination from the 
indifference of something and other in the “Existence” chapter and with the emergence of “Measure” 
as the dialectical unity of quantity and quality in the third section of the Seinslogik, is that each 
mechanical object must be understood to have in its concept a necessary relation to its others. In the 
Mechanism chapter, this relation is the logical form of gravitational relation: each mechanical object 
 
268 Reason in the World, 16.  
269 Reason in the World, 17-18.  
270 All or Nothing, 18.  
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is determinate only with reference to the “central body” [Zentralkörper] (12.143/641). Now, while this 
raises the problem of how Newtonian physics finds its way into an a priori category derivation,271 it 
does help us bring the abstract derivation of determination in the Seinslogik into more direct relation 
with contemporary questions of scientific and liberal naturalism, a project I have begun in two 2017 
conference papers. 272  Insofar as the mechanical object is for Hegel the most immediate form of 
objectivity, this line of thinking also brings into view Hegel’s derivation of the object as such in the 
“Syllogism” chapter of the first section of the Begriffslogik (“Subjectivity”). Given that the 
“Subjectivity” section treats the relation between the singular (or the individual [Das Einzelne]) and 
universality and their mediation in particularity, and then derives the mechanical object as the 
immediacy of the most integrated – most fully mediated – form of singularity/particularity/universality 
relation (the disjunctive syllogism), a complete comparative reading of the logical components of 
Kant’s concept/intuition distinction in Hegel’s Logic would need to consider the Doctrine of the 
Concept.273  
Nonetheless, one cannot reproduce the entirety of the Critique and the Logic; one has to 
decide on an interpretive frame and see what it catches – and what it misses. I am confident that the 
account of the Kant-Hegel relation presented in this thesis is accurate and robust enough to be 
integrated into, rather than overturned by, future treatments of the concept of determination in Kant’s 
and Hegel’s respective oeuvres.  
  
 
271 Nathan Ross addresses this question and the history of its debate in On Mechanism in Hegel’s Social and 
Political Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2008), 62-68. See also John Burbidge, Real Process: How Logic and 
Chemistry Combine in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996). 
272 Gene Flenady, “Normativity in Nature,” German Classical Philosophy and Naturalism, Georgetown University, 
Washington D.C., 14-16 December 2017 and “Striving toward the Centre: Determinism, Indifference, and Nor-
mativity in Hegel’s Mechanism,” Kausalität bei Hegel, LMU Munich, 20-21 May 2017.  My understanding of sci-
entific naturalism as committed to the reductive or eliminativist claim that the world consists of nothing but the 
entities to which mechanistic explanation commit us is drawn from the editors’ introduction to Naturalism and 
Normativity, ed. Mario de Caro and David Macarthur (New York: Columbia UP, 2010), 72.  
273 Stern’s Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object motivates the Hegelian account of objectivity by drawing 
attention to the indifference of intuitions in abstraction from conceptual synthesis, a line I broadly follow (see 
3.2 above). Stern then treats Hegel’s Begriffslogik as providing an account of determination not reducible to the 
subsumption of individuals under more general concepts; objects are rather determinate on account of their 
own immanent conceptuality as instances of a “substance-kind.” The above dissertation can be read as filling in 
a gap between Stern’s account of Kant’s bundle theory and Hegel’s account of universality in Begriffslogik, but 
the precise relation between Hegelian immanent conceptuality advanced in Stern’s “substance kinds” (and 
Kreines’ “concept thesis”) and the account of qualitative determination as relational individuation advanced here 
would need to be worked out.  
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